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ABSTRACT 
Business incubators have proved to be effective tools for tackling unemployment. 
diversifying economies and creating wealth in numerous developed countries. By providing 
timely help and support to new ventures, business incubators hold the potential to create and 
develop entrepreneurial talent at the micro level and foster an environment for 
entrepreneurship at the macro level. Business incubation programmes represent a popular 
approach that many countries have used to assist new business start-ups. Saudi Arabia has 
struggled with unfavourable demographic tendencies with a dynamic population growth and 
registers a high level of unemployment, notably among students (33% of graduates) and low-
skilled manpower. Also, the local economy, that has long been dependent upon the traditional 
"transformation industries" needs to be diversified and modernised in order to face the ever-
growing fierce international and regional competition. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
constitute the majority of the Saudi business (in terms of the number of firms), yet a minority 
in terms of revenue. SMEs and enterprising university graduates are believed to be the motors 
of developing economies. A business incubation programme in theory is fit in dealing with 
obstacles facing SMEs and young entrepreneurs. 
The research attempts to determine whether the economic conditions for business 
incubation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are favourable to a programme of business 
incubation, and to suggest directions on the best ways to implement business incubation in the 
Kingdom. To meet this objective the study undertook a three -stage approach whereby each 
stage contributes to the next. The first stage was two focus groups interviews with Saudi 
experts, the second a series of three questionnaire surveys and the third was a case study of 
the first Saudi business incubator. 
The findings of the research indicate a relatively low level of practical business skills 
and business experience exhibited by Saudi graduates and the weak relationship between 
academia and the private sector. The links between education and business were also shown 
to be lacking. From the results it would seem that, any Saudi incubator programme would 
need to take into account these deficiencies. Poor links between academia and business 
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deprives business of the expertise and research knowledge. Furthermore, the findings showed 
the lack of primary tools that could enable small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to grow and 
develop. These include lack of funds and credit options, and poor networking. Thus. 
incubators could have the potential to provide an improvement to the Saudi SMEs. The 
research shows that numerous business incubation criteria are met in Saudi Arabia and that 
the Jeddah Business Incubator has been a success. However, important shortfalls are 
identified, e.g. the unsatisfactory university-business cooperation, deficiencies in the 
curriculum and the lack of knowledge of the support for SMEs that could be obtained in 
Saudi Arabia. Most of the findings of this study are consistent with the previous body of 
research in this subject. Based on the study results, it is proposed that; more effort should be 
exerted on softer services such as networking; academics business links (closer interactions 
between academic research and industry) relative to the provision of physical space and hard 
infrastructure. In addition, there should be a clear focus on economic and business 
development goals, continuing relationships with external funding agencies will also be 
required. Incubators will need to be a source of direct funding for tenants firms. Furthermore, 
the business incubator has to market itself, and has to use the media in order to create an 
attractive images of it self. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A business incubator is a place where business professionals are offered an organized 
resource rich environment and support services dedicated to start-ups, to strengthen their 
development. These structures, which emerged during the 1970s in the US and Europe. have 
propagated amoebically throughout the whole world, to the extent that they can now be 
counted in thousands. In its most literal sense, a business incubator is a building that houses 
tenant companies that are in their initial phases. However, a business incubator is more than 
just a building. Their goal is to assist in the development of new entrepreneurial 
organisations. By doing this, business incubators are able to help these new companies 
survive and grow during a period in which they are most at risk for failure. The overall goal 
of any business incubator is to produce companies that are "successful." More specifically, 
the goal is for these companies to be able to "graduate" or leave the incubator in a financially 
stable state and be able to operate on their own upon graduation. Incubators are seen as a 
policy mechanism that enhances business development (Hannon and Chplin, 2001 a, b) 
particularly for start-up businesses, including those linked to universities (Jones-Evans and 
Klofsten, 1997). As a broad approach to enterprise development, incubators are generally 
considered as a positive and effective means of public intervention. Businesses generally 
report satisfaction from services and increases in turnover higher than non-incubated 
businesses (Nahavandi and Chesteen, 1988). 
Business incubators are viewed by many governments as dynamic tools for fostering 
new ventures with the macro objective of economic development and job creation. The major 
role of Business Incubators is to help entrepreneurs start or expand their business by 
providing various functions in a supportive environment. Such functions are composed of 
hard and soft services that provide physical space, utilities, facilities, equipment, shared 
services, business and legal advice, and financial inputs - to facilitate their creation and assist 
them until "graduation", when they have the capacity to "survive" in a competitive 
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environment. These functions can remedy the disadvantages that the Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) encounter by providing numerous business support services and fostering 
technological innovation and industrial renewal (Simi lor and Gill, 1986; Mian, 1994a, 1994b, 
1997). Incubators are also important for universities to set links with the commercial world 
that enables commercialization of research and transfer of technology (Phillips, 2002). They 
can be viewed as a mechanism for new venture creation and technological entrepreneurship 
(Mian, 1994a, 1996, 1997); an initiative to deal with market failures relating to knowledge 
and other inputs of innovative process (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002); and a mechanism to 
support Regional development (Allen and Levine, 1986; Mian, 1997). For such goals and 
reasons, many countries have increasingly been engaged in establishing incubators. 
Business incubation programmes represent a popular approach many communities have 
used to assist new business start-ups. The objectives of the incubators must be considered fully in 
evaluating their "success." If the objective is to create and graduate new companies with a higher 
probability of success than a non-incubator start-up, then graduation and long-term survival rates 
are the criteria to use. On the other hand, if the objective of an incubator is to earn a return as an 
entity in its own right, then graduation of successful firms would not be a suitable criterion of 
success. Ellen and McCluskey, (1990) found that the majority of incubators surveyed reported 
some degree of success in achieving their objectives. Doescher, (1988) claims that about 80 
percent of incubator graduates survive, while in the general economy only about 20 percent of 
new firms do; the 1991 United State's national business incubation association (NBIA)l survey 
found a failure rate of 16 percent (Lichtenstein, 1992). Finally, there is a growing quantity of 
"hard" data supporting incubator successes. 
Success of incubators depends on several factors, and many lessons have been learned 
so far. Many of them can be applied to developing countries. Some aspects, however, require 
specific attention, depending on the status of the private sector development in each country. 
I The National Business Incubator Association (NBIA) is the leading organization promoting and supporting business incubation 
in the United States - 'it provides thousands of professionals with the information, education, advocacy and networking 
resources to bring excellence to the process of assisting early-state companies' (NBIA, 2000) 
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There is no single formula for creating a successful business incubator. but several 
elements are keys to success, namely: dynamic incubator management. Good incubators 
require an effective administrator who organizes support services well, and who in 
many cases plays a key role in the selection of tenants. Another element that is key to a 
successful incubator is access to business services and business assistance at the 
incubator site. A true business incubator provides shared office support and 
management consulting services. Shared office support typically involves access to a 
copier, secretarial services, FAX machine, telephones and receptionist services with 
costs either included in rent or on a fee-for-service basis. Tenants are able to minimize 
initial investment and overhead costs by utilizing these support services. Availability of 
management consulting services may be the most critical contribution the incubator 
makes to put a fledgling firm on a successful track. The incubator provides tenants with 
business counseling ranging from assistance to develop a business plan to locating 
sources of capital. In general, it should be noted that recent surveys and empirical 
investigations have begun to support the arguments that incubators are effective both in 
development of new-business and survival of existing ones. At the same time, these 
surveys have exposed some of the shortcomings of incubators. 
In the fast growing population around the world today, SMEs play an important role as 
one of the powerful forces in economic development and an accelerator of economic growth. 
Their role in growth and development is demonstrated by the volume of literature dedicated to 
the subject. Like many other countries, Saudi Arabia considers SMEs as one of the principal 
driving forces of economic development. While SMEs playa significant role in the acceleration 
of economic growth, however, their growth and success is confronted by many obstacles. 
Incubators can be considered as a remedy for the disadvantages encountered by SMEs by 
providing numerous business support services and fostering technological innovation and 
industrial renewal (Smilor and Gill, 1984; Mian, 1994a, 1994b, 1997). It is an innovative 
methodology that creates new entrepreneurial skills and new businesses. Also, it is considered 
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as one of the popular tools in assisting SMEs to cope with challenges. Consequently. many 
countries have increasingly been engaged in establishing incubators. 
Background 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has made considerable achievements in economic 
reform and liberalisation measures over the last decades which led to strong economic 
growth, increased exports. The Saudi economy is based on the strong backbone of the world's 
largest oil reserve (more than 25%). The private sector is playing an increasing role in the 
Saudi economy, accounting for 48% of gross domestic product. However, since the beginning 
of the 21 st century per capita income had declined to around 40% of its peak at the height of 
the oil boom of the eighties, this was also coupled with a massive population boom that the 
labor market was struggling to absorb. The combination of these two factors meant that a 
massive restructuring of the Saudi economy would be necessary. 
Nonetheless, in the last few years (2003 -2008), an unexpected surge in oil prices has 
had a profound effect on the Saudi economy which is now maintaining its achievements in 
scoring high growth ratios in all sectors for the period from 2003 and continuing throughout 
2007and 2008. The Supreme Economic Council had already undertaken the privatisation of 
many vital economic sectors that augmented the role of the private sector in the local 
economy. The advanced banking services actively support economic growth by financing 
development projects. The Saudi economy benefits from strong support from the government 
and free market policy, both of which have contributed to the growth of the economy. 
Utilisation of oil revenues to expand and diversify economic activities in order to reduce 
dependence on oil has resulted in an increase in local economic capacity. It has also 
encouraged foreign investment, particularly after Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The efforts in this direction also resulted in raising the Saudi credit 
classification and raised the economy's standing in all international reports. The International 
Financial Corporation reported that Saudi Arabia attained 38th position in worldwide 
rankings and first place amongst all Arab countries. 
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In spite of all these recent positive developments, the economy still needs to operate 
more efficiently and offer more jobs to the growing population. Furthermore, in the present 
era of borderless and market-oriented economy, and the emergence of WTO, a new and more 
competitive trade environment is emerging, putting additional challenges to the Saudi 
economy. In this regard, it is extremely important to direct special attention to SMEs. 
With most of the world's businesses being conducted by SMEs, it makes good economic 
sense for governments to implement polices that encourage SMEs growth. 
One instrument to promote SMEs growth and counter the high start-up failure rate 
is the business incubator which is currently adopted by many countries worldwide. Saudi 
Arabia also followed this trend in 2005 with a particular interest in general purpose mixed 
incubator. In this research, an attempt will be made to investigate the conditions 
necessary for the introduction of wide scale business incubation projects in the kingdom. 
To achieve this task, there appear a need to collect information on Saudi SME 
environment and investigate particular SME problems or needs in terms of planning, 
financing, networking and provision - in order to detect areas in which an incubator may 
be able to redress structural problems within the business environment. 
Research Goals and Methodology 
The goal of this research is two fold: 
First, it seeks, to establish a set of conditions under which business incubators are likely 
to be successful; namely the macro economic and micro economic conditions, the political 
environment, the level of government and non-governmental support, the relationship 
between business, science and academia and the cultural context. These "general properties" 
are to be obtained through the inductive interpretation and analysis of secondary data, 
especially case studies on the introduction of failed and successful incubator programmes in a 
range of national economies. 
Second, the theoretical background will be deductively applied to the Saudi 
environment. Since, incubators are increasingly seen at a political and academic level as a 
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viable approach to the Kingdom's drive towards greater economic diversification and private 
sector expansion with the aim of addressing the interacting problems of population expansion 
and high unemployment. However, are the politico-economic conditions actually in place to 
support incubators? What are the conditions which may affect the success of incubators? In 
addition, the basic characteristic of the early phase of Saudi experience in business incubation 
was investigated. To achieve this task, information on leddah business incubator is collected 
through face to face interviews and questionniers. 
The research methodology used IS a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques encompassmg both data and methodological triangulation enabling the 
convergence of results. The researcher collected (primary) data in order to address these 
questions - and has put forward a hypothesis as to the likely course and level of success of 
incubation development in Saudi Arabia. The Qualitative methods used included focus 
groups. The advantage of this first step is that it efficiently extracts the salient themes and 
paths of investigation - including those overlooked by the researcher or not covered in the 
literature that currently persist in thinking around incubators in Saudi Arabia. The 
quantitative methods used, included a survey that targets three different samples considered 
to be more affected by introduction of incubation programme . These groups were: SMEs, 
University Business Science staff and University Business Science Students at King Saud and 
King Fahad University for Petroleum and Mineral (KFUPM) . The final stage of the research 
took place in the leddah Business Incubator (case study). 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is orgnised in seven chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides the background and introduces the topic (introduction of incubation 
programme in Saudi Arabia). 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on business incubation programmes, strategies and 
functions. Research on business incubators is given under three main headings; descriptive, 
prescriptive and evaluative research. Business incubation programmes in different countries 
are reviewed to set the Saudi experience in context. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on the approach and research methodology used in this thesis including 
details of how the study was approached and the processes involved in data collection. A 
detailed account of methodological techniques is given. 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the business and economic environment in Saudi Arabia 
based on the past, present and future direction of economic programmes. The prevailing 
social, political and economic conditions of the Kingdom are explored, and the structure of 
the Saudi economy, the role of SMEs within it, the problems it currently faces , the 
government policy towards SMEs and the support available to SMEs from private and public 
is examined. The answers to these questions are hoped to give indications to the applicability, 
suitability, and prospects of incubator programmes within the Kingdom. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the results of two focus group session and uses empirical methods 
to analyse education and its relationship with business in Saudi Arabia The chapter also 
provides analysis of the Saudi SME environment and practice as well as the attitudes towards 
business incubation amongst Saudi Business academics, business students and currently-
existing SMEs 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the case study in order to provide an in depth analysis of the first 
business incubator experiment in Saudi Arabia and to testing the approach taken by the 
first Saudi incubator and its merits and demerits. 
Chapter 7 summarises the aims and key findings and presents the conclusions of the 
study, draws together the findings and offers suggestions on the way towards initiation a 
viable business incubation in the Kingdom . Implication of the findings, contribution, 
limitations and future research are also included in the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 -LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
It is widely believed that the primary forces of new growth within the global economy are 
technological innovation and business entrepreneurship. It is also widely accepted that the 
private sector is, ordinarily, the most effective arena in which to deploy these forces in order 
to generate wealth, employment and general material well-being. Consequently. 
entrepreneurship and fast-growing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are instrumental to 
private sector growth as they assist economic diversification and provide a wide range of 
goods and services to national and international markets. Thus, governments of both 
developed and developing economies have often undertaken policies for supporting SMEs, 
promoting entrepreneurship, and fostering technological innovation. 
Amongst the enormous range of public and private initiatives designed to support 
SMEs development, business incubation has gained increasing worldwide prominence as an 
effective method for the direct promotion of 'decentralized economic growth from the bottom' 
(Lalkaka and Abetti, 1999: 197). The United State's National Business Incubator Association 
(NBIA) indicated that business incubation provides entrepreneurs with the expertise, networks and 
tools that they need to make their ventures successful. Incubation programmes diversify 
economies, commercialize technologies, create jobs and build wealth (NBIA, 2004). 
Business incubation is considered as a dynamic process of business enterprise 
development (NBIA, 2002). Whether created by private or public bodies, incubators, in their 
widest definition, are support-mechanisms for enterprise creation (Albert and Gaynor, 2001: 
158). Dinah Adkins, the president and CEO of NBIA added that business incubators help 
entrepreneurs translate their ideas into sustainable businesses by guiding them through the maze 
of starting and growing a thriving business (Knopp, 200 I). At a practical level Gibbons. (2002) 
described incubators as something like a mixture of an office park and a business school for 
entrepreneurs. Critically, incubators help small businesses to survive - and develop - by 
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providing resources that are otherwise hard to access because of reduced capital or 'network' 
opportunities. 
Whilst SME survival and development constitute the "meta" objectives of business 
incubation, the roles of specific incubator programmes are highly diverse and are usually 
contingent upon prevailing local, regional or national socio-economic priorities. Common 
objectives cited for incubator projects have included any, or all, of: combating national or 
regional unemployment (by means of enterprise creation and improved rates of survival); 
facilitating national or regional economic diversification (typically away from heavy-industry 
towards technology-orientated business); more specifically, encouraging the development of 
particular technologies and industries (e.g. the development of information technology 
industries in developing countries); "redressing" local or regional economIc decline and 
assisting urban or regional regeneration; expanding the supply of inputs to national 
infrastructure (this is especially relevant to rapidly developing economies like Saudi Arabia); 
national and regional technology transfer (e.g. upgrading the technology capabilities of firms in 
a given location); providing a "nursery" for the commercialisation of university research (in 
particular through technology incubators); assisting in the social and economic development of 
minority or (previously) marginalized groups (for instance women or ethnic minorities); and 
even offering a "safe haven" for "legitimate entrepreneurship" in areas where crime or 
corruption can constrain business activity (the OEeD cites the Russian Federation of the 1990s 
as an example) (OEeD, 1999: 8). In sum, though all business incubators fall under the general 
umbrella of "economic development tools" their specific objectives are usually unique to the 
prevailing concerns of their individual sponsors (OEeD 1999 in Ibid) 
This diversity of incubator roles and objectives has made it difficult for academics, 
incubator managers and their sponsors alike to develop a generalised set of evaluation tools 
for measuring incubator performance (OEeD 1999: 10). However, a very broad way of 
measuring incubator success is an analysis of firm survival rates. For instance, in Australia 
the SME failure rate within the first year is an estimated 8 per cent among incubator tenants, 
compared with a national average of around 32 per cent (OEeD, 1999). Survival rates for 
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incubated firms in the United States are around 80 per cent, 'considerably above the norm for 
new businesses', furthermore, an NBIA statistic from the 1996 report Business Incubation 
Works, which reported that 87 percent of firms that graduated from responding incubators 
since inception were still in business.(NBIA, 1996) 
According to OECD in 1996, the British government established an Entrepreneurial Panel 
to examine business incubation within the UK (OECD, 1999: 10). The panel concluded that 
"business incubators do improve survival rates, as well as facilitating technology transfer. 
innovation and generating jobs and local economic development" (in Ibid)2. 
Currently, one or more medium- to large- size business incubator programmes have been 
present in both the United States and all the European Union countries for at least a decade. The 
popularity of incubators, both in developed and developing economies is growing. Yet despite its 
popularity amongst thousands of entrepreneurs around the world and its logical appeal as an SME 
development tool, the concept of business incubation is not widely known and even less widely 
understood. However, an ever-growing volume of "descriptive" literature is addressing this 
problem and has succeeded in raising awareness amongst academics, entrepreneurs and those with 
various professional interests in incubator programmes (e.g. potential public and private sponsors). 
(Bhabra-Remedios and Cornelius, 2003) 
Despite the clear merits of incubation as a business development tool, it ought to be 
recognised that its effectiveness has varied historically and geographically. In other words, 
incubators do not constitute a universal formula for business/entrepreneurial growth and are 
not always the best "answer" to various social and economic problems. In several instances, 
incubators have proved both expensive and ineffective devices for enabling economic growth 
or facilitating intended social change. For an incubator to be successful as both a small 
business development tool and as a means of fulfilling wider socio-economic objectives, 
certain conditions need to be in place. 
2 Evidence from France likewise indicates significantly higher survival rates among incubator tenants. (OECD 1999: 10). 
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Several studies have provided an overview of incubation literature, most notably Albert 
and Gaynor (2002), and Hackett and Dilts (2004). Hackett and Dilts organised their revie\\ 
around (l) the area and community in which the incubator operates, (2) the incubator as an 
enterprise, (3) the incubator manager, (4) incubatee firms, (5) incubatee management teams. 
and (6) the innovations being incubated (Hacket and Dilts, 2004). However. Albert and 
Gaynor (2002: 160) offer a comparativelly simpler template for organising a review of the 
research literature which better allows for the numerous topical overlaps that appear in most 
accounts. Thus, the Incubator literature may be divided into three broad (and overlapping) 
categories which are: 
Descriptive Literature 
These studies are concerned with defining the incubation process and distinguishing 
various incubator "types" from other support programmes. Generic and type-specific features 
of incubators are identified. Analyses that account for the (historical) development of 
incubators and incubator "landscape" are mapped to distinguish the relative importance of 
different incubator types and to set out the "life-cycle" of an incubator. 
Prescriptive Literature 
The target audience of "prescriptive" works is identified as 'key stakeholders, primariy 
sponsors and incubator management' (Albert and Gaynor, 2002: 160). These studies are keen 
to highlight the role incubators play in economic development, and are often addressed to the 
specific public bodies that sponsor incubation projects (an example would be the various 
reports by the NBIA and United Kingdom Business Incubators (UKBI). The likely features of 
successful incubators are also identified in prescriptive studies, as well as best practice 
guidelines for infonning managers on the best way of running incubators. 
Evaluative Literature 
Evaluative research attempt to establish the 'benchmarks'metrics by which incubation 
programmes can be evaluated. The quantifiable impact on incubatees, and local and national 
economies is measured. The effectiveness of different types of incubation programmes and 
processes is compared (Albert and Gaynor, 2002: 161). 
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Naturally, there is a significant overlap between these areas, but this seems the most 
logical template to follow in summarising incubator research to date. In practice many studies 
touch on a range of these issues in order to set the context for their particular contribution. 
2.2 Descriptive Research 
2.2.1 Historical Development 
Business incubation remains a "young industry" (OECD, 1999). In the US, business 
incubators have grown rapidly in numbers from less than 100 in 1980, to around 1000 in 2002 
(Lalkaka, 2002). According to the NBIA, incubators in North America have added in excess 
of 19,000 companies and more than 245,000 jobs to the economy (NBIA, 2002). By that same 
year (2002), Europe had around 900 incubators (EC Report, 2002), and worldwide numbers 
were estimated at around 3000. In 1999, over 100-business incubator schemes of 'different 
sorts' were operating throughout the United Kingdom (OECD, 1999). 
Business incubation is not a new phenomenon. It has been around since 1942 in schools 
and universities where students and professors were given the opportunity to test and employ 
their knowledge and research to start up new companies. In 1942, Student Agencies Inc., 
located in Ithaca, New York, was created to incubate student companies. In 1946, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) president Karl Compton and other alumni 
founded the American Research Development (ARD) incubator (Chinsomboon, 2000). 
The world's first known incubator outside of the academic environment was the 
Batavia Industrial Centre (BIC) located in Batavia, New York in 1959 (Brown et aI., 2000) 
. and the formal concept of business incubation had been developed ever since. One of its 
tenants was a poultry producer and it is believed that this is where the name "incubator" 
was conceived (McKee, 1992, 41). It was started by a real estate developer (Charles 
Mancuso and Son) who was unable to secure a tenant able to lease the vast 850,000 square 
feet Batavia facility and innovated a strategy of subletting subdivided partitions of the 
building to a variety of tenants. Each tenant occupied as much space as he or she needed 
(the first ever tenant, a New York sign painter took only 2000 sq ft). As tenancy gradually 
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rose it became expedient for the various businesses to share the expense of various office 
services and supplies. Then, as the idea of multiple business occupancy and service pooling 
at Batavia caught on, new tenants started to request business advice and assistance with 
capital raising as part of the lease (Adkins, 2001). Thus, the first business incubator was 
born3 - and the idea soon spread. Incubators in the UK and Europe started to develop later 
during the 1980s through various related forms such as innovation centres, technopoles 
centre, science parks, etc. 
Business incubators have been growing very fast. The mapping survey in 2005 of UK 
Business Incubators identified around 270 incubation environments across the country (lalkaka, 
2007). As from the survey of the (NBIA) in October 2006, there were about 5,000 business 
incubators worldwide, there were over 1,400 incubators in North America, up from only 12 in 
1980. Of the 1,400 incubators, 1,115 were in the United States, 191 were in Mexico and 120 
were in Canada (EC, 2002). The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) has also played a significant role in monitoring and promoting the development of 
business incubators worldwide and estimated the annual growth rate of new incubators at about 
20 percent. (See appendix A for additional information) 
2.2.2 Definitions 
There is no one standard definition of business incubation. Nearly three dozen 
definitions are available in the academic literature and just as many have been adopted by 
industry associations and policymakers in different countries, reflecting local cultures and 
national policies. Germany for example, targeted innovative start-ups, while France and 
Netherlands promote the university -incubator model (Aernoudt, 2000). (For more details 
see appendix B) 
3 John Mancuso who tirst ran Batavia is also credited with coining the term "incubator" (Burger 1999). 
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2.2.3 Incubator Services 
Incubators are commonly evaluated on the basis of meeting their goals and objectives 
(Bearse, 1993). Business incubators seek to add value by offering clients a combination of 
facilities and services that cannot be so easily obtained from other sources. The nature of 
these services and the way in which they are delivered will usually have an important 
influence on the success of incubator tenants and hence the performance of the incubator 
(European Commission Enterprise Directorate-General [ECEDG] 2002: 48). The type and the 
range of support services provided by an incubator is believed to vary depending on the type 
of incubator and the objectives of the investors financing it (ECEDG, 2002:49). Thus the 
management literature has contributed to the theoretical constructs used to examme 
incubators. Five dimensions constitute the package of serVIces offered by a business 
incubator. It is worth considering these provisions in more details: 
A) Enterprise Development 
Incubators provide an instructive and supportive environment to entrepreneurs at start-
up during the early stages of business (UKBI, 2004). Similarly, the (NBIA) describes an 
incubator as providing "hands on management assistance, access to financing and 
orchestrated exposure to critical business or technical support services. They also offer 
entrepreneurial firms shared office services, access to equipment, flexible leases and 
expandable space - all under one roof' (NBIA, 2004). Gulotta and Mac Daniel (1995 
:71)describe an incubator as 'a flexible facility in which a number of new and growing 
businesses operate under one roof with affordable rents, shared support services, business 
development services and office equipment, and having equal access to a wide range of 
professional, technical and financial programmes.' 
The incubator manager and other members of the incubator management team can play 
an important role in assisting their clients to launch and grow their business ventures. It is 
typical for the incubator manager to know a great deal more than an incubator client about the 
entrepreneurial process. The incubator manager will have experienced the entrepreneurial 
29 
process at close quarters on many occasions with a variety of business ventures. This experience 
is valuable, particularly early in the life of a client firm. In addition to this, it is typical for the 
incubator manager to bring expertise in strategic planning for small enterprises, and to be well 
connected to small business resources and contacts in the business community. as links to 
information and advice. Further, the incubator manager may have established a business 
development network and he is most often the access point to that network. 
B) Consultancy Network 
Until the early 1990s, the main emphasis for incubators was on the provision of a 
physical space for fledgling businesses which provided affordable rents and vital economies 
of scale on services and facilities. However, more recently, modem incubators place 
increasing emphasis on the actual 'process of incubation' (Kirby, 2004). In other words, the 
incubation process is seen as more important than the incubator facility (Adkins, 200 It. Thus 
the focus has shifted from the "hard" facilities (office space and facilities) to the more 
"human" provisions of managerial and technical advice/assistance. Unfortunately, most 
literature has tended to overlook this human dimension, thus the research conducted so far -
is 'limited almost exclusively to the incubator facility' (Hackett and Dilts, 2004:55-82). 
A common problem amongst small and new business practitioners is that a significant 
level of technical proficiency in the production of their product or service is undermined by 
an equally high level of naivety when it comes to the practical tasks of running and planning 
business. In an incubator this problem is, at least in part, remedied by the provision of 
"business counseling" services. 
Business counseling can take many forms which are likely to vary according to 
incubator type, however, managerial and financial consulting are likely to be available in 
most incubators as part of an overall 'mentoring' programme. The practical delivery of these 
4 This also allows for the emergence of 'virtual' incubators and also places a higher value on training mentoring and the creation 
of a 'learning environment.' These developments complicate definitions, not only because virtual incubators fail to meet with 
the traditional. primary, criteria of an incubator (providing "space") but also because it is increasingly difficult to locate 
where and with whom the incubation process takes place. 
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services is likely to vary across incubators. However, consultancy services in most incubators 
are likely to include both scheduled 'sit down' sessions providing long-term strategic advice, 
and 'on-the-spot' consultations whenever problems need solving quickly. Thus, incubator 
staff are likely to operate an informal "open door" consultancy service for their tenants. As 
Garrity (2002) suggests, this effectively makes each and every member of the incubator staff 
a small business consultant. It is this ethos of always-available assistance and continued 
mentoring by staff that constitutes, according to Garrity, the 'core of what an incubator 
provides' as it goes about "filling in the gaps" of knowledge and skills for its tenants (Garrity, 
2002). At a more intangible level incubator staff also provide invaluable encouragement and 
"moral support" to new business owners who are more likely to lack professional confidence 
than their more established contemporaries. 
Clearly, it is unrealistic to expect that incubator staff will be equipped to fully address 
each and every question/request by their tenants - especially in more technically advanced or 
specialised fields. Instead, they provide another invaluable service working as a point of 
reference, or as a "connector", to a much wider network of specialised assistance. The 
competent incubator will have cultivated an extensive network of contacts within the local 
community which is likely to include local professionals, educational institutions, Non 
Governmental Orginasation (NGOs) charities, community organisations, and private 
businesses - both large and small (the full role and value of networks will be discussed in 
more detail later). Of particular importance in the mentoring process is the cultivation of 
professional contacts. Thus, lawyers, accountants, bankers and marketing experts should be 
available to tenants at reduced (or no) cost, to give presentations, involve themselves in 
individual mentoring and/or directly provide professional services. Evidently, an incubator 
that is adept at cultivating a wide and willing array of professional contacts is best able to 
meet the needs of its incubatees. (Smilor and Gill, 1986) 
Thus, when discussing and researching the role of incubators it is vital to keep in mind 
what Hackett and Dilts (2004) describe as the 'totality of the incubator' which spreads out 
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from the physical reality of the incubator building itself to the 'core' formal and informal 
services provided by its staff to the wider network of associated interests it has cultivated: 
Much as a firm is not just an office building, infrastructure and articles of incorporation, 
the incubator is not simply a shared space office facility, infrastructure and mission statement. 
Rather the incubator is also a network of individuals and organisations including the incubator 
management and staff, incubator advisory board, incubatee companies and employees, local 
universities and university community members, industry contacts, and professional services 
providers such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, marketing specialists, venture capitalists, 
angel investors and volunteers (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) 
Table 2.1: Incubator Resources and Services. 
SHARED OFFICE SPACE SHARED SERVICES/FACILITIES MANAGEMENTffECHNlCAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE 
Below market office space Conference room Mentoring (Managerial and Financial advice) 
Flexible leases Receptionist coverage Business plans 
Business waiting Telecommunications and Internet (e.g. fixed 
areas/reception areas line telephone, dial-up or ADSL internet and Marketing plans fax) 
Common lounge areas Office equipment/supplies Accounting 
Secretarial services and typing Government grants and loan (advice on application) 
Computer hardware/software Research and development 
Business resource library Legal services 
Audio/visual equipment Patent assistance 
Bookkeeping Computer training 
Group health insurance Government procurementltendering (advice) 
Manufacturing equipment Equity and debt financing 
Access to advanced technology 
Access to Chambers of Commerce 
Access to other resources outside of the incubator 
--- -
Business taxes (advice) 
-~---
Notary services 
--
i Desktop publishing and design 
-- -
Website design/publishing 
---, -- -
Access to interns 
--_. 
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SHARED OFFICE SPACE SHAREDSERVlCESIFACILlTlES MANAGEMENTITECHNIC4.L AD/leE A,VD ASSISTANCE 
Financing 
External aided 
Internally provided 
"Survival Funding" 
Adaptedfrom Hackett and Dilts, 2004 
An incubator consultancy network or business development network consists of 
individuals drawn from the ranks of professional business service providers, experienced 
business people and educators who are will ing to provide advice and assistance to 
entrepreneurial enterprises. An incubator adds value by assembling a comprehensive array of 
skills and through experience, screening the participants in the network down to select 
individuals who can most successfully tailor their services to the needs of small growing 
firms. This process assembles a rich business development resource base for the region. 
Something that otherwise would exist only as a dispersed set of individuals that would be 
very difficult to replicate by a small business. Participants in the network gain from devoting 
their time by having what could be a rich source of growing clients made aware of their skills 
and expertise. Network participants commonly regard this, and the associated word of mouth 
information dissemination, as an effective marketing tool. 
C) Entrepreneurial Synergy 
Co-locating entrepreneurial firms provides the prospect of generating a symbiotic 
environment where entrepreneurs share resources and experiences, learn from one another, 
exchange business contacts and establish collaborative business relationships. One other 
important contribution that co-location of entrepreneurs can make, is to overcome the 
loneliness of the entrepreneurial work environment (Rice, 1992). 
D) Flexible Space 
Commercial real estate developers normally find the balance of risk and return 
unattractive for spaces smaller than about 150 square metres (1500 square feet). From the 
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developer's perspective, prospective tenants for smaller spaces tend not to appear substantial. 
in commercial terms. Small firms find the expectation of covenants, guarantees and bank 
references required to secure a lease, typically for a minimum of three years, difficult to meet. 
In addition, given the relatively large scale of the space against a firm's early needs, moving 
into available spaces means that new firms must carry a significant cost overhead, particularly 
if the space requires fitting out. 
The flexibility in space provided by incubators results from the incubator offering to 
lease small spaces (down to as little as ten square metres), commonly on short-term leases 
with as little as one month's notice required by either party to vacate. In addition, incubator 
buildings usually contain spaces in a variety of sizes so that as a firm grows, there is the 
potential to relocate to a larger incubator unit. It is less common for incubators to vary the 
dimensions of individual units. 
A key advantage to incubatees is the ability to sign short-term leases which are 
(ordinarily) designed to facilitate affordable growth by permitting movement to larger spaces 
as and when the business expands. Thus, at anyone time, the business occupies - and pays 
for - only the amount of space necessary to meet its needs. Moreover, no huge deposits are 
required and the rents are often below market prices (Barrow, 2001 ).Furtermore, flexibility in 
rearranging tenant spaces as the companies grow in number and size, is important5• 
Cost is seen by many entrepreneurs and some incubator programmes as a big factor. For 
most businesses, however, the rent they pay for space is not a large proportion of their cost 
structure. What is important is that they have the right sized space in the right location. It is 
much cheaper to pay a high price per square metre for exactly the space you need, than to pay 
a normal price for a bigger unit and only use a small proportion of the available space. 
Consequently, incubator developers tend to talk about price per week or month rather than the 
rate per square metre. The significant additional flexibility afforded by incubator space can 
justify a price premium. 
S The current research (see Chapter 6) demonstrated that in the Jeddah Business Incubator the Jeddah Chamber Chamber of 
Commerce subsidized rents acoording to the duration of tenancy. where they only take 6OOSR(£IOO) for the first 6 months 
and 700SR(£116) for 6-12 months and 1000 SR(£I66) for 12-24 months. 
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E) Shared Services 
Both the type of services and the level of 'sharing' are likely to differ according to the 
incubator. For instance a technology incubator is likely to have a higher level of provision for 
high-speed communications than a 'general' incubator. Moreover, the incubator's setting is 
likely to have an effect on the facilities provided. It is, for instance, highly unlikely that a US-
based technology incubator would provide Personal Computers for its incubatees as these are 
considered "everyday" items, are relatively cheap to purchase (vis-a.-vis cost of living) and it 
is likely that the incubatees would require highly specialist (i.e. non-standardised) equipment. 
In contrast, the provision of a standard desktop computer and internet access to a 'general' 
incubator in a developing country where these facilities are rare may well become the most 
"valuable" service provided (Temaali and Campbell, 1984). 
Likewise, the extent to which services are 'shared' may also depend on the specifics of 
the incubator. As already stated, many technology-based firms are likely to possess highly 
specialist hardware/software that will not be made available to other incubatees whereas in low-
technology and/or more 'general' incubators more facilities can be expected to be shared. 
However, almost all incubators should be able to provide: (1) shared receptionist 
facilities (e.g. telephone answering and a dedicated reception area for visitors), (2) 
conferencing (e.g. provision of meeting rooms and potentially phone/video conferencing); 
and (3) communication facilities (phone, internet and fax). (Petree et aI., 1997)6 
The shared services dimension refers to incubator-provided pooled equipment, services 
and facilities such as photocopier, fax, receptionist, mail handling, board room, loading dock 
and the like. Start-up firms have a need for such services but are often too small to justify the 
cost of providing these services in-house. Access to those services through the incubator 
means that entrepreneurs can focus their attention and capital on the critical task of getting 
6 Indeed. the findings of the current research (see Chapter 6) how that JBI provided each incubtee with phone. high- speed 
internet connection and printing and fax facilities, This enabled about 71.4% of them to create company websites which is a 
significant improvement on the Riyadh-based SMEs (see Chapter 5) (of whom only 11.5% had websites) 
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their product or service to market, while still presenting a professional image to their business 
contacts and customers. 
It is important to note that the first two dimensions of a business incubator. shared 
services and small spaces, have been available in the marketplace for many years via serviced 
offices and so called nursery factories, to name two of the more common options. A business 
incubator must include a number of additional dimensions to distinguish itself from such real 
estate ventures. These additional dimensions relate to how incubators facilitate management 
development and growth In their clients. "Emphasis in incubator programmes on site 
development is misplaced In light of the management assistance needs of entrepreneurs" 
(Allen and Weinberg, 1988: 214) 
"Providing shared office services ... may help reduce tenants' operating expenses but 
does little to address management problems that plague new firms." (Allen and McCluskey, 
1990:70) 
The NBJA has chosen to emphasise the non-real estate parameters of incubator 
management in its definition. To be classed as an incubator in the eyes of the NBJA a 
programme: "must offer at least one of the following services: 
1. Networking opportunities encouraged by incubator management 
2. Management or technical assistance through in-house expertise and/or a network of 
community support 
3. Assistance in obtaining financing 
4. Service to business clients outside the incubator as well as to in-house tenants. (Rice, 
1992:43) 
Across the incubator movement, the management problems of incubator clients are met 
with the delivery of a variety of value-added management services. 'The driving force (in 
incubator programmes) is the supply of expertise, capital and support that comes from 
assistance activities directed towards filling the voids in entrepreneurs' abilities (Allenand 
Weinberg, 1988 :214). 
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However, several authors (e.g. Tornatsky et aI., 1996, Smilor and Gill, 1986) do not 
specifically indicate what assistance an incubator should provide. Others vary enormously in 
the range of assistance they believe should be available, for instance Hanson et aI., (2000) 
lists; Physical space, Capital Coaching, Common services, and Networking connections. 
However, from the above descriptions it can be identified that the core provisions of an 
incubator as providing: Shared office space, Shared services, and business advice/assistance. 
On the other hand, the five dimensions (Duff, 1994) work together to provide the unique 
defining character of a business incubation programme. Experience in assembling and 
managing these elements has developed rapidly over the past years. 
2.2.4 Types of Incubator 
Having identified how incubation differed from other types of support to business, the 
research focus changed to the identification of different classes of business incubators. This 
research has continued to the present day showing up-surges during periods of particularly 
high social and economic change. 
To aid in the analysis of business incubators, particularly in identifying issues related to 
incubator evaluation and recommended practices, a classification system needs to be adopted 
(Albert and Gaynor, 2001). Various researchers have provided different means for 
categorizing business incubators. Some researchers propose to classify them according to a) 
their primary financial sponsors (Kuratko and LaFollette, 1987; Temali and Campbell, 1984), 
b) the business focus of the incubator (i.e. property development or business assistance) 
(Brooks, 1986), c) the business focus of the incubatees (Plosila and Allen, 1985) whether the 
incubatee is a spin-off or a start-up (Plosila and AlIen,1985). However, because the 
configuration of an incubator is highly dependent on the social, cultural, and economic 
environments that they are in (Albert and Gaynor. 200 I), using existing classification systems 
as a predictor of a particular incubator's success is not advisable. Nevertheless, they remain 
helpful in understanding the motivations and key issues behind certain incubators. 
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The vast majority of business incubators fall into two general categories: technology 
incubators, focusing on commercialisation of new technology and technology transfer: and. 
mixed use, servicing a wide range of clients. For example, in the USA and Australia mixed 
use is still the largest proportion of business incubators, 43% in USA and 80.2% in Australia 
(NBIA, 2002). Either type can be specialised in a particular industry, although possibilities 
need to be strongly qualified with regard to the critical mass that can be achieved. With a 
specialised business incubator the pool of possible clients is limited. 
In large economies such as the USA and Europe there are many variants of business 
incubator, but in smaller countries it may be hard to achieve critical mass at a very general 
business incubation level, let alone for a more specialised variant. Indeed, rather than 
specialisation, aggregation and convergence of different types of business incubation along 
with related services may be more applicable. 
In developed countries incubation first emerged in the 1980s, operating alongside many 
other generic business development services, and evolved into narrow and deep services for a 
small selected group of companies. Subsequently, developing countries adopted the concept, 
so that currently there are more incubators in developing than developed countries. The 
traditional business incubation found in developed countries is often not relevant; however, 
hybrid models, combining outreach, virtuaf and broader services with more traditional 
incubation, for both new and existing businesses, have emerged in many developing 
countries, particularly those with smaller economies and limited generic business support. 
Preliminary studies (Ellen, 1985; Latona, 1988) limited their classification to public, 
private and university incubators. This classification has gradually been broadened as the 
global incubator landscape has become more complex. An effective way to summarise the 
different sponsorship programmes behind incubators is to divide them into 1) non-profit, 2) 
for-profit and 3) university-based (Peters, 2004). Less easy to distinguish are the social and 
economic objectives of an incubator. Whilst each and every incubator has the development of 
7 The virtual model. allows a company to gamer the advice of an incubator without actually being located at the incubator site. 
This new model suits those entrepreneurs who need the advice an incubator otTers but still want to maintain their own 
offices. warehouses. etc. 
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small businesses as its primary, practical objective (with job-creation as a logical associate of 
that aim), an abundance of ancillary objectives may also exist. For instance, "urban 
regeneration", "technology transfer", "minority group empowerment", "community 
integration", "economic diversification" "commercialise research" etc. may be cited. These 
objectives are ordinarily determined by the incubator sponsor. However, there is no clear way 
of predicting objectives from the type of sponsor - although it is more likely University-based 
incubators will seek to commercialise research and for-profit incubators will seek a more 
general "business development" mission plan. However, many incubators have several 
different and overlapping objectives - a University incubator may seek to commercialise 
research, but it may also be concerned with the advancement of national technology transfer 
and economic diversification; similarly a for-profit incubator may predominantly seek to 
develop small businesses for profit but it may also be concerned to assist in urban 
redevelopment, minority group empowerment etc. 
Classification schemes have been based on location (rural, urban), objectives 
(empowerment, for profit), configuration (residential, virtual), business model (property, 
venture capital) lead sponsors (university, corporate, public), type of company within it 
(mixed, industrial, technology, internet) and indeed combinations of location, objectives, 
configuration, lead sponsor and type of tenant. 
Ellen and McCluskey (1990) used a value-added continuum with property development 
and business development at the two extremes to describe various kinds of incubators and 
their operations. This idea of a continuum is relatively unique with most other researchers 
preferring classifications based on discreet groupings. 
Lalkaka and Bishop (1996), highlight the fact that in different countries, different types 
of incubation structures have become important depending on the existing resources and the 
social agenda. In China, for example, Overseas Chinese Scholars Parks are an important 
feature on the incubation landscape. 
The final method by wh ich to classify incubator type is more straightforward. 
Helpfully, the NBIA has classified the 1,000 or so North American incubators into 7 
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categories: Mixed Use (43%), Technology (25%), Manufacturing (10%), Targeted (9%), 
Service (6%), Empowerment (5%) and other (2%) (NBIA, 2002) With the typical exception 
of restaurant-based and retail firms, mixed-use incubators place no restrictions on the 
commercial type of firm tenanted and is suitable for all businesses. Their objectives are also 
likely to be 'general' and focused around employment generation and local economic growth. 
In North America they are typically sponsored by local governments or their affiliated bodies 
(Burger, 1999). 
Technology-based incubators are focused upon 'enhancing community research and 
development in high-tech, rapid-growth industries' (Tornatzky, et aI., 1996). Manufacturing 
incubators (10% of North American business incubators) provide large production spaces. 
Manufacturing incubators also provide technical assistance and tend to focus on lighter 
manufacturing. 
A specific type of incubator is a 'targeted incubator', which 'focuses on assisting start-
up ventures in a specific industry. The specialisation within an incubator of that type is 
hypothesised to affect the characteristics of new ventures within that incubator and their 
subsequent performance. Linking industry contacts and capital sources familiar with that 
industry with new ventures may provide an explanation for these effects. (Duhaime and 
Matherne, 2000) 
Targeted incubators have the advantage of being able to concentrate on specific types of 
resources, products, equipment and services. As Meredith Erlewin of NBIA put it: ""If you 
have a focus -- either on a certain type of company or a certain population, like women or 
minorities -- then you're working with people who have the same challenges, who are 
undergoing the same shared experiences," (Gibbons, 2002)8 
'Service incubators' (60/0 of North American incubators) are specific to those businesses 
involved in the service industries, including professional services (Barrow, 2001). 
'Empowennent' incubators (also known as "community" incubators) make up 5% of the 
8 'Coleman's Micro Business Incubator. for instance. wants to help minority contractors, leading the center to offer courses in 
things such as blueprint reading and bidding on government contracts' (Gibbons, 2002) 
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North American incubator industry and tend to focus upon a particular local community or 
targeted demographic (for instance, women or ethnic minorities). The incubator is designed to 
assist and "empower" these groups by facilitating economic growth through business 
development. In other words they target particular populations and not particular industries. 
However, often, the type of business incubated will be associated with the particular group 
being "empowered" - for instance, in the US such incubators have been established to help 
Native Americans living in traditional communities set up businesses to market their 
traditional craft products. 
In addition to sponsorship, objective and sector, location (rural ,urban) could have an 
impact on the performance of the incubator .therefore it is worth considering whether or not 
an incubator is located in an urban or rural setting. It therefore seems useful to describe the 
"type" incubator projects according to some or all of the following vital dimensions: 
Sponsorship (i.e. not-for-profit, for-profit, university) 
Socio-economic objectives (e.g. employment, local empowerment, technology transfer etc.) 
Sector (i.e .. mixed, technology, manufacturing, targeted, services, empowerment, other) 
Location (rural, urban) 
The point of classification is to allow some sort of framework for comparison between 
and within programmes, (however the list above has not exhausted the many ways in which 
incubators can differ - especially at an international/global level). 
Inevitably, within each 'genre' or 'type' significant variations between incubators are 
observable in terms of facility size9 , staff size, space available to incubatees, training 
programmes offered, types and levels of service, types and level of equipment sharing, entry 
requirements, graduation criteria and rent. In sum it is still possible to compare different 
"forms" of incubators according to how they provide (I) space (2) services and (3) assistance. 
Ideally - for the researcher - such comparisons are made between incubators who have the 
same or similar sponsors, objectives and are of the same or similar sector. 
9 Incubator facilities vary widely in size as measured by the square footage or total startup costs and the number of tenants 
resident in the facilities. One recent survey indicated total startup costs ranging from $175,000 to over four million dollars 
with the median being 5412,500. (JBV, 2002) 
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Hansen et al. (2000) depicted incubators as a new organisational model that has evolved 
from mass production firms and multidivisional companies of the 1900s. They suggest that 
incubators should be seen as a means of addressing corporate rigidity caused by deep 
bureaucracy. What is critical, according to Hansen et al. (2000), is for incubators to own 
"significant but minority equity stakes [that] will ensure that the incubator and the associated 
investors have influence-but not authority-over companies." Viewing the incubator as an 
evolved multidivisional firm also allows its management to achieve a certain focus in the 
types of tenants that it accepts. Just as a multidivisional firm must adopt a certain focus on the 
types of businesses it enters, so must an incubator. By maintaining a related set of companies, 
the incubator is able to optimise benefits to the incubatees and thus to itself. Hansen et al. 
(2000) also warn that incubators that assemble a highly diversified portfolio of companies are 
likely to suffer from the same problems that traditional conglomerates do. The whole will not 
be greater than the sum of the parts. However, while the proposal of Hansen et al. is 
compelling, much work needs to be done on their agency-based theory (For more information 
on agency theory, see Eisenhardt 1989) since "rather than working for the success of the 
principal's firm and shareholders, the incubatees work to attain their own firm's success" 
(Hackett and Dilts, 2004b). That is, the principal-agent dyad that is commonplace in 
multidivisional firms may not be present in incubators making agency-based theory difficult 
to implement. Furthermore, their proposal to adopt a portfolio strategy in selecting incubatees 
may only be applicable to certain types of incubators. 
Given that incubation structures are so culturally dependent, it is not surprising that 
variations on classifications have been proposed for Canada (Kumar and Kumar, 1997), 
France (Schmuck, 2000), Italy (Cariola, 1999) and the UK (Enterprise Panel of the UK, 
2000). 
In most cases, creating a classification is not an end in itself. The classification is used 
to create a culturally relevant framework to discuss other issues such as evaluation (Lalkaka, 
1997), best practice (Kumar and Kumar, 1997) or the role of public sector (Enterprise Panel 
of the UK, 2000). 
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2.2.4.1 Identifying Key Features of Different Types of Incubators 
With the high growth and increasing diversity in the range of incubators, some 
researchers have chosen to focus on understanding the format, structure, environment and 
operations of a singular type of incubator. These include university technology incubators 
(Mian, 1994a -1996b; Cariola, 1999; Bruton, 1998), corporate incubators (Chesbrough and 
Scolof, 2000), internet incubators (Hansen et aI., 2000), for-profit incubators (Nash-Hoff, 
1998), non-profit incubators (Vinokur-Kaplan et aI., 1997, 1998), rural incubators (Weinberg, 
1987) and virtual incubators (Camp and Peier, 1986; Nowak and Grantham, 2000). 
Focus on a specific incubator type, has lead inevitably to a greater understanding of the 
differences in incubators within the same class. These differences relate principally to 
different business models or incubator sponsors. Rice and Matthews (1995), for example, 
identified three models for self financing incubators. Nash-Hoff (1998) classified four for-
profit incubator models. Hansen, et aI., (2000), distinguished four different sponsors of 
internet based incubators. 
It is assumed by most researchers that incubators are, by universal definition, economic 
development tools for business development and job creation whose 'basic value proposition 
is embodied in the shared belief that operating incubators will result in more start-ups' 
(Hackett and Dilts ,2004). However, despite the possession of certain "key properties" 
significant variations do exist across different incubator programmes. When it comes to any 
sort of evaluative or prescriptive research, which often involves the comparative study of 
different incubator programmes - it is essential that key differences between incubator 
"types" are understood by the researcher, so that "apples are compared with apples." Thus, it 
is possible to (broadly) differentiate between incubator types according to (A) their 
sponsorship origin (8) their social and economic objectives and (C) their sector. 
Though most incubators have been established as publicly funded vehicles for job 
creation, urban economic revitalisation, and the commercialisation of university innovations 
(Campbell and Allen, 1987) more recently the amount of privately funded organisations for 
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the incubation of high-potential new ventures has grown rapidly, as has the proliferation of 
'specialist' incubators in niche sectors. 
2.2.4.2 University Incubators 
Although the main goal of universities is education, they can still make substantial 
contributions to local economies through research leading to patentable inventions and 
discoveries, faculty spin-off ventures and technology transfers (Schutte, 1999). University 
business incubators (UBI) are set up by universities willing to adopt a directly entrepreneurial 
role in generating and spreading scientific and technological knowledge (Radosevich, 1995). 
UBls are institutions that provide support and services to new knowledge-based ventures. 
The most prominent, and successful, incubators have been those associated with 
substantial local economic growth and/or the development of new technology industries. For 
example, the Austin Technology Incubator, associated with the University of Texas, Austin, 
has nurtured more than 38 companies, created more than 500 jobs, and brought 
approximatelyUS $60 million to the local community in the first four years of operation. 10 
Existing evidence suggests that universities have a seedbed effect on their local 
economies. (Felsenstein, 1994) Indeed, a relationship has been established between firm 
innovation rates (measured by patents) and the level of local university research. This 
suggests the existence of technological spillover that benefits firms located within the general 
vicinity of a university. (Jaffe, 1986) Capitalizing on this spillover effect, the university 
incubator (like the Austin or San Jose incubators) is employed by some entrepreneurial 
universities to provide support for nurturing new technology firms. 
In addition, other incubators, such as the Environmental Business Cluster, the Software 
Business Cluster, and the International Business Incubator in San Jose, are designed, in part, 
to provide more opportunities for students and professors at San Jose State University, 
enabling them to make downtown San Jose more of a technology centre (Mitchel, 1996). 
10 Enterprise Panel. Growing Success: Helping Companies to Generate Wealth and Create Jobs through Business Incub81ion. 
Midland Bank pic, October, 1996 
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According to Mitchell (1996), San Jose State President Robert Caret is promoting formal 
internship programmes with the downtown incubators, and is looking at the possibility of 
commercializing research conducted on campus. San Jose State will also be encouraging 
professors to look into consulting opportunities with the incubator start-ups. The incubation 
concept seeks to link talent, technology, capital and know-how to leverage entrepreneurial 
talent, accelerate the development of new companies, and thus speed the commercialisation of 
new technologies. (Smilor and Gill, 1986) Most universities are generally motivated to 
implement incubator programme because of a desire to stimulate regional economics and/or 
to encourage the commercialisation of the university's own research. (Matkin, 1990) Links 
between the university and the incubator usually include labs and workshops, student 
employees, faculty consultants, library resources and technology transfer. Table 2.2 below 
presents the contributions of university-related services, and assesses their value to incubator 
clients (Mian, 1996a) 
Table 2.2: Contributions of University Related Services 
Service No Value Minor Value Moderate Vallie Major Value 
University image 19% 12% 28% 40% 
Labs/workshops/equip 33% 16% 18% 33% 
Student employees 13% 20% 35% 32% 
Faculty consultants 20% 28% 26% 26% 
Library resources 19% 26% 29% 26% 
Service No Value Minor Value Moderate Value Major Value 
Education and training 69% 9% 13% 9% 
Tech transfer programmes 59% 23% 12% 6% 
Sports and social activities 56% 29% 9% 6% 
Mainframe computer 73% 15% 9% 3% 
Related R&D 49% 9% 20% 22% 
Source: Mian, S."'., 1996 
As of 1996 there were 550 incubators in the United Sates with a new facility opening 
every week. About 20 percent, or approximately I 00, are technology incubators, and most of 
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these are sponsored by universities. Roughly half of all technology incubators are located in 
urban areas and focus on general technology, while 20 percent focus on software and another 
20 percent are involved in the medical or biotech industries. The average square footage is 
31,000 and most university sponsored technology incubators offer a range of services 
including management advice, business plan preparation, financing and marketing. 
2.2.5 The Incubator Life-Cycle 
According to Allen (1988) the incubator is an enterprise with its own developmental 
life-cycle. The incubator start-up stage commences when the local community begins to 
consider establishing an incubator and ends once the incubator has reached full occupancy 
(Ibid). The "business development stage" is marked by an increase in the frequency of 
interaction between incubator manager and incubatees, stable demand for space within the 
incubator, and greater support for the incubator within the local community (Ibid). 
In Figure 2.1, Smilor (1987) visualises the incubator as a mechanism for re-shaping the 
way industry, government and academia interrelate. 
Fig 2.1: Smilors incubator framework 
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He describes four distinct benefits to incubatees: (1) development of credibility (2) 
shortening of the [entrepreneurial] learning curve, (3) quicker solution of problems, and (4) 
access to an entrepreneurial network. However, as Hackett and Dilts (2004) point out, this is 
very much an external account and fails to consider the incubation processes occurring 
internally. 
Allen (1988), examined the development process of business incubators in a study that 
involved nearly 60 stakeholders working with 12 incubators using a three-stage life cycle 
model. The first stage, the start-up stage, is characterized as real estate driven and emphasis is 
placed on preparing the space and locating initial tenants. The second stage, business 
development , occurs when the facility is on sound financial footings and attention shifts to 
managing up tenant finns. The third stage, Incubator maturation, is characterized by a 
sophisticated enterprise support network and demand for additional user space. 
A key feature of business incubation is that the tenancy of incubated finns must be 
limited. For the incubator itself to be sustainable and create space for new finns to join, 
businesses eventually need to leave. The actual criteria for 'graduation' (also known as 
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"spinning out") differ across incubators. However, most incubators use one (or both) or two 
types of criteria according to time or size (Garrity, 2002). Either businesses will be permitted 
to stay for a set amount of time (typically three years) after which the business is expected to 
be profitable and self-sustaining , or else, businesses remain in the incubator until they 
achieve a certain "turnover or number of employees" (Garrity, 2002). Ordinarily the two 
criteria are used in combination (especially in for-profit incubators), so that businesses are 
permitted to stay for a maximum three years but move out if they reach a pre-determined size. 
Most start-ups graduate within two years from public incubators and within one year 
from private incubators (Rosenwein, 2000 in Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005: 3) The current 
research revealed that the maximum tenancy in leddah business incubator (lBI) is two years, 
yet the majority stayed only 6 months (58.3%) and 35.7% stayed for one year. 
2.3 Prescriptive Research 
The target audience of "prescriptive" literature is identified by Albert and Gaynor as 
'key stakeholders, primarily sponsors and incubator management' (Albert and Gaynor, 2002). 
Prescriptive works have focused on highlighting the role incubators play in economic 
development. The likely features of successful incubators are also explicitly identified in 
prescriptive studies, as well as management practice and best practice guidelines for 
informing managers on the best way of running an incubator. 
2.3.1 Role of Incubators in Economic Development 
Until the recent wave of private sector incubators, the public sector was by far the most 
active sponsor in the development of incubators. This support for incubators was driven by 
the belief that they contribute significantly in a cost-effective way to local economic 
development. Several researchers have published works that illustrate how this economic 
development can occur (Campbell, 1989; Lyons, 1990). 
Campbell and Allen (1987), reviewed literature on incubator development and 
examined how and why incubators continue as aids for new development and redevelopment 
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in declining areas, as well as serve as an enhancement to innovation and entrepreneurship 
through university-related incubators or innovation centres. 
Business incubators contribute to the economic development of a country through 
creation of new companies, increased employment, improvement of industry structure, and 
transfer of technology owned by universities and research institutions. BI helps to utilise idle 
space, facilities and manpower, improving profitability and promoting entrepreneurship 
(OECD, 1997a). 
As more business incubators have been established in the U.S., a number of studies 
evaluating their impact have been completed. In general, these studies examined factors like 
jobs created by incubators tenants and graduates, product innovation, number of new business 
starts, success rates of incubator firms, or impact on local development. One difficulty 
involved in these evaluations is that incubators have been established by both public and 
private entities, with different objectives. In some cases, the incubator may be linked with a 
job training programme and designed to provide job opportunities for unemployed 
individuals. In other cases, the incubator may be linked with a university, providing an 
opportunity for product development, commercialisation, and employment of highly skilled 
graduates. Other incubators may have restrictions on the type of firm that may enter. The 
success of any incubator must be evaluated in relation to its objectives and recognizing 
mandated operating restrictions. 
Incubators have been evaluated in terms of their impact on economic development, 
more specifically on job creation, firm success, increase in employment and sales, and 
whether or not the firm locates within the local area after leaving the incubator. Ellen and 
Weinberg (1988), describe several studies of incubators created in the mid-1980s. A national 
study of 45 business incubators found an average success rate of almost 2: 1, two successful 
firms for every one failure. And, 84 percent of incubator graduates remained in the local area 
after leaving the incubator. In a more limited study of 12 Pennsylvania incubators and 56 
firms, the average two-year job creation rate was seven employees per incubator. These 
results suggest that incubators are successful in helping firms start up, but that the overall 
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impact on the local economy in terms of direct job creation may be small, at least in the short 
run. Campbell and Allen (1987), discuss the results of several studies that evaluated incubator 
facilities. These studies provide a descriptive analysis of the incubator, including its 
sponsorship, the services provided to firms and any subsidies that accompany those services. 
e.g., below-market rentals, and management features including criteria for screening firms. 
entry/exit requirements, and guidelines for tenant mix. In most cases, tenant surveys were 
used to determine the background of the business owner, benefits from tenancy, and local 
economic impact measured through direct employment and employment growth. Frequently, 
these economic impacts are limited to number of firms graduated, jobs/incubator, jobs/firm, 
and job growth from entry to the present. From this review of past research, Campbell and 
Allen conclude that incubators are long-term strategies for economic development and any 
evaluation must consider both short- and long-run impacts from a facility. Campbell's study 
of 13 incubators and 587 firms provides a more detailed evaluation of the impact of incubator 
firms. The current study found that incubators served primarily start-up enterprises, with 
about 65 percent of firms entering the incubator with no sales history. The firms were 
relatively small, averaging 6.8 employees/firm in the incubator and 20 employees/firm for 
those firms that had graduated from an incubator. 
Three-quarters of graduate firms had less than 20 employees. While firm size was 
relatively small, incubator firms experienced rapid increases in employment, both during and 
after their stay in the incubator. Employment increased an average of 39 percent for firms 
from the time of entering the incubator until graduation. Employment increased by 153 
percent from entry into the incubator until 1986, including time outside the incubator. As 
other studies suggest, Campbell found that most firms locate in the local area after graduating 
from the incubator. About 86 percent of firms located within the same city as the incubator 
and only one percent of firms chose to locate in another state. These results suggest that the 
benefits of the incubator tend to remain within the state in which the initial investment is 
made. An important concern addressed in Campbell's study related to the quality of jobs 
created by an incubator, not only the quantity of jobs. Quality of jobs, measured by wage rates 
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and benefits, varies depending upon the objective of the incubator. Average wage rates are 
likely to be quite different for an incubator focusing on creating jobs for unemployed 
individuals vs. an incubator associated with a university research facility. Overall, the 
Campbell study found an average hourly wage of $8.63/hour, in line with national averages. 
However, wages ranged from $3.711hour up to $36/hour. 
One weakness of the studies conducted to date on incubators has been the lack of 
consideration of linkages created by incubator firms to the rest of the local and/or state 
economy and the failure to measure the fiscal impacts of incubator firms. Past studies address 
direct employment and sales impacts, but do not attempt to quantify the relationship between 
incubator firms, other local industries, and local/state governments. In recognizing this 
weakness in a study of Michigan incubators, Lyons (1990) suggests that a detailed evaluation 
of the impacts of business incubators requires a benefit/cost analysis. The author defines 
benefits to include facility revenues, jobs created by tenants and graduates, sales, taxes paid, 
contributions to local charities, the increased survival rate for small businesses, and the 
multiplier effect of jobs and sales created. The start up, operation, and maintenance costs of 
the incubator facility along with any public subsidies or services provided would be included 
in the cost side of the analysis. 
Studies dealing with the economic importance of incubators to a local economy have 
been scarce. However, there are two previously published studies in which the characteristics of 
incubators were analyzed. The first is a study of the role incubator industries played in the local 
economy of Westfield, Massachusetts (Armstrong and Mullin, 1984). The study is a result ofa 
survey of the owners of 25 small firms that have been in business for fewer than ten years, 
manufacture a product, and are doing business in Westfield. The results of this study indicated 
that these firms are not really typical of what is now being defined as incubators. None of these 
firms received financial assistance from government sources, most had a customer waiting 
when they started, and most operate under poor physical conditions. Their employees are 
primarily recent technical school graduates and family members. It was found that this 
incubator increased employment in the city, but it did not have a very significant impact on 
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employment. An important recommendation of this study was that the Chamber of Commerce 
develops marketing and management training programmes for the incubator. 
Another important study of incubators was done by Allen and Rahman (\985). They 
surveyed 12 Pensylvania incubator facilities. Of these, eight had unique financing 
arrangements and eight incubators were provided rental space at below market rates. All 
incubators did not receive tax, , advertising, marketing, computing, and information services. 
Carroll (1986) concluded that the beneficial economic impact of continuing the incubator 
project can be categorized as primary and secondary. The primary impact is the initial 
creation of new jobs and the diversification of the regional economy. Accompanying these 
new jobs is a higher level of local income and expenditure. From this primary effect on the 
region flows the secondary result, which is the economic multiplier effect. This impact is in 
terms of both employment and income expenditure (Carroll, 1986). Brooks (1986) noted that 
as firms outgrow the economic incubator and its hand-on assistance, they also contribute to 
the local economy by feeding into the real estate model (Brooks, 1986). Campbell et al,( 1985) 
state that economic development strategists should view the conversion of entrepreneurs' 
ideas into new businesses as a productive force for local job creation and economic growth. 
Demuth (1984) points out that private companies often build small business incubators to 
receive such economic benefits as: (1) the opportunity for profits by investing in new 
companies, (2) profits from real estate appreciation, and (3) management or franchise fees. 
Merrifield (1987), concludes that over 200 business incubators have been formed and have 
contributed to the generation of jobs, new wealth, and tax revenue. 
2.3.2 Identifying Features of Successful Incubaion Programmes 
A business incubator's main goal is to produce successful firms that will leave the 
programme financially viable and freestanding (Adkins et aI., 2002). A large number of 
studies have tried to identify the features of successful incubation programmes (Smilor, 1987; 
Lichtmstein, 1992; Mian, 1994a; OEeD, 1997). Researchers also offer lists of success factors 
that contribute to the narrative model of the ideal business incubator. Success factors for 
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business incubator may differ according to economic, social and cultural differences. There is 
no single formula for creating a successful business incubator, but several elements are keys 
to success. 
Factors that have an impact on an individual business incubator success can be 
classified into, internal and external factors. Internal factors are those factors that a particular 
business incubator has control over. External factors are factors that are outside of the realm 
of specific individual business incubators' control. 
2.3.2.1 Internal Features: 
Although it is difficult to provide universal answer to the question "What is successful 
business incubation," some key components can be identified. These include:, Selection of a 
competent manager and team, establishment of entry and exit criteria of incubator clients, 
flexible premises with favorable conditions and flexible rental arrangements, Supportive 
learning environment for both technical and business skills training, dedicated business 
advice with ready access to specialists, business advisers, mentors and investors, ability to 
coordinate and access to venture capital and investors, encouragement in networking 
opportunities(Adkins et aI., 2002). Some of the important features for successful incubators 
will be discussed below: 
A) An Experienced and Good Management Team 
A successful business incubator depends on the incubator management having the 
skills, experience and contacts required to help to grow start-up companies. The incubator 
management team needs to be appropriately compensated (money is not the only aspect, 
challenge is often important), and to have access to training for upgrading their skills and to 
"best practice" and "best technology" standards and expertise. 
A vital role played by incubator staff is that of "connector" to a wider network of 
contacts. Therefore a critical requirement of an incubator manager is that he or she IS a 
competent networker adept at liaising with external businesses, organisations and 
communities and hard-working in this role. The manager is the first "link" between the 
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incubator and the outside world. He is required to link together research universities, large 
technology companies, small technology companies, state government, federal government, 
community leaders, "people to know," and support groups. 'The role of incubator 
management is crucial in ensuring continuing local support and sponsorship, attracting and 
evaluating prospective tenants, assisting in the development of existing tenants and 
facilitating the smooth transition ofleaving tenants' (Barrow, 2001) 
Greene and Butler (1996), note that "this role, like every other aspect of incubators, 
varies widely between incubators, but includes a selection of responsibilities such as 
networking, counseling, providing emotional support, and providing expertise in diverse areas 
as marketing, business operations, finance, and accounting" (Rice and Abetti, 1993; Smilor 
and Gill, 1986). Despite the highly "intangible" nature of these qualities it is recommended 
that incubator managers should possess a high level of educational qualification "Eighty-five 
(85) percent of all senior incubator managers have a college degree or post-graduate 
education. (NBIA, 2000) 
However, such is the pivotal importance of the incubator management role that if it is 
badly performed, the negative consequences for the incubated businesses will be significant. 
It is speculated that government sponsored incubators are more prone to poor management 
than their private-sector counterparts (Lerner and Haber, 2000). Based on a study of 
government incubators specialising in the tourism industry, Lerner and Haber, argue that 
'regardless of the size and age of ventures, those obtaining advisory type of assistance from 
the governmental tourism incubator performed less well than those ventures that did not 
obtain such support.' Put simply, Lerner and Haber attributed the poor management and low 
quality of advice given within government sponsored incubators for this outcome. 
B) Entrance and Exit Policies 
A good incubator has explicit entrance and exit criteria for clients. The incubator selects 
high-quality clients, implements proactive and customized programmes to serve them and 
graduates them into the community. With the exception that they must be (relatively) new, 
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small to medium sized, and not involved in the retail or restaurant trades all firms have the , 
potential to benefit from business incubation. However, some businesses are clearly better 
suited than others. 
Several scholars pointed out that tenant screening is an important component in the incubation 
process (Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Kuratko and laFollette, 1987; Merrifield, 1987; Mian, 1994a). 
Kuratko and Lafollette (1987) concluded that variability in the tenant screening and selection 
process may lead to the selection of tenants that are too strong or too weak to be hatched in an 
incubator, which in turn may lead to tenant or even incubator failure. Mian (1994a) observes that 
most incubators in his dataset screen their tenants on a formal or informal basis and that this tenant 
evaluation process provides the necessary expert feedback for improved performance. 
Mian (1994a) investigated the screening process more in detail and postulate important 
screening factors. Merrifield (1987) described the tenant selection process in a three-step 
decision tree. In the first phase, the incubator evaluates the potential tenant on six criteria: 
sales profit potential, political and social constraints, growth potential, competitor analysis, 
risk distribution and industry restructure. In the second phase the fit between the potential 
tenant and the host is evaluated, again on six criteria: capital availability, manufacturing 
competence, marketing and distribution, technical support, component and materials 
availability and finally management. The combination of the business attractiveness and fit 
factors determines the probability of commercial success and thus the potential added value 
the tenant has to otTer to the incubator. Merrifield (1987) admits that no analytical scheme can 
guarantee 100% success, but careful tenant selection can definitely increase the probability of 
tenant-and thus incubator-success. 
Mian (1994a) analyses the tenant entry policy of six university-sponsored technology 
incubators and finds the following elements: technology-based start-up, firms with high 
growth potential, strategic business plan developed, qualified management team, 
commercializable product! process/service, existing cash flow stream, manufacturing firm 
preference, ability to pay the rent, fit with the university resources/mission, investor's 
commitment. (see appendix G for more information) 
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C) Linkage and Networking 
A good incubation programme is an integral part of a community-wide network aimed 
at providing financing, services and cultural support for entrepreneurial companies. The 
incubator should pull stakeholders together and endeavor to build linkages to appropriate 
knowledge-bases, finance providers, and market channels. Good incubator management 
values networking and promotes a dynamic community of entrepreneurs, both within and 
outside its building. 
The role of the business incubator is to create a safe place, a microcosm of the best 
possible entrepreneurial community that can provide a synergy among business, academic, 
government, and community entities. Institutional alliances facilitate the development of 
business. All types of alliances are essential to small business success, and incubators pull 
them together to work as a cohesive unit. (Allen and McCluskey, 1990) 
It is possible that an incubator can "fill in" for an entrepreneur's "impoverished 
network." It is worth considering that a network of very similar individuals and companies 
may be of limited use to an entrepreneur in search of buyers and backers - although it may be 
useful for the business to be surrounded by similar firms (particularly in the technology 
sector). However, as Kirby (2004) points out, networking may also take the form of 
relationships with private and public sector organisations that constitute the "regional support 
infrastructure. " 
Therefore it is essential that incubator units are not "isolated" - 'when units are not 
integrated into the local innovation strategy or lack support of the key local enterprise 
organisations, they become no more than Managed Workspaces, and integration is at the heart 
of the concept' (Bennett and Mc Coshan, 1993, cited in Kirby, 2003). 
In the development of technology, 'sharing' and the development of 'alliances' takes on 
massive importance. This may go as far as joint research and development but certainly most 
small high technology companies benefit from information sharing (Carayannis et aI., 2000). 
Moreover, these alliances are increasingly likely to bring about seed capital than an 
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'isolationist' approach (Ibid.) Thus; the role of good management is to facilitate rich 
networking opportunities both with national and community organisations as well amongst 
the actual businesses inside the incubator. Indeed, "learning from your peers while you all 
grow your businesses is a key incubator selling point". (Barrow, 2001) .The atmosphere and 
awareness of mutual support both from the incubator staff and tenants contributes to better 
efficiency and success rate (Ibid). 
This reported experience of "community" amongst incubated firms is one of the most 
important, and unique benefits of the incubation process. By placing several new 
entrepreneurs in the same, supportive, environment several' intangible' benefits accrue. First, 
entrepreneurs are able to learn from each other's successes and mistakes .. Second, they are in 
an 'innovation rich' environment where new ideas are likely to emerge and be encouraged. 
Third, there should be an atmosphere of mutual support created by the commonality of 
purpose and circumstance amongst incubatees and are I ikely to exchange advice and 
information. Andrew Parkinson, president and chief executive of Peapod says the chief 
benefit of the incubator was "office space at very cheap rent" and the moral support from 
other startups. (Quittner, 1999) 
Thus, at the "social level" an incubator can be described as a "true entrepreneurial 
community," shared circumstances, similar attitudes and a determination to "triumph in 
adversity" added to the professional mentoring by incubator staff leads, hopefully, to a 
dynamic and supportive environment for new business (Garrity, 2002). There are clear 
tangible benefits too to the incubator community. According to Sherman and Chappell (1998) 
some studies show that incubator participants collaborate with one another (one study 
revealed that lout of every 6 incubated firms had partnerships with the other incubatees). 
D) Access to Funding 
As part of their 'networking' role, incubators are often able to bring together a diverse range 
of funding resources to provide financial assistance for entrepreneurs. Funding may be public or 
private and often comes in the form of grants. One of the main benefits of business incubation is 
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the access to funding it provides. This funding may be direct (i.e. from the incubator itself) or 
indirect (from the incubator helping incubated businesses seek grants and loans). 
In the case of direct funding, the incubator may well have a "revolving loan pool" 
which is able to give micro-loans (e.g. between £20,000 - £50,000) to incubator tenants. 
Because the incubated firms have already met the necessary entrance criteria, additional credit 
assessments (of the type typically required by lending institutions) are not ordinarily required. 
It is also likely that any loans will be at relatively low (sometimes zero) interest rates. 
Moreover, funding is often also available to provide small emergency loans for tenants 
suffering temporary cash-flow difficulties. 
In the instance of indirect funding, incubators are often able to provide 'capital 
referrals'. This involves incubator management leveraging their network of contacts amongst 
local banks, investors and venture capitalists and putting together a proper loan/capital 
package presentation with the tenant. According to the NBIA, 58% of incubators help connect 
their client companies to investors and strategic partners. 
Despite the high value of the funding-access role performed by incubators, this does not 
prohibit capital-rich SMEs from joining an incubator. The numerous other benefits provided 
by the incubator make it an attractive tool for business development even amongst firms with 
ample financing in place. (See appendix C for additional information on funding) 
E) Commercialisation and Marketing 
A number of stages are necessary for developing innovative products into a 
commercially successful business: idea; concept testing; feasibility assessment; property 
rights protection (eg patent); prototyping and production practice; product testing; start up. An 
important function of incubators is to help firms to go through the whole process of 
commercialisation in a systematic and fast-track way. Generally, the process can be divided 
into the first part of technology or product development, and the second part of marketing. 
To accomplish the first part, incubators should have strengths in the provision of 
technological facilities and specialist professional consultation. 
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On the second part, incubators need marketing professions to assist companies at an 
early stage. In this era, it is important to understand the global market. not just the local 
market. Incubators need to be able to provide international marketing and business training 
programmes and advice. 
In addition to training programmes, the services considered the most important when it 
comes to sales and marketing are: marketing position statement, consumer feedback test. 
corporate identity package, advertising and placement, access to market information, public 
relations, and so on. In addition, incubators can hold promotional events for incubated 
enterprises, such as open house, entrepreneur week, enterprise picnic, cocktail nights etc 
(Adkins,1995). 
F) Location and Goals 
According to the OECD, the areas chosen as incubator sites should ideally provide 
access to markets for goods and services (as small firms within an incubator stand to benefit 
from trade and networking with larger companies outside) as well as a degree of business 
expertise in the surrounding community, diverse financial resources (such as venture capital 
funds, business angels, banks etc.) and local commitment to the incubator programme. 
However such ideal conditions will often be lacking, especially as incubators are often 
established in response to local economic distress. Consequently, prior to setting up a 
business incubator it may be necessary to improve the local climate for entrepreneurship so as 
to encourage demand for the services an incubator would provide (OECD, 1999, .9). 
In many countries local governments, industry representative bodies and local financial 
institutions playa role in the financing of business incubators, heightening the significance of 
the nexus and the local economy (OECD, 1999). For instance, a number of incubators in Italy 
have become focal points for alliances between leaders from politics, business and trades 
unions. And in Australia incubators have developed through partnerships involving local, 
state and commonwealth governments (OECD, 1999, 9). 
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Incubators will vary between economies and regions depending on the local conditions. 
culture and the range of other business development service available. The prevailing local 
circumstances often dictate incubator 'objectives.' They may also dictate success rates and the 
effectiveness of particular incubators. The economic characteristics of the location in which 
an incubator is established will greatly affect its operation and usefulness. According to the 
OECD report (1999: 98) For instance, as Colombo and Delmastro (2002) note, Italian 
incubators have a higher 'success rate' than many of their UK equivalents because they 
specialise in providing for New Technology Based Firms (NBTFs) for which there is very 
little 'infrastructural support' within the local economy but which are able to link with, and 
sell to, larger local businesses who lack local technology suppliers. In comparison, UK 
technology incubators are often "clustered" around technology "hubs" (e.g. the Silicon Fen in 
Cambridgeshire) and do not cater to specific local industries. Although the UK model has 
significant networking and knowledge-transfer advantages it often lacks an obvious, local, 
route to market for SME products. 
G) Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property right protection provides incentives to individuals and firms to 
undertake innovative research. Governments could work to provide an adequate and 
functional intellectual property infrastructure to help incubators to commercialize intellectual 
property. 
2.3.2.2 External Features 
External conditions for a successful business incubator might include several 
interlinked key components and can be expressed as, public policy that stimulates business 
environment conducive to entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial culture) and enterprise creation; 
Government policy favorable to business development, Linkages to knowledge base, of 
learning and research, networks of business professionals, Private sector growth, financial 
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sector, such as equity and debt finance, and public incubator investment. It is believed that all 
these influence an incubator and make the task more or less difficult. 
A) Entrepreneurship, a Culture of Enterprise and Firm Creation 
Entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial culture) and enterprise creation refers to creating a 
business environment conducive to entrepreneurship and enterprise creation in which 
innovative young firms have scope to expand rapidly. Entrepreneurship refers to an 
individual's ability to turn ideas into action. It includes creativity, innovation and risk 
acceptance, as well as the ability to plan and manage projects in order to achieve objectives. 
This supports everyone in day-to-day life at home and in society, makes employees more 
aware of the context of their work and better able to seize opportunities, and provides a 
foundation for entrepreneurs establishing a social or commercial activity. (Commission 
Communication, 2006) 
Entrepreneurs are agents of change and growth in a market economy and they can act to 
accelerate the generation, dissemination and application of innovative ideas. Entrepreneurs 
not only seek out and identify potentially profitable economic opportunities but are also 
willing to take risks to see if their plans are right. While not all entrepreneurs succeed, a 
country with a lot of entrepreneurial activity is likely to be constantly generating new or 
improved products and services, which in turn generate new employment opportunities. 
A study carried out by the (OEeD, 1998), makes it clear that the subject of 
entrepreneurship is a complex one and the framing of policy to address it is a complex task. 
Nurturing entrepreneurship has been increasingly accepted and acknowledged as an 
instrumental factor driving the emergence and growth of new business (McMullan and 
Graham, 1986). In a world increasingly characterized by global markets and rapid economic 
and technological change a strong entrepreneurial culture is essential. Therefore, the creation 
and expansion of small enterprises is accepted as the most important mechanism for 
employment growth (Baumol, 1990). 
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By taking risks and translating ideas into business results, the entrepreneur contributes 
positively to economic development of the country. Entrepreneurial activity and new firm 
creation are viewed as engines of economic growth and innovation (Murphy, et al., 1991). 
The importance of new firm formation for growth has been emphasized since Schumpeter 
(1934). 
According to Petrin (1994) entrepreneurial orientation is based on stimulating local 
entrepreneurial talent and subsequent growth of indigenous companies. This in turn would 
create jobs and add economic value to a region, and at the same time it will keep scarce 
resources within the community. 
Furthermore, studies in various parts of the world have indicated that rural enterprises 
can be an important modernizing agent for small agriculture. Governments have supported 
this process by creating incentives for agro-industry to invest in such regions. This has not 
only been in developing countries, but it has also been a clear policy of the European Union 
(EU) which channels a large part of the total common budget to develop the backward and 
less developed regions of Europe. 
Lyson (1995) identifies the prospects of small-enterprise framework as a possible rural 
development strategy for economically disadvantaged communities and provides this 
description of the nature of small-scale flexibly specialized firms: "First, these businesses 
would provide products for local consumption that are not readily available in the mass 
market. Second, small-scale technically sophisticated enterprises would be able to fill the 
niche markets in the national economy that are too small for mass producers. Third, small, 
craft-based, flexibly specialized enterprises can alter production quickly to exploit changing 
market conditions." 
8) Education for Entrepreneurship 
As a result of the growing interest in entrepreneurship as a driving force to economic 
development and job creation, policy makers at the macro level have generated and 
implemented a comprehensive system for venture support. This integrated system consists of 
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entities such as innovation centres, incubators science parks (McMullan and Long, 1987). 
Beside these entities, academic institutions such as universities have been singled out to 
contribute by offering appropriate entrepreneurship education courses and training 
(Laukkanen, 2000). 
The Spring European Council of March 2006 underlined the need for an overall 
positive entrepreneurial climate and for framework conditions that facilitate and encourage 
entrepreneurship, and invited Member States to introduce stronger measures, including 
entrepreneurship education. Following the European Conference in Oslo in October 2006, 
which presented a wealth of good practice examples, the Commission published the "Oslo 
Agenda for Entrepreneurship Education in Europe II 
Entrepreneurship education should not be confused with general business and economic 
studies; its goal is to promote creativity, innovation and self-employment, via developing 
personal attributes and skills that form the basis of an entrepreneurial mindset and behavior 
(creativity, sense of initiative, risk-taking, autonomy, self-confidence, leadership, team spirit, 
etc.), raising the awareness of students about self-employment and entrepreneurship as 
possible career options; and providing specific business skills and knowledge of how to start a 
company and run it successfully. 
Entrepreneurial programmes and modules offer students the tools to think creatively, be 
an effective problem solver, analyse a business idea objectively, and communicate, network, 
lead, and evaluate any given project. Students feel more confident about setting up their own 
business as they can now test their own business ideas in an educational, supportive 
environment. However, the benefits of entrepreneurship education are not limited to boosting 
start-ups, innovative ventures and new jobs. Entrepreneurship is a competence for all, helping 
young people to be more creative and self-confident in whatever they undertake. 
The Recommendation of the European Parliament and the Council of t 8 December 
2006 on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning identifies the "sense of initiative and 
II Ahttp://ec.europa.eulenterpriselentrepreneurshiplsupport_ measuresltraininL education/index. htrn) 
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entrepreneurship" as one of eight key competences that should be put across at all stages of 
education and training12 . Higher education is not isolated from previous levels of educations. 
It should reflect what is done at school. Entrepreneurship is a combination of mindsets, 
knowledge and skills. As mindsets take shape at an early age, entrepreneurship is something 
that should be fostered already at school. 
Higher education is normally highly decentralized, but there are examples of public 
policy that drive entrepreneurship, for instance based on cooperation between public 
administrations and universities. Universities and technical institutions (e.g. polytechnics) 
should integrate entrepreneurship as an important part of the curriculum, spread across 
different subjects, and require or encourage students to take entrepreneurship courses. 
Special attention should be paid to systematically integrating entrepreneurship training 
into scientific and technical studies and within technical institutions, to facilitate spin-offs and 
innovative start-ups, and to help researchers acquire entrepreneurial skills. There needs to be 
more focus on developing the skills necessary for fully exploiting innovation and knowledge 
transfer activities in combination with the commercialisation of new technologies. 
Academic spin-offs are increasingly seen as important means of enhancing local 
economic development. However, in their new roles, scientists and universities must build 
business and managerial competencies. 
More generally, students in all fields, including Humanities, Arts and Creative studies, 
can greatly benefit from learning about gaining experience of entrepreneurship. In fact, 
entrepreneurial mindsets, knowledge and abilities would be of benefit to young people in all 
walks of life and in a variety of jobs. At higher education level, the primary purpose of 
entrepreneurship education should be to develop entrepreneurial capacities and mindsets. 
Developing Entrepreneurship Skills in Higher Education' refers primarily to the 
development of entrepreneurship skills· 3 in students through teaching and learning of and 
12 Best Procedure" Projects. Final Reports are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eulenterprisclentrepreneurshipisupport_measuresltraininLeducationlindex.htm) 
13 Entrepreneurship skills include leadership, creativity. marketing/sales, negotiation, administration, time management. self-
motivation, financial management and a range of interpersonal skills. 
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about entrepreneurshipl4; and secondarily to the development of entrepreneurial faculties, 
staff and universities '5 . While different the two activities are linked as the teaching of 
entrepreneurship and requisite entrepreneurial skills requires both knowledgeable staff and 
innovative pedagogy such as internships or business plan competitions not usually part of the 
standard university teaching programme. 
The current urge to foster entrepreneurship skills teaching and learning in Higher 
Education curricula and develop 'Entrepreneurial Universities' is an expression of more 
fundamental changes in the tertiary education sector and society at large. On one hand, we 
need to recognise that employment prospects for university graduates are changing. Long-
term public sector employment is decreasing and with an increase in outsourcing many 
employees are expected to move to self-employment or small to medium size businesses. 
Moreover, the creation of new knowledge-based or social enterprises is seen as vital to 
maintaining competitiveness in a global ising world and to address social and environmental 
issues effectively (Small Business Service, 2005). Miclea (2004) noted that graduates are 
expected to be job-creators rather than being job-seekers. 
On the other hand, universities are recognising their responsibility to provide a useful 
and relevant educational experience. Responding to external pressures, universities around the 
world have started to change the way they operate (Clark, 2004: 1). Entrepreneurialism is not 
(anymore) a concept foreign to academia. There is an increasing interest in co-operating with 
businesses and industry often leading to the input of private funding to public universities. 
Like corporations, universities diversify. Many universities have broadened their mission 
(beyond education and research) to include outreach activities such as community service and 
knowledge transfer in the form of spin-offs, incubators or enterprises. Although the 
stimulation of intellectual activity in students through transmission of theoretical knowledge 
and the advancement of knowledge through research are still important, other aspects are 
14 Entrepreneurship in the broadest sense is defined as "an activity which leads to the creation and management of a new 
organisation design to pursue a unique. innovative opportunity" (see Higher Education Academy Circular 6.2004) 
I S The term entrepreneurial university is often used in juxtaposition with traditional university meaning innovative or proactive 
(see Clark 1998.2004). 
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gaining importance such as provision for practical skills and applied knowledge and the direct 
and indirect contribution of universities to knowledge economies. Providing employability 
and entrepreneurship skills is a logical progression from this development. A 2003 European 
University Association survey of heads of European universities reveals that 90% regard the 
future employability of their graduates as important and 56% as very important aspect 
impacting on the design of university curricula. As entrepreneurship creates employment, it is 
not only intrinsically linked but may also be seen as a special form of employability 
(Moreland, 2004). 
C) Academia and Entrepreneurship Education 
Formal entrepreneurship education at the university level is relatively young. One of the 
first courses specifically addressing entrepreneurship was established at the Harvard Business 
School in 1947 (Volkmann 2004: 178). In the UK the first courses were launched in the 1980s 
together with the UKs first initiative for Enterprise in Higher Education (Elton 1991, Kirby 
1989, Kirby, 2005). Since then entrepreneurship programmes have experienced a global 
proliferation and it has been suggested that entrepreneurship will become "the major 
academic discipline for business education in the 21 st century" (Volkmann, 2004). 
Entrepreneurship programmes differ significantly. Some emphasise theoretical issues, 
i.e., research into the characteristics of entrepreneurship success, management models and so 
forth. Other programmes focus on entrepreneurship practice, i.e. the necessary skills such as 
interpersonal skills, business planning, idea creation, negotiation etc. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurship is being either taught by academics specializing in entrepreneurship research 
and/or actual entrepreneurs (often on a part-time basis). 
Moreover, while entrepreneurship programmes typically are offered in the business 
schools, recently different models of entrepreneurship education and training have been 
emerging. At the University of Limerick (Ireland), for example, entrepreneurship courses are 
integrated not only in the curriculum of the business school but also in engineering, the 
humanities, science and educational faculty programmes. At the University of Ulster (NIR) 
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two introductory e-Iearning modules on entrepreneurship are integrated in the UG curriculum 
of nearly all its courses, including engineering and construction/surveying. Other Universities 
have developed independent entrepreneurial units responsible for training and support of 
entrepreneurial activities of all students (Anderseck 2004). 
Despite the proliferation of entrepreneurship programmes, however, there is (still) 
considerable debate about the goals of entrepreneurship education - is it to study 
entrepreneurship? to increase the number of start-ups after graduation? or is it to eqUIp 
students with the skills, attitude and behavior enabling them to function effectively in the 
competitive atmosphere of the 21 st century and become potentially entrepreneurs? 
The latter element of developing students' skills, self-confidence, and way of thinking 
and behaving in a confident, independent and pro-active manner has the most value and 
promise for Higher Education and Built Environment Education in particular. With the 
challenges facing us in terms of creating high quality, sustainable living environments we 
need young people who are innovative and enterprising. 
Further research has shown that by modifying their curriculum to meet the needs of the 
labor market, universities are able to cultivate human and social capital with greater skill-sets 
and they create value-added networks for current students and alumni as well as faculty 
members (Sager et aI., 2006). Universities should move away from their traditional approach 
and utilize a more constructivist approach which would build their core curriculum around 
entrepreneurship education (Binks, et aI., 2006). Graduates of an entrepreneurship based 
education would have the relevant skill sets (human and social capital) that would allow them 
to support and leverage economic development in their local communities and build a 
sustainable competitive advantage for their region. Schumpeter offered the insight that 
economic development is a result of entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1934); hence, in order to 
promote economic development universities must provide a service to their region by 
promoting and sustaining entrepreneurial education. 
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D) Culture of Enterprise 
Policy makers have sought to increase the entrepreneurial capacity of young people. 
Initially, this was a response to the endemic youth unemployment of the early 1980s (Greene, 
2002), but more latterly there has been a concern to bridge the gap between the world of work 
and education (Straw and Blair, 1991). In this regard, the UK, have initiated a variety of 
schemes (e.g. School 'Compacts', the Technical and Vocational Educational Initiative and 
Education Business Partnerships) that sought in the 1980s and 1990s to prepare students for 
work. There have also been schemes, run by voluntary providers such as Young Enterprise, or 
by the UK government (e.g. Mini Enterprise in Schools Project, Enterprise Awareness in 
Teacher Education, Education and Enterprise Initiative) that were designed to improve the 
entrepreneurial awareness of teenagers. The latest iteration of this process is the Davies report 
(2002) which advocated the compulsory introduction of five days of entrepreneurial learning 
for secondary level students at a cost of £60 million by 2005/06 (HM Treasury, 2002). 
At the post secondary level, there has been a long term concern about the supply of 
young graduate entrepreneurs (Gibb et aI., 1984; Scott and Twomey, 1988). Since the 1980s, 
then, there have been a number of university based schemes (e.g. Graduate Enterprise 
Programme, Enterprise in Higher Education and the Science Enterprise Challenge). 
There is also an abundance of enterprise schemes designed to specifically help young 
people to start and run their own businesses. Perhaps the best known examples of such 
schemes are the Prince's Trust, Shell Livewire, the New Deal for Young People (UK), Law 
44 (Italy), Youth Business Initiative (Australia) and Atlantic Canada. In fact, it is estimated 
that there are at least 68 major initiatives specifically targeted at young people in Europe 
(European Commission, 2002). What all of these schemes are designed to do is to increase the 
entrepreneurial capacity of young people and increase their take up of such options. 
There is a general agreement that attitudes towards the entrepreneur, entrepreneurial 
activity, and its social function are determinant factors for university students to decide an 
entrepreneurial career. Veciana, et al. (2005) studied the attitudes of university students 
towards entrepreneurship and enterprise fonnation amongst students in two places. Results 
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revealed a positive entrepreneur's image in both samples. Both samples have a favorable 
perception of desirability of new venure creation, although the perception of feasibility was 
not very positive and only small and only a small percentage had the firm intention to create 
new company. 
When it comes to the promotion of enterprise, it is important to consider the many 
influences on young men and women in their decision to start their own business. Collectively 
these influences make up an "enterprise culture". An enterprise culture has been defined 
(Gibb, 1988) as "a set of attitudes, values and beliefs operating within a particular community 
or environment that lead to both "enterprising" behavior and aspiration towards self-
employment" . 
Gibb (1988) has identified three of the most common cultural influences affecting a 
person's decision to go into business. These are, firstly, parents or relatives - those who have 
parents or relatives working in a small business are more likely themselves to start their own 
business. Secondly, previous experience in small business employment - those who have 
worked in small enterprises as employees are more likely themselves to start their own 
business. Thirdly, enterprising environments - those young people who work in organisations 
that allow them a great deal of independence and freedom of operation under conditions of 
uncertainty are more likely themselves to start their own business. 
E) Enterprise-Focused Curriculum and Educational Experiences 
The school environment can have a significant influence on the life and career 
aspirations of young people. Enterprise education and enterprise-focused curriculum and 
educational experiences that allow young men and women to explore and consider the self-
employment option, has become an important part of many education and training institutions 
around the world. Understanding self-employment as a career option is an important 
ingredient in them for their movement from school, college or university to the workplace. 
There are two general types of enterprise education. The first is learning about business 
development, administration and management. The second is developing the skills of 
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enterprise through teaching methods that encourage responsibility, initiative and problem 
solving. The purpose of enterprise education can vary according to the type and level of 
education institution involved. In schools, for example, its main objectives are to teach and 
encourage enterprise to students and to foster their personal development; in higher education 
institutions, such as colleges and universities, students may be exposed to leaming situations. 
which develop their skills for action planning and implementation to encourage creativity and 
to develop their skills in time and personal management. (Bailey, 1995) 
White and Kenyon (2007) described the different types of enterprise education 
activities that can be used by schools, colleges and universities. These include: 
1) Whole-of-curriculum approach - where enterprise forms a part of every subject 
affecting all levels of the teaching curriculum. 
2) Cross-curriculum approach - also known as "education through enterprise", this 
approach helps students develop enterprising skills such as risk-taking, initiative, problem 
solving and possibly encouraging students to start their own business. 
3) Enterprise programmes - usually business courses that enable students to plan and 
manage their own business. 
4) An exposure programme, to help teachers better understand the dynamics of small 
business and appreciate the value of self-employment as a career option; 
5) Career information to introduce young men and women as early as possible to the 
concepts of enterprising behavior and self-employment as a realistic post-school career 
option. 
6) Exposure of successful young entrepreneurs as role models. 
7) Development of school and industry links ("industry in the class room"). And 
8) Campaigns designed to highlight the success and growth of youth enterprise. 
In this regard, technical education has always been the fast track to independence. It 
involves training in the kind of real skills that the market demands, and is always focused on 
the desired goal: jobs. But technical education also instills the kind of confidence and self-
worth that often inspires an even greater ambition: start your own business. 
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For many years, technical college graduates have found that their technical training was 
an excellent foundation for starting their own businesses. Students in fields ranoing from 
b '-
heaIthcare and information technology to welding and graphic design graduate from their 
programmes and discover that there are customers out there willing to pay for their services. 
The only obstacle between these technical college graduates and the independent life of a 
small businessperson is the knowledge needed to develop market and manage a new venture. 
That's why, in recent years, Georgia's Technical College System has begun implementing 
new programmes specifically designed to give ambitious entrepreneurs the knowledge and 
training they need to launch a new business. These programmes have been designed to quickly 
give an aspiring entrepreneur training in developing business plans, mapping out marketing 
strategies, untangling the process of incorporating and understanding tax laws. 
For five years, North Georgia Technical College l6 has been helping entrepreneurs 
through its innovative Small Business Resource Centre. North Georgia Tech is one of many 
technical colleges focusing on entrepreneurship, by teaching students step-by-step how to 
launch a business, including instruction in determining a market niche for a product or 
service, exploring financial options and understanding the legal aspects of business. "We help 
students do all their research, write a business plan and prepare to open their doors," says 
Fran Chastain, director of the Entrepreneurial Education programme at North Georgia Tech. 
he adds because of the nature of study at technical colleges, graduates are more likely to open 
their own businesses. "About 75 percent of my students are straight out of other degree or 
diploma programmes. About 25 percent come to the entrepreneurial programme because they 
already know what they want to do, but they need help to develop their plan." 
For those students who qualify, the Small Business Resource Centre can also help 
pinpoint funding through the Mountain Partnership Loan Fund, a federal grant administered by 
Appalachian Community Enterprises, a non-profit, community-based organisation in Cleveland 
that awards small loans to entrepreneurs. Many of the programme's graduates have already 
16 GCO'1ia Department of Adult and Technical Education( www.dtae.o'1) 
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launched businesses, Chastain says, including a dollar store, restaurants, pet store. landscape 
businesses and computer businesses. The college is also developing a new certificate of credit 
programme called Small Business Owner/Operator." This second certificate will teach small-
business owners more accounting and management skills," 
F) Business and Education Linkages 
Linkages between educational institutions and industry allows students to explore the 
opportunities of self-employment through the practical and direct involvement of local 
businesses. The Graduate Enterprise Programme of the United Kingdom is a national 
programme targeting final-year undergraduate students of any discipline for a range of 
training workshops and placement opportunities within local businesses. This programme 
allows students to learn more about the realities of small business and to explore their own 
potential for self-employment. 
Young Achievement Australia is a non-profit organisation which attempts to bridge 
the gap between business and education by teaching young people hands-on business skills 
while they are still in school. Supported by some 600 companies, Young Achievement 
Australia provides business education programmes to over 14,000 students each year. 
Between 1977 and 1995, over 70,000 secondary school students had participated in Young 
Achievement Australia. 
Young Achievement Australia runs Business Alive, a curriculum-based enrichment 
programme teaching senior secondary students about business through the experiences of a 
"consultant" from a sponsor organisation. Teamed with a teacher, the consultant spends 
approximately one hour per week with the students over a ten-week period. 
Host companies involved in the programme gain an opportunity to forge links with 
local schools and their students. In addition, these companies benefit by gaining a positive 
corporate image recognized by the business community, young people and the public in 
general; and their staff benefit through improved verbal presentation and public speaking 
skills from their interaction with a group of interested young people. 
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G) Undergraduate Internships 
The notion that business and management education is incomplete until the student has 
had a chance to experience real life business challenges and acquire practical know-how is 
well recognized. Such ideas have led to the proliferation of a wide assortment of business 
internship programmes at universities and colleges. In a recent survey of the College of 
Business' internship practices Zigli ( 1982), found that sixty-eight percent of the respondents 
acknowledged the existence of internship programmes for business students. The concept of 
internship as an educational tool is significant in its own right. 
However, the effective utilisation of such a tool IS a function of the realistic 
comprehension of the tool's nature, process, and potential. 
Student employment in the university typically falls into one of two categories: working 
as teaching or research assistants, and working within service units such as libraries or IT 
departments. Such employment may be considered from perspectives related to economics or 
to student involvement and success in academic programmes. 
With regard to economics, relevant issues have already been pointed OUt. 17 Student 
employment in support units, for example, provides benefits to students through employment 
on campus with minimal overhead in terms of commuting, and employment possibly related 
to each student's field of study and professional development, which helps students apply 
theoretical knowledge to practical problems and might also open up opportunities for 
employment after degree attainment. 
Economics are increasingly important to universities, but so is student success. Low 
drop-out rates and high academic achievement are important factors for student recruitment 
and for the university's position in the market. Astin (1999) pointed out that part-time student 
employment on campus is an important factor in involving and retaining students. Students 
17 I. J. Mrazek. "Student Workers: The Narcotic Tech Departments Can't Live Without," EDUCAUSE Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 
3, 2003. pp. 5-8. hnp:/Iwww.educause.edulirllibrary/pdOeqm0330.pdf. 
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relying on the institution not only as a source of education but also as a source of income are 
likely to develop a greater sense of attachment. 
Thomas and Busby (2003) discussed the experiences of three stakeholders involved in 
live projects (live projects are part of an industry and education partnership to provide level 2 
students with an opportunity to work with "real life" business problem situations). In 
particular they examined the expectations and perceptions of industry partners, tutors and 
students involved in a live project experience at Birmingham College of Food, Tourism and 
Creative Studies (BCFTCS). From a comparison of these stakeholder perspectives it can be 
suggested that although a more self-managed approach to student learning is desirable, it is 
not always achievable with large student groups and time-constrained activities. Despite this, 
the students appeared to have further developed the desired skills of communication, 
teamwork, problem solving and research, as well as the personal attributes of greater self-
confidence and leadership. 
Work-study or internship (WS/I) programmes are designed to give college students an 
opportunity to complement their formal education with career-related experience. Historically 
these programmes have been initiated by universities as a formal part of their curriculum, 
however more and more students and businesses are taking an active role in organizing these 
beneficial programmes. 
In order to compete in today's professional environment, students often need more than 
just a college degree. The lengthening periods of fonnal education for growing numbers of 
young people have changed the work/education pattern. In addition, businesses are putting 
pressure on schools to better prepare students for the actual requirements of their first 
position. These factors have created an increasing demand from students and universities for 
more and better internship experiences. 
The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) supports work-study and 
internship programmes because they help prepare students to work effectively in the business 
world after graduation. Gaining real world experience also helps participants to make more 
infonned career choices which will result in higher job satisfaction and higher productivity. 
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SHRM developed a guidebook to assist its professional and student chapters to create new 
internship opportunities and to improve upon existing programmes for the mutual benefit of all 
participants. The Society's student membership programme is to increase the number of work-
study and internship experiences available in human resource management (HRM). A greater 
number of internship opportunities will result in better placement of HRM graduates, and a 
higher level of experience and professionalism among these entry-level workers. 
H) Conducive Policy Environment for Employment Creation 
Policies, institutions and regulations that provide an enabling environment for small 
enterprise can make a substantial contribution to employment creation. Paula et at. (2003) 
assessed the policy environment for small enterprises in Tanzania. They concluded that 
despite small enterprises dominating the enterprise landscape in Tanzania the sector can be 
characterized as survivalist and providing poor quality employment. This situation is 
aggravated by the policy and legal framework in which SMEs operate. Similarly, Jennifer 
(2002) assessed the policy environment in South Africa and noted that inadequate access to 
finance, lack of skills and poor business conditions remain the primary factors constraining 
SMEs performance. 
The ILO (1999) estimated that, out of a world labor force of 3 bill ion people, 25 to 30 
per cent were underemployed and about 140 million workers were fully unemployed. The 
ILO further estimated that 60 million young people between the ages of 15 and 25 were in 
search of work but could not find it then. 
The employment situation since then has not changed much: of special social concern 
still is the severity of youth unemployment worldwide. Youth unemployment still seems to be 
directly related to the overall unemployment rate which depends on the prevailing economic 
situation of the country. 
Statistics show that the youth unemployment rate in most countries (as well in 
industrialized, in transition and developing countries) is two or three times higher than the 
general unemployment. with some notable exceptions in Europe such as in Austria, 
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Germany,lceland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland and most recently in Denmark, Ireland and 
the Netherlands. 
In all of the countries having low youth unemployment rates, vocational education and 
training (VET) is based on vocational schools having close enterprise relations. Some 
programmes In countries successfully combating youth unemployment are based on 
enterprise-based apprenticeship training provided by private companies, combined with 
school based learning and sometime also by technical training provided in schools. 
Many developing countries have experienced a significant rise in unemployment among 
educated workers, principally among holders of university degrees. This worsening 
unemployment problem appears to be linked to the slowdown of recruitment in the public 
sector, the principal employer for educated workers in developing countries. A typical 
example of these countries is Morocco where the unemployment rate among educated 
workers in 2000 was 27.5%, as opposed to 7.1 % among non-educated workers. This 
deterioration in employment rates is particularly important for workers with Bachelor's 
degrees, for whom the unemployment rate is currently above 40%. 
In their study on the unemployment of educated workers in Morocco, Bougroum and 
Trachen (1999) argue that the first concern of those workers is to reach a permanent and 
stable job in the public sector, and that in this desire, they might consider risking long periods 
of unemployment. Also, Orivel (1995) notices an extreme preference for employment in the 
public sector in African countries, a fact which results in assigning highly educated workers 
to non-productive employment in the public sector and then in negligible contributions of 
education to the economic growth. In addition to job stability, the public sector generally 
offers higher wages as compared to the private sector, which suggests that the unemployment 
of educated workers could be equilibrium since some workers rationally, prefer to remain 
unemployed while waiting for employment in the public sector. A similar argument was 
advanced by Harris and Todaro (1970) to explain high urban unemployment in developing 
countries. Because of a substantial wage differential between urban and rural areas, some 
rural workers choose to migrate to urban areas in search of high-wage employment, which in 
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tum results in a positive urban unemployment rate. The continuation of such mioration in 
e 
spite of high risk of unemployment constitutes a rational choice on the part of migrants 
looking to improve their economic situation. 
In Egypt, Psacharopoulos and Sanyal (1982) compaired student expectations and actual 
labor market performance. The results indicated that the relative structure of economic 
rewards is consistent with the operation of the forces of supply and demand. In particular, 
students' expectations of the labor market are in tune with the actual market conditions. The 
social demand for different fields of specialisation is closely linked to the expected economic 
rewards. A strong element of self-selection is in operation. Many students follow highly 
undesirable subjects (such as agronomy) because of the availability of places. As already 
documented in other studies, expected or actual unemployment following graduation is of 
extremely short duration. 
Salma M. AI-Lamki (1998) studied the determine barriers to Omanisation (employment 
of Omani nationals) in the private sector as perceived by the senior graduating students at the 
Sultan Qaboos University (SQU). Results from the data analysis have shown that over 65 per 
cent of respondents indicated a work preference in the government (public sector). A 
significant majority of the students confirmed that obstacles to Omanisation in the private 
sector exist. All of the 20 items on the questionnaire recorded mean values ranging between 
moderate (3) and High Degree (4) on a 5-point scale, reflecting a relatively high level of 
obstruction to Omanisation in the private sector. The most deterring items to Omanisation in 
the private sector as perceived by the students were related to the compensation and benefits 
package offered in the private sector. The private sector employees' compensation and 
benefits package was perceived to be less attractive than that offered in the government 
(public sector). The lack of information (awareness) about the private sector employment 
opportunities was also overwhelmingly perceived as a major obstacle to Omanisation in the 
private sector. 
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I) Business Academic Links 
University, industry and Government have been trying various methods to create an 
environment for interchange of knowledge and thereby increase productivity and economic 
growth. Education and research must be geared to relevance, competence, excellence. 
entrepreneurship and development. Educational institutions must accept extension and public 
service as a third dimension, in addition to training and research. It is increasingly being 
advocated that higher educational and research institutions should be involved not only in 
generating but also in transferring such knowledge to industry and to the society at large. 
They should act as seedbeds for technological innovation and new industrial ideas. 
Traditionally, several mechanisms have been employed to develop closer interactions 
between academic research and industry, such as, use of university faculty as consultants in 
industry; research projects in university funded by industry; students hired by industry; 
visiting professorship filled by industry scientists; advisory committee membership to 
university faculty; and universities providing special courses to industrial personnel. 
University spin-off is another form of university-industry interaction; mostly prevalent in the 
USA. In this case the academic starts his own venture, either taking temporary leave from the 
university or leaving the job altogether. The spin-off phenomena are relatively frequent in the 
field of biotechnology and information technology. 
The growing intensity of university-industry ties has been one of the most profound 
organisational changes that shape the work experiences of academic scientists over the past 
two decades. The 'triple helix' thesis (Etzkowitz, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) 
argues that the development of closer ties among academia, industry and government 
represents a new mode of knowledge production that will bring about greater autonomy and 
flexibility for researchers. It highlights the emergence of a 'dual cognitive mode' among 
academic researchers and the development of a new class of entrepreneurial scientists who 
focus both on fundamental advances in knowledge and its commercial capitalisation. In 
contrast, the academic capitalism theory (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Croissant et aI., 2001) 
sees the increased emphasis on the economic role of universities as a form of 'academic 
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capitalism' signifying the encroachment of a profit motive into academia. It postulates those 
closer ties between the two sectors may result in the erosion of academic autonomy. work role 
conflicts and the emergence of a precariously integrated knowledge structure dependent on a 
growing army of non-permanent researchers designed to support flexible industrial projects. 
Despite the on-going debate, there have been few detai led empirical studies, on the 
impact of closer business ties on the work experiences and professional orientations of 
academic scientists. In general, there is a growing body of research that stresses the 
importance of careers and human resource linkages to collaboration and knowledge sharing 
between the scientific and business communities (Lam, 2007; Zucker et aI., 2002). 
University-industry links and the collaboration of scientists across the two sectors have 
long been shown to be problematic. This is particularly because of the difficulty of 
reconciling the divergent work norms and career interests of scientists with the needs of the 
two different kinds of institutions (David et aI., 1999). The sociology of science literature 
argues that scientists are motivated primarily by recognition awarded by the scientific 
community for establishing priority in discovery (Merton, 1957; Hagstrom, 1965). The 
academic career system provides a basis for promotion tournament whereby competition with 
one's peers for prestige and promotion acts as a powerful incentive for scientists to do good 
science (Lazear, 1995; Freeman et aI., 2001). 
What, then, motivates academic scientists to build links with firms and engage in dual 
work roles? What are the tensions and career risks inherent in hybrid roles and how might 
these be reconciled? 
Colleges and universities have long been important components to regional economic 
and workforce growth and development. Academic programme offerings, faculty engagement 
and consultation, and professional development and support for small business have 
characterized much of this support. Lately, there has been a growing body of academic 
research on the role of universities in regional development. Much of which has been 
primarily concerned with two issues: economic analyses of the direct employment effects 
associated with staff and student spending in the local economy and technology transfer, 
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particularly through the creation of spin off companies and the establishment of "industrial" 
and "science parks" (Goddard, et aI., 1994). However. recent research has shown that 
universities have not as been successful in creating sustainable environments that enhance 
technology transfer and the commercialisation of intellectual property from the university 
(Wright et aI., 2004). In contrast, research universities have been able to capitalize on 
generating revenue from their research projects resulting in patents and other methods of 
technology transfer (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Furthermore, as a result of bias that exists in 
academia, regional universities may be viewed as institutions that repress the growth of 
human and social capital and they have not been able to capitalize on the large funding 
models (Wright, et aI., 2004). 
More recently, the role of universities in regional development has been seen as 
transcending this narrow technical and economic approach to embrace the role of universities 
in enhancing human capital within a region. Examples include certificate and degree 
programmes in entrepreneurship, workshops and seminars, technical and administrative 
assistance, and resource referral. It also includes recruiting students from outside the region 
and placing them with local companies through internships, co-ops, and part-time 
employment; programmes of continuing and professional development to enhance the skills 
and knowledge base of local managers; embedding international businesses by targeted 
training programmes and research links. This could provides a gateway to the broader and 
international knowledge base for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and provide strategic 
analysis and leadership within local civic society. The fact that expectations of and 
opportunities for colleges and universities is rising can be traced to fundamental shifts in the 
organisation of production and the related regulation of the economy reflected in the 
processes of globalisation and localisation. 
Recently, there has been an increasing emphasis on the generation of commercial 
outcomes from university-based research. At the policy level, the commercialisation of 
university research has been viewed as a key driver of national competitiveness, and been 
consequently supported by a range of initiatives seeking to promote the links between 
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universities and industry (Henderson et aI., 1998; Mowery et aI., 2002). Many universities 
have taken great strides in pushing commercial agendas to generate more financial value from 
their research, by creating new structures and encouraging entrepreneurial activities (Hackett, 
2001a; Phan and Siegel, 2006). Some scholars have suggested that these changes are bringing 
about an 'academic revolution' towards more entrepreneurial universities, in which 
commercial outputs become the norm rather than an optional side activity (Etzkowitz et aL 
2000; Owen-Smith, 2003). However, such a transition is likely to be both painful and difficult 
to achieve, and at the moment the evidence of universities developing commercial capabilities 
is mixed (Markman et aI., 2005b; Owen-Smith, 2003; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Stern, 
2004). At its heart, the challenge essentially involves taking an organisation that is equipped 
for and accustomed to doing one thing (academic research) and at the same time asking it to 
build a capacity for doing something entirely different (commercialisation of technologies and 
ideas). The extraordinary challenge here is that universities and their faculty are not simply 
required to switch from one (single-handed) activity to another, but to develop the 
simultaneous capacity for two activities (academic rigor and commercialisation). Thus, 
tensions arise at the level of the organisation as a whole as it strives to manage these two sets 
of activities at the same time, and also at the level of the individual who has to work out how 
to balance his or her time between competing demands. As we know from the significant 
literature on ambidexterity in the wider domain of organisation theory, this dual focus is very 
hard to manage (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Much of the research as well as the rhetoric 
around the 'entrepreneurial university' (Etzkowitz, 1998) anticipates research institutions 
learning to manage these conflicting demands, but reality shows mixed results in terms of 
adequate university structures and policies as well as career tracks and trainings for 
individuals. While a considerable stream of research has dealt with the specific results of such 
a dual focus, such as technology transfer mechanisms and commercialisation practices and the 
subsequent success and failure of commercial projects (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; 
Markman et aI., 2005a; Phan and Siegel, 2006), few researchers have addressed the very roots 
of this new paradigm. 
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The tension between academic and commercial demands is more salient at the level of 
the individual researcher than at the level of the organisation. Universities show evidence of 
being able to manage the tensions between academic and commercial demands throuoh the 
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creation of dual structures. At the individual level, on the other hand, the tensions are more 
acute, and people who are accustomed to a traditional academic career are typically less able 
to deliver commercial outcomes. 
J) Commercialisation of University-Driven Research 
Universities research commercialisation is the process of converting research into 
successfully marketed products and industrial processes is improving. The trend for firms to 
allocate a growing proportion of their R&D investment to university based projects is 
indicative of the growing linkages between the two sectors. In recent years, there has been 
increasing public interest in promoting the commercialisation of university-driven research. 
This has occurred across almost all countries, and also among the various institutional players 
associated with research and innovation (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). Most universities 
now have corporate plans that define their missions, identify target markets and specify 
financial and other performance targets (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005). The trend has been 
driven by a recognition that research conducted in collaboration with industry can be a potent 
source of innovation (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Cohen et aI., 2002; Lam, 2005), and by 
changes in governmental policies and legislation such as the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the 
United States (Henderson et aI., 1998; Mowery et aI., 2002). Consequently, there is a growing 
amount of governmental and institutional funding available for public-private R&D projects, 
and an increasing number of universities are founding structures focused on the 
commercialisation of scientific discoveries (Phan and Siegel, 2006). 
The institutional changes have created tensions between facilitating the diffusion of 
new knowledge as a public good and controlling its private ownership and value (Argyres and 
Liebeskind. 1998; Etzkowitz et aI., 2000). Indeed, as Etzkowitz (1998, p. 824) argues. -the 
incorporation of --extension of knowledge" into a compatible relationship with -'capitalisation 
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of knowledge" is a profound normative change in science'. Taken together, the developments 
have led to several pressure points between academia and the commercial sector (Lockett et 
aI., 2003), at both the organisational and individual level. 
It is widely recognized that commercializing academic research is difficult, and the 
heart of the problem is the inherent tension between academic and commercial demands 
(West, 2008). 
This barrier takes several forms. First, universities and industry are likely to prioritize 
different research goals. Industry usually focuses on less risky research with direct 
commercial applicability, while government-funded academic research institutions typically 
undertake projects with longer time horizons and less predictability (Di Gregorio and Shane, 
2003). Second, academia traditionally encourages knowledge dissemination and full 
disclosure of methods and results, whereas the commercial sector actively seeks ownership 
and tight control of intellectual property (Arrow, 1962; Kremer, 1998). This may be slowly 
changing through the emergence of open innovation platforms (Chesbrough, 2003), but many 
of the underlying tensions remain as West's (2008) study on the commercialisation of the 
Shannon Theory demonstrates. Third, and related to the second point, the academic research 
community is incentivized to publish its breakthrough ideas as quickly and widely as 
possible, while commercial interests often seek to delay the publication process and keep 
some findings hidden (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stem, 2004) 
The tensions are no less profound for individual researchers, and it is known from 
previous research that academic scientists vary significantly in their entrepreneurial 
involvement (Louis et aI., 1989). First, there is a strong intrinsic sense amongst scholars that 
academic and commercial activities represent fundamentally different and potentially 
contradictory endeavours (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2003; Owen-Smith, 2003). As Dasgupta 
and David (] 994) recognized, communities of scientific peers shape the definition of what 
constitutes a valuable avenue for research, and this makes it risky for a scholar to deviate 
from the social norm of conducting academically rigorous research in order to seek 
commercial accomplishments (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2003). Second The dominant reward 
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system in universities can act as a major cultural barrier to commercialisation of university 
research. Researchers are more likely to be rewarded on the basis of their publ ication rate and 
success in achieving external research grants. Whilst traditional academic publications and 
conference presentations continue to be important channels for technology transfer and 
generating awareness of new technology, universities and funding bodies need to have the 
flexibility to offer options to researchers pursuing commercial lines of work (Markman et aL 
2005a). A successful academic career requires significant investment in a specific style of 
research, paper-writing and network-building, which essentially means little time for pursuing 
other commercial activities (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Third, most university researchers are 
not entrepreneurs and they do not want to learn how to become entrepreneurs. They may lack 
the competence to undertake commercial activities as they require different skills and abilities 
than purely academic ones (Lockett et aI., 2003; Shane, 2002). 
However, there are also some researchers who my have the aptitude and taste for 
entrepreneurship and who might be the best people to commercialise their own inventions. In 
addition, there may be some reluctance on the part of senior faculty to alter a system that has 
provided the basis for their own success and recognition (Markides, 2007). The formidable 
challenge in addressing these tensions, at the organisational or the individual level, lies in the 
path-dependence of academic and commercial activities. Organisations are products of their 
administrative heritage (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), and core competences can easily evolve 
into 'core rigidities' (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Similarly, individuals are bound by their 
experiences and socialized into specific work environments (Adkins, 1995; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1999). This path-dependency tends to reinforce existing patterns of behaviour 
and my make universities, and their staff, resistant to change. 
K) Government Policy Favourable to Business Development 
Creating a business environment conducive to entrepreneurship and enterprise creation 
in which innovative young firms have scope to expand rapidly once they have established 
themselves requires a broad range of mutually reinforcing and supportive policies. Many of 
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these affect the economy as a whole but impinge importantly on potential entrepreneurs and 
SMEs. These include sound fiscal and monetary policies, which are essential to provide a 
basis for a stable macroeconomic environment. They also include structural policies that 
determine the overall economic framework in which the business sector operates. such as 
those affecting labor markets, tax design, competition, financial markets and bankruptcy laws 
(OECD, 2004). 
There is considerable evidence that regulatory and administrative burdens can impinge 
adversely on entrepreneurial activity. Legal entry barriers should obviously be avoided unless 
their benefits are very clear, since they appear to be associated with less private investment, 
higher consumer prices and greater corruption. Employment regulation, which the World 
Bank finds is generally more flexible in advanced countries than in developing economies, 
limits management flexibility and leads to smaller firm size and less research and 
development as well as less investment in technology (World Bank study,2000). 
Culture is increasingly acknowledged as a factor which can contribute to building an 
entrepreneurial society as it is an important determinant of career preferences and helps 
shape attitudes to risk-taking and reward. Developing an entrepreneurial culture and 
fostering entrepreneurial attitudes and values has moved high on government agendas. 
Education and training (including lifelong training) in entrepreneurship and creativity are 
the preferred instruments for encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour in societies, and 
evidence suggests that such programmes can have an impact on entrepreneurial activity and 
enterprise performance. However, in spite of the numerous initiatives launched and 
implemented in recent years, a number of shortcomings and problems characterise this 
domain: entrepreneurship is not sufficiently integrated into educational curricula or 
integrated into national long-term economic strategy and planning; a lack of public 
resources has resulted in limited teaching and research capability in this field; there is a 
need to improve co-ordination among government agencies when designing and 
implementing initiatives; there is a need for a broader acceptance of the concept of 
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education and training for entrepreneurship; and both more data and more evaluation and 
assessment of initiatives taken are needed (OEeD, 2004). 
Entrepreneurship and SME policies also have an important local dimension. Indeed. 
facilitating increasing rates of enterprise creation is an almost universal concern for local 
authorities who seek to accelerate development or reverse decline in localities, whether 
disadvantaged or prosperous. Programmes aimed at reducing social distress and 
unemployment, including chronic unemployment, have been implemented in many countries 
(Looney, 2004). New enterprises can procure a range of benefits that contribute to local 
development, including: rises in employment and incomes; enhanced provision of services for 
consumers and businesses; and possibly, demonstration and motivational effects. 
Determinants of rates of enterprise creation at the local level include demographics, 
unemployment, wealth, the educational and occupational profile of the workforce, the 
prevalence of other small firms and infrastructure endowment. 
Governments often need to go beyond provision of the framework conditions that 
influence the business environment to address policy and market failures that dampen 
entrepreneurial activity and limit the scope for innovative small firms to grow. In practice, 
this requires programmes and support policies for small enterprises which may be complex 
and involve scarce resources. Many of these programmes and policies are designed and 
implemented at the local level. To ensure that these programmes are cost effective and well 
targeted, it is important that they are systematically reviewed, assessed and evaluated. 
2.4 Evaluative Literature 
2.4.1 Metrics and 'Benchmarking' 
According to ECEDG in Europe (2002), a European Commission initiative, 
benchmarking is "a practical tool for improving performance by learning from best practices 
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and the processes by which they are achieved". In the context of business incubation. this 
involves the identification of successful incubation environments, an analysis of their 
practices and characteristics and the development of indicators and measures to describe those 
practices and characteristics to enhance the quality of provision. There is consequently an 
increasing demand from stakeholders and policy makers to identify and establish good 
practice as well as develop 'benchmarks' to measure performance and impact. For incubation 
management teams, benchmarking is also a very important means of identifying strengths and 
weaknesses, monitoring and comparing their performance against others, and progressively 
upgrading their performance. Benchmarking is an invaluable tool to help incubation 
environments make the transition from start-up and early development phases through to 
achieving a full-service, mature, sustainable business model (Lalkaka, 2001 a). 
2.4.2 Establishing the Metrics for Incubation Programmes. 
There is no clear cut standard to measure incubator performance (Phan et aI., 2005). 
Allen and McCluskey (1990) extract different measures from their literature review: tenant 
employment, incubator period, tenant success rate, local retention of graduates and added 
value of incubator services. They evaluate incubator size and occupancy rate, jobs created and 
firms graduated. Mian's research (1994a, 1996b, 1997) focuses on university technology 
business incubators in the US. His 1994 article describes their management, policies and 
performance, and in 1996 he assesses them by exploring their value added contributions to 
technology-based start-ups. Mian, (1997) groups incubator assessment research around four 
approaches in the management literature: (1) goal approach, (2) system resource approach, (3) 
stakeholder approach, (4) internal process approach. He introduces four dimensions in his 
assessment framework on the performance of university technology business incubators: (1) 
programme growth and sustainability, (2) tenant survival and growth, (3) contributions to 
sponsoring university'S mission and (4) community-related impacts. Also the scope and 
effectiveness of the facility management policies and the provision of services are assessed. 
The European Commission (2002) emphasises that survival rates are one indicator of the 
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performance of incubators but that the extent to which incubators can contribute to the 
accelerated development of innovative, high-growth firms and their capacity to create new 
jobs are more important. Lofsten and Lindelof (2002) examine the added value of science 
parks to tenant performance by employment growth, sales growth and profitability. Bhabra-
Remedios and Cornelius (2003) urge for the incorporation of organisational theory concepts 
in the evaluation of incubators and propose a framework that incorporates both the actors 
(incubator sponsors, managers and tenants) and the earliest stages of new firm development 
from idea to start-up. Abetti (2004) bases his performance evaluation research on the 
elements that Molnar published and evaluates new venture creation, job creation, cost 
effectiveness, growth and regional unemployment. Ferguson and Olofsson (2004) analyze 
science park performance based on survival and growth of the tenants compared to non tenant 
new technology-based firms. Survival is measured as continued legal existence of the firm; 
growth is based on changes in employment and gross sales. Once the decision is made on 
which variable(s) will be used to measure incubator performance, the next step is to decide on 
the unit of comparison that enables the researcher to validate the outcome of the performance 
measure. Sherman and Chappell (1998) warn that direct comparisons with non-tenants' 
survival rates may not be meaningful as the use of selection criteria in admitting tenants to the 
incubator results in a selection bias. Also Phan et al. (2005) argue that the rate of firm survival 
(or failure) has little construct validity because of endogeneity, since incubators are 
specifically designed to maintain and increase life span. They suggest comparing survival 
rates among different incubators: the tenant survival rate. 
While considerable progress was made in delineating and categorizing incubators, study 
of the characteristics of a successful incubator lagged. The earliest attempts to evaluate the 
performance of incubators had three features. They typically related to inputs; diverging from 
the evaluation criteria proposed by the earlier writers such as Campbell and Allen (1987), 
they analysed incubators from the perspective of the incubatees; and they were economic and 
financial in nature. 
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There continued to be no model for benchmarking an incubator's effectiveness (Mian. 
1997; NBIA, 1993; Bhabra-Rhemedios and Cornelius (2003). However, Campbell and Allen 
(1987) proposed the criteria by which to analyse the performance of an incubator. These 
included the following: 
Creation of a responsive business consulting network; participation of financial 
intermediaries in incubatee capitalisation; the point at which a majority of the residents of an 
incubator are start-up firms; and synergies, e.g. incubatees doing business with one another 
such as subcontracting and joint purchasing. 
Mian (1996) studied incubatees' perception of the usefulness of specific inputs, 
including the incubator's image, laboratories and equipment, and technology transfer 
programmes. As the choice of inputs included in his study suggest, the focus of his attention 
was on university-sponsored incubators. In other studies, Mian added growth-related 
measures pertaining to the incubator (rentable space, employment, number of incubatees and 
graduates), and the performance of incubatees (survival rates, sales, etc.) 
Earlier studies (Cambell and Allen, 1987; Allen and Weinburg, 1988 and Cambell et 
aI., 1988) were constrained by the lack of relevant data. They had to rely on incomplete data 
or make use of proxies. Consequently, their findings were either inconclusive or questioned. 
These studies tended to look upon incubators as either an economic development tool or a 
means of commercializing new ideas, and they had the underlying assumption that provision 
of appropriate amounts of inputs would satisfy the demand. But researchers studying 
incubators from a management and organisational point of view argued that while the variety 
and quantities were necessary metrics for benchmark analysis, the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which they were delivered would also matter in the performance of the 
incubator and the success of incubatees (Yasin, 2002). Therefore, it was necessary to 
understand why and how an incubator is successful (Bhabra-Remedios and Cornelius, 2003). 
Consequently, performance measures derived from organisation and management were 
added. It meant that the contribution of an incubator to entrepreneurship and the economy in 
the form of graduates and jobs was important, goals-related metrics were needed to compare 
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inter-firm efficiency and get a better sense of factors responsible for success. However. such 
comparisons would be restricted to incubators pursuing similar goals or, in other words, 
generally confined to a particular business model. Further, there can be variations in 
objectives among incubators pursuing the same business model. The system approach is 
advanced to compensate for problems in the goal-based approach by considering the 
simultaneous achievement of multiple generic performance aspects. But, this fails to provide 
an effective performance framework for analysing organisations (Murphy et aI., 1996). 
There are very few frameworks available in the academic literature for measuring 
incubator success. In fact, several writers claim it is simply impossible - Bearse (1998), 
Shearman and chappel (1998) and Tornatsky et al. (1996) 'concur that there are no 
satisfactory benchmarking comparators for evaluating incubators'. There are however several 
criteria that can be used to evaluate business incubation. These include: (i) survival rates, (ii) 
the numbers of jobs/firms created, (iii) the public investment required for each job created, 
(iv) the profitability of the incubator, and (v) the sales and profits performance of tenant firms 
(OECD, 1999: 11). The NBIA conducts surveys, discussed above, in which feedback from 
incubator managers identifies the most important measures as: number of (1) jobs created, (2) 
clients served and (3) companies graduated (Albert and Gaynor, 2001). 
Nonetheless, caution must be applied in using "evaluative" tools/data. For instance, as the 
OECD Report makes clear, 'it is difficult to gauge the significance of improved survival rates 
among incubator-resident firms if those firms enter the incubator after a process of selection, 'in 
other words, such firms may be unrepresentative: their success may be attributable more to 
inherent characteristic than to the effect of the incubator' (OECD, 1999: 11-12) 
Moreover, information on non-tenant firms is usually found in sources which exclude early 
enterprise failures, which complicates the identification of a truly comparable set of firms, while 
the dynamic effects of incubation on firms might be missed in short-run data sets (OECD, 1999: 
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12)18. Another measure of incubator perfonnance which is often cited is the cost of "public 
subsidy per job created", 'however, such estimates are of little use to policy-makers. and may even 
mislead, if the job would have been created anyway outside the incubator' (Ibid). 
Therefore, there exists a strong argument in favour of qualitative and "micro" case 
studies of incubation programmes. Such studies should be better equipped to assess levels 
of actual job creation, 'the performance of firms within incubators against that of similar 
firms outside of incubators, and the costs of incubation as compared with other measures 
which might be employed to achieve similar outcomes' (Ibid). Unfortunately, the lack of 
systematic evaluation of business incubators is a problem shared all too often with small 
enterprise support programmes generally. In this regard, a noteworthy and potentially 
fruitful initiative is the preparation of toolkits by the National Business Incubation 
Association of the US aimed at facilitating and standardising data collection by 
incubators so as to provide meaningful statistics for evaluation. Such a measure could be 
emulated by institutions in other countries representing and/or working closely with the 
incubation industry (OECD, 1999: 12). 
In fairness, trying to measure incubators' success is very difficult. Campbell and 
Allen (1987), Campbell et aI., (1988) made a serious attempt to do so. They studied 
companies from 60 incubators to determine sales growth and job creation after 
"graduation," when the companies leave the incubator. 
Incubator proponents have tried to quantify their benefits with limited success. In 
1997, the NBIA produced a much-publicised study claiming that for every $1 in subsidy, 
incubators generate nearly $5 in tax revenues and a host of other public benefits. The 
study, which looked at 50 incubators, was produced with the University of Michigan, 
Ohio University, the Southern Technology Council, and the economic development 
administration. Yet the study sheds little light on how the researchers reached their 
conclusions, mainly because the data presented are incomplete. Besides the $5-for-$1 
18 Sherman and Chappell (1998) note that incubator managers might collect data on control companies by gathering information 
on "near miss" firms, i.e. firms which for reasons other than eligibility did not enter the incubation programe. (OECD 1999: 
12). 
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return on public investment, the study claimed that the vast majorities (87%) of all 
incubated companies surveyed were still operating, and 85% were in the same 
communities in 1996. However, the report does not say how long the companies had been 
out of the incubators on average, making it difficult to evaluate survival rates or 
companies' commitment to their towns. Moreover, the researchers mixed graduates with 
companies that were still in incubators. 
The study's claim that incubators produce $5 in taxes for every dollar of public subsidy 
is also puzzling. The ratio is based on estimated tax revenues generated by 23 companies, not 
actual taxes paid by companies in the 50 incubators. Even so, few small businesses are 
profitable in their first few years, so they do not pay much tax. Nor do incubators, because 
they are mostly non profit entities. 
2.4.3 Benchmarking University Incubators 
M ian (1997 :281) has developed an 'integrative framework' for assessing the success 
or failure of US university incubators. His evaluation criteria can be summarized as: 
• Performance Outcomes: 
Programme growth and sustainability, tenant firm's survival and growth, new firms 
created (graduation rate) contributions to sponsoring University's mission, community-related 
impacts 
• Effectiveness of Management Policies and Practices 
Goals, structure, Governance Financing and Capitalisation, Operational Policies, Target 
Markets, 
• Services and their Value Added 
Shared incubator services, University related services 
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2.4.4 Benchmarking non-Profit Incubators 
The 2002, European Commission report on publicly funded non-for-profit incubators 
attempts to develop a methodology for measuring incubator success. The report looked at all 
the areas which it believed had the potential to be assessed, and in some of these areas 
established 'benchmarks' 
• Capital Investment and operating costs: The commISSIOn decided it was 
'inappropriate' to assess incubators based on levels of capital investment and 
operating costs as these are so dependent upon the type of incubator, (e.g. an 
internet incubator is going to have significantly less capital and operating costs 
than a bio-tech firm requiring specialist labs and materials.) 
• Proportion of revenue dependent on public subsidies: Although the report 
recognises that funding requirements are affected by conditions in the local 
economy, a clear objective should be to 'increase the proportion of operating 
costs derived from their own activities' (e.g. rent, advisory services) 
• Incubator space/number of tenants: The commission recommends a range of 
between 2000 square metres and 4000 square metres to achieve economies of 
scale. 
• Length of tenancy: a benchmark of three years is recommended. However, this 
applies to the 'average' incubator, on the other hand 'specialist' facilities with 
longer product development lead times will require more time (e.g. bio-tech, 
high tech R&D and manufacturing). 
• Number of managerial staff Ratio to Staff Tenants: The EC benchmark of 2 
managers assumes an average of 20-30 tenants: 'given that the real added value 
of incubation lies not in real estate but in the quality, relevance and utility of 
business advise, the ratio of incubator managers to incubator tenants should not 
exceed 1 :20' (OECD .2002) 
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• Proportion of Management Time Advising Clients: According to the survey . 
the current proportion of management time engaged in advising incubatees is 
39%, however, the commission recommends this be increased (over 
administrative matters) 
• Survival Rate of Tenant Firms: The survey revealed that the survival rate of 
firms reared in an incubator was significantly higher than the business success 
rate amongst the wider SME community, estimated at 30-50% over a five year 
period (OECD, 2002). In the survey, there was a 'notable clustering' of 
incubators amongst tenant firms of around 80-90%, where the EC sets its 
benchmark. However, the report makes clear that survival rates in more high-
risk areas (e.g. high tech industry) will be lower. Moreover, survival rate is not 
the most important indicator of incubator success: 'of more importance is the 
extent to which incubators can contribute to the accelerated development of 
innovative, high-growth firms and their capacity to create new jobs.' (Ibid) 
• Job creation - average jobs per tenant company/new jobs per incubator: 
Although the EC recognizes job creation as a 'key objective' of incubators, 
setting a benchmark for jobs per firm per incubator would be 'inappropriate' 
because job creation will vary greatly with the type of company/industry (and 
how labor intensive it is), the amount of tenants an incubator can accommodate 
and the amount of available space. 
• Costs per job: According to the survey, average gross costs per job in incubators 
are 4,400 Euros (with set up costs and capital amortisation: 6,700 Euros). Rather 
than set a universal benchmark the Ee has established a 'range' dependent upon 
'location-specific' factors. 
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2.4.5 Conditions for Success: Case Studies 
So far the arguments for incubation - that is, the problems that often face SMEs and the 
"solutions" provided by incubators - have been reviewed. However, in certain instances 
incubators may not provide the most effective solution to SME needs or else their 
effectiveness is undermined by internal or external discord and lack of co-ordination. 
Especially in cases where 'incubator programmes' are being introduced at a national level 
(especially in developing economies) to tackle specific macro-economic problems or 
aspirations several, generic, 'conditions' can be separated out that are likely to affect the level 
of success or 'usefulness' of incubators in their intended context. As the OECD (1999:9) 
notes, 'notwithstanding the paucity of rigorous impact assessment,' one of the most useful 
ways of evaluating incubator performance is to assess the 'apparent considerable variation in 
incubator performance from one country to another' 
Description and comparison of key elements of the business incubation landscape in 
some different countries (U.S.A, China, Brazil, Argentina and Korea) may provide an 
understanding of the similarities and differences in incubation systems across these countries, 
as well as the opportunities and challenges inherent in the macro-environmental and 
institutional environments for new business creation. Hence incubator models in these 
countries will be reviewed along key dimensions, which include strategic objectives, 
incubator financing/incubator sponsorship and its impact on strategy, and the incubator's 
service mix with an emphasis on financial services provided by incubators to client firms. 
Incubation and the innovation ecosystem in these incubation markets could have relevance 
not just in cross cultural comparative settings, but also to global incubation in both developed 
and developing countries, in terms of policy and practice. 
2.4.5.1 National Case Study: United States 
Background 
The institutional structure and maturity of its institution in a country shapes the 
environment for incubation. At the macro level, new business creation in a market environment, 
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such as the United States, is facilitated by the presence of well-established institutions of 
capitalism, such as an independent and solvent banking system to guarantee such rights. etc. 
These institutions serve to reduce friction by lowering transaction costs of doing business. Weak 
institutional structures could result in market failures, or gaps in the system that hinder new 
business creation. In addition, the availability of capital as well as the structure of financial 
markets is a key determinant of growth of fledgling ventures (Guerrera, 2005). 
The United States is considered as the "pioneer" in the field of incubation. Hence, it 
may be useful to look in detail at the world's largest and most successful incubation 
programme. As stated earlier, the movement of business incubators in U.S.A. started in 
1959 in New York City, when a tractor factory of Massey Ferguson closed and the 
facilities of the factory were divided in small boxes and rented for start-up companies. 
Besides the low price, the companies also could share some types of equipment and 
administrative services (REDE INCUBAR, 1994). One decade later, the U.S government 
decided to stimulate the creation of new companies in the Silicon Valley using a similar 
system to that used by Joseph Mancuso. On that occasion, the government offered legal, 
administrative and technical support to new entrepreneurs to start their enterprises. 
Making reference to the system used by Mancuso, the U.S government called these 
system business incubators (REDE INCUBAR, 1994). 
The United States has the oldest and largest incubation system with approximately 1000 
incubators, which has evolved into an incubation ecosystem with a plethora of incubator 
models, ranging from public to private incubators. Interestingly, a majority of U.S. incubators 
operate as non-profit entities and many are university-affiliated. 
According to the NBIA (1998) in( NBIA, 2002) the main features of the US programme 
showed that 870/0 of firms graduated are still in business, predominantly in their local 
communities, publicly supported incubators create jobs at a cost of approximately $1,100 
each, - other public mechanisms often costing much more, for every 50 jobs created by an 
incubator client, a further 25 are generated in the community, and finally incubator clients and 
graduates have created approximately half a million jobs between 1980 and 1998. 
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Support Structure and Government Involvement 
Support from state economic development agencies as well as capital funds from the 
state's legislative allocation, and competitive and matching grants from the state were primary 
sources of incubator support in the United States (Knopp, 2001). Since a majority of 
incubators in the United States are run as non-profit entities, they operate under a business 
model that generates additional revenue from rental income and consulting services. 
Following the initial preparations, federal such as the US department of Commerce and 
Economic Development Administration, Department of Housing/Urban development and 
Regional development authorities are approached. Federal funding is mostly limited to 
preparation and construction costs and research grants for client companies (Lalkaka, 2002). 
Thereafter, incubator managers have to look elsewhere for supplementary operational 
financing which takes considerable time and effort. 
According to (NBIA, 2000), 24% were sponserd by the government whereas only 8% is 
sponsored by venture capital (table 2.4) 
Table 2.4: The pattern of US incubator sponsorship 
SPONSOR PERCENT(%) 
State/Local/Provincial government 24 
No sponsor (independent) 18 
Economic development group 18 
Educational institution 20 
Venture Capital 8 
Other 12 
Source: NBIA (2()(J()) 
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Type and Location 
In terms of location the majority of incubators are in urban (45%), then rural (36%) and 
suburban (15%). The main focus areas of US incubators are presented in table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Incubation main focus areas. 
INCUBATOR FOCUS PERCENT(%) 
Mixed use 43 
Technology and Targeted 34 
Manufacturing 10 
Services 6 
Empowerment and others 7 
Source: NBIA (2000) 
The average operating costs for a US incubator are $350,000, however that cost is reduced 
by almost 50% to around $125,000 for a service-based or mixed-use facility (NBIA, 2002). 
Services 
The service most often In demand In US technology-based incubators IS access to 
external experts (table 2.6) 
Table 2.6: Services available at US incubators.Technologies services (Valid percent responses) 
Technologies services at US incubators (Valid percent responses) 
Yes, direct Yes, referral Both Rarely 
Consulting faculty, students 51.9 30.8 13.5 3.8 
Organize access to external facilities 62.7 15.7 17.6 3.9 
Locate key technical staff 27.5 45.1 21.6 5.9 
Use data bases of researchers 46.0 34.0 12.0 8.0 
Finance research and development 27.8 45.1 3.9 23.5 
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In the US (and elsewhere) the operation of many business incubators is overseen by an 
advisory board comprising representatives of the local business community. Most incubators 
in the US also have an affiliation with the nearest Small Business Development Centre 
(established in every State by the federal government's Small Business Administration) 
(OECD, 1999: 8-9) 
Problems 
According to Lalkaka (2002) many US regional (and international) incubators which 
have attempted variations upon the "Silicon Valley" model of technology-focused US 
Business Incubation (which is closely associated with universities and business parks) have 
failed because of: 
• Lack of university affiliations 
• Lack of entrepreneurial/enterprise culture 
• Lack of risk-taking and innovation culture 
• Poor business infrastructure 
• Insufficiently varied ethnic mix 
• Lack of venture capital, legal, accounting and management services. 
2.4.5.2 National Case Study: China 
Background 
Since its beginnings in 1987, the Chinese business incubation programme has become 
"the largest of its type" in the developing world (Lalkaka, 2001 b: 15). Although Ch ina has only 
promoted the creation of small business through the incubation model since the late 1980s, it is 
the world's largest emerging market and has had an annual average growth rate of over 10 
percent for the last decade (Konana, et aI., 2005); it is second only to the United States in terms 
of number of incubators. There are now more than 500 incubators in China with over 600,000 
employed by those incubators (Ma, 2004). China has a well-developed incubation market space, 
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with the government playing a predominant role in the business of incubation by channelling 
resources to accord with the government mandate of high technology led economic growth. In 
China, incubators and incubatees alike depend to a large extent on government funds in an 
environment marked by a paucity of risk capital. 
Support Structure and Government Involvement 
The expansion of the Chinese incubator programme has been encouraged by significant 
subsidies - usually through land and buildings, low-cost or no-cost loans by local state 
agencies and some on-going operating support (Ma, 2004). The overall investment by the 
state of China in the incubator programme at the central, provincial and city levels is 
reportedly over one and a half billion US dollar. 
For the first decade of their existence, incubators were 'initiated, funded and managed 
by the government based on its strategic priorities, either locally/city Sand T commissions or 
high-technology industrial development zones' (Ibid). Both sponsors had enormous financial 
resources. 
Currently, the incubators are generally non-profit, state owned entities, sponsored by 
local affiliations of the ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), and in recent years the 
Ministry of Education. However, a small number of for-profit corporations have recently 
made an appearance. 
Given the structural barriers in the environment to the creation of private enterprise, 
coupled with the need to transition effectively to a market system, the Chinese government 
uses business incubators as policy tools of market creation by offering financial support for 
them both for construction and operations. The Torch Programme, a part of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST), was set up by the Chinese government to support the 
creation and growth of incubators in China in 1990s, has invested heavily in incubators 
through its line of "construction funds." 
The Torch Programme Office of MoST is responsible for organising and guiding 
China's official technology incubator programme. Provincial, county, municipal and district 
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Science and Technology Commissions implement the programme in their local jurisdictions, 
providing land for buildings, low/no cost funding and a variety of tax breaks. Within 
technology incubators, these tax breaks extend to both incubator and its clients. Moreover, 
national-level "High Technology Development Zones" also promote technology-based 
business incubators. 
However, according to (Lalkaka, 2003) "exclusive" state sponsorship is now "giving 
way" to the entry of private corporations into the area. 
The visible hand of government has been ubiquitous in the country's economic and 
political life over the past half century. Business incubators are no exception. Business 
incubators in China currently have varying levels of government particularly in the southern 
regions of China, such as Shenzhen and Guangdong (Chandra, and Fealey, 2007). The 
government has several lines of dedicated funds to support incubation in the form of 
"construction" funds for incubators, "seed capital" funds for start-ups and "innovation" funds 
for small and mid-sized ventures that are in the growth phase of their life cycle. In their 
nascent stages, business incubators in China were mostly supported by the government with a 
clear mandate for technological advancement and economic development. The government 
viewed business incubators as a strategic tool for China's transition to a high technology-
driven market economy and hence was willing to invest large amounts of resources into these 
crucibles of entrepreneurship (Harwitt, 2002). The Ministry of Science and Technology made 
incubator construction a core part of its 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005), setting aside 50 
million Yuan ($6 million) in annual funding for incubator construction. As a result, incubators 
in China tend to be larger in terms of size and incubating capacity (Scaramuzzi, 2002). 
Types and Services 
Technology commercialisation has been the objective of most incubators to date (Ibid). 
According to the Chinese government's Torch programme regulations, priority technologies 
are: 
• New materials 
• Environmental and electro-mechanical technologies 
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• Biotechnology 
• Aerospace 
• Information technologies 
Chinese incubators are generally large, with an average size of 10,000 square metres 
and provide large-scale physical facilities like conference rooms and exhibition rooms. they 
. generally tend to give priority to physical facilities at the expense of business services 
(Ialkaka,2003 ). 
Universities have always had strong links to Chinese incubators. The majority of incubates 
are "spin offs" from University projects, research institutes and state-owned enterprises. In terms 
of ownership (of patents and collection of royalties) this usually stays with the parent institution 
(e.g. University) which also provides the finance for the incubatee. However, once again, in recent 
years there has been a marked increase in the number of privately-owned tenants/incubatees, 
which must raise their financial backing from their own sources. 
With massive state support behind it, the Chinese programme continues to evolve. 
There is also a slow but steady movement towards profit-orientation and private sector 
funding. However, as Lalkaka (2003) also comments, there are no credible evaluation 
procedures of incubator effectiveness in China. This not only makes research difficult for the 
academic, but may fundamentally undermine incubator performance through a failure to 
evaluate consistently and benchmark operations. 
An incubation variant pioneered in China is the International Business Incubator(lBI). 
Opening in 1986, the IBI programme was designed by the Business and Technology 
Development Strategies, New York and the TORCH project. Eight existing incubators were 
converted into IBIs, (Beijing-Fengtai, Tianjin, Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuhan and Xi-an, Chengdu 
and Chongqing). The IBIs provide high levels of support and modem facilities to 
international technology based companies and Chinese scholars now overseas. Moreover, 
they provide support to local companies in their efforts to export their products, services and 
102 
technology as we)) as to enhance their competitiveness abroad. (See appendix 0 for other 
national case studies) 
Conclusions 
An incubator is a business process and not just mere facilities and office space provided 
to entrepreneurs. Although definitions vary it has been agreed that the major quality that 
distinguishes a business incubator from other types of business facilities designed to help 
young business in their survival is the responsibility an incubator assumes for the future of the 
business as we)) as a high degree of integration of the incubated firm with the incubator. This 
is reflected in an entry policy that characterises incubators. 
It is important to bear in mind the fact that there exist many different incubator models, 
from general incubators to highly specific ones, from privately sponsored to publicly 
sponsored, from property development ones to university affiliated ones. 
The role of incubators is, generally speaking, three fold: 
• To create jobs. 
• To diversify economies. 
• To commercialise and disperse innovation. 
In order to achieve these goals certain measurable conditions must be met: 
• Surplus of qualified manpower. 
• Demand for incubator services and a certain competitive edge of the incubation 
programme (e.g. Italian technology incubators), 
• Availability of side services (such as access to professional services, i.e. law, 
accounting, etc.), 
• Availability of funding - I.e. banks, private equity, business angels, state-
sponsored funding, 
• A vailability of businesses that can offer services to the incubated firms or 
become their clients or collaborators. 
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There are several external and internal factors that have an impact on an individual business 
incubator. External factors are those outside the realm of individual business incubators' control. It 
includes; the level of policy co-ordination, support and stability, the prevailing environmental and 
business conditions and physical demand all interact to significantly affect the likelihood of an 
incubator programme's success. Several external salient conditions affecting the successful 
introduction of incubators emerged from the literature: 
• The overall level of support (financial, technical) provided by outside 
organisations 
• Level of co-ordination between support organisations, especially between 
public and private sectors. 
• Suitability to local needs, skill levels and resources 
• Prevailing entrepreneurial/business culture and conditions 
• General availability of finance/credit 
Internal factors are those factors that a particular business incubator has control over, 
some of these would be the followings: 
I) Management that develops and orchestrates business, marketing and management 
resources and relationship tailored by the needs of business clients. 
Three qualities are required from incubator staff: 
• High level of expertise and business acumen. 
• A large network of relevant business contacts, especially In the local 
community. 
• Readiness and ability to coach and mentor the incubated firms both at regular 
intervals as well as on demand. 
2) Shared services, training, technology support and equipment. 
3) Selection of clients .. 
4) Assistance in obtaining the financing necessary for business growth, 
5) Office and / or workshop/laboratory rooms for lease on flexible terms 
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6) Access to internal and external networks. 
The literature stresses the ambiguity of the process benchmarking and measuring the 
performance of business incubators. Generally speaking, the following are some criteria to 
assess the performance of incubators are: 
• Level of actual job creation. 
• Performance of incubated firms against unincubated ones. 
• Cost of incubation in comparison to other available measures. 
As Hoeser points out a difficult business environment hinders the growth of incubators 
and is a double edged sword: 'while it may lead to a lower number of new companies and 
higher mortality rates, the very reason for the incubators' existence is to help entrepreneurs 
get started in difficult contexts' (Hoeser 2003: 20). 
The success of incubators depends on all of the aforementioned factors, and many 
lessons have been learned worldwide so far. Many of them can be applied to incubators in 
Saudi Arabia. Some aspects, however, require specific attention, such as, knowledge of the 
basic socioeconomic factors that contribute to successful creation of business incubators 
under Saudi environment. There are certainly some specific constraints that hinder success of 
incubator projects for each specific country. In each country there is one key constraint that 
dominates the attention and concern of project managers. In most of the developing countries, 
this constraint is funding. Since they lack a large and liquid venture capital industry, incubator 
projects find it exceedingly difficult to find outside funding so that they can leave the 
incubator and launch their businesses. It is expected that this problem is of minor importance 
in Saudi Arabia because of the relatively strong economy. The Saudi economy benefits from 
strong support from the government and free market policy, both of which have 
contributed to the growth of the economy. Nonetheless this remains to be tested in reality. 
Interviews with some of the SMES policy makers and experts in the country (Focus 
groups) could shed light on these and on other issues of concern. Also surveys targeting 
Saudi SMEs, business science students and University academics could also furnish 
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additional information on this subject. It is hoped that conclusive indicators could be drawn 
from the case study. 
GeneraJJy, incubator processes seem to follow, consciously or unconsciously, those 
prevalent in the USA, where the incubation idea was born. Yet, American culture is in many 
ways a special case, with, for instance, individualism far more pronounced than in most other 
countries, especiaJJy developing economies. Due to these differences it is thought necessary to 
investigate the specific local socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the Kingdom and to test 
their suitability for introduction if a wide -scale business incubation projects. 
Furthermore, a future task for researchers is to devise instruments to separate out and 
measure these factors that can then be applied - deductively - to the Saudi economy in the 
hope of gaining some measure for the overall "conditions" that will affect incubator success. 
There is evidence that incubator initiatives help promising entrepreneurs launch their 
business and succeed. However, incubators still do not exist in most developing countries, 
especially where they could make the most dramatic difference in the development equation. 
Therefore, an overview of the status and development perspectives of the incubator industry, 
with a special focus on the needs and challenges observed in other developing countries, 
would be very useful for setting the stage for launching incubation programme in the 
Kingdom. To achieve this task, the various sectors mostly affected by introduction of 
incubation programmes were targeted in this study. Chief among these sectors are the SMEs 
who usually represents the major focus of incubation programmes, next comes the university 
business students and finally comes the university academics, both are expected to contribute 
to business incubation programmes, especially university business incubation. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Recently, several countries in different parts of the world have increasingly been engaged in 
establishing business incubators, which are considered as an attractive frame- work for 
dealing with the various difficulties hindering the achievement of economic growth. 
Knowledge about the basic socioeconomic factors that contribute to successful creation of 
business incubator is lacking in Saudi Arabia. There is only limited information and previous 
research is scant on this subject. This research aims to find out two things: 
First, it seeks, through review of business incubator's experiences worldwide to 
establish a set of politico-economic conditions under which business incubators are likely to 
be successful, i.e. to explore the necessary conditions for successful business incubation. For 
instance, the macro economic conditions, micro economic conditions, the political 
environment, the levels of government and non-governmental support, the levels of co-
ordination between interested agencies, the relationship between business, science and 
academia, and the salient cultural context. These "general properties" were obtained through 
analysis of secondary data and comparing success and failure series in deferent settings. 
Second, the factors and conditions necessary for business incubation succes has been 
examined in the Saudi context 
As shown in (Chapter 2, Chapter 4), incubators are increasingly seen at a political and 
academic level as a viable approach to the Kingdom's drive towards greater economic 
diversification and private sector expansion, with the aim of addressing the interacting 
problems of population expansion and high unemployment rate . But are the politico-
economic conditions actually in place to support incubators? What are the conditions which 
may affect the success of incubators? In addition, the basic characteristic of the early phase of 
Saudi experience in business incubation was investigated. To achieve this task, information 
on Jeddah business incubator was collected through face to face interviews and 
questionnaires. 
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The researcher collected (primary) data in order to address these questions - and has put 
forward some policy recommendations as to the likely course and level of success of 
incubation development in Saudi Arabia. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out how the research was undertaken. 
3.2 Justification 
The situation in Saudi Arabia is of particular importance for Business Incubator research. 
First, the country launched its first incubator in 2005, allowing a unique opportunity to study its 
initial impact. Secondly, the purpose behind the introduction of Saudi Business Incubators is 
explicitly concerned with promoting the survival of SMEs, which makes it easier to measure 
subsequent levels of incubator success. Thirdly, the connection between incubators and SMEs is 
directly related to the promotion of specific Saudi socio-economic objectives, namely: job 
creation, economic diversification, and technological innovation. Finally, as the economically and 
politically dominant member of the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC)19 , it is likely that the 
success or failure of incubators in Saudi Arabia will impact other GCC states which have similar 
socio-economic structures (and problems)20. 
As stated, the primary objective of this research is to investigate whether the necessary 
conditions for the successful introduction of wide-scale business incubation projects exist in Saudi 
Arabia. It was the researcher's intention to arrive at some form of objective knowledge about the 
optimal conditions for business incubation which takes into account the general conditions necessary 
for successful incubator development and apply them to Saudi Arabia. 
Once the general conditions were identified (Chapter 2), they were applied to the 
prevailing socio-economic situation in Saudi Arabia. 
19 The GCC is made up of the gulf states: United Arab Emirates, The State of Qatar, The State of Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. A Customs Union has been in place since 2003 allowing freedom of trade, capital and labour. Currency union 
is scheduled for 20 10. 
JO Although it is not the intention of this research to influence policy, a research study does not have to be deliberately 
policy-focused for the findings to have relevance for policy. Indeed, as Finch argues, it is almost impossible to 
engage in social or economic research that is not in some way policy-orientated (cited in Clarke, 2001: 28). 
Certainly. incubators are a politically salient issue within the Saudi Ministries of Planning and Finance, as well as 
being promoted heavily by several key academics (e.g. Nabil Shalaby) and the Saudi Chambers of Commerce. 
Therefore. the researcher acknowledges, and welcomes, the opportunity for this thesis to add to the body of 
knowledge currently shaping the "incubator debate" in Saudi Arabia. 
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3.3 Strategy of Inq uiry and Analysis 
Inductive analysis involves 'discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one's data' 
(Patton 2002: 453); findings emerge out of the data - through the researcher/analysis 
interaction with the data. By contrast, in inductive analysis data is analysed according to an 
existing framework. It is often the case that quantitative data is analysed to examine 
deductively established hypotheses, whereas qualitative data is useful in the induction process 
at the early stages of inquiry. 
"Grounded theory" emphasises immersion in the data, being 'grounded', so that deeper 
meanings and relationships may emerge (Patton 2002). This strategy involves establishing 
patterns, themes and categories inductively before a final stage of deductive inquiry that tests the 
inductive analysis, with particular attention paid to data that does not fit the categories or themes 
in the inductively generated hypotheses. Grounded theory then involves both inductive and 
deductive processes, 'at the heart of theorizing lies the interplay of making inductions (deriving 
concepts, their properties, and dimensions from data) and deductions (hypothesizing about the 
relationships between concepts)' (Strauss and Corbin 1988:22 in Patton 2002: 454). 
In contrast to grounded theory, Analytic Induction begins with an analyst'S "deduced 
propositions" or "theory driven hypotheses"; it provides a way of verifying theories and 
propositions using data. With analytic induction, data is first deductive, or quasi-deductive 
(Patton 2002) and becomes inductive when the analyst begins by examining the data in terms 
of theory-derived concepts. As Hoyle et al (2001: 416) have stated, 'in practice, no one 
works either purely inductively or purely deductively.' 
In this investigation, inquiry moved between the two approaches. In the first part, research 
was centred around secondary data, in order to establish a set of general conditions/measures that 
can be applied to national incubator programmes to assess their likelihood of success. This 
deductive part was taken because at present there are no general hypotheses within the literature 
on the socio-politico conditions necessary for incubator success. Moreover given that Saudi 
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Arabia has only one incubator, some form of international comparative analysis is the most 
appropriate way of measuring its effectiveness. 
Once these theoretical conditions/measures were established, the second part of the 
investigation involved the collection of primary data which was deductively analysed to test these 
conditions. The primary data collection process was divided into three steps using (1) focus groups. 
(2) questionnaire surveys and (3) a case study. Using these qualitative and quantitative tecImiques, 
the fmdings in each data set were checked, i.e. triangulated, against the other. Therefore, an 
important purpose of the focus groups was not only to collect data on deductive theoretical 
categories and themes, - but also to highlight anything that the theory may have elided, or data that 
'doesn't fit' before the design of the questionnaire surveys. The third step, the case study, is the final 
stage in the "deductive-inductive-deductive" process. Through ongoing data analysis of the focus 
groups and survey responses it should then be possible to know whether the necessary conditions 
are, or are not, present in Saudi Arabia. When conducting the case study phase the researcher will 
once again be looking for data that 'does not fit' and should it emerge, will inductively pursue new 
avenues of enquiry that might account for variations in the incubator's performance. 
3.4 Sources of Data 
3.4.1 Primary Data 
Primary data is collected and used by the researcher for a particular purpose; Ghauri 
and Gronhaug (2002, 76) define primary data as 'original data collected by us for the 
research problem at hand'. The means of collecting primary data are experiments, 
observations and communications and the latter includes questionnaire surveys and 
interviews.Advantages of primary data include consistency with respect to research 
objectives and questions (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002) as well as seeking information 
from persons involved in a particular issue or event. The disadvantages of primary data 
are requirement of time, money and resources, difficulty in finding the right respondents 
and complete dependence on them, need for right procedures, tools and methods for data 
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collection and lack of researcher's "full control" over data collection (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2002). 
3.4.2 Secondary Data 
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002, 76) have defined secondary data as 'information 
collected by others for purposes which can be different from ours'. There are several 
sources and types of secondary data, and the researcher has to locate and identify data 
that suits his/her research requirements. According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002), 
secondary data can be obtained from multiple sources which include central and local 
governments and their allied agencies, universities, research institutes, corporations, 
consulting organisations, academic and organisational journals and newsletters, books, 
commercial companies, internet and websites as well as reports written by students. The 
advantages of using secondary data include saving of time and money; help in answering, 
solving and formulating research questions and problems; making decisions regarding 
fitness of particular research methods for particular research problems; and providing 
benchmarking measures and findings for comparisons (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). 
According to Churchill (1999), one should start with secondary data and when it exhausts 
and provides reduced returns, one may proceed with primary data. The disadvantages of 
secondary data include different purpose and definitions, under which secondary data is 
collected, therefore, the researcher has to be careful in using secondary data particularly 
the source of secondary data may be explored; definitions, accuracy and consistency 
should be checked (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). It has therefore been suggested that 
'some research questions can be better answered by combining secondary and primary 
data' (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002: 78). 
3.4.3 The application of primary and secondary data in the research 
In this research, secondary data was used in three ways. First, to establish the 
theoretical conditions necessary to support an incubator programme. In this instance, case 
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studies of previous incubator projects were subjected to comparative analysis (see Chapter 2). 
Then, once the researcher knew "what to test for", secondary data was acquired to ascertain 
the current macro economic and political conditions prevailing in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 
4); data was collected from the following sources in order to ascertain the prevalent macro 
socio-economic indicators within the Kingdom: 
• SAMA - Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
• SAGIA - Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
• Saudi Ministry of Planning 
• Saudi Ministry of Finance 
• Saudi Ministry of Labor 
• Saudi Chambers of Commerce 
• Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
Levels of employment, skills, education and training were quantified, by the previous 
sources, as were broader economic indicators like GOP and per capita income. The 
comparative positions of various productive sectors were analysed. However, of most 
importance was data relating to the breakdown of SME types of activity, (e.g. rates of 
'turbulence' and growth.) This data was exclusively collected from the Ministry of Municipal 
and Rural Affairs. 
Data from the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs helped the researcher "target" 
cases for questionnaire survey, by providing the researcher with a sampling frame of Riyadh-
based SMEs. The data analysed from the comparative case studies led the researcher to seek 
out the salient individuals when it comes to key decision makers and opinion leaders in the 
incubation debate (e.g. academics, government departments etc.) As Simmons ( 2001: 87) put 
it, the 'researcher generally needs information about the target population' in advance of the 
study in order to obtain hislher sample and develop survey questions that are appropriate for 
the recipients .Therefore secondary data also led to the sampling of primary sources21 • 
21 For instance. the number and types ofSMEs interviewed will be determined by data supplied by the Saudi Chamber ofComrncrce. 
112 
Although the sample for the focus groups (see Appendix E) was ""targeted" according to 
the patterns suggested by the secondary data, the researcher also had access to senior 
representatives from the following institutions: 
• Riyadh Chamber of Commerce: SME Support Unit 
• Council of Saudi Chamber of Commerce 
• Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Centenary Fund 
• Abdulatif Jameel Community Service Fund 
• SAGIA - Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
• Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
• Ministry of Labor - Human Resource Development Fund 
• Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
• General Institution of Technical Education and Training 
• Saudi Ministry of Planning 
• Saudi Credit Bank 
• Directors of the King Farad University for Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) 
Research Centre, Students and academics 
Primary data was used in two ways. Firstly, it was used, where possible, to check 
against the secondary data gathered on Saudi economic and political conditions (i.e. did the 
experiences of respondents tally with the official statistics?). Secondly, and most importantly, 
data gathered "on the ground" (from incubatees, policy-makers, SMEs, academics, students 
etc) in Saudi Arabia was used to establish what the current set of politico-economic 
conditions actually are in Saudi Arabia. These conditions, as identified in the literature 
review, included: 
• Macro economic conditions: Gross Domestic product, Industrial infrastructure, 
Export markets, Employment levels, Education and Skill levels, Economic 
Diversification, Research and Development spending. 
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• Micro economic conditions: Business and legislative environment, number of 
businesses, urbanisation and level of regional integration, regional specialisms 
in knowledge and skills. 
• Levels of Government support and political situation. 
• Non-governmental support organizations. 
• Level of co-ordination amongst policy makers and support organizations. 
• Relationship between business, science and academic research. 
• Specific cultural factors. 
3.5 Research Methods 
In collecting primary data for deductive business research, there are several 
methods of inquiry. Indeed, when testing for the broad range of indicators involved in this 
research, it was prudent to consider the full array of methodological approaches available 
to the researcher, together with their advantages and disadvantages. These methods can be 
divided broadly into two categories: qualitative methods and quantitative methods. (For 
more details see appendix E) 
3.6 The Research Design: A Step-Wise Approach 
When it comes to researching small firms (and, by extension, the incubators that nurture 
them) 'it would seem' as Sue and Kirby put it, 'that a combination of research methods' is most 
appropriate (Siu and Kirby, 1999). The decision to be made was not necessarily a straight one 
between "quantitative" and "qualitative" 'but about developing a research design which is 
appropriate for the issue under investigation' (Kirby, 1995 in Siu and Kirby, 1999: 136). In order 
to enhance the internal validity of this research, the methodological approach of the researcher was 
to 'use multiple measures of the same phenomenon' (Neuman, 2003: 138). This involved a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data gathering. The advantages, disadvantages and 
distinct features of both can be illustrated as follows: 
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Table 3.4: Quantitative vs. Qualitative Methods 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Test hypothesis that the research begins with. Capture and discover meaning once the researcher becomes 
immersed in the data. 
Concepts are in the form of distinct variables Concepts are in the form of themes, motif~, generalisations. 
and taxonomies 
Measures are systematically created before data collection Measures are created in an ad hoc manner and are often 
and are standardized. specific to the individual setting or researcher. 
Data are in the form of numbers from precise measurement. Data are in the form of words and images from documents, 
observations, and transcripts. 
Theory is largely causal and is deductive. Theory can be causal or non-causal and is often inductive. 
Procedures are standard, and replication is assumed. Research procedures are particular, and replication is very rare. 
Analysis proceeds by using statistics, tables. or charts and Analysis proceeds by extracting themes or generalisations 
discussing how what they show relates to hypothesis. from evidence and organizing data to present a coherent. 
consistent picture. 
Source: Neuman, 2003: 145 
The popularity of qualitative research is generally high, and this has led to a growth of 
interest in the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques (Bryman, 1988 in 
Hammersely and Atkinson, 1995: 2). Davis et al (1985) (cited in Siu and Kirby, 1999) argue 
that conducting small firm research is a difficult and demanding task, 'as small firms are 
notorious for their lack of attention to keeping complete and accurate records and for their 
reluctance to divulge information about their business.' To get around these problems, they 
suggest the use of "co-ordinated research programmes" (otherwise known as a "stream of 
research" approach) whereby each study is designed to build upon what has been learned in 
previous studies 'in order to make an incremental contribution to the established knowledge 
base' (Ibid.). The specific model advanced by Davis et al is the initial use of small scale case 
studies, followed by small scale 'exploratory' studies, followed by large scale exploratory 
studies, and finally controlled field studies (Ibid). 
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Siu and Kirby (1999) advocate the adoption of a 'stepwise' approach that follows a co-
ordinated research programme adjusted in accordance with the situational factors (that is a 
contingency approach). This approach is incremental and builds upon what has been leamed 
at a previous stage - to make an incremental contribution to the 'established knowledge base', 
but is also contingent upon 'environmental variables,.22 
Following Siu and Kirby's model, an 'incremental' strategy was used in the 
collection of primary data. This comprised: (1) a focus group, (2) a questionnaire survey 
and (3) in-depth, unstructured interviews based around a case-study (fig 3.1). The 
triangulation of these approaches has several advantages. The use of an interview 
alongside the questionnaire gives additional information and aids the analysis of the 
major issues involved in the development of incubator projects in the organisations 
selected. These multiple measures enhance the internal validity of the research: makes it 
easier to see the correlations and disjunctures between the three. Should there be low 
correlation then the researcher knows that the internal validity of his/her research has 
been potentially compromised. This incremental approach also allows data to be analysed 
as the study progresses, it becomes possible to alter deductively the questions and objects 
of inquiry if new areas of interest emerge. 
U Cenainly, the chief 'environmental variable' in the current research design is the status of the Eastern Province incubator, 
scheduled for completion in 2006. 
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Figure 3.1. Step-wise strategy for primary data collection. 
STEPl 
Focus Groups 
Sample: 'Experts': Academics, CEO's, Policy Makers 
Prevailing micro economic and political conditions: 
Survey 1 
Sample Population: 
Saudi SMEs 
Skill levels, 
Management, 
Marketing, Financing, 
Networking 
STEP 2 
Survey 2a 
Sample Population: 
Business and Science 
students 
Specialisms, 
Employment Prospects 
-----. i 
STEP 3 
Case Study 
Survey: all incubatees. Skill levels, 
Management, Marketing, 
Financing, Networking 
In-depth interviews: Experiences 
within the incubator 
Step One: Qualitative Data: Focus Groups 
Survey 2b 
Sample Population: 
University Academics 
Relationship between 
Industry and 
University Research 
The advantage of this first step is that it efficiently extracts the salient themes and paths 
of investigation - including those overlooked by the researcher or not covered in the literature 
that tackled incubators in Saudi Arabia. Once the researcher refined the specific research 
areas (and 'measures'), it became possible to proceed to the next steps, in this case surveys and 
interviews. 
As the first stage in the primary research, focus groups were used to canvas and explore 
the opinions of various "experts," Many of these experts also occupy key decision-making 
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roles when it comes to the implementation and funding of Saudi incubator programmes. As 
for future prospects, and economic 'needs' for incubators (and therefore the conditions for 
their success), the study focused upon 'experts' and policy-makers within organisations that 
are likely to play a decisive role in introducing and supporting their implementation at a 
national level. Moreover, many Saudi academic experts interact with policy-makers (via 
direct consulting, conferences and journal publications) to 'set the agenda' for the introduction 
of incubators in the kingdom. 
In these focus groups the objective was to elicit information around these themes: 
• The perceived problems currently facing Saudi SMEs 
• The specific macro-economic 'development' role envisaged for incubators 
• The current level of support for incubators 
• The degree of co-ordination among SME support organisations 
• The nature of the relationship between science, business, technology, education 
and government and future prospects of such relationship 
The initial sampling procedure was non-probability purposive sampling. Respondents 
were selected according to their association with agencies and organisations, that directly 
impact the development of SMEs and incubators in Saudi Arabia. These respondents were 
also asked to recommend other useful individuals or organisations that might be willing to 
participate; (i.e. snowball sampling) the researcher had access to senior representatives from 
the following organisations: 
• Riyadh Chamber of Commerce: SME Support Unit. 
The SME support units of the Riyadh Chambers of Commerce are the mam 
instruments of support for SMEs in Saudi Arabia. Their primary role is to co-
ordinate with an, government and non-governmental, institutions to implement the 
'best strategies to develop SMEs' (SME Support Unit Website) 
• Council of Saudi Chamber of Commerce. 
118 
The council was established to represent interests of all chambers of commerce 
within Saudi Arabia at national and international levels. As a coordinating and 
representative body, the council assumes the role of forwarding the needs of the 
private sector to government organisations as well as organising private sector 
support projects throughout the country. The council is 'considered as the channel 
where drives towards the private sector are being united, an instrument which 
oversees its ambitions and an institution which pursues realisation of those 
ambitions within the national economy' (Council of Saudi Chamber of Commerce 
website, 2005) 
• Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Centenary Fund. 
The Fund works in partnership with SAGIA (below) to translate the entrepreneurial 
ideas of young Saudis into 'profitable businesses'. The Centenary Fund provides 
financing and business counseling. 
• SAGIA - Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority. 
SAGIAs role is to provide young business men and women with information about 
the Kingdom's laws and regulations, as well as to obtain permits and finalise 
government procedures on their behalf. SAGIA advertises itself as the "one stop 
shop" for investors in the kingdom. Created in 2000, it functions as a 'facilitator' 
for potential investors, acting as Saudi Arabia's 'inward investment promotion 
agency'. Crucially, SAGIA recommends policies designed to promote and enhance 
local and foreign investments and proposes executive plans to improve the 
investment climate in Saudi Arabia' (SAGIA website, 2005). SAGIA also acts as 
an 'intermediary' between international investment organizations and Saudi 
Government ministries and agencies. Conducting surveys and workshops on the 
'investment climate' in Saudi Arabia is also an important contribution of SAGIA. 
• Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. 
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Responsible for the "development of municipal incomes", which, '"in light of 
'-
development objectives", includes "seek[ing] new sources of municipal incomes 
such as investment, commercial and entertainment projects" (Saudi Ministry of 
Muncipal and Rural Affairs Website, 2005). The Ministry also collects an 
enormous amount of statistical data and has registers of all commercial premises. 
• Abdulatif lameel Community Service Fund. 
The fund is intended to support the 'projects and skills' of Saudi youth. Its main 
goals are to: (1) integrate young entrepreneurs into the Saudi economy (2) support 
small "downstream" industrial projects and (3) to develop new employment 
opportunities in the labor market. The fund extends loans 100,000 SR 
(approximately 17,000 BP) to each project, helps with organising, supervising and 
training the appropriate labor for the project. The loan is expected to be repaid 
within three years (AlCSF website, 2005). 
• Ministry of Labor - Human Resource Development Fund. 
The Ministry of Labor is 'concerned with the development and use of the 
Kingdom's human resources. It is responsible for manpower planning, labor 
relations and the general monitoring of all matters relating to employment affairs' 
(Saudi Arabia Information Resource Website, 2005). The Ministry also deals with 
labor disputes, employment in the private sector and labor visas (Ibid). 
• Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry IS responsible for all aspects of 
commercial and industrial activity in the Kingdom (Saudi Arabia Information 
Resource Website, 2005). 
• General Institution of Technical Education and Training. 
This is a government-sponsored institution responsible for teaching technical 
business skills. It enrolls university and high school graduates as well as company 
employees. The institution also offers career advice to graduates and attempts to 
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match them with employment opportunities in public and private sectors. Graduates 
are also eligible for small loans. Currently, the institution has 33,298 graduates and 
provides training for 118 companies (General Institution of Technical Education 
and Training website, 2005). 
• Saudi Ministry of Planning. 
The Ministry of Planning is responsible for the formulation of the kingdom's 
five year development plans (discussed extensively in the Saudi Context 
chapter, Appendix I). The Ministry has extensive resources for the gathering 
and analysis of economic, social and demographic data. The Ministry is also 
responsible for furnishing other departments with statistical information. The 
Ministry 'identifies the issues and obstacles, proposes adequate policies and 
resolution measures, survey the achievements and provides for future 
requirements within a framework of national priorities and objectives. In so 
doing, the Ministry relies on a socio-economic database that has developed in 
the course of work in the field of economic and social research' (Saudi 
Ministry of Planning website, 2005). 
• Saudi Credit Bank and Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) 
The Bank allocates money from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) to 
provide interest-free loans to Saudi businesses. Such loans can be used to finance 
up to 50% of the total capital required for establishing the business. Established in 
1974, by 2001 the SIDF has distributed total loans for industrial projects of SR 40.3 
billion (Saudi Arabian Information Resource Website, 2005) 'The SIDF has played 
a key role in creating local Saudi industrial enterprises and the employment 
opportunities which they present. The wide range of locally manufactured goods 
now available in the Kingdom attests to the success of the SIDF' (Ibid). 
Two focus groups, each containing eight members, were conducted. Snowball sampling 
Was successfully used to find additional members from within the organisations. 
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Step Two: Quantitative Data: Questionnaire Surveys. 
To find an answer to the research question related to socioeconomic conditions 
prevailing in the Kingdom and to test their suitability for introducing wide -scale business 
incubation projects, a survey was conducted targeting three different groups considered to be 
more affected by introduction of incubation programme. These groups are: 
• SMEs 
SMEs posses an important place in the Saudi economy. Therefore, the government 
authority has employed various policy tools to assist them through: direct financial support, 
R&D subsidies and tax allowance. 
• University Business Science Academics (King Saud, KFUPM) 
Universities play an important role in the creation of incubators; they usually lend 
resources, faculty time, and talent to economic development efforts. Academics were 
specifically targeted in this survey because of the role they play within incubators, in 
commercialisation of research and transfer of technology, as well as their potential 
contribution to the business mentoring in the incubator. 
• University Business Students (King Saud ,KFUPM) 
This group was targeted because they are the potential (SMEs, incubatees) that could 
benefit from establishing the incubation programme in the kingdom. 
These three groups were also targeted in order to establish the level of awareness of 
incubation among these sectors and their readiness to take advantage of the services provided 
by incubation programme. 
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SMEs: Telephone Surveys 
The first survey was among technology based firms, the most likely to benefit from 
business incubators (Grimaldi and Grandi, 200] )23. In order to ascertain whether they would 
be "candidates", the researcher used secondary data provided by specialised governmental 
agencies in Saudi Arabia (e.g. Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs) which show size, 
type, and location etc of firms. A telephone-based questionnaire survey was used because it is 
expected that the response rates are likely to be higher (Despite the advantages of cost and 
convenience, a mail out survey was rejected on the basis that the postal service is inefficient). 
To obtain the sample, the researcher utilized the database of the Saudi Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs, which holds a database registry of every commercial enterprise 
operating within Saudi Arabia. The database, to which the researcher was given access, is also 
able to differentiate between size and type of business. The population and sampling frame 
was technology and manufacturing based SMEs in Riyadh. From this frame of approximately 
2600 firms, the researcher picked a simple random sample using a random number generator. 
The sample size was 500 cases with response rate of 52% i.e. 260, higher than the predicted 
response rate of 50%. This relatively high response rate is expected to minimise the effect of 
non-response bias. 
The aim of this approach was to extract as much information as possible about the 
specific areas where incubators could contribute to SME development in the Saudi context. 
Areas of investigation - informed by the findings of the focus groups - included: 
• Skill levels and management organisation within the enterprise 
• Marketing strategies used 
• Experiences of financing and funding 
• Experiences of the business and legislative environment 
U It is worth considering that aside from Jeddah incubator, there are no other incubators operating ~nside th.e Kingd~m. Not only 
does this preclude sampling cases directly involved in incubation it also creates a dilemma m reachmg Saudi. SMEs ~at 
WOUld, speculatively, benefit from incubator support. To put it another way, if the incubators do not currently.exlst there IS a 
strong chance that neither do the businesses that would have benefited from their support (for instance many high-technology 
finns). 
123 
• Levels and types of support received from governmental and non-governmental 
organisations 
• Relationships with other businesses and universities 
Universities: Face-To-Face Surveys 
The second area of investigation was within universities which were considered likely, 
or at least most equipped, (following 'Western' models,) to develop incubator schemes 
themselves or else, introduce similar alternatives such as science parks and commercial 
research centres. Academics directly involved in teaching technical skills, were surveyed; all 
teaching staff attached to the Business Science faculties. Given the large size of technology-
based syllabuses and the ease of access, the sample was confined to King Saud University 
(Riyadh), and KFUPM (Dahran). 
Areas of investigation included: 
• Exploration of the relationship between academia, science and business - including 
areas of co-operation (or disharmony), support or sponsorship. 
• Relationships with industry, government and the region or municipality. 
• The level of industrial or technical research currently undertaken. 
• Perceived opportunities for incubation. 
Given the economic imperative to generate employment and 'normalise' technical 
skills, final semester Science and Business students were also surveyed to discover their 
future plans, and the nature of any business or research ambitions and their expected 
obstacles. 
Areas of investigation included: 
• Research specialties. 
• Knowledge of business and marketing. 
• Future plans and expected obstacles. 
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• Perception of employment opportunities. 
• The potential of incubators. 
The researcher has personal connection with faculties members of both universities. 
, 
therefore, within these two universities all available on the day of survey Business and 
Science students (153 students out of 544) and teaching staff (19 out of 53 teaching staff) 
were surveyed. Questionnaires were administered face-to-face to ensure high response rates. 
It should be noted here that the total number of the staff interviewed was relatively small (19) 
and the data obtained should be taken with cautious. 
Upon completion of this part of the research, the researcher analysed the data collected 
to present the "conditional properties" for Saudi Arabian business incubation. The researcher 
did so deductively, with the intention of hypothesising the likely levels of success of Saudi 
incubation projects. 
Step Three: Case study: The Jeddah Incubator. Survey and Extended Interviews. 
The final stage of the research took place in the leddah Business Incubator, launched in 
2005. This case study will allow the researcher to test the proposed hypothesis. 
An updated version of the SMEs questionnaire was presented to the tenants. Areas of 
Investigation included: Skill levels and management organization within the enterprise, 
Marketing strategies used, Experiences of financing and funding, Experiences of the business 
and legislative environment, Levels and types of support received from governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, Relationships with other firms and larger businesses. 
This allowed assessment of conditions within the incubator and a comparison with the 
non-incubated SMEs, regarding for instance, levels of skills, management, marketing 
conditions, financing, and networking. 
In depth Qualitative interviews were also conducted with the incubator management 
and staff; these interviews intended to build upon the questions posed in the surveys to better 
explore the experiences of the first incubatees. The interviewer devised a universal topic list 
(interview guide) for the respondents to discuss - but with the freedom to ask the question 
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any way the researcher wished, in any order that seemed appropriate at the time, and even 
discussing what they think of the topic themselves. 
Upon completion of this part of the research, the researcher could get some indication 
as to whether or not the first Saudi incubator correlates with or is an "'exception" to the 
hypothesis generated after step 2. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
Transcriptions from the focus group and in-depth interviews were coded into sections _ 
or 'chunks' - so that salient themes can be established. Ten responses of each survey were 
piloted to identify the errors and to rewrite unclear questions. The questionnaire surveys were 
statistically analysed using SPSS software. Case study observations were analysed as a 
'narrative' (following Hytti, 2002). 
3.7.1 Ethics and Transcription 
Confidentiality and integrity of information provided by the respondents are extremely 
important (Scheuren, 2004). The respondents had the option to be anonymous or reveal their 
identity. 
Interviews and focus groups were tape-recorded - then transcribed into Arabic, before 
their subsequent translation into English. Then, to ensure validity this transcript was re-
translated into Arabic, to check against the original. Authentized translation/transcription 
service was used. 
After both focus groups and case study interviews, the respondent(s) were given the 
opportunity to check and approve both transcripts (English and Arabic) before they were 
analysed. Participants also had the option to remain anonymous. In the questionnaire some 
Participants have remained anonymous. All respondents were also able to withdraw their 
participation at any time, including 'post-hoc' withdrawal. 
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3.7.2 Justification of the Research Design 
The researcher had extensive access to a rich variety of data sources, including the 
major Saudi SME policy makers and experts, Riyadh-based SMEs, the two largest Saudi 
universities and the first Saudi incubator in Jeddah. The researcher felt that it was best to 
exploit these available resources through a variety of measures to increase the internal validity 
of the data. 
By adopting both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies it is possible to 
capture the fullest range of dimensions associated with the problem being studied. Moreover, 
the use of different data collection methods and sources enables the researcher to ensure high 
internal validity by triangulating data via multiple measures. 
The synthesis of qualitative and quantitative research methods prove to be useful in 
obtaining valid data and providing comprehensive and deep understanding of the research 
problem. 
CHAPTER 4 - THE SAUDI CONTEXT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a background to the business and economic environment in 
Saudi Arabia as it is informed by the specific economic, social and political imperatives 
of an economy reacting to a series of local and global pressures. The argument throughout 
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this chapter is that the past economic trends followed by the country, the past economic 
policies, and the local entrepreneurial cultures are vital elements for the formulation of 
effective policies. The chapter provides a survey of the prevailing social, political and 
economic conditions within the Kingdom and will review: (i) the structure of the Saudi 
economy; Oi) the role of SMEs within it; (iii) the problems SMEs currently face; (iv) the 
support available to SMEs from private and public bodies; and (v) government policy 
towards SMEs. The answers to these questions are intended to give an indication as to the 
applicability, suitability, and prospects of incubator programes within the kingdom24. 
Incubators are widely regarded as one of several mechanisms to support the growth 
and survival of SMEs (Chapter 2) especially those enterprises involved in technology. As 
an opportunity to absorb more young Saudis into the job market and diversify the 
"economic base", a great deal of focus has been placed by Saudi policy-makers upon 
fostering SME growth and survival, with particular emphasis on high-technology 
projects. In the previous (Seventh, 2000- 2005) and current (Eighth, 2005 - 2010) 
National Development Plans, the introduction of business incubation centres has been 
strongly advocated by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and the Saudi 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The first Saudi business incubator, based in leddah 
and operated by the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, opened for business in 
June 2005. A second incubator is currently under-construction in the Eastern Province 
and is scheduled to open in late 2009. 
4.2 The Structure of the Saudi Economy 
4.2.1 Economic Priorities 
It is widely accepted amongst many of the Kingdom's policy makers that Saudi Arabia 
must transfonn and diversify its economy over the next decade to cope with rapid population 
24 (i) Why are incubators needed in Saudi? (ii) What specific role, if any, are they expected to play? (iii) Is the cu~nt social~ 
political and economic environment conducive to their introduction? (iv) How would their success be measured In the Saudi 
context? and (v) who would be responsible for them? 
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growth and continuing social change. The macro economic imperatives facing policy makers 
can be surmised as follows: 
1. A massive population boom which the labor market is struggling to absorb. 
2. Oil wealth continues to be the main support for the Saudi economy. Despite the 
massive boom in oil revenues over the past half-decade, the oil sector alone cannot 
sustain Saudi Arabia's ever growing, long-term, labor market needs. 
3. The economy needs to operate more efficiently and offer sustainable high quality 
jobs centred around an internationally competitive, knowledge-based economy. 
In other words, the great social and economic problem facing Saudi policy makers is 
how to reconcile the great uncertainty of oil prices ,with the 'absolute certainty' of massive 
population growth (Cordesman, 2003: 31) - new, private, sources of income and employment 
must be developed. 
Since the mid-1980s and the inception of the Kingdom's fourth national development 
plan (1985-1990) the Saudi government has been consistent in its belief that the best, and 
only real, solution to these problems is significant economic diversification through private 
enterprise. Since the turn of the 21 st Century (as marked, so far, by the seventh and eighth 
development plans of 2000-2005, 2005-2010) the Saudi government has become increasingly 
pro-active in developing policies intended to stimulate private enterprise. Moreover, the 
recent increases in national income - driven by a surge in oil prices (2003 - 2008) have given 
the government the means to increase spending on such projects. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, the government response has been focused upon: (i) economic diversification; 
(ii) training; and (iii) investing in education. Within all three of these areas, policies have been 
targeted towards the growth and survival of SMEs. 
4.2.2 Economic Growth 
At the beginning of the 21 st century Saudi Arabia's per capita income had declined to 
around 40% of its peak at the height of the oil boom (from the mid ] 970s to late ] 980s). this 
decline continued for most of the previous decade (Cordesman, 2003: 21).25 A combination of 
explosive population growth and slow real growth meant that re-structuring of the Saudi 
economy would be necessary to accommodate the flood of young Saudis entering the labor 
market26• Sustained economic development generally requires economic growth rates that are 
at least 2% above the population growth rate, and the Saudi population growth rate is well over 
3%. The Seventh Development Plan projected average annual real growth of 3.16% during 
2001-2005, including 5.04% in the non-oil sector (Mann, 2000). At the same time the World 
Bank (2000) forecasted that economic growth for oil nations would, in the long run, average 
2.7%, in comparison with growth for nations with a more 'diversified slate of exports'. 
However, since those forecasts in 2000, the unexpected surge in oil prices has had a 
profound effect on the Saudi economy. Between 2001 and 2006 the Saudi economy nearly 
doubled in size. Oil averaged a record $60.53 per barrel and nominal GDP hit $347.91 bn. a 
12.4% improvement on the 2005 level; real GDP grew by approximately 4% and among the 
population (estimated in 2006 at 22.7m people) per capita GDP stood at $14,451, a 15% 
increase over 2006 (Oxford Business Group, 2007: 15). By the spring of 2008, the oil price 
was almost double 2006 level. Progress has also been made in the non-oil private sector 
which grew by 6.3% in 2006 and was forecast to grow by 7.1 % in 2007 (Ibid). However, it is 
notable that the private sector remains largely dependent on the continuation of major, public-
sponsored, projects which are, of course, financed by the surge in oil revenues. 
4.2.3 Globalisation 
2S According to Halliday, in the 1990s, per capita income fell by up to two thirds, to around $6000 per year (Halliday, 2002: 
161). 
26 Data indicate that the Saudi economy grew by 14.5% in real terms between 1969 and 1974, and by 8.0% between 1974 and 
1979, but then dropped to -1.8% between 1979 and 1984. There was no real growth between 1985 and 1989. The su~d~n rise 
in oil revenues after the first Gulf war created a 9.5% rise in 1990 and a 10.3% rise in 1991 - 'although the economic Impact 
of the rise in oil revenues was largely offset by Saudi expenditures on the war' (Cordesman 2003: 242). Growth then 
dropped to 2.0% in 1992 and averaged less than 1% annually between 1993 and 1995 (Ibid). It rose to 1.3% in 1996, 1.6% in 
1997 and 1.8 % in 1998; it then dropped to 0.90/0 in 1999 because of low oil prices, rising by 4.7% in 2000 as a result of the 
sudden peak in oil revenues (Ibid). GNP fell well below population growth for the decade between 1992 and 200 I. 
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After the massive infrastructure building projects of the 1970s and 1980s, the Saudi 
economy has gone through radical change. It is generally recognised that economic 
globalisation has meant the scale of international competition is expanding in terms of quality 
and quantity. Therefore, Saudi companies increasingly find themselves competing with more 
efficient international rivals who are able to compete better on both cost and quality (Boubshait, 
1999). The intensification of global competition has been further exacerbated by Saudi Arabia's 
accession to the World Trade Organisation in December, 2005. Although the commercial 
effects of membership have yet to be fully felt at "ground level" (Oxford Business Group, 
2007), several commentators (e.g. Sanjini, 2004, AI-Dosari 2003) expect a negative influence 
on both local industrial activities with large production capacities and smaller enterprises. In the 
latter sector, as Radwan puts it, the fear is that Saudi SMEs 'will be swamped by the entry of 
cheaper and higher quality imports, with technology transfer through foreign-owned companies 
adding more pressure' (Radwan, 2005: 198). 
It is widely acknowledged that economic globalisation has generated a unique and 
urgent revolution in technology. Combined with increased competition, trade liberalization, 
and the consequent opening up of national markets to international competition, this could 
seriously endanger national enterprises that lag technologically behind their new global 
competitors. The challenge from foreign products to national products is deemed to be 
'intense' (AI-Dosary, 2003); moreover, Saudi Arabia does not just have to compete with "the 
world" Increasingly, as Jamal Khashoggi (cited in Slackman, 2007) , editor of the AI-Watan 
newspaper puts, it 'has to compete with the region'. Regional competition has become 
extremely intense, especially given the emergence of the United Arab Emirates' and Qatar's 
as the Gulfs cutting-edge global financial and technological hubs. Thus, the development of 
new high-technology enterprises is seen as an urgently required support to the 
competitiveness of national enterprise (AI-Dosary, 2003). 
However, there have been several upsides to Saudi Arabia's growing integration into 
the global economy and, in particular, its 2005 accession to the WTO. A myriad of reforms 
has been undertaken which have improved the kingdom's business environment. Since 2005 
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new rules have streamlined the investment process, reduced the maximum income tax rate. 
loosened the requirements for obtaining business visas, changed ownership rules so that 
foreign companies can obtain a majority stake, and established the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA) to attract foreign and private investors (Oxford Business 
Group, 2007: 18). As a consequence, foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased 
dramatically, rising from $3.58bn in 2005 to $16.49bn in 2006 .counter to expectations, the 
Saudi information and communication technology sector has attracted much FDI - from a 
total of 75 new Saudi FDI projects in 2006, 37 FDI projects operated in this sector. Some 
researchers (e.g. Radwan et aI., 2002, Radwan, 2005) have argued the liberal-market doctrine 
that global competition will force inefficient businesses out of the market and, in the long-run, 
the business environment - and especially the SME sector - will be better off as it responds 
with quality and productivity gains. However, as Radwan warns that a lot needs to be done to 
ensure that the SME sector flourishes following WTO entry (Radwan, 2005: 198). In the 
course of this chapter, precisely 'what needs to be done' to ensure an efficient globally 
competitive SME sector will be considered. 
4.2.3 Saudi Indicators 
Boubshait (1999) listed several socio-economic indicators as unique to the Kingdom 
that remain salient to the present: (i) there are large numbers of native, technical, workers 
available, however, many of these workers lack opportunities commensurate to their skill 
levels - it is therefore an economic and political imperative that appropriate work 
opportunities are created; (ii) there is an underutilised surplus supply of 'basic products' 
generated by many of the 'transformation industries'; (iii) the transformation sector still lags 
behind global and regional competitors in terms of quality and quantity; (iv) marketing 
activities remain 'substandard' and fail to maximise the benefits of massive industrial 
production; (v) private commercial enterprises are still unable to compete in the international 
arena due to the social structure of these enterprises which are either sole owner or family 
corporations, mainly dependent on personal relations in their management functions. 
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4.2.4 Population and Employment Pressures 
Saudi Arabia is currently in the midst of profound socio-economic change - the 
Kingdom is experiencing a population boom which ranks as one of the largest in the world, 
combined with rapid urbanisation and a massive shift in labor organisation. It is these 
changes, considered in the context of the current oil boom that is driving government policy. 
Bourland, (2002), summarises the Kingdom's demographic challenges as follows: 
• 45.6 % of the population is fourteen years of age or younger. 
• 73.9% of the population is twenty nine years of age or younger. 
• 38% if the 16.75 million Saudi nationals alive in 2001 were born after Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 
• The fertility rate of native Saudi women was 5.5 infants per woman in 2000, compared 
to a world average fertility rate of2.7 and a Middle East average of3.5. 
• While 210,000 Saudis graduated in secondary school in 2001, 402,000 entered 
elementary school the same year. 
• The population of Saudi nationals is projected to almost double by 2020, expanding the 
Saudi Labor force from 3.3 million in 2000 to 8.3 million in 2020. 
Given the absence of a reliable national census, there are no certain means to be sure of 
the exact scale of the demographic challenge27 • However, the US State Department estimates 
that Saudi Arabia had a total population of only 4.8 million people at the time of the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli conflict (Cordesman, 2003: 231). By 1980, this population had - according 
to independent estimates by the US State Department and the World Bank - reached 9.4 
million people. The Saudi Ministry of Planning issued (conservative) estimates in the Seventh 
Development Plan (2000) that put the total population of the Kingdom at 21.4 million in 1999 
- with 15.7 million native Saudis and 5.7 million non-Saudis. It estimated that the total 
population of the Kingdom would grow to 29.7 million in 2020, a rise of 89.2% over two 
27 However. in the last decade the Kingdom has implemented advanced sampling techniques to accrue population data. 
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decades, and that the annual growth of the Saudi population of working age would remain 
high, ranging between 3.5% and 4.1 % during 2000-2020 (Saudi Ministry of Planning, 2001: 
77-78). The Saudi Department of Statistics calculated slightly higher total population figures 
in 2001 (22.01 million in 2000) with a population growth of 3.2% in 200028 • As of 2000, 
some 73% of the population was twenty-nine years of age or younger (SAMA, 2001: 265/9• 
Given that Saudi Arabia has one of the highest populations 'momentum ratios' in the world 
(l :6), the population can be expected to continue its "boom" into the foreseeable future. 
The inevitable consequence of such rapid population growth is a labor force that will 
grow faster than the total population because the Saudi population is so young. Indeed, the 
World Bank estimated that the Saudi labor force grew from 3 million in 1980 to 7 million in 
2000, and projects 10 million in 2010, with an average growth of 4.5% from 1980 to 2000, and 
3.4% during the time period 2000-2010. Social change has also absorbed women into the labor 
force, their proportion growing from 7.6% in 1980 to 16.1 % in 2000 (Cordesman, 2003: 236). 
The massive increase in population has been accompanied by profound changes in 
labor force structure. In the last three decades, the Saudi labor force has shifted from one 
dominated by manual labor in agriculture (64% in 1973) to one where by the year 2000,40% 
worked in government office jobs whilst the rest of the labor force, some 25%, worked in 
industry and oil and 30% work in services (Cordesman, 2003: 7) However, the above figures 
show, Saudi Arabia faces a "youth explosion" that generates enormous pressure to create 
massive numbers of new jobs for national Saudis and reduce the numbers of foreigners 
employed in the Kingdom. However, in the first decade of the 21st Century, government 
employment, with the exception of the education and health sectors, is expected to remain the 
same; consequently, the private (pre-dominantly non-oil) sector is expected to absorb the 
majority of new entrants into the labor market (Prokop, 2003: 87). 
28 According to Saudi Department for Statistics, the Makkah region was home to 25.2% of the population, Riyadh had 22.5% 
and the Eastern province had 14.5%. . . 
29 These population counts differ from alternative government ministries which often estimate higher population growth rates. 
Moreover, these estimates may undercount illegal foreign residents (Cordesman 2003: 230) 
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4.2.4 Regional Development and Urbanisation 
It is a stated aim of the Ministry of Finance to address 'the development of remote areas 
which are isolated from traditional industrial centres' as well as regions that have been 
adversely affected by technological advances that have made traditional modes of 
employment obsolete (Boubshait, 1999io It is clear that alongside rapid population growth 
there has been a massive change in Saudi society and labor structure, with a shift from the 
agrarian and rural to the industrial/technological and urban. As Cordesman puts it: "What was 
once a rural and isolated Saudi society, divided into regional and tribal groups, has become a 
society that is largely urbanised, although tribal links remain powerful." (Cordesman, 2003: 
232). According to the World Bank (2000), urbanisation reached 86% by 2000, with 25% in 
cities over 1 million. 
A significant advantage cited in favour of supporting SMEs is that their development 
would most likely provide a more even regional balance of incomes. Currently, high incomes 
are relatively concentrated in the industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu, the capital Riyadh and 
the financial and diplomatic centre of Jeddah, however, the development of: 'SME's would 
bring jobs and higher incomes to many of the towns and villages bypassed by the Kingdom's 
petroleum-based growth' (Looney, 2004a). 
4.2.5 Economic Policy Priorities 
Demographics interact with wealth to determine relative wealth and per capita income. 
It is unlikely that any analysis, whether from inside or outside the Kingdom, could deny that 
popUlation growth has had a significant effect on the relative wealth of the Saudi people and 
that economic growth has, until the recent and likely unsustainable boom in oil prices, failed 
to match the rate of population increase31 • 
30 For instance, the number of Saudi males employed in agriCUlture dropped from roughly 45% in 1980 to under 7% in 1998 
(World Bank 2000). . ., 
31 However, 'the total PPP, GNP, and GOP, and per capita income figures almost certainly sharply underestImate the Kmgdom s 
true economic and demographic problems' (Cordesman 2003: 239) 
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The Saudi population boom - and the related rise in unemployment and. until recently, 
the decline in per capita income - is regarded as the most 'severe' structural challenge facing 
the Kingdom. In the Seventh Development Plan, the government argues that to address the 
problem, the Kingdom must urgently 'privatise and diversiry its economy far more rapidly 
than in the past, expand oil export capacity as quickly as possible, develop a far more 
comprehensive infrastructure ... and take more aggressive steps to eliminate most of its foreign 
labor (Cordesman, 2003: 260). 
To re-iterate, government planning and economic policy is explicitly - and primarily -
driven by the need to manage the demographic pressures created by the surge in population. 
Despite the recent improvements in per capita income driven by the surge in oil prices, the 
need to address the ramifications of the population boom continues to dominate government 
concerns. As the Oxford Business Group's survey of the Saudi Economy puts it 'It may seem 
ironic that in the midst of an oil boom, the government has embarked upon a policy of 
economic liberalisation and diversification. But having witnessed the boom-and-bust cycle in 
the 1970s and 1980s, attention has been focused on insulating the economy from fluctuations 
in the oil markeL.the 2007 budget has conservative oil and revenue forecasts, while making 
significant investments in education, health-care and infrastructure development. Capital 
expenditure is aimed at projects that promote economic diversification and private sector 
development.' (Oxford Business Group, 2007: 15). Thus, in the wake of the oil boom of the 
past six years, the challenge remains to translate economic growth into sustainable jobs. 
4.3 Education and Business in Saudi Arabia 
4.3.1 Public Policy 
Saudi human resource development, via education and vocational training, is chiefly 
concerned with the two-fold objective of (i) the generic build-up of knowledge and skills and 
(ii) the specific provision of employment opportunities for unutilisedlunder-utilised 
manpower (AI-Dosary et aI., 2006). The Saudi government clearly recognizes the need to 
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expand employment of the native labor force (especially via the pol icy of Saudisation32) and 
to ensure that young Saudis have the necessary education and motivation to contribute to a 
knowledge-based economy. This is seen as the key to providing young Saudis with job 
opportunities, and with jobs that are globally competitive and relatively well-salaried. As 
stated earlier (chapter 2), threats and opportunities within developing economies associated 
with competing in a global marketplace have created a pressing need to commercialise new 
technologies. This is especially true for Saudi Arabia, as its major concern in the present is to 
introduce an edge in global competition to its SME market as the current non-oil trade 
account balance is in debt. Currently, the Kingdom has seventy-five training institutes for 
various professions and vocations, which are expected to train some 300,000 young Saudis 
within three years. 
However, in order to achieve these education/employment goals, (i) the technical 
knowledge and skills of Saudi students needs to be raised to international standards, which 
are currently not being met (Cordesman, 2003, Looney, 2004b) and (ii) the amount of 
private sector employment opportunities for Saudi graduates needs to increase. 
Chapter 2 suggests that successful incubation is a mechanism for re-shaping the way 
industry, government and academia interrelate. In terms of government policy (as evidenced in the 
national Development Plans), universities are now expected to perform two roles: (i) to build upon 
their 'traditional' role of building student skills relevant to the contemporary workplace (through 
the provision of traditional and vocational education) and (ii) to adopt a newer role of 'bridge-
builder' with local and national businesses. It is intended that this second role will enhance the 
vocational experiences and employability of students (through work experience placements, 
internships etc) and assist the private sector through knowledge transfer. On a broader level, it is 
hoped that the education sector will develop a better understanding of private sector 'needs', and 
likewise the private sector will develop an understanding of what the education sector has to offer 
in terms of knowledge and human resources. 
32 The long-tenn national employment strategy is to achieve lOOper cent Saudisation which is intended to bring about the 
employment of 120,000 Saudis in the private sector every year. 
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With the current level of regional competition (especially from Qatar and United Arab 
Emirates) the situation in Saudi Arabia calls for an immediate response through the 
development of enterprises - especially new technology (see Chapter 2). 
4.3.2 Universities and Business Incubation: Conditions. 
In terms of its direct relevance to business incubation, the educational field interacts 
with the business incubation phenomenon in four ways: 
1) Graduate Skills and Training. The business incubation literature (see Chapter 2) 
suggests that technical skills of incubatees (measured by learning experiences and academic 
qualifications) have a strong effect upon the success of incubated businesses. Put simply, 
incubated businesses run by well-educated and technically proficient graduates are much 
more likely to succeed. Thus, an optimal condition for business incubation is a high level of 
graduate skills and training. Business incubators require candidates who have been educated 
to a high academic level, have a good technical proficiency and, preferably, some degree of 
commercial experience. At present, a high proportion of university graduates were graduated 
from faculties of arts and Islamic law therefore, it is expected that with this kind of education 
they would not fit for business incubation. 
2) Entrepreneurial attitudes. The entrepreneurial attitudes amongst graduates are an 
important, albeit less tangible, factor in incubator success. Specifically, they are likely to affect 
application levels to incubation programmes. Chapter 2 proposed that, incubation is a continual 
process and the typical tenure period in an incubator is 1-3 years. Therefore a steady demand for 
incubator admission ought to be present in order to utilize the full capacity. This would also imply 
that the incubator has entered its business development life cycle characterised by the highest 
productivity. In developing countries, which are often prone to a weak entrepreneurial culture, it is 
important that new graduates are willing to consider private enterprise and business involvement 
instead of the large public sectors that have typically dominated developing economies. Thus, as 
well as possessing the requisite technical and commercial skills and experiences, it is important 
that graduates are 'commercially-orientated' and enthusiastic about entrepreneurship and business 
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involvement. Universities are able to playa role in imparting "entrepreneurship' both in their 
syllabus and in their teaching styles. 
3) Graduate employment. SMEs that are incubated require high-quality graduates to run 
them - the well-known, 'generic' purpose of incubation is small business development, which 
leads to job creation (Greene and Butler, 1996) .The small businesses nurtured by incubators are 
an effective means of absorbing unemployment in an over-supplied labor market and are 
particularly useful in absorbing graduate unemployment (particularly if they are successful). Thus. 
a surplus of skilled graduates entering the labor market represents an optimal condition for 
business incubation. 
4) University and business links. As demonstrated in the international case studies (see 
Chapter 2) the type and strength of the relationship between higher education institutions, 
local businesses and, business incubators have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
incubator success. Extensive collaboration and communication between universities and 
businesses (and any organisations that promote business) makes an incubation project more 
likely to succeed. Thus a positive relationship between universities and local businesses 
represents an optimal condition for business incubation. Ideally, both academics, through 
research commercialisation or collaboration, and students, through internships and 
placements, will be involved in commercial activity at some level. 
4.4 Student Skills and Competencies 
4.4.1 Graduate Skills 
As in many developing economies, higher education in Saudi Arabia is expected to 
support centrally planned national development strategies (as made clear in the Seventh, 
2000-2005 and Eighth, 2005-20 I 0 Development Plans) aimed at raising the skill and 
knowledge levels of the Kingdom's labor force. It is intended that the development of national 
'human capital' will, 'make products and services competitive; [provide] researchers to 
generate, adapt and apply new knowledge and technologies; and [produce] manpower for 
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high and medium skill industries and services,]3 (Tayag, 2005 in AI-Dosary, 2006 et al: 397). 
These intentions are confirmed in the subject literature (Campbell, 1987; Campbell et aI., 
1988), for example, in the US for 50 jobs created through incubation, further 25 are created in 
the local communities and as incubated firms grow, they employ both highly qualified and 
less qualified staff However, the total number of males enrolled at the (seventy five) 
institutions for technical education and vocational education totaled only 46,058 in 1999, and 
less than half of these received training related to non-white-collar jobs in the private sector 
(Cordesman, 2003). According to the private sector employers are not enthusiastic regarding 
the output of those universities because of poor skills in terms of real-world jobs (Ibid). 
Placke (1999) contends that large numbers of young Saudis are unemployed because they 
lack the skills needed in modern economies. AI-Dosary disagreed with this view (that Saudis 
are unemployable) but suggested that there could be a mismatch of skills with employers' 
requirement. However, there is a general agreement amongst the Saudi literature that the 
skills of the Saudi graduates have generally failed to meet the needs of the job market (AI-
Dosary, 2006: 409). 
4.4.2 Education and Employment 
As stated, a consequence of the Saudi population boom has been the surge in 
unemployment. The Saudi Central Department of Statistics estimated in 2001 that the native 
33 However, to date, the problem Saudi Arabia has encountered in the development of its human capital is directly linked to 
those difficulties it has experienced in the development of small, private enterprise. In the industrial sector, extraordinarily 
rapid infrastructural development - predominantly in the 1970s and 1980s - left behind a "missing middle": in order to 
realise ambitious development plans the giant nationalised industries imported products and services from abroad, creating 
no incentive for local business creation thus depriving Saudi Arabia of the small and medium sized enterprises that would 
ordinarily have "grown up" around major industry (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Similarly, in human 
resources, this enormous modernization and industrialization process created an urgent demand for a large, often highly 
skilled and technologically adept, labour force. The general absence of such skills amongst the indigenous population led to 
skilled labour being imported from abroad (like industrial products and services) and both the public and private sector 
became saturated with expatriate labour., The native population were given little opportunity (or incentive) to acquire 
technological or vocational expertise. The capital-rich government did not place a priority on raising skill levels amongst the 
native population. Neither were private employers incentivised to employ Saudis - native employees were generally more 
expensive and less skilled than foreign labour. The situation was further worsened by government regulations which 
exacerbated the 'local' and 'foreign' split in the labour force. For instance, until the mid 1980s, Saudi graduates were 
prohibited by employment regulation to work in the private sector - on the basis that the government had funded their studies 
and should be repaid through public service (Maimani 1989). The public sector (which was dominated by the oil sector) 
came to dominate the Saudi economy. This massively distorted employment and wage policies and created 'considerable 
segmentation along public/private lines' (World Bank 1996). Thus, in the last three decades, the Saudi labour force has 
shifted from one dominated by manual labour in agriculture (64% in 1973) to one where by 2000, 40% worked in 
lovemmenl office jobs whilst the rest of the labour force, some 25% worked in industry and oil and 30% work in services 
(Cordesman. 2003: 7). 
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Saudi labor force was 3.3 million in 2000, and would rise to 8.3 million in 2020 (SAMA. 
2001i
4
• Frustratingly for planners, the average annual rate of job creation is 0.9% versus a 
population growth rate that averages over 3.0% and over 3.5% in recent years. In response to 
these pressures, the Seventh Development Plan made both creating new jobs and increasing 
education levels its highest priorities (Cordesman, 2003: 259). The government clearly 
recognizes the need to expand the native labor force (relative to the foreign labor force) and to 
ensure that younger Saudis have the education and motivation about a knowledge-based 
economy as the key to giving young Saudis not only employment, but jobs that are globally 
competitive enough to ensure that they receive relatively high salaries (Ibid). 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2005) called for the creation of 328,000 jobs to 
raise total employment from 7,176,300 in 1999 to 7,504,900 by 2004 (SAMA, 2001)35. As 
stated, government employment, with the exception of the education and health sectors is 
expected to remain at the same, absolute, level; consequently, the private sector is 'expected to 
absorb the majority of the new entrants entering the labor market' (Prokop, 2003: 87). The 
private sector is projected to create 311,000 out of the 328,000 jobs - with only 16,100 new jobs 
in the government sector. This cut government employment from 12.8% of all jobs in 1999 to 
12.4% in 2004. In the current study (see Chapter 5), the survey results, showed that only 4.6% 
of students interviewed expected to be employed in the public sector and the vast majority 
(74%) expected to work in large private sector companies. Student's expectations are in line 
with the projections of the seventh and eighth development plans. Furthermore, the results also 
demonstrated clearly that the preferred employment sector is the private sector. 
The seventh and eighth development plans allocate virtually no growth in the 
'traditional' sectors, for instance, only 700 jobs are projected in petrochemicals in the Seventh 
Development Plan. Private manufacturing, finance and real estate are the areas that will 
dominate job growth. All these areas are largely outside the control of government and 
34 The Saudi Central Department of Statistics 'seems to be a reliable source' (Cordesman ~OO3: 2SI) of inform~tion on 
employment and Saudi perceptions of the Kingdom's labour problems and its estimates track In very rough terms WIth those 
of the World Bank (Ibid). 
3S Statistics are yet to be published on whether this has been achieved. 
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involve limited direct government investment in the plan.' (Cordesman, 2003: 257). 
Moreover, a significant number of the projected new jobs are in areas in which Saudis have 
been reluctant to take jobs in the past.' (Cordesman, 2003: 256)36. However, the growth of 
Saudi held jobs in the private sector has been very slow relative to the number of Saudis 
entering the labor force, and the number of foreigners in the private sector actually increased 
through the late 1990s (Cordesman, 2003: 257). At the same time, traditional rural and 
agricultural jobs are vanishing from the economy as a percentage of the workforce, and 
although agricultural jobs are now subsidized, they will continue to shrink steadily as a 
percentage of the labor force even if subsidies continue (Ibid: 259). 
4.5 Non-native Labor, 'Saudisation' and 'Insourcing' 
The increasingly urgent employment pressures explain why the Saudi government 
puts so much emphasis on the policy of "Saudisation" which has been pursued since the 
Fourth Development Plan (1985 - 1990) to the present. Saudisation is a 'dual policy' of 
replacing foreign nationals with native workers in the labor market and reducing the 
reliance upon foreign-based enterprises for the provision of materials and technologies for 
the giant utilities industries. To date the policy has been followed largely by using various 
employment quota targets. The policy can be sumarised as focusing on four primary 
goals: 
1. Increase employment for Saudi nationals across all sectors of the national economy. 
2. Reduce the over-reliance and dependence on foreign workers. 
3. Repatriate and reinvest income which would have left the Kingdom in remittances to 
foreign worker home countries. 
4. Stimulate economic growth by encouragmg native businesses to provide raw 
materials to the industrial sector. 
36 These include 81,400 new jobs in construction, 72,000 in manufacturing and 24,400 in agriculture .. ?'tly 9,000 j~bs ~ 
estimated to arise in "attractive" service sector jobs like management and administration, and an additional 15,500 Jobs In 
professional and technical positions (Cordes man, 2003) However, another 93,000 are expected to come from 'less desirable' 
service sectors like sales, services, and clerical positions. 
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The Seventh Development Plan set a goal of 25 % Saudisation in the private sector. 
with an annual, targeted, increase of 5%37. The Saudi Ministry of Labor issued an 
announcement in May 2001 that it intended to cut foreign jobs by 85% over the next thirty 
years, from 7.2 million to 1 million; at the same time it is still projected that foreigners would 
make up 10 million of a projected 39 million population in 2030 (Cordesman, 2003: 261). In 
June 2003, the government announced its decision to reduce the number of workers to 20 per 
cent of the total population within the decade, in order to open up jobs for its nationals 
(Looney, 2004b). The policies seem to be having some effect, a press release by the Ministry 
of Labor (Ministry of Labor website, 2004) stated a fifty six per cent reduction in visa 
applications for foreign workers between 2003-2004. 
However, the real problem around Saudisation is that many non-natives are working in 
jobs that have low social status; moreover, productivity is also extremely low. Therefore, 
these jobs may simply cease to exist, rather than providing an opportunity for young Saudis to 
enter the labor force. As Cordesman puts it: 'turning Saudisation theory into practice means 
restructuring much of the present labor market to create the new types of knowledge-based 
jobs that young Saudis want and expelling and replacing roughly 2 million foreign workers 
over the next decade' (Cordesman, 2003: 271). 
Data from the Ministry of Planning (2002 cited in AI-Dosary et aI., 2006: 409) shows 
that on average native Saudis earn approximately two to three times as much as non-Saudis, 
even in low-quality jobs38. As Cordesman again warns the Saudi economy cannot simply 
afford to replace current non-Saudi jobs at twice or three times the current cost (Cordesman 
2002, in Ibid: 410) and it is simply not realistic to envision Saudisation policies as capable of 
replacing foreign workers one-for-one with Saudi equivalents (Bourland, 2002 ). 
37 The Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) saw the introduction oflaws that required that: (i) Busine~ses emplo~ing more th~ 
20 people increase the number of Saudi workers by 5% per year; (ii) No less than 30% of workers In any bUSiness be Saudi; 
(iii) The employment of foreigners in 22 key administrative professions was prohibited. F~ we~ ~ade payable by 
businesses employing foreign workers, - the revenue going towards a government fund to help 'nationalize' Jobs. 
38 In 2000 in Saudi Riyals, the average Saudi and non-Saudi primary school graduate earned 4,600 versus 1.378; se~nd~ 
school graduates earned 7,200 versus 2,580; intermediate college graduates earned 6,810 versus 2,880; and universIty 
graduates earned 10,893 versus 5,581 (Saudi Ministry of Planning. 2002 cited in AI Dosary et a12006: 409). 
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However, a significant part of the foreign workforce is highly skilled, and it is these 
jobs that provide some opportunity for an increasingly skilled Saudi labor force. Saudi 
statistics show that there are nearly as many foreign university graduates in the Kingdom 
as native Saudi university graduates (although the ratio is turning in favour of the Saudi 
nationals). This 'top half' of the foreign workforce is the true target of Saudisation - the 
"bottom half' (low social status and low salaries jobs) will face difficulties in 
Saudisation. 
The other, indirect, dynamic of 'Saudisation' is the need for Saudi business to replace 
foreign firms in supplying the major 'transformation industries.' The primary form of 
government intervention in this instance comes from of grants and soft loans from the Saudi 
Credit Bank (6th Development Plan) and the Industrial Development Fund (7th Development 
Plan) that privilege small, 'fledgling' enterprises competing against international competition 
to supply the specialist products to the major national industries. This process of , in sourcing' 
or 'downstream industry' has been advocated by the Ministry of Planning (AI-Kurdi, 2002), 
however, at present there are no direct incentives on offer to the industrial giants to prefer 
national over foreign firms. Indeed, the recent oil boom, despite its positive knock-on effects 
for private enterprise and the non-oil sector has also generated a net doubling of industrial 
imports between 2001 - 2007 (Oxford Business Group, 2007: 16). 
The Labor Market 
The increase in urbanisation has been matched by a major increase in the level of 
education, although much still needs to be done if Saudi Arabia is to compete in skill and 
knowledge levels on a global basis. However, the structure and composition of the Saudi 
workforce has changed - 'qualified cadres', albeit in small numbers, are now available for 
work in high tech, specialised industries (Boubshait, 1999). 
Saudi labor statistics show that the labor force already has substantial skills; figures 
from 1999 show that 2,217 million out of the total labor force work in finance or real estate, 
1,037 million work in trade; and 1.1 million work in scientific and technical jobs. The rest of 
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the labor force consisted of 534,000 clerical (7.4%), 134,000 in administrative and business 
jobs (1.9%),507,000 salesmen (7.1%),551,000 in agriculture and fishing (7.8%), and 2.2 
million in constructions and production works (30.5%). Government services accounted for 
916,000 workers, oil and gas industries, with a further 21,500 in oil refining and 9,400 in 
petrochemicals (SAMA, 2001 i 9• 
However, SAMA (2001) data (this is the most recent data that can be obtained) shows 
that the Saudi Government is making significant progress in raising the educational standards of 
new entrants into the labor force. Table 4.1 first shows the Development Plan projections for the 
amount of manpower and the amount of native population participating in the workforce. More 
significantly, table 4.2 shows the number of Saudis participating within the education system. 
As of 1999 enrolment in secondary education has increased at an annual rate of 10%, 
outstripping population growth for this age group (Cordesman, 2002 in AI-Dosary et aI., 2006). 
As of 1999, a record 232,000 Saudis were also engaged in tertiary education40 . However, these 
improvements must be measured against a striking an unemployment rate among new graduates 
(in the age group of 20-24), these first time job-seekers have an unemployment rate of 27 
percent for men and 33 percent for women (Looney, 2004b). 
Table 4.1: The Labor Force Numbers Used in the Seventh Development Plan (Manpower in OOOs) 
Category Number in 1999 Number in 2004 Change 1999-2000 Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Population below working age 5999.2 6814.8 818.6 2.6 
Working age population 9662.2 11705.5 2043.3 3.9 
Total population 15658.4 18520.3 2861.9 3.4 
Population in work force 3172.9 3990.2 817.3 4.7 
J)cpendency Ration (%) 62.1 58.2 -- 3.8 
Aggregate Labor Force Participation Rate 
Soill'f:t: .£4MA, 2001: 77-78 
32.8 34.1 -- 1.2 
39 A problem with these statistics is that it is not sure of the distribution of 'native' Saudi and non-native (i.e. foreign) work~. 
Moreover. categories such as "trade" and "real estate" often include extended family enterprises which are prone to practices 
of unnecessary job-creation (i.e. irrespective ofactual employment/economic need).. . . . 
40 According to the Ministry of Planning, only 452,000 students enrolled in secondary education programes In 199~ (MIniStry of 
Planning, 2002 in AI Dosary et aI2006). There were 704,566 students in secondary school in 1999, and the ratio of students 
to teachers was also relatively low 12: I (SAMA, 200 I). 
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Table 4.2: Qualifications Estimates Used in the Seventh Development Plan (Manpower in OOOs) 
Category Number Share % 
Tertiary level 
Universities 178.6 21.9 
Teacher Training Institutes 36.7 4.5 
Intermediate Technical Colleges 16.7 2.0 
Subtotal 232.0 28.4 
Secondary Level 
Secretary (General) 213.9 26.2 
Technical and Vocational 78.7 9.6 
Subtotal 292.6 35.8 
Primary Level 
Intermediate 143.1 17.5 
Subtotal 235.4 28.8 
Total Educational Entrants 760.0 93.0 
Other Entrants 57.3 7.0 
Elementary 92.3 11.3 
Total New Entrants 817.3 100.0 
Source:SAMA,2001: 77-78 
Access to all levels of education in Saudi Arabia is free. Moreover, the government also 
provides grants to every student in higher education. The Kingdom currently 21 universities, 
the latest constructed in 2009. (Table 4.3) 
The Imam University, opened in 1953, - specialising exclusively in Islamic law -
however, a University building process got under way in the 1960s and 1970s, and gradually 
a wide range of faculties were incepted. Institutions like the King Fahad University of 
Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) were created specifically to engender 'scientific, economic 
and industrial development' (King Fahd cited in Saudi Information Resource, 2005) The 
KFUPM now has a dedicated Research Centre and a patents section for any technologies it 
Innovates. 
Across all Higher Education (including eight universities, seventy colleges and seventy 
eight institutes of Higher Education) the annual number of graduates jumped from 87,000 in 
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1994 to 167,000 in 1999 (Ministry of Planning in AI-Dosary et aI., 2006). Within universities. 
the total number of males graduating annually from university rose from 795 in 1970 to 
21,229 in 1999, while the number of female graduates rose from 13 to 21,721~1 (Ministry of 
planning ,2002). However, as Cordesman warns, between 1995-1999 some 42.2% of post-
secondary graduates received degrees in social sciences and Islamic studies - areas that are 
not likely to equip graduates adequately for work in the private sector (Cordesman, 2002 in 
AI-Dosary et aI., 2006). 
In the wake of the recent oil boom, the Saudi government is spending significantly III 
education; some $26bn was allocated for education and manpower development in 2007 
alone, - 'one of the world's largest budgets per capita for education ever' (Oxford Business 
Group, 2007: 19). A significant portion of this investment will be used to improve the scale 
and scope of higher education. The problem remains, however, whether the ever-increasing 
pool of Saudi graduates possess the necessary technical skills to enter an increasingly 
competitive, globally oriented, and knowledge-based private sector. Moreover. the private, 
non-oil, sector, despite its recent impressive growth (7.1 % in 2007) is still unable to absorb 
the increasing numbers of the Saudi graduates. 
-
41 The number of Saudi women graduating from university has grown at an average rate 2.5 times that of male graduates during 
the lISt decade (Cordesman 2003: 234) 
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Table 4.3: Saudi Universities and their colleges. 
University Location Year Colleges 
nome launched 
King Saud Riyadh 1957 Administrative SCien.ces, Agriculture, Vetinary Sciences, Architecture and Planning, 
Arts~ C~mputer SCIences, Dentistry, economics and Administration. Education, 
Engmeenng, Languages & Translation, Medicine. Applied Medicinal Sciences, 
Pharmacy and Science 
King Jeddah 1967 Arts and Humanities 
Abdulaziz 
Dentistry, Economics and Administration. Education, Engineering, Geology. Marine 
Sciences, Medicine, Meteorology and Science. 
KingFahad Dammam 1963 Petroleum and MinteraJ 
(KFUPM) 
Technology. Engineering Science. Computer Science and Engineering. Industrial 
Management, Environmental Design 
Imam Riyadh 1953 Judiciary (Shari'ah Judges) Theology, Arabic Language and Social Science, Library 
Mohammed Science 
UmAlqura Mekkah 1949 Applied Science and Engineering, Islamic Education, Scientific Research, Islamic 
heritage, Psychological Research Centre, Education, Arabic Language, 
Islamic Madinah 1961 Islamic Theology, Quran and Islanlic studies. Arabic language. Judicial} (Shari'ah 
University Judges) 
King Faisal AIhassa 1974 Agriculture, Vetinary Medicine and Animal resources. Medicine and Medical Sciences, 
Engineering 
King Khalid AIgassem 1996 Education, Medicine, Islamic Law, Religion, 
King Abdullah Jeddah 2007 Earth science, environment engineering, vital science and engineering, math, Physical 
Engineering, 
Taibal1 Madinah 2004 Humanitarian science ,finallce management ,medicine, computer science , 
engineering. 
AJgaseem AIgaseem 2004 Finance Judiciary (Shari'ah Judges) , medicine, computer sciences. medical science , 
Arabic language, Dentistry agriculture 
Altaif Taif 2004 computer sciences , Medicine , social sciences . mallagement and financial sciences , 
society support 
Albal1a Albaha 2006 Electric engineering , architecture engineering ,civilian engineering , mechanical 
engineering 
AJjouf Aljouf 2006 Social sciences society support medical sciences, engineering 
Tabouk Tabouk 2006 Social sciences society, computer sciences, engineering 
Jazan Jazan 2006 Medicine, engineering, computer sciences, society support . 
N~ran Najran 2006 Social sciences society, management and financial sciences, computer sciences 
Northern Arar 2006 Arts and Humanities, engineering, society support, Arabic language 
Boarders 
King Abdulla Jeddah 2009 Chemical and Life Sciences and Engineering, Mathematical and Computer Sciences and Engineering, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
King Saud for Jeddah& 2005 Medical science, Nursery, Applied medical science, Dentistry,Pharmacy . 
Health Science AI hassa 
Princes Nora Riyadh 2008 Art ,Social work I Kindergarten, phesiotheraby , Computer science, Business 
management 
~ Ministry of Higher Education (2009) 
4.6 The Role of Saudi SMEs 
4.6.1 Background 
Saudi Arabia is currently devoting more attention to the problems and prospects of its 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The spectacle of growing unemployment has 
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given a 'new sense of urgency to the development of the SMEs which are generally labor-
intensive and, therefore, capable of absorbing a share of the local unemployed youth' (AI-
Kurdi, 2002: 5). The history of the Saudi industrialisation drive has been relatively short. 
having been limited to a 30-year span beginning with the oil boom in the mid-1970s (AI-
Kurdi, 2002: 2) Over the past two decades, the Kingdom experienced an active development 
process involving several economic sectors; however, large-scale industry, commerce, 
agriculture and service sectors enjoyed the 'lion's share' of the interest officials and 
businessmen took in the development process (Buobeshait, 1999),- leaving small, "organic" 
business infrastructure significantly underdeveloped. As Al-Kibbi and Radwan (of the Saudi 
Ministry of Planning) note: 
Due to its historical development, industrial development in the KSA [Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia] exhibits the "missing middle". While there are simultaneously large well-
established companies such as Aramco and SABle and plenty of micro-enterprises and 
family run businesses in the retail sector, the SME sector remains relatively under-developed. 
(Radwan and Al-Kibbi, 2002: 18) 
Indeed, only with the completion of the major "infrastructure projects,,42, did the role of 
the private sector start receiving attention - but until recently financial and other incentives 
were made available only to large and medium-scale manufacturing sector (Al-Kurdi, 
2002:2). Prior to the sixth development plan, the extensive range of Government subsidies 
granted to 'home-grown' industry were not available to smaller start-ups. 
Two structural problems emerged from Saudi Arabia's rapid industralisation 
programme. First, the relatively recent arrival of modem (liberal-market) capitalism and its 
associated technologies resulted in the state limiting its definition of the private sector to 
exclude small-scale business establishments whose economic activities did not directly 
contribute to the state's urgent modernisation projects. Thus, until the ninties, small-scale 
42 Major utilities such as transportation, communication, power. 
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private enterprise was neglected by policy makers who preferred to promote large scale 
private business through subsidies. As Radwan (2005: 196) puts it: 
'In the rush to industrialise, the SMEs were neglected because they were not "glamorous 
enough" or organised managerially, and state bureaucrats preferred to handle the needs of 
larger corporations.' 
Second, the state's commitment to rapid modernisation meant overly-generous financial 
assistance to those larger-scale areas of the private sector deemed important for infrastructure 
development. This meant that private sector growth became heavily dependent on state 
sponsorship which distorted incentives and reduced efficiency and competitiveness43 : 
During the third development plan (1980 to 1 ?85) this dilemma was particularly intense 
as the government emphasised economic diversification through the agency of the private 
sector. To support rapid economic growth, the government nearly doubled the capital 
available to the private sector to approximately $3 billion in the form of generous loans from 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. It is estimated that before the third five-year plan the 
Fund had already provided approximately 50 percent of the capital invested in private-sector 
development since its establishment in 1974. (Hess, 1995) 
Thus, while the government's attempts to stimulate the private sector were laudable, 
they also meant the absence of a competitive, "indigenous" smaller-scale private sector, free 
from public subsidy. This does not ordinarily bode well for the expansion of entrepreneurial 
activity which requires a private sector responding to market forces, not government 
subsidies. 
Since the emergence of the "SME agenda" in the mid 1990s, enthusiasm for the socio-
economic role of smaller private enterprise has gathered pace among Saudi policy-makers, 
especially since the onset of the Seventh Development plan44 • However, despite the recent 
43 As Hess claims. generous government sponsorship h~ meant that 'the private sector, like the rest of Gulf society, is based on kinship 
relations,' instead of , modem' human resource and management regimes designed to maximize efficiency (Hess. 1995: 22) . 
44 ACCOrding to Shalaby, SME development 'may lead to employment opportunities, stimulate a strong free enterymse sector, 
assist the poorest of the poor, develop local skills for economic and social leadership, support woman and their household 
spending. stimulate regional growth through the use of local suppliers and sub contractors, and encourage long-term 
economic growth and expansion.' (Shalaby, 2003) 
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optimism and enthusiasm about SMEs development as a panacea for the Kingdom's manifold 
demographic problems, the challenge for the government is to avoid the mistakes made in the 
previous oil-boom when the blunt instrument of subsidies undermined private sector 
competitiveness and efficiency. The key now for the government is to find new and effective 
ways to target SME growth and survival. 
4.6.2 The Expected Role of SMEs in National Economic Development 
As discussed in (chapter one), in many developing nations, small-and-medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have played a crucial role in creating jobs and providing economic 
stability (Looney, 2004at5• In 2002 Otsuki46 addressed the Saudi Ministry of Planning on the 
topic of 'SME Support Systems in Saudi Arabia'. He identified the following 'vital roles' 
SMEs could play within the Saudi economy: 
1. Diversification of Economy: SMEs playa significant role in diversifying national 
economy and expanding industrial production into various sectors in Saudi 
economy. 
2. Contribution to National Economic Growth: SMEs can contribute to significant 
('say more than 50 %') of future industrial production. 
3. Generating Employment and Vitalizing Saudisation: SMEs are able to playa 
'decisive role' in generating employment opportunities for Saudi nationals, thereby 
'greatly contribute[ ing] to the Saudisation by offering various jobs to Saudis.' 
4. Regional Development: SMEs also contribute to the regional development and 
combat some of the difficulties created by rapid centralisation and urbanisation: 'the 
geographic dispersion of SMEs helps to achieve a more balanced growth of local 
economy and creates employment opportunities for local people in the national 
economy.' 
45 In Thailand, for example, a whole new development model has centered on SMEs playing a leading role in advancing Ihe 
economy (Looney 2004a). . . 
46 Seconded as an SMEs expert from JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) to SAGIA (SaudI ArabIan General 
Investment Authority). 
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5. Technological Innovation: SMEs are the sources of new products and are very 
innovative in creating and adopting new technology.' However, Saudi Arabia has a 
specific difficulty in that rapid industrialisation meant that virtually all industrial 
technology was imported at the expense of 'homegrown' development. 
6. Export Market Expansion: Without oil exports, Saudi Arabia would suffer from a 
trade deficit as the industrial sector is over-reliant on imports. SMEs are a useful 
mechanism to correct this because of their flexibility in adapting to market changes. 
In addition, Radwan and Al-Kibbi (2002), recognised that SMEs can playa key role 
in: Industrial insourcing, as suppliers of materials, inputs or specialized goods and 
services to the larger, national, industries. Currently, many of the inputs of the Saudi 
petrochemical and oil industries are supplied by overseas companies; this is clearly an 
area where local SMEs can enter the market and have a clear competitive advantage. 
Radwan and AI-Kibbi (2002), believe that there is 'enormous advantage' and 
'tremendous potential' for large companies to support SME development through the 
creation of 'business linkages or 'co-operative arrangements.' 
4.6.3 The Scope and Scale of Saudi SMEs 
The Saudi Chamber of Commerce, 2002 estimates that "Small" (1-19 employees) 
enterprises comprise 240,853 of the total business population: 84.1 per cent from the total 
working enterprise in the Saudi Arabia. "Medium" (20-59 employees) enterprises number 
17,520 - comprise 5.9 per cent of the total enterprise. Following these definitions, 90% of 
total enterprises in the Kingdom can be described as SMEs. However, Saudi SMEs 
contribute only around 14% of total industrial production, utilise about 35% of the energy 
consumption of industry and contribute only around 8% to the total value of industrial 
exported goods according to the 7th Development Plan (SAMA, 2001). However, as Radwan 
points out (2005: 196) a problem with all figures related to Saudi SME numbers is that they 
do not reveal how many enterprises survive and how many close. At the moment, Saudi 
authorities do not collect such data - a serious flaw in government planning. The only clues 
available as to SME failure rates are provided by Ministry of Commerce figures which show 
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that in 1988, 44,893 SME permits were non-renewed or cancelled and in 1999 the figure 
jumped to 88,808 (Ministry of Commerce, 200 I in Radwan, 2005: 197). Based on these 
figures, Radwan laments, 'this represents a serious waste of productive capacity in the 
economy, with unused resources, especially employment' (Radawn, 2005: 197). 
In terms of registrations, the Saudi SMEs sector is slowly growing. According to AI-
Kurdi, in 2002 the SME sector in Saudi was depended upon by around 5 million people for 
their livelihood. By the late 1980s and 1990s the SMEs sector in manufacturing and services 
did, he claims, start 'making its presence felt' (Ibid: 4). As of 2002, SMEs were estimated to 
represent the largest sector among 'other products sectors' (i.e. non-oil) in the Kingdom 
according to Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Otsuki, 2002). A total of93,000 new 
companies, with a total capital ofSR 2.6 billion were registered by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry during the year 2002 (SAGIA, 2005) - making the numbers of licenses granted 
to SMEs represent about 95% of new total commercial registrations47 . 
In terms of geographic distribution, Riyadh, leddah and the Eastern Province account 
for nearly 75% of all SMEs registered in Saudi Arabia (Radwan, 2005: 195). As shown in 
table 4.4 47% of SMEs are engaged in commercial and hotel businesses, 27 % in 
construction, 12% in industrial manufacturing sector, 6% in social services, and 8% in 'other 
businesses' (Saudi Chamber of Commerce, 2002). 
Table 44' Distribution of SMEs by industry sector , , 
Sector Percentage % 
Commercial and Hotel 47 
Construction 27 
Industrial Manufacturing 12 
Social Services 6 
Other 8 
Source: StlUdi Chamber o/Commerce. 2002 
47 The numbers of licenses granted to commercial establishments by the Ministry of Commerce by the end of 200.1 were 
675,425. The individual establishments represent about 95% of the total commercial registrations. The numbers ofhcenses 
issued for shops through Municipalities Ministry has reached to 161,855 by the year 2001. ?I% out o~total numbers.of 
industrial sector are SMEs. Small factories are 1,105 with capital I to 5 million SR and medIum factones are 1,360 WIth 
capital 5 to 20 million SR (Otsuki 2002). 
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4.7 Problems Facing Saudi SMEs 
Published research on Saudi SMEs - and the Saudi business environment in general - is 
somehow limited. Only four studies currently exist, each of which were produced for a non-
academic audience: AI-Kurdi's (2002) New Approach to Small and Medium Sized 
Development, produced for the Ministry of Planning; Otsuki's (2002) SME Support Systems 
in Saudi Arabia, produced for the Ministry of Planning; Radwan and AI-Kibbi's (2002) Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprise Development: A Vision for Action in Saudi Arabia, also 
produced for the Ministry of Planning; and Shablaq's (2003) Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises in Riyadh City, Precarious or Continuous? which was presented to the Saudi 
Chambers of Commerce. All four studies point to similar problems. 
Shablaq (2003) found that at least 50 SMEs in Riyadh were for sale every week. More 
than 80 percent of the SMEs in Riyadh were sold within one to three years of them being 
established. Some of the results in the current study (see Chapter 5) indirectly support the 
previous findings - the results also showed that 84.2% of the companies surveyed were 
cumulatively, less than five years old. 
Shablaq found that more than 80 per cent of SMEs owners did not have a business plan 
and more than 70% of their owners did not know how to 'use' information technology, 
putting them at a likely disadvantage in an increasingly knowledge-based, globalised and 
competitive marketplace. The problems currently faced by Saudi SMEs are summarised by 
Shablaq as: (i) lack of planning; (ii) general mismanagement; (iii) a lack of marketing; and 
(iv) a lack of finance. 
Similarly, AI-Kurdi (2002) described Saudi SMEs as beset by problems on various 
fronts: poor finance, poor marketing, poor technology, poor management and the threat of 
increasing global competition. He summarises the 'multifarious' problems faced by SMEs as 
follows: (i) shortage of credit for investment and working capital; (ii) managerial 
inadequacies; (iii) insufficient marketing effort and paucity of commercial intelligence, and; 
(iv) inadequate attention to technology and research and development. 
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In this regard, results of the current study (see Chapter 5) showed the reluctance ofSMEs 
to construct business and marketing plans before starting their business (82.3% did not consider 
to write business plan and 98.5% did not consider writing a marketing plan) 
Otsuki, (2002) goes into more detail, blaming SMEs underperformance in Saudi Arabia 
on: 
1. Lack of Funds. A shortage of capital and credit 'makes SMEs vulnerable to fluctuations 
in the supply and demand market economy.' They often 'face the refusal of financing 
institutions to provide necessary funds without credit guarantees for the establishment 
and operation of their enterprises.' 
The current work confirmed the important role of bank loans on start-up financing of 
the SME. The majority of the interviewed SMEs agreed that these loans have high 
impact on their financing. However, in spite of this results showed that the majority of 
SMEs did not receive any government grants in the last three years (70.4%). 
2. Lack of Skilled Human Resources. Otsuki (2002) cites the poor skills of Saudi 
workers as a consequence of Saudi's rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s 
- 'because of direct proceedings toward modern industries through importation of 
production technology from developed countries, Saudi industries became 
dependent on foreign manpower.' Therefore, 'there are shortages of skilled workers 
and qualified human resources in the factories and companies'. Indeed, in 2002 the 
rate of Saudisation in small enterprises ( 1-9 workers) in the kingdom has reached 
only 2% (Otsuki, 2002 :48). 
3. Lack of Management Skill. Saudi SMEs 'typically' have low management 
standards due to the administrative and managerial inexperience of their 
proprietors. Moreover, this situation is compounded because 'most Saudi 
48 However. in my own survey of Saudi based in Riyadh SMEs (that is companies between 1-19 employees. disc~ssed in 
Chapter S). non-native workers made up only 2S.77% of the mean total employees, meeting. or very nearly meetmg. ~he 
aovemment target. Thus government policy. at least when measured in terms of percentages, does seem to be havmg 
some effect. 
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SMEs owners are not involved in the daily management of the companies and 
leave the management to the non-Saudi expatriates'. 
4. Lack of Market Penetration and Marketing Skills. There are restrictions in the 
size and area of markets to which they have ready access (predominantly 
domestic and Gulf Co-operation Council area) due to 'low quality products, 
high and uncompetitive prices and inadequate marketing skills'. In a domestic 
market place dominated by large industry 'they are often unable to satisfy the 
large market requirements which need large production quantities, 
homogeneous outputs and consistent international quality standards' (Ibid). 
5. Lack of Modern Technology. According to Otsuki (2002), Saudi SMEs use 'rather 
old fashioned technology'. This structural weakness, a 'weak industrial and 
scientific approach' - is a direct consequence of the major limited funds and human 
resources' (Ibid). 
6. Cost Problems and Raw Material Purchase. SMEs experience their "generic" difficulty 
of lowering cost by achieving economy of scale in manufacturing. They 'also have the 
problem of higher purchase prices of equipment and raw materials because of small 
quantities which causes the increase of production costs' . 
7. Lack of Information. A 'limited availability of information and data on the 
production technology and know-how' is caused by 'the weak human resources 
and fund shortages'. There is also a difficulty in attracting foreign investment, 
emanating from 'the lack of appropriate information and public relation needed 
by the investors' (Ibid). 
Otsuki maintains that SME problems are not being adequately addressed by public and 
private support programmes, this could be attributed to (i) current support programmes are 
not properly targeted and (ii) the implementation and co-ordination of support is not properly 
administered due to the lack of a central authority responsible for SME support. 
Radwan and AI-Kibbi (2002) identified the wider aspects of the Saudi 'business 
environment' that potentially impede SME growth and development; they list problems 
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relating to: (i) the legislative environment, (ii) the regulatory environment, (iii) Saudi tax and 
trade structure and, (iv) state infrastructure. The first problem relates to the costly and time-
consuming procedures relating to licensing and registration of companies. In addition they 
cite a 'lack of legal framework for commercial dispute resolution and its enforcement', and 
the difficulties surrounding bankruptcy procedures and the use of property as collateral for 
financing. The second difficulty surrounds the regulatory environment and the current 
employment laws (which make both the hiring and firing of workers an arduous process), and 
government procurement procedures which, they allege, disadvantage and discourage SMEs 
from bidding from public contracts. Third, it is alleged that the tax structure and trade climate 
discriminate against SMEs. Finally, an inadequate, albeit rapidly developing, infrastructure 
places limits on access to information, transportation, and communication. 
The final appraisal of Saudi SMEs comes from the Saudi government's own 7th National 
Development Plan (2000-2005) which identified five key problems: (i) lack of preparatory studies, 
(ii) difficulties in transferring business ownership, (iii) difficulties in obtaining finance, (iv) low 
productivity (v) inadequate and management skills. First, echoing the findings of Shablaq (2003) 
and AI-Kurdi (2002), the government cited the poor quality of the business planning ('preparatory 
studies') and 'market intelligence' of many Saudi SMEs, especially when considered in the context 
of markets that are increasingly competitive (due to globalisation) and changeable (due to 
technology) (Saudi Ministry of Planning, 2001). It went on to state that 'within the new paradigm, 
government has a role to play in facilitating the provision of such services on a commercial basis' 
(Ibid). The second problem is unique to the government's study, the difficulty of 'transferring 
business ownership to the new generation.' Many family-owned SMEs emerged during the oil 
boom (i.e. the mid- 1970s to late- 1 980s) which are now in the midst of a 'generation shift' as their 
originators retire. The government therefore resolved to 'clarify the legal status of mergers and 
dissolutions' in order to facilitate the expansion of those firms that are successful and the 
rationalisation of those that are no longer functional in any meaningful sense. Third, the 
government repeats the findings of all four studies: there is a lack of easily available finance for 
SMEs. Fourth, the government alleges that poor research and development and low use of 
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advanced technology has led to declining productivity (mirroring the findings of AI-Kurdi, 2002). 
Finally, the government cites poor quality management skills - repeating the findings of Shablaq 
(2003), AI-Kurdi (2002) and Otsuki (2002). 
4.8 SMEs Support 
4.8.1 Government and Public Support 
The government began taking serious notice of the problems within the SME sector 
from the mid-1990s with the emergence of the Sixth Development plan. This was the first 
time that SMEs (as opposed to the private sector in general) became recognised as integral to 
the project of economic diversification and employment generation. Government support for 
SMEs has progressed incrementally with the implementation of Saudi Arabia's five-year 
development plans. The historical progress of government support can be traced as follows: 
The Sixth Development Plan (1995 - 2000) 
During the sixth plan (1995-2000) specific measures were introduced for the first time to 
support SMEs. This support took the form of: (i) increased access to finance/credit by 
expanding the mandate of the Saudi Credit Bank (a division of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency - the Saudi central bank) to include credit provisions for SMEs; (ii) an expansion of the 
government's incentive/subsidy system (administered by the Industrial Development Fund) to 
include small enterprises; (iii) the implementation of 'specialist training programmes' for small 
businesses provided by the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and sponsored by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry; (iv) a commitment to develop new organisational structures intended 
to promote co-operation between small-scale enterprises. 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000 - 2005) 
By the introduction of the seventh five-year plan (2000 - 2005) a 'key role' had been 
designated to the role of SMEs in Saudi's economic development. As discussed above, the 
government had identified several problem areas affecting the SME sector (i.e. planning, 
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ownership-transfer, financing, productivity, management skills). In response the plan 
initiated: (i) the establishment of a specific SME unit within the Industrial Development 
Fund, its main role is to provide grants, loans and free advice to SMEs as well as to research 
potential ways of promoting SME growth; (ii) a further expansion of the Saudi Credit Bank's 
provision of loans to SMEs (as initiated in the sixth development plan); (iii) the promotion of 
academic research (through the allocation of generous research grants) within Saudi 
universities to better support SMEs. 
The Eighth Development Plan (2005 - 2010) 
The Eighth Development plan saw a continuation, and relative acceleration, of the SMEs 
policies introduced by the Seventh plan. Notably, the role of the Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund (SIDF) was expanded to finance more loans to the SME sector. The Fund now operates a 
special loans programme alongside private banks to provide an equal distribution of SR 100 
million each (£ 16 mi II ion), which will be disbursed by the SIDF (Radwan, 2005: 199). At the 
same time, the Saudi Credit Bank is to expand the scope of its SME lending, raising the current 
lending ceiling to SR 200,000(£32.000) per firm (Radwan, 2005: 199). 
Although many of the government initiatives are laudable and the government has 
recognised the key problems affecting the SME sector, support is still hampered by 
inadequate targeting and delivery. As Otsuki recognises, the government development plans 
'seem better suited to identifying problems than presenting real solutions.' Otsuki (2002) 
describes the 7th Development Plan's proposals as 'too general' and advocates that 'the Saudi 
Government should take more active steps towards SME development by providing specific 
support programmes' (Ibid). A key task of the government is to create a centralised body 
responsible for SME support. Technically, such a body already exists - the 'Mobilizing 
National Committee on SMEs' was inaugurated on 17 April 2001, with the mandate to 
'prepare comprehensive programmes to support and develop SMEs by co-ordination among 
the Supreme Economic Council, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity, Ministry of Commerce, The Council of Saudi Chamber of 
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Commerce and Industry, SIDF, Saudi Credit Bank and SAGIA' (Otsuki, 2002). HO\\ever, to 
date none of the committee's recommendations have been implemented - Otsuki claims that 
'the progress of this committee is rather slow because of the challenging task of its nature'. 
The committee has increasingly taken a back seat to the work of the Saudi Small Business 
Agency (SSBA) sponsored by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Both the SSBA and 
the National Mobilizing Committee suffer from the same design flaw: in reporting to so many 
different government agencies but having executive or coordinating powers over none, they 
are not in a position to "deliver" coherent and wide-ranging SME support. All they can really 
do is lobby on behalf of the sector. 
4.8.2 Chambers of Commerce and SME Support Units 
An important, and potentially more focused, source of public SME support is the 
Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CSCCI). Within the last five years, 
the Chambers in the major urban centres - Riyadh, leddah and the Eastern Province, have 
each established SME 'support units.' These units provide some technical and financial 
consultation services to existing and prospective SMEs. All three units run free-of-charge 
workshops, seminars, lecture-programmes and courses focusing on management, marketing 
and finance. The CSCCI claims that the most important - and popular - programme they 
provide is the "How to Start Up a Small Enterprise" course which includes a series of lectures 
and workshops over several weeks and is available to any Saudi national interested in starting 
a new business (Saudi Chambers of Commerce, 2002). The course places especial focus upon 
business planning and accessing available public and private sources of finance. In addition, 
one-on-one consultancy services are also available to both current and prospective SME 
owners; in these sessions, business plans can be further developed and basic financial 
questions answered. Reference materials are also made available within the Support Units, 
listing potential SME finance and investment opportunities. 
The CSCCI is also involved in SME related research and policy-making. The Chamber 
has commissioned and funded several studies aimed at understanding and supporting SME 
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needs (Saudi Chambers of Commerce, 2002). Recently, the Chamber has also become involved 
in the research of international SME development programmes; collaborative agreements have 
been signed with their equivalents in Italy, South Korea and Japan in order to utilize outside 
expertise and adapt it to the Saudi context. The UK's HSBC has also been brought in by the 
CSCCI to consult on appropriate SME policy measures (Radwan, 2005: 198). However, the 
results depicted in the current research (see Chapter 5) showed that use of the facilities offered 
by the CSCCI reported to be low (51.2% never had any physical connection to the CSCCI and 
87.7% not attended any of the events held by the CSCCI). 
Significantly, the CSCCI has created precisely the sort of organisation that Otsuki 
(2002) claims the government should have - a single umbrella organisation, the Saudi Small 
Business Agency (SSBA), responsible for SME development. The SSBA is funded by the 
government but retains autonomous private management. The agency plays a 'co-ordination' 
role between SMEs and the government - submitting its findings to the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. The Director of the SSBA sits on all government and ministerial 
committees that are involved in the development, and implementation, of SME policy (e.g. 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, Saudi Credit Bank, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Saudi Ministry of Planning). 
Finally, Jeddah's Chamber of Commerce has introduced Saudi Arabia's first business 
incubator, which opened in the summer of 2005 - a project which will be discussed at length 
in Chapter 5. The Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce, in collaboration with King Fahd 
University for Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), also has an incubator and science park 
project underway. However its opening has been delayed, without public explanation, to 2009 
(from the originally planned date of 2006). 
Using Chambers of Commerce as a vehicle of Saudi SME support has some practical 
merits - the Chambers are the 'closest' public institution (in terms of accessibility and contact) 
to the small business community; they also have large and centrally located offices in each of 
Saudi's urban centres and are generously subsidised by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, allowing them to provide professional services. However, two problems attach 
161 
themselves to the CSCCI as a means of support-delivery. First, the Chambers are unable to 
provide a full 'one-stop-shop' for SME support - they can offer basic training and consultation 
services but they are not able to unify SME services. For instance, the Support Units are able 
to provide information on funding support (as provided, ordinarily, through the loans and 
grants of the Industrial Development Fund) but they are only able to give limited advice. 
They do not (currently) possess the resources to guide SMEs through the lengthy application 
process and (with the exception of the Jeddah Business Incubator) cannot support such 
applications - although in 2004, the Saudi small business agency (SSBA) has recommended 
the establishment of a loan guarantee fund for SMEs (Radwan, 2005: 198). Indeed, as shown 
in the research (Chapter 5), of 260 SMEs surveyed in the Saudi Arabia, only 72 SMEs 
(27.7%) received SIDF loans. Of those 72 SMEs - 51 respondents (70.8%) rated the speed 
with which the loan was approved after application as "very slow." 
Although the CSCCI SME support units are a laudable innovation and are certainly 
attempting to address managerial and business-planning inadequacies as well as pointing 
SMEs towards start-up finance ,they are, inevitably, unable to remedy some of the more 
profound difficulties, e.g. a difficult legislative environment, an underdeveloped information 
and technology infrastructure and poor availability of market information (Al-Kurdi, 2002). 
The establishment of the SSBA is a useful step that proved effective in co-ordinating 
the efforts of the Chambers' SME support unites, but within the wider context of public 
support for SMEs, it suffers from the same flaws as the National Mobilizing Committee for 
Small Businesses because its executive and co-ordinating roles are clearly limited - although 
the Director is able to sit on governmental and ministerial committees, the SSBA does not co-
ordinate the government response to SME support, nor does it deliver it. 
A second, perhaps more fundamental flaw in delivering SME support through the CSCCI is 
that very few SMEs - potential and actual - actually contact their local Chambers of Commerce, 
even though membership is mandatory upon registration of a new business, the process equates to 
filling out and posting fonns. The new services the CSCCI provides for SMEs are not well-
known and a minority of new businesses actually visit the Chambers' premises. Indeed, as shown 
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in this research (see Chapter 5) only 46 (17.7%) of 260 SMEs surveyed in Riyadh had actuall~ 
visited their Chambers of Commerce in person. Thus, an absolute priority for the Chambers of 
Commerce must be to enhance knowledge of the services they provide. 
4.8.3 Private Support 
At the moment, private support for SMEs remains highly limited. As Radwan and AI-
Kibbi (2002) point out, SME growth is dependent upon a wide range of public and private 
actors working in unison - the government requires the active participation of the private 
sector including 'commercial banks, large enterprises, business service providers and other 
relevant stakeholders' (Radwan and AI-Kibbi 2002: 32). However, a fruitful public-private 
partnership to develop the SME sector has not yet emerged, The government has yet to 
persuade the private sector, especially Saudi commercial banks, that the SME sector today 
represents a commercially viable sector in its own right and a lucrative future market. 
4.9 The Development of Business Incubators in Saudi Arabia 
4.9.1 The Usefulness of Business Incubators in Saudi Arabia 
The review of the Saudi SME environment revealed that Saudi SMEs suffer from six 
broad structural and institutional flaws: (i) lack of finance; (ii) poor management; (iii) poor 
business planning; (iv) poor market intelligence; (v) under-utilisation of technology and (vi) a 
difficult business and legislative environment. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, it is 
widely acknowledged that business incubators are well placed to address such problems. 
Within Saudi Arabia, much of the available literature focuses upon the role incubators 
might play in technology-transfer. Shalaby (2001: 39), claims that SMEs are under-pressure 
to utilise information technology, 'everyone is constantly telling them that they must embrace 
the internet and the digital economy, they must go into e-commerce and become global ... but 
whereas everybody tells them to do so, not many people tell them how to do it. A business 
incubator would be able to show them' (Shalaby, 2001: 39). Likewise, AI-Kurdi advocates 
the use of business incubators as a means of 'strengthening the technology standards of SMEs 
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in the context of global trends in trade liberalisation ... therefore promotion of incubators and 
technology parks have a key role to play in Saudi Arabia' (AI-kurdi ,2002: 12). 
However, several studies point to the wider advantages of business incubators in 
addressing the institutional problems facing Saudi SMEs. Radwan and AI-Kibbi (2002: 18) 
and Radwan (2005: 194) highlight the general advantages of business incubation; they believe 
that incubated Saudi SMEs would 'gain a lot through inter-firm linkages. Such linkages can 
serve to enhance the individual competences and capabilities of the SMEs, through collective 
effort in vital areas along the manufacturing value chain (e.g. R D), bulk sourcing of raw 
materials, sharing of key facilities (e.g. testing calibration, warehousing) meeting of industry 
and market standards, enhancing IT capabilities or collective training of human resources 
(Radwan and AI-Kibbi, 2002: 18). 
Similarly, a report by Boubshait (1999) argued that the introduction of business 
incubators is likely to help: (i) support commercial, industrial and service environment; (ii) 
expand the business base and enhance Saudi entrepreneurs' participation in the development 
of the national economy and economic diversification; (iii) provide market and financial 
intelligence to assist in the update of industrial, commercial and service activities; (iv) 
develop new technological concepts into tangible projects; and (v) reduce the risks of 
business failure. 
The answer to the question of who would - or should - be responsible for business 
incubation in Saudi Arabia very much depends upon the proposed scale of its introduction. A 
large scale, national, programme of business incubators would, of course, require government 
support. 
The Saudi Ministry of Planning (2002) identified three potential mechanisms of 
sponsorship. First, they suggest a 'Partnership Financing Mechanism' whereby the incubator 
would become a partner with the owner of the incubated project. The incubator itself would 
be a private business, funded by loans from commercial banks and the incubatee would be 
obliged to pay a portion of profits to the incubator. This, essentially private, model, could 
only maintain small-scale incubator projects - at least initially - as it would not require any 
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sort of national co-ordinating mechanism. Generally, commercial banks prefer to lend money 
to low-risk projects with short-term returns; thus, a common problem faced by high-
technology projects is the reluctance of commercial banks to lend money to such "high-risk" 
enterprises. Ironically these are precisely the type of enterprise that would be of most use to 
the Saudi economic development process. Thus, a privately funded incubator runs the risk of 
experiencing the funding problems faced by SMEs, especially in the technology sector. 
The second mechanism identified by the Ministry is a 'Joint Financing Mechanism' -
the incubator would be jointly funded by the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(SCCI) and the government, represented by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. Funding and support would be provided for incubatees in return for 
a proportion of profit generated. It is not clear which body would have 'executive control' of 
the incubators, a significant flaw in such model. Indeed, as Boubshait ( \999) points out, there 
are 'inherent problems' in establishing financing partnerships in Saudi Arabia, especially 
between the public and private sectors; to date there is no track record of success for this type 
of collaboration. 
Finally, the Ministry identifies what it regards as 'the most suitable mechanism'- incubators 
are sponsored by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), a government agency. In this 
model, the SIDF would provide funding, technical support and administrative direction to 
incubators. Several reasons are advocated for this sponsorship model. Boubshait (1999) argued 
that direct government sponsorship and administration, via the SIDF, would circumvent the 
problems of co-ordination exhibited by the joint financing mechanism, and the problems of 
fmancing experienced by the partnership financing mechanism. It would lead to the most effective 
introduction of projects that were better suited to the national interest, generating 'positive 
economical, social and technological returns to the Kingdom. (Boubshait, 1999) 
There is a good deal of logic to the Ministry's recommendations. However it should be 
noted that a critical problem in the design and delivery of SME support in Saudi Arabia has 
been a lack of proper co-ordination, and clear direction within those government bodies 
responsible for promoting the SME sector. Indeed, it is not possible to identify a single 
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department responsible for SME support; the Ministries of Commerce and Industry. Finance. 
Planning, and the Saudi Industrial Development Fund are all 'stakeholders' in SME 
development, but none has claimed - nor is able to claim - a clear leadership role. Bodies that 
have been created specifically to address SME needs, such as the Saudi Small Business 
Agency (SSBA) and the National Mobilising Committee on SMEs suffer from this ambiguity 
and are not able to take a clear lead. Thus, when it comes to the organisation and sponsorship 
of any incubation programme it is imperative to avoid confusion amongst disparate 
government agencies. 
Currently the organisation most involved in SME-support is the Saudi Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (SCCI), co-ordinated through its (SSBA) and SME Support Units. It 
would seem likely that the SCCI is best placed to deliver a business incubation programme on 
a national scale in the near- to medium- future. The SCCI already have a 'physical' presence, 
have developed SME training programmes and are, at least relative to other public 
organisations, the most "in touch" with the SME community. However, the inevitable 
problem is one of finance; the SCCI would require additional funding for such large-scale 
programme. The obvious candidate to provide such funding is (as identified by the Ministry) 
the (SIDF). The problem is that this leads back to the problems detailed earlier in the' Joint 
Financing Mechanism' situation - "collaborative" projects in Saudi Arabia are notoriously 
difficult to implement. A solution could be found if the SIDF would not only fund the SCCl, 
but also place full decision-making and administrative co-ordination in its hands. 
The alternative route is for the SIDF to co-ordinate the entire project, and takes full 
responsibility for its implementation. As to the likelihood of securing SIDF funding, the Saudi 
Ministry of Planning (2002) points out that the cost of establishing a business incubator does 
not involve more financial costs than the establishment of small scale industrial ventures in 
which the SIDF traditionally specialises. However, although the SIDF has the funds, and may 
be willing to spend them, the question remains as to whether it has the organisational capacity 
to implement such a large-scale project. 
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4.9.2 Known conditions for and against incubator success in Saudi Arabia 
A) Known reasons for success 
Saudi Arabia is in the process of restructuring its economy with the aim of diversifying 
its economic base and incorporating advanced technology and eventually realise the objective 
of reducing the labor market pressures caused by the population boom. 
In many countries moving away from 'command-and-control' economies (e.g. China, 
Czech Republic and Poland) - and towards a diversified, knowledge-based market economy, 
it is alleged (e.g. Shalaby, 2001: 33) that incubators have made a "prime contribution" to 
economic restructuring. Technological incubators in particular are seen as the most 'reactive 
mechanism' (Boubshait, 1999) to achieve this goal. Thus, the Saudi Ministry of Finance 
(2002) identifies technological incubators as a candidate to achieve the 'normalisation of 
advanced technology' within the Kingdom, as well as prompting economic diversification. 
Moreover, the structural problems afflicting Saudi Arabia's SME sector appear to be so 
entrenched that SMEs require extensive assistance to survive. Certainly business incubators 
provide the most extensive and intensive assistance to SMEs. It is contended by Boubeshait 
(1999) and the Saudi Ministry of Planning (2002), that incubators can provide such a role in 
Saudi Arabia. Boubeshait believes that incubators can help to: (i) achieve "convergence" 
between large industry and 'applied scientific research'; (ii) offer support to existing high-
tech SMEs whilst encouraging the creation of new ones (iii) transfer the expertise of 
universities, which will increasingly function as 'centres for production of knowledge, 
technological inventions and modern innovations,' (iv) act as "guides" and economic 
indicators for new SMEs; (v) enhance the efficiency of SMEs thus generating increased 
productivity . 
B) Known reasons against success 
As stated, the key aim of Saudi economic policy and planning is to address the 
employment difficulties generated by the Kingdom's demographic pressures. Although SME 
development projects, such as incubators, are often seen by policy-makers and governments 
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as a "panacea" to unemployment (Kirby, 2003: 62), pre-existing levels of employment are 
shown to have a significant effect upon their applicability in a given environment. As Kirby 
(Ibid) notes, employment may affect the predisposition towards new enterprise in opposing 
ways. On the one hand, evidence exists to suggest that high levels of unemployment correlate 
with low levels of new firm creation. On the other, it is logical that more individuals will seek 
self-employment as a means of "remedy" if there is large-scale unemployment in a given 
society/region. Indeed, Storey and Jones (1987) and Hamilton (1989) cited in (Ucbasaran, 
2008: 30) have suggested that individuals may be "pushed" into starting a venture due to 
threats of business closures, layoffs, mergers, relocation, rejection of the individual's ideas, 
and reduced job satisfaction. However, as the OECD report on entrepreneurship has pointed 
out, 'entrepreneurs tend to gather business ideas from previous work history' (DECO 2003, 
49) - indeed, Fielden et al (2000, in Ibid) found that over 80 per cent of entrepreneurs had 
created businesses based on previous work experience, thus: 'populations comprised of 
individuals who have never worked, or whose work history is limited are likely to produce 
low numbers of viable business proposals.' As the DECO concludes: 'entrepreneurial inertia 
is likely in communities in which unemployment has been common and protracted and 
average levels of human capital are low' (OECD, 2003: 50). These are, however, supply side 
conditions. 
By contrast, as Kirby (2003) notes, if demand-side environmental factors become 
dominant then the lack of economic buoyancy ordinarily implied by high levels of 
unemployment would suggest that overall, high unemployment levels are indicative of sub-
optimal economic conditions for new enterprise creation. Hamilton (1989 cited in Ucbasaran 
2004: 30, 31) argued that there is a critical level of unemployment based upon supply vis-a-
vis economic demand, estimated to be around 20%, beyond which, falling levels of venture 
formation may be expected. Although unemployment statistics in Saudi Arabia are 
notoriously unreliable, they have been estimated to be as high as 31.7% (according to a 2003 
survey by SAMA "Unemployment: Causes and Remedies" cited in Radwan, 2005: 365) and 
even the "official" figures, provided by the Manpower Council, estimate a rate of between 8% 
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and 14% (Ibid). Moreover, unemployment levels amongst new graduates are estimated at 
27% for men and 33% for women (Looney, 2004b) figures that clearly surpass Hamilton's 
(] 989) benchmark of 20%. 
A final consideration in the relationship between employment and SME creation is the 
role of networking. An important source of 'business networks' is past employment, which 
introduces potential entrepreneurs to potential suppliers and potential customers. Birley 
(1985), in (Ucbasaran 2008: 32) found that 66% of the founders of new firms had some 
relation to their previous employer - either as customer, competitor or supplier~ similarly, 
Turok and Richardson (1991 in Ibid) suggested that for 50% of the founders in their sample 
the main source of their ideas was derived from their previous employment or experience 
gained at work. In this context, the previous employer of an entrepreneur has been referred to 
by Cooper (1985) as his or her "incubator organisation" (in Ibid). This would seem to re-
inforce findings that employment levels are a significant variable on the macro level. Again, 
this would indicate a negative condition for business incubation in Saudi Arabia. 
The question that emerges is whether the problems generated by unemployment (e.g. 
poor business networks, poor skill levels, poor experience, poor economic conditions), 
provide an opportunity or a hindrance for business incubation in Saudi Arabia. On the one 
hand, the low levels of "skills" of Saudi entrepreneurs may make the promotion of SME 
support programmes, including incubation, an imprudent course of action for the government. 
On the other hand, if the Saudi government is committed to the support of SMEs, which all 
the evidence would imply, then business incubators may be the only means with which to "fill 
in" the skills and network gaps of Saudi entrepreneurs. 
The other major problem affecting incubator success in Saudi Arabia is related to its 
management. As Shalaby (2001) puts it, 'the correlation between the success of an incubator 
and its degree of independence is a direct one.' Shalaby believes that incubators must be 
independently managed and independent from any bureaucratic entity or organisation 
whereby the Director and his assistants assume full responsibility for managerial functions. 
Therefore, only two realistic options exist for the wide-scale introduction of business 
169 
incubators in Saudi Arabia: (i) delivery through the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry backed by government funding (e.g. from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund): 
and (ii) delivery and funding from a single government source (e.g. the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund). Under both scenarios, the "independence" of the incubator's 
management is at risk of interference by government financiers. 
4.10 Alternative Options: (University Incubators) 
Shalaby (2001) believes that Universities such as King Fahad University for Petroleum 
and Minerals (KFUPM), King Saud and King Abdullazeez are institution established to foster 
'scientific, economic and industrial development and they have the potential to build future 
incubators around their research centers. In particular, he believes that universities can 
contribute to the 'system of innovation' by: 
• Fostering entrepreneurship to support local high-tech enterprises 
• Develop generic technologies for locally based industries 
• Engage in the commercial transfer of technology 
• Undertake the training of high-skilled industrial personnel 
• Collaborate with local/regional commercial initiatives 
Shalaby also believes that universities can help fledgling SMEs, in the form of a "quasi-
incubator" capacity, by: 
• Investing in patents and other intellectual property protections and developing the 
technology to the start-up enterprises and determining the role of inventor 
• Incorporating the enterprise, issuing stock, completing licence agreements and 
executing other enterprise formation processes 
• Developing the business plans of SMEs 
• Providing technical and business support in the form of human resources, contacts, 
flexible rental space and access to laborities and equipment 
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• Raising the substantial venture capital required to get beyond initial stages of business 
(Shalaby, 2001: 39).49 
4.11 Discussion 
The link between the 'macro economic' problems facing the Saudi economy and the 
SMEs now seems quite clear. Certainly, the government now recognises that the relationship 
between private sector development, economic diversification and SME development is a 
strong one. It is now expected by policy-makers that rapid SME development will, almost 
exclusively, fulfil the dual role of generating employment and diversifying the economy. In 
addition, SME growth is seen as an effective way to contribute to economic growth, vitalise 
Saudisation, encourage regional development, innovate new technologies and expand export 
markets. Clearly, Saudi Arabia's economic planning focuses heavily on the blossoming of 
small-scale, private enterprise as "vehicles of change". They are seen as the enterprises best 
equipped to cushion the large scale demographic and economic pressures discussed in part 
one of this chapter. 
Despite the government's enthusiasm, the Saudi SME sector appears, at present, under-
equipped to assume the expected role. The SME sector is under-performing, and the problems 
of inadequate funding, human resources, management skills, marketing, technology and 
information are underpinned by inadequate government support as well as poor co-ordination 
of this support. In order for any SME support - and in particular business incubation - to be 
successfully delivered, it must be properly organized by the supporting bodies. It is not yet 
clear whether adequately organized support bodies currently exist in Saudi Arabia. 
As discussed in the literature review, incubators have historically developed as specific 
'solutions' to the common structural difficulties experienced by start-up businesses. The logic 
behind the Saudi incubation initiative is clear and can be traced directly to the macro socia-
49 In agreement with these finding, the current research demonstrated that a high percentage (84.2%) ~f the ~ntervie~d 
academics confirmed that they had undertaken commercial research and 47.4% of their research was In the Information 
technology, this research collaboration is important in creating successful environment for incubators. 
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economic difficulties currently facing the Kingdom. In the last three years, Saudi polic) 
makers, particularly the Ministry of Planning, have taken up the theme of incubation as a \Va) 
of improving the survival rates of Saudi SMEs. The leddah incubator is the first example of 
this enthusiasm for incubation as well as an evidence of the increasing levels of government 
interest in supporting SMEs. 
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
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In this chapter results of empirical analysis will be presented. These include: (i) Focus group 
(ii) Survey data. 
5.1 Focus Group 
This section summarises the results of two focus group sessions conducted in august 2006 
at Riyadh chamber of commerce. One group was composed of eight members and the other 
composed of seven. Both groups were mainly composed of experts who hold key decision-
making positions within organisations that are likely to play a decisive role in introducing. 
supporting, and funding of Saudi incubator progrmmes. One participant was unable to attend 
the second focus group; he was supposed to represent Abdulatif Jameel Community Service 
Fund. Five participants requested anonymity; therefore, to maintain the consistency of this 
research they will be referred to as (participant A-a). Details of the participants and their 
organisation are as follows: 
1. Participant (A). King Saud University. Member of the teaching staff .Engineering 
college. 
2. Participant (B). Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. 
3. Participant (C). General Institution of Technical Education and Training. 
4. Participant (D). Saudi Credit Bank (SCB). 
5. Participant (E) .Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF). 
6. Participant (F). Riyadh chamber of commerce and industry. SMEs development 
centre director. 
7. Participant (G). Council of Saudi chambers of commerce and industry. SMEs 
development centre director. 
8. Participant (H). Human resource development fund. Employment department 
manager. 
9. Participant (I). The Saudi Arabia century fund. Operation Director. 
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10. Participant (J). The Saudi Arabia general investment authority (SAGIA). SMEs 
development department. 
11. Participan (K). Ministry of Planning. 
12. Participant (L). Ministry of Labor. Programmes and studies Director. 
13. Participant (M), Manager SMEs support unit (SAGIA) 
14. Participant (N). Director of SMEs support unit, Ministry of trade and industry. 
15. Participant (0). King Abdulaziz city for science and technology. 
Focus group responses were audio taped and were captured by note taking for the 
purpose of assuring the audio tape was complete. The observations, comments, key themes, 
conclusions, and recommendations drawn from the two focus groups are given below: 
Focus Group Results 
A) Role of Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Supporting and Encouraging SMEs 
and the Degree of Co-Ordination between SMEs Support Orgnisations 
In discussing the current situation with regard to policies to promote the development of 
small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia, Participant N indicated that he absolutely 
believed that government support strategy to entrepreneurship and SMEs is an absolute 
priority; he cited some example of this support such as the provision of financial support, 
research and counseling. He further added that this belief is widespread amongst many 
government orgnisations in the gulf regon and the rest of the Arab world. Examples of these 
orgnisations are the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA), and the Arab Organisation for Industrial Development. In addition some 
of the banks such as the Saudi British bank also show an interest in supporting SMEs in the 
Kingdom. He also added that some researchers (Dr. AI-malki) are currently doing joint 
research with Riyadh Chamber of commerce (SME support unit) to explore more in this field 
of SMEs support. Another study is also underway in collaboration with the United Nation 
International Labor Organisation (lLO). 
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Participant N added that, apart from a comprehensive entrepreneurship and SMEs 
strategy, the development of national SME support institutions and networks is one key 
condition for success. There is no doubt that governments should create different types of 
support institutions that could provide information on regulations, standards, taxation, 
customs duties, marketing issues, business planning, marketing and accountancy, quality 
control and assurance; and help in creating incubator units to provide the space and 
infrastructure for business beginners and innovative companies; helping them to solve 
technological problems, and to search for know-how and promote innovation. 
All these support activities reflect the strategic importance of SMEs In market 
economies and their role as an engine of economic development, as well as their potential to 
react to challenges and changing environments, and their contribution to sustainable growth 
and job creation. 
Participant D draw the attention to the seventh national development plan (2000-2004) 
which adopts several measures to support small and medium scale enterprises while 
complying with the Kingdom's commitments under WTO, the most important of these 
measures and initiatives are: 
• Simplify the procedure for establishing small and medium scale enterprises, 
eliminating associated routine constraints and enhancing technical and 
administrative support for these firms. 
• Study the possibility of establishing special fund with Government and Private 
sectors participation to facilitate access to loans by small and medium scale 
enterprises to develop Islamic financing instruments such as Musharakah, 
Murabaha, and to broaden future Mudarabah finance opportunities available to 
these enterprises. 
• Expand the lending activities of the Saudi Credit bank. 
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• Develop the regulation and rules necessary for encouraging small industries . 
(The priority mentioned in the seventh development plan, is to enhance job 
creation and increasing the role of the private sector in the economic activity). 
Participant H commented that the Council of Ministers decision on privatisation 
objectives and policies, was to ensure a continued increase in the share of the private sector 
and expand its participation in the national economy, by adopting the best available modality 
including: transferring certain types of economic activity to the private sector, enhancing the 
participation of the private sector in economic development and enabling it to carry out its 
investment and financing role in accordance with the national development plans. He went 
further, to mention that the Government has listed 20 activities and services to be privatized. 
Among the listed activities considered relevant for the development of small and medium 
enterprises are: Industrial cities services, banks, Municipality's services, educational services, 
and social services. 
Participants indicated that the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) has established a 
special fund for SMEs (Credit Guarantee scheme) with an intial capital of SR 200 Million (US$ 
53 million), 50% of which is funded by the Government and the other 50% funded by the Saudi 
local banks. The main activity of the Saudi Credit Bank (SCB), is to give social loans to 
Saudis who have low income. A part of the social loans, SCB gives loans to some specific 
sectors up to SR 200,000 (US$ 53,000). A new loan programme was recently created 
targeting taxicabs to encourage Saudies to this profession. 
These measures could enhance the business environment for domestic and foreign 
investment, supporting and promoting entrepreneurship, and leading to more rapid private 
sector development. However, without appropriate operationalisation and without clear 
description of the role and position of government and governmental institutions, achieving 
these goals will be difficult. Therefore, designing a comprehensive, coherent and consistent 
approach by the Council of Ministers and respective governments entities is an absolute 
priority. A comprehensive government approach to entrepreneurship and SMEs would 
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provide for a full coordination of activities of numerous governmental institutions and NGOs 
dealing with entrepreneurship and SMEs. 
Participant H further added that SMEs have strategic importance for national economics 
due to a wide range of reasons. Logically, the government shows such an interest in 
supporting entrepreneurship and SMEs since there is no easier way to create new jobs. 
increase GDP, and raise standards of living than supporting entrepreneurship. Every surviving 
and successful business means new jobs and growth ofGDP. 
Unfortunately, in Saudi Arabia the contribution of SMEs to the economy IS meagre. 
Undoubtedly, an unfavorable business environment is one of the reasons whos SMEs are 
undeveloped and there is no real reason to deprive SMEs of governmental support and assistance. 
Success of the micro credit sector in the Kingdom in the form of provision of financial 
support through micro-credits is the best evidence that people in Saudi have entrepreneurship 
potential and that with small support they can successfully manage small businesses. 
Accordingly, establishment of an appropriate governmental support to entrepreneurship and 
small business should be one of the key priorities. 
B) The perceived problems currently facing Saudi SMEs 
Participant C admitted that a set of complicated regulations are currently in force under 
which an SME has to pass to establish a new firm. These complicated regulations, Participant 
C said, should be simplified so that SMEs could get a license to start up a new business 
without facing too much difficulty. 
The majority of participants indicated that In Saudi Arabia, small (less than 9 
employees) and medium sized (10-21 employees) businesses to date have not achieved what 
was expected for a number of reasons. Major obstacles mentioned by participants could be 
summarized in the following: 
• 
• 
Lack of a clear definition, form and productive orientation for SMEs 
Lack of a central body to coordinate support provided to SMEs 
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• 
• 
• 
Difficulty in securing land (industrial cities) on which to establish businesses. 
Lack of coordinated and easily accessible information on SMEs support 
programmes 
Bureaucratic barriers. While some progress has been made in cutting 
bureaucratic red tape. Participants noted that Approvals can still take a long 
time in Saudi Arabia. 
• Lack of credit/finance/capital. The effective cost of capital is often quite high. As a 
result, lending institutions often require guarantees beyond the means of the 
borrower. Participants mentioned that most SMEs in the kingdom are not satisfied 
with the existing banks/financial institutions. They (SMESs) find loan procedures 
very complicated. Most of them are unable to meet the requirements for personal 
guarantee and securities. Compared with the terms given to the country's larger, 
more established firms, banks are generally too rigid and cumbersome, and there is 
considerable difficulty in obtaining loans. 
• Dependence on foreign resources. Ironically, given the ability of SMEs in many 
developing countries to create local jobs, many Saudi SMEs create very few. As 
part of the country's Saudisation programme, whereby the percentage of the jobs 
held by Saudi nationals was to reach 30 percent by the end of2003, many of these 
companies have managed only marginal progress of two percent on average in the 
case of very small enterprises. 
• Limited management skills. Lower management standards to run their 
businesses due to lack of managerial experiences. Owners are usually not 
involved in the daily management activities and leave the management to the 
non-Saudi expatriates 
• Limited marketing skills. Many SME managers in Saudi Arabia have little 
formal training in marketing and product distribution. As a result, their 
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operations often cannot take advantage of economies of scale and are high cost. 
They are limited to local rather than export, or even national markets. 
• The cost of complying with national and international standards can also be 
very expensive for SMEs. This will be especially the case when Saudi Arabia 
joins the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
• Limited information on possible markets and clients. Many Saudi SME 
owner/operators have little experience in exporting to foreign markets. 
• Vulnerability during recession. Because of their lack of access to credit, Saudi 
SMEs are usually vulnerable in times of economic recession. The resulting 
business failures often add to the severity of the recession. This problem will 
only be compounded as the economy moves to a freer price system with the 
country's ascension to the WTO. 
It should be added here that extensive surveys carried out by the Council of Saudi 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CSCCI) and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (Richard, 2003) documented almost the same concerns raised by 
the focus group. 
C) Suggested Initiatives and remedy measures 
The main strategic elements and areas for special emphasis identified by the 
participants are: 
• Developing a general policy framework within which SME development policies and 
initiatives are to be implemented. In addition, clear government policy on SMEs and 
special incentives for SMEs in order to promote SMEs development would be vital. 
The government assistance and support are indispensable for SMEs. The purpose of 
the proposed policy framework is to establish a reference to guide all services, 
programmes, incentives and policy initiatives addressing SMEs. 
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• Creation of government authority to be responsible for and support SMEs . 
Participants confirmed that solutions to problems facing SMEs essentially, needs 
government involvement and support plus an active contribution of the private sector 
including commercial banks, large enterprises, business service providers and other 
relevant stakeholders. 
• A much needed public-private partnership must take shape if SME's are to be 
empowered. An example of such an intervention is for the government setting up a 
systematic policy on how to support and develop SME's in the Kingdom. This policy 
must contain a practical working structure that is simple and achievable, and that 
indicates the roles and tasks of key players. It should provide a checklist of how 
regulatory procedures must be dealt with. 
Participants suggested that the second issue to be addressed in the policy is the 
creation of an official authority to oversee SMEs development. Something like the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to be called the Saudi Arabian SME 
Development Authority (SASMEDA). Such an authority would be the major body that 
caters to all the administrative and regulatory issues facing SME's. By simplifYing 
regulation and facilitating licensing as well as other procedures like property registration 
and labor issues, SME's will have more time for their actual business instead of spending it 
on routine administrative work that requires them to commute from one ministry to another 
in order to get a simple job done. The critical factor here is to decentralise existing systems 
while providing absolute executive power to this authority to resolve all regulatory 
administrative issues. 
Finally, the policy should include the establishment of a national association for SME's 
with the purpose of providing its members with state-of-the-art technical, managerial and 
marketing support. Other services should include legal counseling, accounting services, 
financial consultations, assistance in conducting economic feasibility studies, research and 
infonnation gathering services, training workshops as well as general awareness in all of the 
above. There is no national association for SMEs in the Kingdom. The association must 
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be established for the successful growth of SMEs separate from chambers of commerce 
and industry. This association will provide member SMEs with know-how and expertise 
of management skills and marketing skills, technical supports, legal, accounting and 
financial consultations, assistance of economic feasibility studies, provision of 
information and research activities, human resource training and various seminars and 
workshops on theses SUbjects. 
• Establishing district industry centre and industrial zones 
• Marketing and export promotion 
• Training and human resource development. This covers both on-the-job training and 
the broader education system. There is a strong need to improve skill bases in a range 
of areas. 
• The encouragement and creation of alternative financial sources. Islamic financial 
institutions could play an important role in providing financial capital on equitable 
terms in accordance with Islamic codes. In addition, guarantees for SMEs through 
either, exiting SIOF and Saudi Credit Bank, or by newly establishing the banking 
institution for specialized financing and credit guarantee for SMEs. The commercial 
banks are also requested to provide as high-level of commercial loans as possible to 
SMEs. Participants collectively agreed that the first issue the proposed policy must 
address is the creation of a general fund and credit facility. Finance plays a major role 
in the development of SMEs. They added, the role of government would be to either 
convince banks to increase their lending power to this sector, or it can establish special 
funds to facilitate loans and credit guarantees, or both. True, certain funds already exist, 
but the regulations governing the credit processes are lengthy and beneficiaries from 
these funds are few. 
• Funding for research and development. SMEs lack assistance both for developing 
new ideas and turning these ideas into commercial products. 
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• Improving awareness of the legal environment for SMEs. The government has 
established a series of legal regulations and provides a number of instruments to 
support domestic industry. However, because they are not aware of their options, 
many Saudi SMEs work under restrictive licensing agreements with foreign 
partners. This often bans SMEs from exporting, and forces them to rely on foreign 
managerial and technical skills. Consequently these firms, rarely undertake 
product and process innovation. By subsidizing e-commerce legal services and 
related online information the government could enable more advantageous 
contracts for local firms. Legal framework of SMEs supports is essential to support 
SMEs and is still in a preparatory stage. SMEs must be supported through the special 
SMEs law and regulations on corporate taxes, labors, minimum wages, accounting 
standard on depreciation, etc. 
• Business incubators. Incubators could provide an attractive framework for 
addressing most of the obstacles facing SMEs. They can be considered as a 
remedy for the disadvantages that SMEs encounter by providing numerous 
business support services and fostering technological innovation. They can work 
as a mechanism for new venture creation. 
Participants concluded that, true empowerment can only be achieved when SMEs have 
the right policies, systems, tools and framework in place. Once these elements are set, then 
comes the role of the SME's to take responsibility for growing their businesses and expanding 
national employment 
D) Role ofBI (The specific macro economic Idevelopment role envisaged for incubators) 
Participant H mentioned that there are many young people with talent and ideas for new 
businesses or services. Despite their desires, and their talents, many of these youth will fail in 
their quest to build a successful surviving small business. He added that business incubator 
would playa significant role in improving the survival rates of business start-ups, as they do 
in other countries. The business incubator could promote enterprise success in several ways. 
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First, the incubator will provide access to a pool of centralised services. Cost of these services 
will be part of a fee. Second, entrepreneurs with similar needs and frustrations will work in a 
close proximity that will enable them to share their experiences. 
He added that the presence of other firms and service providers will create a strong 
opportunity for trade relations to develop. The incubator will also help aid business' start-ups 
search for capital. An incubator run by a local government wi II predicate on creating 
employment opportunities for that local region. University-related incubators, while sharing 
that goal, will also look to transfer academic research into new products and technologies as 
well as to create opportunities for students. 
Other advantages will be attained if the incubator is located near or on a University site 
Including: library facilities, exposure to certain state-of-the-art technology and thinking 
utilisation of undergraduate students in science and engineering that form a very useful 
source oftechnicallabor/assistance etc. 
Participant M indicated that absence of venture and seed capital, low levels of business 
networking, lack of marketing and inadequate business support mechanisms appear to be 
major problem areas that drive down the positive impact of incubators in the Kingdom. He 
added that venture capital markets are not developed and there should be some attempts for 
finding and developing one. 
To accelerate activities for the cause of SMEs, in the last few years the Kingdom started 
to consider introduction of business incubators. This movement started in early 2004 with 
eastern province chamber of commerce and industry (EPCCI) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) to establish an 
incubator which will provide technical support to SMEs. This incubator, the first of its kind in 
the Kingdom is expected to come up later that year (failure to secure funding delayed 
operation of this incubator). 
In terms of prospects for incubators in the Kingdom, Participant F proposed that 
incubators and their graduates could playa key role in fostering economic development on a 
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local level, especially in these four ways: I) providing employment, 2) retooling workforces. 
3) increasing local tax bases, and 4) creating economic specialisations. 
Participant G generally accepted that smalI and medium size enterprises (SMEs), 
particularly micro and small enterprises, in Saudi Arabia lack the necessary resources to 
effectively scale up, and grow their businesses. Yet these firms offer some of the greatest 
opportunities for innovation, employment, and value creation. Business incubators can be an 
effective tool for supporting local innovation and new business creation and can reduce SME 
failure rates substantially. 
E) The current level of support for incubators 
Participants indicated the need for government and non government orgnisation and 
funding to contribute in the establishment of incubators. Coalition of partners from the public 
and private sector should join together and take initiatives and get involved in assisting 
incubators efforts 
F) Success factors for business incubators 
Participant A and D indicated that solid planning for establishing a new incubator should 
first assess the private sector environment where the incubator would be established and that a 
survey of SMEs needs should be conducted. They added that incubators effectiveness in similar 
environment in other countries should be emulateded. Finally, the model should be clearly 
identified and should be consistent with the objectives of the incubator. 
Participant K emphasised that the important success factors that lead incubators to 
perform better in the Kingdom include qualified technical, managerial, and administrative 
support. However, Participant J also argued that better networked incubators perform better. 
Better networked incubators can provide incubatees (start-ups) with effective internal 
networking and sufficient external networking as well (e.g., technical support from outside 
experts, professional assistance from outside consultants, support from the central and local 
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governments, etc.). Participant L suggests that external networking and outsourcing are 
significant components in the case of the Kingdom. 
Participants indicated the need to establish incubators in small cities and rural areas in 
Saudi Arabia. They added that small cities and rural areas are vulnerable to characteristics of 
rural economic environment such as the low population density which makes it difficult to 
build markets and workforces, remoteness from transportation centres, raw materials, market 
activity, and financial institutions. All these factors represent barriers to entry and cost 
disadvantages. Also, poor physical infrastructures, in addition low education levels, skilled 
worker shortages, and lack of experienced managers increase entrepreneurial challenges. 
5.2 Survey Data 
As discussed at length in the methodology, three surveys have been conducted to gather 
data: (1) a survey of 153 Business students, (2) a survey of 19 Business academics and (3) a 
survey of 260 Saudi SMEs. This section presents the empirical results of these surveys and is 
organised into three sections: 
• Education and its relationship with business in Saudi Arabia 
• Saudi SME environment and practice 
• Attitudes towards business incubation amongst Saudi Business academics, 
business students and existing SMEs. 
Instead of being presented as separate surveys, the findings are themed around these 
topics. Where questions have been identical across surveys, the data is presented together. 
S.2.1 Education and its Relationship with Business in Saudi Arabia 
A) Attitudes towards Business 
According to (SAMA, 2001), in recent years Saudi Arabia has had to come to terms with an 
enormous population boom (the world's most rapid - according to the World Bank the labor force 
in Saudi Arabia should exceed 10 million in 2010 - compared to over 8 million in 2008 - an 
average growth of 4.5%), uncertainty over oil prices, and an increasingly competitive global 
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business environment, which was intensified by WTO membership in 2005. Public sector 
expansion is no longer viable as the sector is now at saturation point, unable to absorb the ever-
growing volume of new entrants into the labor market.50 Consequently. as well as being a 
desirable indicator for entrepreneurship and innovation, it is a national economic priority that 
students should aim towards private sector employment. 
According to Table 5.1, only 7 students (4.6%) expected to be employed in the public 
sector in 12 months time - on this basis, student expectations are almost perfectly in line with 
the projections of the Seventh and Eighth Development Plans. The vast majority (74%) of 
respondents expected to work in a large private sector company. Significantly, only 7.1 % and 
8.4% expected to be employed in a 'small or medium sized firm' and self-employed 
respectively. Thus, cumulatively, a maximum of 15.5% of graduates expect themselves to be 
involved with SMEs. These expectations should also be analysed with regards to high 
graduate unemployment rates in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman 2003: 251). 
Table 5.1: Student employment expectations by frequency and percent 
Expected Employment Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Employed in Public Sector 7 4.6 4.6 
Employed in Large Private sector company 114 74.5 79.1 
Employed in small or medium sized finn II 7.2 86.3 
Self Employed 13 8.5 94.8 
Don't Know 8 5.2 100.0 
Total 153 100.0 
But do these 'expectations' correspond with the student's preferences for public or 
private sector employment? Attitudes towards private sector employment in Saudi Arabia 
have traditionally been mixed. Although certain private sector jobs are regarded as highly 
prestigious (e.g. professional services and business management) the vast majority of "'new" 
SO. Indeed public sector employment was scheduled to decline sharply in the Seventh (2~2005) and Eighth (2005 - 2010) 
Develo'ment Plans. The latest national plans expect 95% of new jobs to come ~m t.he private sector and only 5% from. the 
public fCalvert & Al-Shetaiwi 2002: 113.; Prokop 20?3: 87). The private sector IS projected to absor: only about 16,100 Jobs 
compared with 311.000 created in the private sector 111 the Seventh Development Plan (see Chapter ). 
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jobs emerging in the private sector are in the less attractive servIce sectors like sales , 
administration and clerical work (Cordesman 2003: 256). Respondents were asked whether 
they would 'prefer' to work in either the public or private sectors. As table 5.2 shows, 89.5% 
expressed a preference for private sector employment against only 5.9% who preferred the 
public sector. The private (pre-dominantly non-oil) sector is expected to absorb the majority 
of new entrants into the labor market (Prokop, 2003: 87). Thus, the results showed that there 
is a good correspondence between expectations and preferences. This may be linked to the 
slowdown of recruitment in the public sector, the principal employer for educated workers in 
developing countries. However these results are contradictory to similar studies in most of the 
developing countries. For example, in Moroco Bougroum, et aI., (1999) studied the 
unemployment of educated workers, they argue that the first concern of those workers is to 
reach a permanent and stable job in the public sector, and that in this desire, they might 
consider risking long periods of unemployment. Also, Orivel (1995) notices an extreme 
preference for employment in the public sector in African countries, a fact which results in 
assigning highly educated workers to non-productive employment in the public sector and 
then in negligible contributions of education to the economic growth. 
In addition to job stability, the public sector generally offers higher wages as compared 
to some jobs in the private sector, which suggests that the unemployment of educated workers 
could be in equilibrium since some workers rationally prefer to remain unemployed while 
waiting for employment in the public sector. In Egypt, Psacharopoulos and Sanyal (1982) 
compared student expectations and actual labor market performance. The results indicated 
that the relative structure of economic rewards is consistent with the operation of the forces of 
supply and demand. In particular, students' expectations of the labor market are in tune with 
the actual market conditions. The Sultanate of Oman is a gulf country that has similar work 
and economy environment as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Salma Al-Lamki (1998) studied 
the barriers to Omanisation (employment of Omani nationals) in the private sector as 
perceived by the senior graduating students at the Sultan Qaboos University (SQU). Results 
from the data analysis have shown that over 65 per cent of respondents indicated a work 
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preference in the government (public sector). A significant majority of the students confirmed 
that obstacles to Omanisation in the private sector exist. 
The results (Table 5.2), generally reflected the higher preference for work in the private 
sector or self-employment in the Kingdom, this could be explained on one hand by the narrowing 
of chances for employment in the public sector in recent years and the other hand by expansion 
and diversification of private sector. In addition, private sector employees' compensation and 
benefits package was perceived to be more attractive than that offered in the government (public 
sector). This might represent a positive condition for incubators, insofar as newly starting private 
enterprise is the preferred focus for business incubation. 
Table 5.2: Future Employment Sector by Preference 
Frequency Percent Cllmlilative Perce", 
Public 9 5.88 5.88 
Private 137 89.54 95.42 
No response 7 4.57 100.0 
Total 153 
When students were asked about their future business plans, specifically 'How likely 
is it that you will start your own business in the next five years?' cumulative responses of 
'very likely' or 'likely' were at 80% (Table 5.3). This may reflect a reasonable level of 
entrepreneurship qualities amongst young Saudis on the one hand and the prevalence of a 
business environment conducive to entrepreneurship on the other hand. However, given the 
high volumes of small family based service and retail based businesses amongst more 
wealthy Saudi nationals, the picture may not be as encouraging as this data suggests. 
Nonetheless, attitudes towards entrepreneurship were enthusiastic, clearly a positive 
condition for business incubation. 
In this regard, Gibb (1988) found that the most common cultural influences affecting a 
person's decision to go into businesses are: firstly, parents or relatives - those who have 
parents or relatives working in a small business- are more likely themselves to start their own 
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business. Secondly, prevIOus experience In small business employment - those who have 
worked in small enterprises as employees are more likely themselves to start their own 
business. Thirdly, enterprising environments; those young people who work in organisations 
that allows a great deal of independence and freedom under conditions of uncertainty are 
more likely themselves to start their own business. 
It seems that Gibb's first factor "Parents working in small business" is the major 
driving force for young Saudis to start their own business (Table 5.3). It is important to 
recognize the wide range of influences that can lead a young person to consider starting 
an enterprise and use these factors to promote private enterprise. It shuld be noted here 
that family firms are characterised by a major deficiency in the way they run their 
business "in many firms the family bonds and 'networks' of family friends are often 
prioritised to true business qualifications. It might be the case that it is not the best 
candidates that secure the job, but the 'elite' few with huge connections" (Hess, 1995: 
22). Again here introducing a business incubation progrmme could help alleviating this 
constrain, furthermore, incubation programme my also upgrade the quality of work by 
co-locating entrepreneurial firms in one place, which could foster environment where 
entrepreneurs share resources and experiences, learn from one another, exchange business 
contacts and establish collaborative business relationships. One other important 
contribution that co-location of entrepreneurs can make, is to overcome the loneliness of 
the entrepreneurial work environment. (Rice .1992) 
Table 5.3: Likelihood of graduates starting their own business. 
Llkehood of starting own business Frequency Percent Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Likely 39 24.7 25.5 25.5 
Likely 83 52.5 54.2 79.7 
Neither Likely nor Unlikely 19 12.0 12.4 92.2 
Unlikely 10 6.3 6.5 98.7 
Very Unlikely 2 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total IS3 96.8 100.0 
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When asked to rate problems in setting up a new business in order of importance 
obstacles of start-up costs and securing financing were regarded as significantly more 
important than those associated with housing and facilities (see Table 5.4). This correlates 
with the finding of AI-kurdi (2002) which highlighted the difficulties in securing finance for 
new businesses in the Kingdom able to cover start-up costs, whereas basic facilities are less 
difficult to acquire. In terms of business incubation this clearly places an emphasis on the 
(direct or indirect) financial assistance they are able to provide, notwithstanding the fact that 
the provision of low/no cost shared and serviced workspace has the effect of significantly 
reducing start up costs. It is one of the most important qualities of an incubator to offer 
flexible space for rent (including short-term leases and the possibility to rearrange the setting 
as the company grows) below market prices (Albert, 1986). 
Table 5.4: Perceived problems of starting a new business in Saudi Arabia, 
Students ralingo/problems high Start-up Securing find ing suitable Office /acilities Costs Financie premises are too expensive 
Very important 69 55 21 13 
Quite important 54 53 69 43 
Neither important Nor unimportant 15 31 38 45 
Quite unimportant II 10 21 39 
Very unimportant 4 4 4 8 
Total 153 153 153 153 
8) Graduate Unemployment 
Table 5.5 revealed that, about half of the students surveyed are liable enter the labor 
market still seeking employment. Consequently, a significant number may face 
I d . 51 unemp oyment upon gra uatlOn. 
51 As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the main problems hindering ~he govemment'sl ef~h~1 t~lve 2~6.P~~;:m r:: 
unemployment is a lack of adequate data on the 'nature and magnItude of the prob em (. . ary f d' '. 
unemployment figures in Saudi Arabia are unofficial and specUlative given the absence of an obJeetlve set 0 ~ta accoun~tng 
for araduate employment (Ibid). Thus, a survey of job otTers amongst current students is one of the few (albeIt speculative) 
indicators of the actual level of graduate unemployment. 
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Table 5.5: Offers of Employment. 
Frequency , Percent Cumulative Perce'" 
Yes 76 49.7 49.7 
I 
No 77 50.3 
• 100.0 
Total 153 100.0 • 
, 
One implication of table 5.5 is that a significant number of graduates from the two 
major universities in Saudi Arabia will be entering the labor market and, theoretically. 
available for employment in the SME sector. As discussed above, graduate unemployment, 
provides a surplus of skilled graduates, and thus represents an optimal condition for business 
incubation. 
Despite the priority given to education as a means to fill high-skilled jobs currently 
populated by foreign nationals, a more pressing problem facing the Saudi government is 
unemployment generated by 'under-utilised manpower' i.e. a basic lack of jobs, even for the 
highly qualified. Indeed, the massive expansion of education has led to an increase in the 
number of university graduates seeking work. General unemployment in Saudi Arabia has 
risen to more than 30 per cent from about 12 per cent over the past five years (AI-Dosary, 
2006). The unemployment rate among new graduates (in the age group of 20-24) is 'striking'. 
These first time job-seekers have an unemployment rate of 27 percent for men and 33 percent 
for women (Looney, 2004b; AI-Dosary 2006). As discussed earlier, successful incubation 
creates jobs directly in the incubators, and indirectly in local communities and might thus 
alleviate this problem. Business incubators contribute to the economic development of a 
country through creation of new companies, increased employment, improvement of industry 
structure, and transfer of technology owned by universities and research institutions. They 
also help to utilise idle space, facilities and manpower, improving profitability. Also business 
incubators help to promote entrepreneurship (OEeD, 1997). 
Incubators have been evaluated in terms of their impact on economic development, 
more specifically on job creation, firm success, increase in employment and sales, and 
whether or not the firm locates within the local area after leaving the incubator. Allen and 
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Weinberg (1988) describe several studies of incubators created in the mid-1980s. Their results 
suggest that incubators are successful in helping firms start up, but that the overall impact on 
the local economy in terms of direct job creation may be small, at least in the short run. 
Campbell's study of 13 incubators and 587 firms provides a more detailed evaluation of the 
impact of incubator firms. While firm size was relatively small, incubator firms experienced 
rapid increases in employment, both during and after their stay in the incubator. Employment 
increased an average of 39 percent for firms from the time of entering the incubator until 
graduation. The results of this study demonstrate clearly the vital role that incubators could 
play in addressing the growing problems of unemployment. 
C) Student Skills and Com petencies 
Graduate Skills 
There are a number of factors that determine success in establishing and operating 
incubators. This section examines the role of student's skills and competencies, and Business 
and university links on initiation and operation of business incubation in Saudi Arabia. 
Analysis of student involvement in previous paid employment is provided in table 5.6. 
The data showed that only 14 students (9.2%) had been engaged in paid employment at any 
point during the time of their university studies. 
Table 5.6: Student involvement in previous paid employment 
Incidence o/previous employment Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes ]4 9.2 9.2 
No ]39 90.8 90.8 
Total ]53 100 100.0 
The low level of work experience reflected in this study might imply a low-level of skill 
acquisition amongst Saudi business students, as well as a reduced exposure to actual business 
environment. Therefore, th is resuh could be interpreted as a negative condition for business 
incubation. However, given the fact that fostering positive entrepreneurial climate and 
framework conditions that facilitate and encourage entrepreneurship could act as a driving 
force to economic development and job creation; thus, generating and implementing a 
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comprehensive system for venture support such as innovation centres, incubators and science 
parks could make the case for establishing incubation programme more desirable (McMullan 
and Long, 1987). 
The OECD report on entrepreneurship has pointed out, 'entrepreneurs tend to gather 
business ideas from previous work history' (OECD 2003, 49) - indeed, Fielden et al (2000, in 
Ibid) found that over 80 per cent of entrepreneurs had created businesses based on previous 
work experience, thus: 'populations comprised of individuals who have never worked. or 
whose work history is limited are likely to produce low numbers of viable business 
proposals.' As the OECD concludes: 'entrepreneurial inertia is likely in communities in 
which unemployment has been common and protracted and average levels of human capital 
are low' (OECD, 2003: 50). 
It is widely acknowledged that work expenence is a useful means of gaining 
commercial experience and enhances employability and entrepreneurial skills and 
competences (Bates, 1996). Moreover, it is a 'likely factor' of the application criteria for 
incubator entry that the applicant entrepreneur has professional qualifications and past 
work experience on his or her CV (Merrifield, 1987, Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988 and 
Mian, 1994b). 
Business planning 
A frequent problem cited by AI-Kurdi (2002), Shablaq (2002) and Osaki (2003) in 
reviewing Saudi SME performance is the poor level of prior planning many business owners 
undertake before setting up a small firm. The right planning can increase awareness of 
market, help to understand financial needs and make sure they stay competitive while 
building their skills and resources. Writing a business and marketing plan will help in 
understanding the factors that can affect the success or failure of the business. Being able to 
identify and exploit opportunities will improve the chances for expansion into new areas and 
give an advantage over other competitors. 
193 
The school environment can have an important impact upon young students and is a 
significant influence on their life and career aspirations. "Enterprise education". i.e .. 
enterprise-focused curriculum and educational experiences that allow graduates to explore 
and consider the self-employment option, has become an important part of many education 
and training institutions around the world (White and Kenyon, 2007). Understanding self-
employment as a career option is an important ingredient in preparing graduates for their 
movement from school, college or university to the workplace. 
Students were asked about their attitudes towards five aspects of business planning: (i) 
prior business training (ii) the importance of mentoring, (iii) the importance of having 
marketing and (iv) business plans in place before starting business and (v) the importance of 
contacts with other businesses. 
As table 5.7 shows all statements were answered predominantly in the affirmative. 
Thus, cumulatively, 133 students (87%) 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed' that those involved 
in business should receive prior training in business practice. Perhaps this is not 
surprising given the sample was made up of business science students. A similar number, 
131 (86%) students 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed' that 'new businesses need mentoring'. 
The highest cumulative positive response was for the importance of marketing plans 
where 144 respondents (94%) 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed' that prior production of a 
marketing plan was important. A slightly lower number of respondents, 136 (89%) 
believed that a business plan was an important prior requirement. The lowest, cumulative, 
positive responses came with the statement 'it is important for a new business to make 
contacts with other businesses', 116 students (76%) either strongly agreed or agreed with 
this statement. 
Overall, student attitudes towards business planning implied a level of prudence 
and foresight that is, according to the literature (AI-Kurdi ,2002; Shablaq ,2002 and Osaki 
,2003) absent amongst many Saudi SMEs. Moreover, the statements reflect those facets 
that an incubator would ordinarily provide: training, mentoring, market planning, 
business planning, networking contacts. That the majority of students agreed that these 
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issues were important is a positive indicator for business incubation, insofar as the need 
for their provisions is recognized. 
Table 5.7: Student attitudes towards some aspects of business planning 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
'It is important that 
'It is important 'It is important to 'It is important to 'It is important/or people involved in the 
that New have a marketing have a business a new business to business receive prior businesses receive plan be/ore plan be/ore make contacts training in business 
mentoring' starting the starting the with otller Attitude practice' business' business' businesses' 
Strongly 54 42 65 65 29 
Agree (35.29%) (27.5%) (42.48%) (42.48%) (18.95%) 
Agree 79 89 79 71 87 
(51.63%) (58.2%) (51.63%) (46.40%) (56.86%) 
Neither 10 I I 6 14 
agree nor 
(6.53%) (0.65%) Disagree (0.65%) (3.92%) (9.15%) 
Disagree 7 20 6 8 18 
(4.57%) (13.1%) (3.92%) (5.23%) (11.76%) 
Strongly 3 I 2 3 5 
Disagree (1.96%) (0.65%) (1.31%) (1.96%) (3.27%) 
Total 153 153 153 153 153 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
According to Radwan and AI-Kibbi (2002), a fundamental problem amongst Saudi 
entrepreneurs is a tendency to launch businesses without having a business plan in place, 
despite launching in highly competitive, and changing, markets. Clearly, the ability to 
construct adequate business and marketing plans is vital to business success. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, most business failures are caused by poor marketing and business management 
(Vesper, 1983). Moreover, an incubator's application process involves, most importantly, the 
valuation of a candidate's business plan. Some form of business plan encompassing both the 
technical, financial and marketing activity of the prospective company is to be provided in 
order to initiate the process. However, if the business appears especially promising, a 
candidate may expect assistance in the form of mentoring from the incubator staff in refining 
and completing the business plan. 
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Academics were asked if they had required their students to create a Business Plan 
as part of their studies. As table 5.8 shows only 10 (52.6%) of respondents had. Although 
this result may be mitigated by varying exposure to, and/or teaching responsibilities with, 
students, and not a reflection of the curriculum, the figure is clearly low for business 
science students. 
Table 5.8: Academic's asked students to create a Business Plan 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Asked to create business plan 10 52.6 52.6 
Not asked to create business plan 6 31.6 84.2 
No response 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
As stated above, the results may not be a fair reflection of student learning experiences 
- teaching is specialised and perhaps certain academics not included in the sample are 
responsible for teaching business plans. Therefore, to further investigate this result, students 
were asked whether they had, in the course of their studies, (i) learned about writing a 
business plan, (ii) written a business plan (iii) learned about writing a marketing plan and (iv) 
written a marketing plan. 
A high percentage of students (84.3%) had learned about putting together a business plan. 
However, 24 students (15.7%) had not. Given that the students were studying Business 
Sciences, which 24 had not learned about creating business plans seems relatively high 
(table.5.9) 
Table 5.9: Students previous experience in writing a business plan 
response Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 129 84.3 84.3 
No 24 15.7 100.0 
Total 153 100.00 
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Only 100 (65%) had actua))y written a business plan as part of their studies, whereas 53 
(35%) had not. That one in three students had no experience of actually writing a plan is. 
again, a significant deficiency for a Business Science programme. This is in line with the 
findings of Otsuki (2002) which suggest, tertiary education ought to focus more on viable. 
vocational training and the practical aspects of the studies. 
Amongst academics, only 3 (15.8%) had asked students to produce a marketing plan in the 
course of their studies. However, 105 students (68.6%) replied that they had leamed about 
marketing plans (table5.10), with 81 (52.9%) having actuaBy written one (table 5.11). According 
to Otsuki (2002) one of the problems suffered by Saudi SMEs is the 'restriction in the size and 
area of markets to which they have ready access'. He blames three factors (i) low quality products 
(ii) uncompetitive pricing and (iii) inadequate marketing skills. Clearly one way of addressing 
inadequate marketing skills is through formal education, especially business-based education. 
That only just over half of business students had experienced writing a marketing plan represents a 
major deficiency in a business programme and does not help bridging marketing skills gap. 
Business incubation could play an important role in this respect, as the mentoring and networking 
opportunities often found in incubators as weB as access to professional services (including 
marketing) connected with a common purpose of the incubated firms within one incubator and 
increased level of professionalism ought to facilitate remedying the problem of lacking marketing 
knowledge (Rice, 1992; Smilor and Gill, 1986). 
Table 5.10: Students who had learned about writing a marketing plan 52 
response Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes lOS 68.6 68.6 
No 48 31.4 100.0 
Total IS3 100.0 
52 T-test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 6.9%, demonstrating the accuracy 
of the data. 
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Table 5.11: Students who had written a marketing plan53 
response Frequency Percent Cumulative Perce", 
Yes 81 52.9 52.9 
No 72 47.1 100.0 
Total 153 100.0 
As Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 show there is a very strong positive correlation (0.77) 
between those students who had written a business plan and those who had written a 
marketing plan. Indeed, every student who had written a marketing plan had also written a 
business plan. Of the 100 students who had written a business plan, only 19 did not write a 
marketing plan. Conversely, this means that a total of72 students (47.06%) had no experience 
of writing either business or marketing plans. This might imply that emphasis ought to be 
placed upon improving the Saudi academic curriculum so that all business students are 
required to produce a set of business documents (business plan, marketing plan, perhaps a 
financial plan) as a criterion for graduation. 
These results generally agree with those of Cordesman (2003); and Looney (2004b) 
who suggested that the technical knowledge and skill sets of Saudi students needs to be raised 
to international standards, which are currently not being met 
Table 5.12: Cross tabulation of student's who had written business plan and students who had written a 
marketing plan. 
Written marketing plan 
Yes No Total 
Yes 81 19 100 
Written business plan 
No 0 53 53 
Total 81 72 153 
53 T-test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 2.70/0, demonstrating the accuracy 
of this data. 
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Table 5.13: Correlation coefficient for the writing of a business plan and writing of a marketing plan. 
Asymp. Std. 
Value Error(a) Appro.'(. T(b) Appro.'(. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R 
, I 
.772 .043 14.933 I .000(c) 
I 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .772 .043 14.933 .000(c) 
153 i 
a Not assunung the null hypothesIS. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c Based on normal approximation. 
Although the main emphasis (Until the early 1990s at least) for incubators was on the 
provision of a physical space for fledgling businesses which provided affordable rents and a 
vital economy of scale on services and facilities. However, more recently, the modem 
incubator places increasing emphasis on the actual 'process of incubation' (Kirby. 2004). 
Similarly (Adkins, 2001; NBIA, 2001) stressed the importance of the incubation process. 
Thus the focus has shifted from the "hard" facilities (office space and facilities) to the more 
"human" provisions of managerial and technical advice/assistance. Therefore, a business 
incubator would be able to provide the necessary guidance and assistance in creating 
marketing and business plans for entrepreneurs. However, those students who had never 
written either would be at a considerable disadvantage to those who had. Given that the role 
of the incubator is to improve upon and develop business ideas and not to generate them in 
the first instance. The likelihood that the initial idea is flawed at the outset is more likely. 
Those who do not possess a business plan might, on the other hand, take part in a 'virtual 
incubator'. However, majority of writers (Bullard, 1992; Feitus, 1993) argue against the 
usefulness of virtual incubator. They noted that the physical facility provided makes it easier 
to maintain a relationship that is critical for the success of business. A possible solution would 
also be promoting the business planning seminars by the chambers of commerce already in 
place (Chapter 4). Thus, the (relatively) low level of business and market planning experience 
of students represents a negative condition for incubator success. 
Academics were asked to consider whether 'students, under [their] supervision have 
enough knowledge to launch their own businesses upon graduation (table 5.14). No academics 
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'disagree[d]' or 'strongly disagree[d],' whereas 15 academics (78.9%) cumulatively stated that 
they 'strongly agree[d]' or 'agree[d].' Thus, the majority of academics believe their students 
have what it takes (at least in terms of their knowledge of business) to start their own SMEs. 
This would seem to constitute a positive condition for business incubation, albeit one based 
upon attitudes and, potentiaJIy, vested professional interest. 
Table 5.14: Academics opinion of students (under their supervision) having enough knowledge of business 
to launch their own businesses upon graduation 54 
Frequency 
Strongly Agree 6 
Agree 9 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 3 
Disagree 0 
Strongly disagree 0 
No response I 
Total 19 
D) Business and University Links 
Student Links 
Percellf ClImlllative Percent 
31.6 31.6 
47.4 78.9 
15.8 94.7 
0.00 94.7 
0.00 94.7 
5.3 100.0 
100.0 
Student internship programmes form a useful linkage between businesses and 
universities. First, they imply a useful relationship between the university and the 
commercial organisation that participates in any organised internship programmes (Bates, 
1996). Second, students gain important contacts through their placement. Third, students 
gain vital skills and experience which will enhance both their employability and 
commercial abilities. 
Table 5.15 showed that, approximately half of all respondents, 54%, had undertaken an 
internship with a commercial organisation during their course of study. 
Table 5.15: Student Internships. 
S4 T-test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 9.450/0, demonstrating the accuracy 
of the data. 
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FrequeIlCY Percent I 
I Cumulative Percent 
Yes 82 53.6 53.6 
No 71 46.4 100.0 
I 
Total 153 100.0 I I 
Student internship expenences did not appear to correlate with other factors. The 
research investigated whether internship experiences had any correlation with future business 
plans of respondents. Of the 82 respondents who had undertaken an internship, 67 (82%) 
were 'very likely' or 'likely' to start a business in the next five years - this is compared to the 
71 respondents who had not undertaken an internship, 55 (77%) regarded themselves as 'very 
likely' or 'likely' to start a business in the next five years. This compares to 80% of all 
students, irrespective of undertaking an internship, who regard themselves as likely or very 
likely to start a business. Clearly, the relationship is a weak one (table 5.16). 
Table 5.16: Cross-tabulation of students who have written a marketing plan and likelihood of setting up a 
business in the next 5 years 
Likelihood of selling up a business in the next five years 
Very Neither Likely 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Very Unlikely Total 
Undertaken an Yes 20 47 9 5 1 82 
internship 
No 19 36 10 5 1 71 
Total 39 83 19 10 2 153 
The research also sought to establish whether undertaking a commercial internship 
increased the likelihood of an employment offer upon graduation (table 5.17). Of the 82 
respondents who had undertaken an internship, 45 had received an offer of employment (55%). Of 
the 71 respondents who had not undertaken an internship, 35 had received an offer of employment 
(44%). There was a low to moderate positive correlation (0.112) between student internships and 
future employment offers. Thus, surprisingly, there is only marginally increased chance of 
receiving a job offer if the respondent has undertaken an internship. Employers generally point to 
internship experience as the most important factor they consider in hiring new college graduates 
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for full-time positions, and they have a variety of self-serving reasons for feeling that way. 
However, employers indicate that although internships and co-ops are not guarantees of 
permanent employment with a company, hiring former interns is quite common. It's difficult to 
quantifY the value of an internship on a graduate'S job prospects, but for many university students, 
these real-world learning experiences in international settings provide life turning points, 
confidence boosters and resume builders (Trimble, 2004). 
Table 5.17: Student internships cross-tabulated with Future Employment Offers 
Future Employment Offers 
Yes No Total 
Internship Yes 45 37 82 
No 31 40 71 
Total 76 77 153 
Table 5.18: Correlation co-efficient ofstudent internship and future employment offers. 
Asymp. SId. 
Value Error(a) Approx. T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .112 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .112 
N of Valid Cases 153 
Q Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
e Based on normal approximation 
.080 1.383 . I 69(c) 
.080 1.383 . I 69(c) 
When asked how helpful they would find commercial experience (e.g. internships) as part 
of their study programme (table 5.19), the results were quite surprising. In total only 89 
respondents (58%) cumulatively regarded commercial experience as either very helpful or quite 
helpful for their future plans. However, 49 students (32%) regarded the idea as 'very unhelpful'. 
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Table 5.19: Perceived helpfulness of commercial experience (internships) to future plans. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percellf 
i 
Very Helpful 42 I 27.5 I 27.5 
Quite Helpful 47 30.7 58.2 
Neither helpful nor unhelpful 10 6.5 64.7 
Quite unhelpful 5 3.3 68.0 
Very unhelpful 49 32.0 100.0 
Total 153 100.0 
Table 5.20 presents a cross tabulation of internships and future plans, of the 82 students 
who had undertaken an internship, 53 regarded commercial experience as either 'very helpful' 
or 'quite helpful' (64%), whereas 17 of these respondents regarded commercial experience as 
'very unhelpful' (21 %). Of the 71 students who had not previously undertaken an internship 36 
regarded commercial research as either 'very helpful' or 'quite helpful' (51 %) whilst 32 of 
those not undertaking internships regarded commercial experience as 'very unhelpful' (45%). 
Cumulatively, 33 respondents who had not undertaken internships regarded commercial 
experiences as either 'quite unhelpful' or 'very unhelpful' (46%) (table. 5.20). Internships, as a 
learning tool, are being increasingly utilized as integral parts of reality-based educational 
programmes. However, analyses of actual designs and processes (as practiced by the different 
academic disciplines in a university) do indicate that lack of clear understanding of the nature of 
the process precludes an effective utilisation of the tool. In many instances, ill designed 
internships perpetuate learning style abuse (Trimble, 2004). It is notable that a key problem 
experienced in the study of Argentinian business incubation is the poor relationships and 
communication between universities and commercial organisations. In a survey of the Colleges 
of Business' internship practices (Zigli, 1982), found that sixty-eight percent of the respondents 
acknowledged the existence of internship programmes for business students. The concept of 
internship as an educational tool is significant in its own right. However, the effective utilisation 
of such a tool is a function of the realistic comprehension of the tool's nature, process, and 
potential. 
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Table 5.20: Helpfulness of commercial experience (internships) to future plans cross-tabulated with prior 
commercial experience. 
Helpfulness of commercial experience (internships) to future plans (SIO) 
Neither 
helpful nor Quite 
Very Helpful Quite Helpful unhelpful unhelpful Very unhelpful Total 
Prior commercial Yes 25 28 
experience (89) 8 4 17 82 
No 17 19 2 1 32 71 
Total 42 47 10 5 49 153 
Academic Links and Research 
Business incubators often involve links between research universities, large technology 
companies, small technology companies, state government, federal government (or local 
government), community leaders, "people to know", and support groups (Mian, 1995) . A more 
tangible relationship between businesses and universities is formed through relationships 
formed by faculty members and commercial organisations. Academics may interact with 
business in a number of ways. First, they may directly collaborate with businesses on research 
projects. Second, they may actually create business through the commercialisation of research. 
Third, they may undertake research about business. Fourth, they may actively promote business 
links both with university and with government. The 'triple helix' thesis (Etzkowitz 1998; 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) argues that the development of closer ties among academia, 
industry and government represents a new mode of knowledge production that will bring about 
greater autonomy and flexibility for researchers. 
Universities research commercialisation is the process of converting research into 
successfully marketed products and industrial processes is improving. The trend for firms to 
allocate a growing proportion of their R&D investment to university based projects is 
indicative of the growing linkages between the two sectors. In recent years, there has been 
increasing public interest in promoting the commercialisation of university-driven research. 
This has occurred across almost all countries, and also among the various institutional players 
associated with research and innovation (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). 
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Table 5.21 shows the frequency of academics undertaking commercial research within the 
last five years. A high percentage (84.2%) confinned they had undertaken commercial research. 
Table 5.21: Commercial research undertaken by academics in the last five years 55 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 16 84.2 84.2 
No 0 0.00 84.2 
No response 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
When they were asked about the main area of their research, the majority of answers 
involved IT and oil sectors (see Table 5.22). Although involvement in the oil sector is somewhat 
predictable, it is an encouraging sign for business incubation that in an economy so dominated by 
oil and in need of developing its technology that almost half of the respondents were specialising 
in information technology sector thus the goal of economy diversification is easier to be met. 
Table 5.22: Main area of Research Undertaken by academics 
Area Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Information Technology 9 47.4 47.4 
Oil sector 3 15.8 63.2 
Others 4 21.1 84.2 
No response 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
As Cambell and Allen (1987) have noted, the more research undertaken by a 
University, the greater the opportunity for the commercialisation of university innovations 
and, by extension, the more positive the environment is for incubator introduction. A high 
level of commercial research undertaken by staff and students makes for a much better 
'business environment' in which an (university-based) incubator could operate. Moreover, a 
high level of involvement between commercial and university sectors is a strong indicator that 
55 T -test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 12.1 %, demonstrating the accuracy 
of the data. 
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students will be better prepared for entrepreneurial activities upon graduation, and therefore 
more able to establish their own businesses. 
Research collaborations and funding sources give some indication of the interaction 
between business, government and academia. As discussed at length by Hoeser (2003) this 
relationship is important in creating successful (or unsuccessful) environments for incubators 
Table 5.23 shows that. Ten (52.6%) academics received funding from the public (government 
or municipal) sector, five (26.3%) received research funding from the private sector and one 
(5.2%) received research funding from both. However, it is possible that these results may be 
more of a reflection of the plentiful supply of government/university funding than a dearth of 
links with the commercial sector. 
Table 5.23: Academics' Source of Research Funding 
Source Frequency Percent Cllmulative Percent 
Public sector 10 52.6 52.6 
Private Sector 5 26.3 78.9 
Both I 5.2 84.1 
No response 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Indeed, despite the relatively low commercial funding involvement, 84.2 per cent of 
academic's research has been made in collaboration with a commercial organization 
(table 5.24). This is not surprising when it is considered that Saudi Aramco (the national 
petroleum enterprise) has "contributed significantly" to the development of both King 
Saud and KFUPM's research programmes and facilities (AI-Dosary, 2006). There is in 
fact something of a grey area in terms of the distinction of the public/private status of 
Saudi Aramco. There is an Aramco-sponsored applied research centre, "market dependent 
programmes" and regular short courses on current advancement "in different areas of 
engineering and management" which has contributed to the observed success of the 
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KFUPM graduates in the labor market but this IS not the general scenario for all 
educational institutes (AI-Dosary, 2006).56 
Table 5.24: Research in Collaboration with a Commercial Organisation 
Frequency Percent 1 Cumulative Percelll 
Yes 16 84.2 
1
84
.
2 
No 3 15.8 
1
100
.
0 
Total 19 100.0 1 
In general, at the policy level, the commercialisation of university research has been 
viewed as a key driver of national competitiveness, and consequently supported by a 
range of initiatives seeking to promote the links between universities and industry 
(Henderson et aI., 1998; Mowery et aI., 2002). Many universities have taken great strides 
in pushing commercial agendas to generate more financial value from their research, by 
creating new structures and encouraging entrepreneurial activities (Hackett, 200 1, Phan 
and Siegel, 2006). 
In the course of their research, SIX academics claimed to have developed new 
technologies. Given that the academics are based in the business (administrative science) and 
not the science (physical science) department of the university, this figure seems impressive. 
(table 5.25). 
Table S.2S: Academics' Development of New Technologies 
Frequency Percent Cilmulative Percent 
Yes 6 31.6 31.6 
No 13 68.4 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
When academics were asked (via open ended questioning) to describe the technologies 
they had developed, all the six academics who had developed new technologies had 
S61ndeed, institutions like the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals were created specifically to engender 'scientific, 
economic and industrial development' (King Fahd cited in Saudi Infonnation Resource, 2005) 
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developed new computer software. For instance one of the academics wrote that he had 
developed a new programme to integrate Human Resource Management processes within 
small enterprises. Another had developed an online 'marketing kif for SMEs (although this 
could similarly be described as a business process, as discussed below. 
Surprisingly, the development of new technologies by academics had a substantial 
negative correlation (-0.637) with their involvement with a commercial organisation (See 
Table 5.27). Whereas only 3 of the 16 academics who collaborated with a commercial 
organisation developed new technologies, all 3 academics who were not involved with 
commercial organisations claimed to have developed new technologies (table 5.26). 
Table 5.26: Cross tabulation of Development of new technologies and Research Collaboration with a 
Commercial Organisation 
Developed New Technologies 
"--
Yes No Total 
Research in Collaboration with a Yes 3 13 16 
commercial organisation 
No 3 0 3 
Total 6 13 19 
Table 5.27: Correlation coefficient for the Development of New Technology and Research Collaboration 
with a Commercial Organisation 
Vallie 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.637 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.637 
N of Valid Cases 19 
a Not _uming the null hypot/.esis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard e"or assuming the nllil hypothesis. 
e Based on normol approximation. 
Asymp. SId. 
Error(a) Approx. T(b) Approx. Sig. 
.157 -3.411 .OO3(c) 
.157 -3.411 .OO3(c) 
Only one respondent (as above) had patented his new (IT) technology (which he said 
was patented by the university (KFUPM) and had been sold to both Saudi and US companies. 
No respondents claimed to have licensed their technologies. 
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Six academics (table 5.28) claimed to have developed a new business process. Of these 
three had also developed a new technology, with a low to moderate positive correlation 
(0.250) between these variables. 
Table 5.28: Cross-tabulation of academics who had developed new technology and developed new business 
process 
Developell new business process Total 
Yes No 
Developed new technology Yes 3 3 6 
No 3 9 12 
Total 6 12 18 
Table 5.29: Correlation co-efficient for development of new technology and development of new business 
processes 
Value 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .250 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .250 
N of Valid Cases 18 
a Not assunung tile null IIypotllesls. 
b Using tile asymptotic standard error assuming the null IIypothesis. 
e Based on normal approximation. 
Asymp. Std. 
Error(a) Approx. T(b) Approx. Sig. 
.238 1.033 .317(c) 
.238 1.033 .317(c) 
Asked to expand further, only one respondent provided details on what he had 
developed which was related to the oil sector - an "advanced supply and demand model 
to forecast the supply of the world crude oil market." The same respondent had 
undertaken research with Saudi Aramco Oil Company. Of the six academics that had 
developed new processes, all had done so in collaboration with a commercial organisation 
(see Table 5.30). Thus the innovation of business processes had a much higher correlation 
with commercial collaboration. This is a positive condition for business incubation, as 
potential incubator sponsors emerge. 
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Table 5.30: Development of New Business Process cross-tabulated with Undertaking of research with a 
commercial organisation 
Undertaken research in collaboration 
with a commercial organisation 
Yes No Total 
Developed New Business Process Yes 6 0 6 
No 9 3 12 
Total 15 3 18 
No respondents had patented any business processes nor licensed them. Neither had 
any respondents created a new venture to commercialise their research. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a well devised incubation programme would be able to properly commercialize the 
fruits of academic research. 
E) Attitudes towards SMEs 
In many developing nations, SMEs have played a crucial role in creating jobs and 
providing economic stability (Looney, 2004b).57 Academics were asked which roles, 
performed by SMEs, they considered the most important. The roles were based on those listed 
by Otsuki (2002) at the Saudi Ministry of Planning are in line with the priorities of Saudi 
government's Eighth Development Plans: (i) 'economic diversification' (ii) 'reducing 
unemployment' (iii) 'developing new technologies and (iv) 'helping regional development.' 
This is also in line with an incubator mission as presented by NBIA (2000) in Chapter 2. 
As table 5.31 shows, academics' rating of importance of the roles performed by SMEs 
was broadly in line with those of the government's development plan. 
57 In Thailand, for example, a whole new development model has centered on SMEs playing a leading role in advancing the 
economy (Looney 2004). 
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Table 5.31: Academic's opinions on the importance ofthe roles performed by SMEs 
Rutes of importance Diversifying tire Reducing Developing new Helping regional 
Economy unemployment technologies developmet/t 
High importance 13 10 6 9 
(68.4%) (52.6%) (31.6%) (47.4%) 
Medium importance 6 9 10 6 
(31.6%) (47.4%) (52.6%) (31.6%) 
Low importance 0 0 3 3 
(0.0%) (0.0%) (15.8%) (15.8%) 
Total 19 19 19 19 
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) 
When asked to rate the university's relationship with local businesses, the response of 
academics is of some concern. Although 12 academics (63.2%) cumulatively rated the 
relationship as 'extremely good' or 'quite good'; however, a further 7 academics (36.8%) 
described the relationship as 'quite poor' (table 5.32) 
Table 5.32: Acadamics opinions on the University's relationship with local businesses 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Extremely Good 6 31.6 31.6 
Quite Good 6 31.6 63.2 
Neither Good nor Poor 0 0.00 63.2 
Quite Poor 7 36.8 100.0 
Very Poor 0 0.00 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Relationships with national businesses are even weaker, only 9 academics (47.4%) 
cumulatively regard them as either quite good or very good, whereas 10 (52.6%) regard them 
as 'quite poor' (table 5.33). 
Table 5.33: Acadamics opinions on the University's relationship with national businesses 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Good 3 15.8 15.8 
Jluite Good 6 31.6 47.4 
Neither Good nor Bad 0 0.00 47.4 
...Quite Poor 10 52.6 100.0 
Very Poor 0 0.00 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
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Attitudes towards international business are less certain (table 5.34). The majority of 
academics (52.6%) stated that they 'didn't know' the condition of university's relationship 
with international business. 
Table 5.34: Acadamics opinions on the University's relationship with international businesses 
Frequency Percent Cumlliative Percent 
Very Good 0 0.0 0.00 
Quite Good 6 31.6 31.6 
Neither Good nor Bad 0 0.0 31.6 
Quite Bad 3 15.8 47.4 
Very Bad 0 0.0 47.4 
Don't Know 10 52.6 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
The overall relationship between their university and business, 13 (68.4 %) did not 
regard the relationship as satisfactory (table 5.35). 
Table 5.35: Overall, is the current relationship between the University and business satisfactory? 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 6 31.6 31.6 
No 13 68.4 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Results of table 5.35 represent a negative condition for business incubation in Saudi 
Arabia. A weak relationship, (or "disconnection") between university and business is 
particularly detrimental for the introduction of university-based incubators, insofar as the 
incubators are less likely to respond to market's needs. Indirectly, for non-university based 
incubators, the incubators' network will be severely weakened by a poor relationship with 
educational institutions. It is widely recognized that relationship between university and 
business is difficult, and the heart of the problem is the inherent tension between academic 
and commercial demands (Hackett, 2001; West, 2008). This barrier takes several forms. First, 
universities and industry are likely to prioritize different research goals. Industry usually 
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focuses on less risky research with direct commercial applicability, while government-funded 
academic research institutions typically undertake projects with longer time horizons and less 
predictability (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003). Second, academia traditionally encourages 
knowledge dissemination and full disclosure of methods and results, whereas the commercial 
sector actively seeks ownership and tight control of intellectual property (Arrow, 1962; 
Kremer, 1998). 
F) Attitudes towards business development 
Table 5.37 shows that 14 academics (73.7%) agreed that it was the responsibility of the 
university to help and encourage staff to launch commercial ventures. The willingness of staff 
to involve themselves in commercial activities is an essential pre-requisite of successful 
university incubation projects. This enthusiasm for university-supported commercial 
enterprise should be taken as a positive condition for business incubation. It also implies that 
the weak relationship alleged between university and business is not the effect of a lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of academics. Contrary to this finding Louis et aI., (1989) concluded 
that the tension between academic and commercial demands is more salient at the level of the 
individual researcher than at the level of the organisation. Universities show evidence of 
being able to manage the tensions between academic and commercial demands through the 
creation of dual structures. At the individual level, on the other hand, the tensions are more 
acute, and people who are accustomed to a traditional academic career are typically less able 
to deliver commercial outcomes. There are, however, certain exceptions to this general 
statement. 
Table 5.37: Acadamic opinion on university responsibility to encourage launch of new commercial ventures 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
StronRly A2ree 1 5.3 5.3 
Agree 14 73.7 78.9 
Neither Awee nor DislWCe 0 0.00 78.9 
Disagree 0 0.00 78.9 
Stronalv Disagree 0 0.00 78.9 
Don't Know 4 21.1 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 100.0 
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Academics were also asked if the university had a responsibility to help and encourage 
students to launch their own commercial ventures (table 5.38). This is a key indicator in terms 
of any future university-related business incubation. Although 2 academics (10.5%) disagreed 
with the statement, 11 academics (57.9%) 'strongly agree[d]' that students should receive 
university support in the launch of commercial ventures. Again this would imply those 
academics' attitudes towards university-business relations, and in particular student-business 
relations, are positive. University-industry links and the collaboration of scientists across the 
two sectors have long been shown to be problematic. This is particularly because of the 
difficulty of reconciling the divergent work norms and career interests of scientists with the 
needs of the two different kinds of institutions (David et al 1999). However, recent research 
has shown that universities have not been successful in creating sustainable environments that 
enhance technology transfer and the commercialisation of intellectual property from the 
university (Slaughter and Leslie, 2001; Wright, M., Birley, S., and Mosey, S., 2004) 
Table 5.38: Acadamic opinion on the responsibility of the university to help and encourage its students to 
launch commercial ventures 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 11 57.9 57.9 
Agree 3 15.8 73.7 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 0 0.00 73.7 
Disagree 2 10.5 84.2 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.00 84.2 
Don't Know 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
G) Policy contributions 
A final way in which the links between universities and business can be tested is a 
survey of academic involvement in, and research for, government business and enterprise 
policy. Saudi academics are often consulted by government ministries during policy planning. 
Government departments are also likely to initiate conference and discussion events, in which 
academics are invited to take part. It is an extremely positive factor, as clear and effective 
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communication and collaboration between all parties involved is a prerequisite for business 
incubation's success (Chandra, 2007). Most importantly, business research and the 
development of systems for collecting and analysing information about business needs (e.g. 
manpower) are vital for both government policy-makers and, eventually, businesses 
themselves. 
Six academics (31.6%) had undertaken research on Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises (table 5.39). Notably, and perhaps predictably, five of these six were involved in 
IT-based research 
Table 5.39: Undertaken research on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 6 31.6 31.6 
No 13 68.4 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Table 5.40 revealed that mne academics (47.4%) had taken part in government 
discussions on SME policy. Academic participation in government discussions on SME 
policy is an important means by which both academics and policy makers acquire knowledge 
about the challenges facing SMEs. It would also be expected to raise awareness of business 
incubation (as discussed further, below) and the issues surrounding it. 
Table 5.40: Academics participation in Government discussions on SME policy 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 9 47.4 47.4 
No 6 31.6 78.9 
No response 4 21.1 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
There are various forms in which acadamics are involved in policy making and these 
are shown in table 5.41 and 5.42. Cumulatively, 11 (57.9%) academics had participated as a 
guest or a speaker in government forums on SMEs (table 5.41), 10 (52.6%) had participated 
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in workshops (table 5.42). As well as contributing to the knowledge about small businesses 
and entrepreneurship, physical events like forums and workshops are a useful way for 
academics to meet the business community, develop contacts and build networks that will 
enhance the relationship between the university and businesses. 
Table 5.41: Academic Involvement in government forums about SMEs 
i 
Frequency Percent : Cumulative Percefll 
I 
As Speaker 4 21.1 I 21.1 
I 
As Guest 7 36.8 ! 57.9 
No involvement 4 21.1 I 78.9 
No response 4 21.1 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 I I 
Table 5.42: Academic Involvement in government workshops about SMEs 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
As Speaker 7 36.8 36.8 
As Guest 3 15.8 52.6 
No 6 31.6 84.2 
No response 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Education and Business: Discussion 
As mentioned earlier, one of the key conditions for a successful business incubator is 
related to the presence of a robust business and management education curricula, vocational 
training and a positive entrepreneurial climate. The results revealed that business and 
technology students lack much needed skills. The students' vocational skills are of particular 
importance yet in Saudi Arabia this is one of the weakest links of business-education 
cooperation, with less than 10% students taking up part-time paid jobs and just over 50% 
taking part in commercial internships. There is, of course, no objective way of measuring skill 
and competence levels from self-completed surveys without resorting to actual testing. 
However, several indicators suggested that graduate skills and competences are not optimal. 
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Although business academics rated student business skills highly, the surveys revealed 
actual graduate skills and experience to be far from optimal. Just over half of students had 
experience of writing business plans and very few had ever undertaken paid work experience. 
This would corroborate the findings of Looney (2004b) and Cordesman (2003) who argued 
that Saudi graduates were under-prepared for employment or enterprise in the private sector 
because their courses lacked the necessary 'practical' and 'vocational' elements that would 
prepare them for employment in the commercial sector. Wary of these shortfalls, the 
Kingdom invests heavily in education, with as much as $26 billion investment in 2007 alone. 
There are 21 operating Universities at the moment. Among the most promising universities 
that might contribute to business incubation are: King Saud University, with faculties such as 
engineering, economics and computer sciences, King Abdul Aziz University with 
Engineering and Science as well as economics, King Fahad University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, specialising in technologies, computer science, engineering, industrial management. 
One of the important conditions for business incubation was that graduates possessed 
high levels of technical skills. As evidenced in the literature review, the quality of workforce 
available for business incubations is of particular importance. Evidence of work experience 
and some business acumen is a preferred criterion for incubator candidates (Merrifield, 1987). 
In the Saudi context the problem of undertaking paid jobs is both culturally and economically 
based. The state offers free education and grants to each student, this policy is expected to 
discourage students from seeking paid jobs. Few students had, to date, undertaken any form 
of paid employment. This may, of course, be more a reflection of economic conditions than 
student attitudes. 
Since work experience is considered as an advantage for incubator admission, a CV 
lacking paid work experience would put incubatees at a disadvantage in most incubator 
application processes (Paid experience is considered as a perquisite for admission). Although 
over half of the respondents had been involved in an internship placement, given that the 
students were studying business sciences this figure seems to be too low, although it part 
compensates for the absence of paid work experience. Knowledge and practice of marketing 
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and business plans were also low. That one in three students had no experience of producing 
these represents a deficiency in Saudi business teaching. Furthermore, nearly all business 
incubators require evidence of a credible business plan before admitting tenants. It would 
seem that the 'practical' /'vocational' elements of student studies may lag behind the 
theoretical parts. Student attitudes towards business planning were more encouraging insofar 
as the vast majority acknowledged the high importance of adequate business planning. Finally 
academics rated student's highly in terms of their suitability to start a new venture. Overall, 
the findings on graduate skills are indeterminate insofar as they demonstrate a mixture of 
positive and negative conditions for business incubation. 
Student attitudes were more positive in terms of entrepreneurship (i.e. the readiness to 
start their own businesses) - the vast majority had plans to begin their own business in the 
next five years. Furthermore, students demonstrated low expectations of public sector 
employment- something previously seen as an 'automatic' employment destination of Saudi 
university graduates (Cordesman, 2003). Instead, private sector employment and private 
enterprise were overwhelmingly preferred by Saudi business students. 
It is believed that in most developing countries jobs in the public sector are looked to as 
more secure). This ultimately led to a deeply rooted beliefe and preference for public job 
amongst graduates. However, contrary to this beliefe, the research shows that few students 
expect to work in public sector .This shift may be explained by the tremendous expansion and 
diversification of private sector in recent years. 
The survey revealed positive attitudes towards private enterprise matched with a surplus 
of graduates without employment offers, suggesting that business incubation would find a 
potential "market" amongst newly graduated students keen to start their own businesses. 
However, given the paucity of business planning skills, a priority for any potential Saudi 
incubation programme would be to fill in the business 'skills gap' of young Saudi 
entrepreneurs - the labor-intensive 'soft' provisions of an incubator (i.e. training, mentoring, 
business-planning) would take on an important role in the Saudi context; incubators that 
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limited their provision 'hard' resources (i.e. accommodation, facilities, funding) would like" 
struggle to meet the needs of young Saudi graduates. 
A further condition for business incubation is a surplus of skilled graduates available in 
the labor market. Based upon the current job offers made to respondents, it seems likely that a 
significant proportion will be seeking work upon graduation. The concern, however, is that 
this amounts to a pool of unemployed graduates who lack the adequate skills to start up and 
run a successful SME (and therefore make a success of incubation). This condition may relate 
to the findings on skills discussed above and is also indeterminate. 
In light of substantial effort on the part of the government to increase the level of 
successful entrepreneurship in the Kingdom, it is surprising only about half the students had 
academic experience in writing a business/marketing plan, which is a key element of an 
incubator's application process and a prerequisite to successful business. This ought to be a 
cause for concern and call for changes in the academic curriculum. There certainly is scope 
for action in this aspect. The above-mentioned state of affairs shows that the government 
initiatives are laudable, but not necessarily well executed and delivered 
However, student attitudes towards business and the business environment were much 
more positive and implied a strong desire to participate in new enterprises. Students expressed 
both a desire and an expectation to work in private enterprise - this represents a significant 
attitudinal shift amongst young Saudis in contrast to previous generations of Saudi graduates 
who were dis-incentivised and disinclined to work in the private sector (sometimes directly by 
legislation). More significantly, four fifths of students wanted to start their own business within 
the next five years represents a positive condition for business incubation. The promotion of 
graduate's enterprise should involve two basic steps. First, it should create awareness of what 
enterprise is and what it takes to own and manage a business. This awareness should allow 
graduates to consider realistically self-employment as a career option. The second step, the 
provision of practical support services (e.g. training, advice, access to finance), can be provided 
via business incubation programme (White and Kenyon, 2007). 
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In this regard introduction of enterprise education could be viewed as a prerequisite for 
introducing a successful incubation programme. Enterprise education can vary according to 
the type and level of education institution involved. In schools, for example, its main 
objectives are to teach and encourage enterprise to students and to foster their personal 
development; in higher education institutions, such as colleges and universities, students may 
be exposed to learning situations which develop their skills for action planning and 
implementation to encourage creativity and to develop their skills in time and personal 
management. (Bailey 1995). 
The investigation of the links between university and business produced more mixed 
results. Academics revealed a high degree of support for university involvement in business 
development, predominantly agreeing that it was a responsibility of the university to support 
both students and staff in commercial ventures. However, they deemed the overall 
relationship between business and university to be unsatisfactory. This would imply a 
negative condition for business incubation. In terms of actual links, the vast majority of 
academics had undertaken research with a commercial organisation and a significant 
proportion had produced new technologies and/or processes, which constitutes a positive 
indicator for incubation. Over half of the students sampled had undertaken a commercial 
internship, which implies that formal links with business clearly exist. The high degree of 
academic involvement in governmental SME discussion, policy and research is also taken as 
a positive indicator that the links "and specifically the flow of knowledge" between business, 
educational institutions and policy-makers is growing. Previous research demonstrated the 
importance of the linkage between intellectual resources of a university and the problem-
solving needs of a firm (Dean et ai, 2005). An incubator has been recognized as a crucial 
mechanism and engine that provide entrepreneurs with appropriate advice, counsel and serves 
as a switching centre to other people and resources as needed (Rice and Matthews, 1995). 
Universities worldwide have contributed significantly to their respective national 
economies as public institutions by providing human resources to those economies. At the 
$ame time, universities "particularly those in developing countries" depend almost entirely 
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on government subventions for their sustenance. However, the nature, form, and operations 
of universities have to change in response to changes in the global economy if they are to be 
sustained and continue to be relevant to the development of their respective national 
economies. Thus, the need to form partnerships with business, industry, and civil society 
has become more crucial now than at any other time. However, University-industry links 
and the collaboration of scientists across the two sectors have long been shown to be 
problematic. This is particularly because of the difficulty of reconciling the divergent work 
norms and career interests of scientists with the needs of the two different kinds of 
institutions (David et aI, 1999). 
The strength of the relationships within this 'triumvirate' of govemment-education-
business is cited as critical to incubator success in terms of making sure incubators are 
properly targeted (where they are based, who they incubate), properly designed (adequately 
funded) and able to build-upon knowledge resources. 
5.2.2 The SME Environment 
As a business development tool, incubators are able to redress many of the problems SMEs 
often encounter when entering the marketplace (Smiler, 1987). These problems generally centre 
around a lack of financing, weak management skills and business planning/training, a difficulty in 
obtaining finance, incomplete networks and the prohibitive cost of essential business facilities. 
According to Otuski, 2002, in Saudi Arabia, the difficulty of fmancing as well as the 
unsatisfactory management skills poses a huge problem. Moreover, many SMEs fail to function to 
their fullest potential as, small as they are, it is impossible for them to use economies of scale. 
Thus, as broadly discussed in Chapter 2, incubation is best suited as a remedy to those problems 
that tend to be endemic to a particular business environment. Importantly, incubation programmes 
are best suited (and most common) to environments in which policy-makers are focused upon 
improving the SME sector. This is clearly the case in Saudi Arabia where it is intended that SMEs, 
and in particularly technology-based SMEs will be able to help in absorbing the problem of 
unemployment, assist in technology transfer, and economic diversification. 
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The survey of the SME environment looks for evidence of particular SME needs or 
problems in planning, financing, networking and facilities. It is hypothesised that evidence of 
deficiencies in these areas would demonstrate a positive condition for business incubation 
insofar as incubators are specifically designed to improve provision for SMEs in these areas. 
A) Industry Type and Structure 
First, it is thought important to distinguish the types of companies surveyed. As 
discussed in the methodology, Saudi SMEs (that are not involved in catering services or 
retail) are categorised by the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Affairs, (the source of the 
sample) as 'industrial'. Beneath the 'industrial' rubric, SMEs are categorized as belonging to 
either 'manufacturing' or 'technological' sectors. As Table 5.43 shows, 89.2% of respondents 
were involved in the manufacturing sector whereas only 10.8% were technology-based 
enterprises. A business incubation programme suitable to the type of the companies surveyed 
would be of industrial nature. However, because the configuration of an incubator is highly 
dependent on the social, cultural, and economic environments that they are in (Albert and 
Gaynor 2001), using existing classification systems as a predictor of a particular incubator's 
success is not advisable. Nevertheless, these systems remain helpful in understanding the 
motivations and key issues behind certain incubators .. 
Table 5.43: Company Type (main area of activity)58 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Technology 28 10.8 10.8 
Manufacturing 232 89.2 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Table 5.44 shows, the vast majority (84.2%) of companies surveyed were, cumulatively, 
less than five years old. This would reflect the finding by Otsaki (2002) that there is a high 
S8 T -test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 0.80/0, demonstrating the accuracy 
of this result. 
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turnover in business start-ups and failures in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, there is scope for business 
incubation: as NBIA (2000) states that, up to 90% of incubated firms remain in business after 
graduation, whereas only 20-30% on non-incubated firms manage to survive. So business 
incubation could fill an important gap by providing SMEs help in navigating these pitfalls, while 
providing a safe environment for new venture survival and growth (Lewis, 2001). 
Table 5.44: distribution of companies by age59 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Less than One Year 65 25.0 25.0 
Less than 2 Years 12 4.6 29.6 
Less than 5 Years 142 54.6 84.2 
Less than 1 0 Years 28 10.8 95.0 
More than 10 Years 13 5.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
In terms of the ownership structure of the SMEs sampled (table, 5.45), 147 (56.5%) 
described themselves as owner-managed (which does not confirm the proposition in Chapter 2 
stating that many of the SMEs are managed by hired managers, often foreign). Cumulatively, 
88.5% of SMEs were either owner- or family-owned. This agrees with the findings of Boubshait 
(1999) who noted that these were the two most common forms of SME ownership in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Table 5.45: SME ownership structure 
OwnershiD WDe Frequenc}' Percent Cumulative Percent 
Owner Managed 147 56.5 56.5 
Family Owned 83 31.9 88.5 
Independent Limited company 24 9.2 97.7 
Group Subsidiary 2 .8 98.5 
PLe 4 l.S 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
59T-test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 2.7S%' demonstrating the accuracy 
of this result. 
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According to Boubshait, a problematic side-effect of this form of ownership is that it 
makes such companies 'dependent upon personal relations as far as management functions 
are concerned' (Ibid). This has the potential to undermine commercial effectiveness in that 
owner-managed and, in particular, family-owned companies are often prone to practice 
traditional management practices, such as, recruiting and promoting staff according to 
personal connections rather than competence or experience. Thus, there is the implication that 
ownership structure is impairing Saudi companies' ability to compete at the international 
level (Boubshait 1999; Otsuki 2002). However, this is not necessarily a negative condition for 
business incubation. Business incubators are ideally suited to address the issues of 
management training. Also, a carefully planned application process and benchmarking helps 
eliminate these pathologies. 
B) Employees 
The Seventh and Eighth Development Plans set a goal of 25 % Saudisation in the 
private sector with an annual, targeted increase of Saudi employees of 5%. Saudi statistics 
show that there are nearly as many foreign university graduates in the Kingdom as native 
Saudi university graduates (although the ratio is turning in favour of the Saudi nationals) who 
should be, theoretically, competing for the same jobs (Looney 2004). The effectiveness of 
Saudisation is a key indicator of the government's success in combating unemployment. It is 
also an (indirect) indicator of the fitness and willingness of Saudi graduates for employment 
in business. As Table 5.46 shows, the mean number of total employees is 9.7 with the mean 
for Saudis at 2.5. Consequently Saudis make up 25.77% of the mean total employees meeting, 
or very nearly meeting, the government target. This represents a positive condition for 
business incubation insofar as a lowered reliance on foreign-workers implies an increased 
ability amongst Saudis to undertake employment in SMEs. 
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Table 5.46: Mean of total, Saudi and non-Saudi employees in SMEs 
Mean Standard deviation 
Total employees 9.6615 4.82201 
Non-Saudi employees 7.0962 3.64898 
Saudi employees 
2.5346 2.60582 
C) Markets 
Knowing the geographic distribution of SME sales is important for two reasons. 
First, in order to assist economic growth and diversification, Saudi policy-makers aim to 
expand the amount of current available exports (Looney, 2004). A high level of 
international sales is a positive indicator of this process taking place. Moreover, 
international sales are an indicator of the ability of Saudi SMEs to compete effectively in 
the global marketplace - something they have traditionally struggled to achieve 
(Boubshait, 1999). Second, in terms of local, regional, national and international 
marketing, Saudi SMEs are traditionally poor at planning for, or identifying, new markets 
(Otsuki, 2002). A wider distribution across these markets would imply a competence in 
this area and a positive condition for business incubation. 
Table 5.47 shows that the mean estimated distribution of local sales is 50.9% of the 
total, regional sales are 25.7%, national are 18.1 % and international at 4.9%. Clearly Saudi 
SMEs are struggling to expand beyond domestic markets. Although this does not, directly, 
constitute a negative condition for incubation it does imply a lack of competitiveness amongst 
SMEs when considered by global standards. 
Table 5.47: Mean of SME's estimated percentage distribution of sales by geography 
Mean Standard deviation 
Local Sales 50.8885 30.33989 
Regional Sales 25.8615 22.96876 
National Sales 18.0811 25.51845 
International Sales 4.89 14.104 
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D) Business facilities 
A]though Saudi Arabia has one of the most advanced communications infrastructures 
among developing economies, yet Saudi SMEs have failed to invest properly in Information 
Techno]ogy. Table 5.48 shows that whereas telephone and fax facilities are virtually standard, 
only 29 companies (11.2%) have access to high-speed internet. However, access to dial-up 
internet is available to 228 companies (87.7%); only 3 companies (1.2%) claimed to have no 
internet access at all. Given that incubators would be expected to provide high-speed internet 
access this represents a valuable material offering from incubators. 
Table 5.48: SME's communication facilities 
Frequency Percellt Cumlliative Percent 
Telephone facilities 
Yes 260 100.0 100.0 
No 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Fax facilities 
Yes 234 90.0 90.0 
No 26 10.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Dial-up Internet Access 
Yes 228 87.7 87.7 
No 32 12.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
ADSLlHigh-speed Internet Access 
Yes 29 11.2 11.2 
No 231 88.8 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Only 48 (18.5%) of SMEs have their own websites (table 5.49). Clearly, what is now a 
standard marketing/sales too] for British and American companies has yet to establish itself in 
Saudi Arabia. It seems likely that the low level of ADSL penetration (both amongst SMEs 
and the wider population) is a factor in this. However, as Shablaq (2003) notes, a major factor 
in this failure may well be a basic lack of knowledge on how to establish an internet presence: 
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'everyone is constantly telling [SMEs] that they must embrace the internet and the digital 
economy, they must go into e-commerce and become global... but whereas everybody tells 
them to do so, not many people tell them how to do it' (Shalaby, 2001: 39). Clearly, 
incubators would be adept at redressing any such lack of skill or knowledge. It is proposed in 
Chapter 2, that the vast majority of incubatees has their web page up and running and that the 
rate of use of internet and e-commerce implementation has rapidly grown once the company 
locates in the incubator. 
Table 5.49: SMEs with websites 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 48 18.5 18.5 
No 212 81.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Due to considerations of cost (as well advances in desktop publishing/printing facilities) 
it is unusual to find high levels of secretarial support amongst SMEs. Saudi Arabia seems no 
different where only 70 (26.9%) of the companies surveyed had secretarial support. Again 
secretarial support is a standard provision of incubators (table 5.50). 
Table 5.50: SMEs with Secretarial Support 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 70 26.9 26.9 
No 190 73.1 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
E) Business Planning 
Another obvious area in which incubators can assist Saudi SMEs is business planning. 
Inadequate business planning and a lack of market understanding are repeatedly identified 
(Otsuki, 2002; Shablaq, 2003; Looney, 2004ab) as a crucial reason for Saudi SME failure. As 
the 7th Development Plan notes: "because SMEs are prone to launch themselves in highly 
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competitive and changing markets, improving the quality of their business planning and 
market intelligence is vital." 
However, this reluctance to construct proper business and marketing plans is reflected in 
Table 5.51 and 5.52, which shows that only 46 (17.7%) of respondents had a business plan and a 
mere 4 (1.5%) had a marketing plan before starting business. As discussed earlier, an entrepreneur 
without a comprehensive business plan would be refused entry to an incubator. The incubator 
would, however, provide facilities and guidance for the production/improvement of both plan. 
Table 5.51: SME's business planning before start-up 
Wrote Business Plan Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 46 17.7 17.7 
No 214 82.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Table 5.52: SME's with Marketing Plan before start-up 
Wrote marketing plan Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 4 1.5 1.5 
No 256 98.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
F) Start-up funding 
The influence of 'self-financing' among Saudi SMEs is relatively high - 37.3 % of 
SMEs stated that their own funds had had a 'high impact' upon their start-up financing. This 
figure is understandable when considering the limited availability of other forms of finance in 
Saudi Arabia (table 5.53). 
Table 5.53: SME impact of Own Funds on Start-up financing 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
High Imoact 97 37.3 37.3 
Medium impact 31 11.9 49.2 
Low imoact 132 50.7 100.0 
No impact 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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Raising capital is often cited as the single greatest problem facing new SMEs (e.g. 
Brooks, 1986; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002: 1104 ; Storey, 1994 ; Ellen and Weinberg, 1988). 
Similarly, 'under-capitalisation' is cited by Shablaq (2003), AI-Kurdi (2002), Shalaby (200 I) 
and Otsuki (2002) as a major hindrance in Saudi SME survival and development. The problem 
is made worse if the SMEs are specialising in technology-based projects that are often perceived 
as "high risk" by banks. Funding is an area in which incubators can playa vital role - both in 
reducing start-up costs and providing access, or exposure, to funding sources. 
Funds from a parent company had little or no effect on Start-up financing - this is 
predictable given the ownership-structure of most SMEs did not take this form (table 5.54). 
Table 5.54: SME impact of Parent Company on Start-up financing 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
High Impact 1 0.4 0.4 
Medium impact 4 1.5 1.9 
Low Impact 0 0 1.9 
No impact 255 98.1 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
More surprising is the zero incidence of investment from a private investor ('who was 
not previously known to [the SME],) and/or venture capitalists. Business incubators through 
their network of potentially interested parties link their tenants with a number of private 
investors, including business angels (see Chapter 2). Further investigation is required to 
establish whether such individuals/institutions simply fail to exist or whether entrepreneurs 
are simply unaware of them. 
By contrast the impact of private bank loans is significant. In total, 178 SMEs (68.5%) 
rated private bank loans as having a 'high impact' upon their start-up financing (table 5.55). 
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Table 5.55: Impact of Private Bank Loan on Start-up financing of SME 
Frequency Percent ClImlllatil'e Percent 
High impact 178 68.5 : 68.5 
Medium impact 53 20.4 I . 88.8 
Low impact 29 11.2 1100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
A cross-tabulation with company type (table 5.56) shows that private bank loans had a 
disproportionately 'high impact' upon technology-based firms vis-a-vis manufacturing firms. 
This would at least suggest that Saudi banks are less risk-adverse to technology-based 
enterprises than some of the literature would suggest. Participants of (Focus group) 
collectively mentioned the importance of creating a general fund and credit facility. They 
added that, the role of government would be to either convince banks to increase lending to 
this sector, or establish special funds to facilitate loans and credit guarantees. True, certain 
funds already exist, but the regulations governing the credit processes are lengthy and the 
beneficiaries to these funds are few. 
Table 5.56: Cross Tabulation of Private Bank Loan impact on Start-up Financing and Company Type 
Impact of Private Bank Loan 
--
Rig" impact Medium impact Low;mpact Total 
Company Technology 23 0 5 28 
Type 
Manufacturing 155 53 24 232 
Total 178 53 29 260 
Historically, government development loans and grants have been available to all 
SMEs since 1995 through the Saudi Centenary Fund and the Human Resource Development 
Fund. The Saudi government has increased both the size and accessibility of these grants 
over successive development plans. Therefore, it is unsurprising that a sizeable proportion 
of SMEs (49.23%) cite government grants as having a 'high-impact' on their start-up 
finances. (table 5.57). 
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Table 5.57: Impact of Government development grant on SME Start-up financing 
Frequency Percem i Cumulative Percent 
High impact 128 49.23 49.23 
Medium impact 52 20.0 169.23 
Low impact 80 I 30.76 
1
100
.
0 
Total 260 100.0 1 
The impact of government development loans was rated, overalI, as lower than that of grants. 
Only 91 (35 %) rated government loans as having a high impact. This is likely because the loans, 
which are generally more sizeable than grants were only introduced in 2000 (table 5.58). 
Table 5.58: Impact of Government development loan on SME Start-up financing 
Frequency Percellt Cumulative Percent 
High impact 91 35.0 35.0 
Medium impact 9 3.5 38.5 
Low impact 160 61.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
The impact of family-provided funds was lower than private bank loans and 
governments. However, the impact of family-provided funds(table 5.59) remains significant, 
98 SMEs (37.7%) regarded such funds as having a 'high impact' upon their start-up financing 
and only 71 (27.3%) claimed it had 'no impact' at all.60 
Table 5.59: Impact of Family-provided funds on SME Start-up financing 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Hi&!! impact 98 37.7 37.7 
Medium impact 57 21.9 61.6 
Low impact 28 10.8 72.4 
No impact 71 27.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
60 Family-provided funds had a slightly higher impact on start-up financing for manufacturing than it did to technology-b~ 
SMEs. Ofall technology-based firms, 9 (32.9%) rated family-provided funds as 'high impact' compared to 89 manufactunng 
based firms (38.4%). 
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It can be concluded that the most significant sources of financing for Saudi SMEs are. 
10 order of impact: private bank loans, government grants, family-provided funds. 
government loans and owner-funds. Would incubation change these sources? Incubators 
would likely appeal to the same sources - namely government grants and loans and private 
banks. An incubator might attempt to make the application process easier for the candidate 
and in some cases act as guarantor. Development of credibility is in fact first on Smilor's 
(1987) incubatee benefit list. Incubators might also be able to source funding from other 
public bodies and charitable organisations. 
G) Public funding 
As discussed in the focus groups, Ahmed AI-Sadhan 61 mentioned that one of the major 
problems in Saudi Arabia is not so much the lack of government support but the lack of 
knowledge (and media/publicity) about it amongst the SMEs who "need it the most". The 
Saudi Sixth, and Seventh, and Eighth Development Plans introduced a variety of support 
programmes for SMEs, but as Otsuki (2002) commented, these programmes are not 
adequately co-ordinated between the various bodies responsible for their administration. 
Which makes the application prosess rather complicated. 
Within the last three years, 80 SMEs applied for a government grant, see Table 5.60. Of 
these 80 SMEs who applied, 77 received grants, see Table 5.61. However, 25 of the 80 
claimed to have applied more than once. 
Table 5.60: SME's application for a government grant (in last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Applied Once 55 21.2 21.2 
Applied More than Once 25 9.6 30.8 
Not Applied 180 69.2 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
61 National Office for Industrial StralegylMinistry of Commerce and Industry 
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Table 5.61: SME's receipt of a government grant in the last 3 years 
Frequency Percent 
, Cumulative Percent 
I 
Received 77 29.6 ' 29.6 
i 
Not Received 183 70.4 i 100.0 
, 
i Total 260 100.0 I I 
A higher proportion of technology-based companies (46.4%) received government 
grants than manufacturing companies (27.6%). This may however, be due to the 
younger age of technology-based companies than manufacturing companies (table 
5.62). 
Table 5.62: Cross tabulation of SME's receipt of a government grant with company type 
Company Type 
I Total 
----~ 
--
Technology Manufacturing 
Government grant Received 13 64 77 
Not Received 15 168 I 183 
Total 28 232 
1 260 
SMEs were asked to assess government grants according to a range of criteria: speed, 
simplicity and publicity. SMEs did not rate the speed of government grants highly. Only 15 
respondents (19.5%) rated their receipt as 'quite fast' or 'very fast'; a higher proportion of 
respondents, 23, (29.9%) rated them cumulatively as 'quite slow' and 'very slow.' The highest 
proportion of respondents, 39 (50.6%), rated them as 'neither fast nor slow.'(table 5.63) 
Table 5.63: Speed of government grant (of SMEs receiving grants in the last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very fast 4 5.2 5.2 
Quite Fast 11 14.3 19.5 
Neither fast nor slow 39 50.6 70.1 
Quite slow 9 11.7 81.8 
Very Slow 14 18.2 100.0 
Don't know 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 77 100.0 
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Grants looked even worse in terms of their simplicity. Whereas II (14.3%) respondents 
cumulatively rated the application process as 'very simple' or "quite simple'. the highest 
proportion of respondents, 43 (55.8%), rated them as 'quite difficult.'(table 5,64) 
Table 5.64: Simplicity of government grant application process (of SMEs in receipt of a government grant 
in the last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent I Cumulative Percent 
I 
Very simple 2 2.6 I 2.6 
Quite simple 9 11.7 14.3 
Neither simple nor difficult 7 9.1 23.4 
Quite difficult 43 55.8 79.2 
Very difficult IS 19.5 I 98.7 
I 
Don't know 1 1.3 100.0 
Total 77 100.0 
Grants were better in terms of their publicity. Cumulatively, 41 respondents 
(53.3%) regarded the publicity surrounding government grants as 'quite good' or 'very 
good.'(table 5.65) 
Table 5.65: Publicity of government grant schemes 
Frequency Percent Cumlilative Percent 
Very good 9 11.7 11.7 
Quite good 32 41.6 53.3 
Neither good nor poor 26 33.8 87.1 
Quite poor 10 12.9 100.0 
Very poor 0 0.0 100.0 
Don't know 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 77 100.0 
H) Loans 
A higher proportion of SMEs have applied for a government loan in the previous three 
years than they have for a government grant. Out of 146 SMEs applied for a government 
loan, 118 applied once and 28 (10.8%) applied more than once (table 5.66). 
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Table 5.66: SME's application for a government loan (in last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent : Cumulative Percent 
Applied once 118 45.4 i 45.4 
Applied more than once 28 10.8 56.2 
Not applied 114 43.8 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 I 
However, of the 146 SMEs who applied, only 72 (49.3%) received a loan - lower than 
that for government grants (table 5.67). 
Table 5.67: Receipt of one or more government loans in the last 3 years 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Received 72 27.7 27.7 
Not received 188 72.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
The speed with which a government loan was received was significantly slower than 
that of a grant. With the exception of three respondents (4.2%) who rated receipt as 'quite 
fast', all other respondents rated the loan as either quite slow or very slow. Some fifty-one 
respondents (70.8%) regarded loan receipt as 'very slow.' Clearly a problem exists at some 
point in the loan processing procedures which needs to be remedied. This problem is made 
more significant by the fact that loans are now replacing grants as the mainstay of government 
assistance for SMEs (table 5.68). 
Table 5.68: Speed of government loan receipt 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very fast 0 0.0 0.0 
Quite Fast 3 1.2 1.2 
Neither fast nor slow 0 0.0 1.2 
Quite slow 18 6.9 6.9 
Very Slow SI 19.6 27.7 
Don't know 188 72.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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Government loans also fared badly in terms of simplicity of the application process. 
Cumulatively 56 SMEs (21.6% of applicants) regarded the process as 'quite difficult' or 'very 
difficult.' (table 5.69) 
Table 5.69: Simplicity of government loan application process (of SMEs in receipt of a government loan in 
the last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very simple 0 0.0 0.0 
Quite simple 3 1.2 1.2 
Neither simple nor difficult 13 5.0 6.2 
Quite difficult 34 13.1 19.2 
Very difficult 22 8.5 27.7 
Don't know 188 72.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Opinions on the publicity of government loans were marginally more positive than 
opinions on their speed and simplicity. Nonetheless, only 12 respondents (4.6%) regarded 
publicity surrounding the schemes as 'good' or 'very good' (table 5.70). 
Table 5.70: Publicity of government loans (ofSMEs in receipt ofa government loan in the last 3 years) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very good 2 0.8 0.8 
Quite good 10 3.8 4.6 
Neither good nor poor 13 5.0 9.6 
Quite poor 36 13.8 23.5 
Very poor 10 3.8 27.3 
Don't know 189 72.7 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
All SMEs were asked to rate government responsiveness to their financial needs. 
Given the largely negative accounts of the grants and loans procedures, the results were 
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unexpectedly positive. The majority of respondents, 132 (50.8%) claimed that the government 
demonstrated a 'high responsiveness' to their needs (table 5.71). 
Table 5.71: Government's overall responsiveness to SME financial needs 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very high responsiveness 43 16.5 16.5 
High responsiveness 132 50.8 67.3 
Neither responsive nor 31 11.9 
unresponsive 79.2 
Low responsiveness 7 2.7 81.9 
Very low responsiveness 7 2.7 84.6 
Don't know 40 15.4 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Clearly, the government grants and loans programme needs to improve its speed, 
simplicity and publicity. However, that the process is currently so arduous for SMEs 
demonstrates the usefulness of incubator mentoring, whereby candidates would be informed 
about, and helped with, any application process. For example, most incubators in China offer 
grant-servicing in one place and micro or short term 'loan pools' that do not require a 
complicated and demanding eligibility verification employed by banks (Ma ,2004) . 
I) Chambers of Commerce 
As shown earlier from Focus group analysis, the Saudi Chambers of Commerce 
now have a wide range of programmes to assist in the training of members of SMEs. 
However, although all Saudi SMEs are (automatically) members of their Chambers of 
Commerce, use of Chambers of Commerce is reported to be low. This is of particular 
concern as the Chambers are currently the only dedicated "portals" for small business 
advice and assistance available to SMEs and have incrementally received additional 
funding through the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Development Plans. Chambers of 
commerce do not offer services most crucial in increasing the survival rate of SMEs, such 
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as mentoring, financing, or networking. They offer lectures on how to set up a small 
business, as well as seminars and lectures on management, marketing, etc, though, which 
make them a good starting point for marketing an incubation programme. The chambers 
also have international programmes designed to utilize outside expertise and adapt it to 
the Saudi context. 
As Table 5.72 shows, only 46 (17.7%) of SMEs have physically visited their Chambers 
of Commerce; an additional 81 (31.2%) have visited the website. Consequently, less than half 
of the SMEs have ever had any contact with their Chambers of Commerce. 
Table 5.72: SME Visits to Chambers of Commerce 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes physically 46 17.7 17.7 
Yes on the Internet, but not physically 81 31.2 48.8 
No 133 51.2 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
A cross tabulation with company type shows that technology-based firms are less 
likely than manufacturing firms to (physically) visit the Chambers of Commerce (table 
5.73). This is particularly unfortunate given as these are the firms the government 
wishes to encourage through funding of SME-support systems (i.e. Chambers of 
Commerce). 
Table 5.73: Cross-tabulation of Company Type and Visits to Chambers of Commerce 
Company Type 
Technology Manufacturing Total 
Chamber of Yes Physically I 45 46 
Commerce Visit 
Yes on Internet 16 65 81 
No 11 122 \33 
Total 28 232 260 
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In terms of attending events (e.g. workshops, seminars, training sessions) held by the 
Chambers of Commerce, only 32 SMEs (12.3 %) had actually attended (table 5.74). 
Table 5.74: SME's attendance of Chambers of Commerce SME-themed events (e.g. workshops, seminars, 
training sessions) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Attended 32 12.3 12.3 
Not attended 228 87.7 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
As the Chambers of Commerce are currently the only nationwide, government-funded 
source of advice and assistance for SMEs it is possible to conclude that Saudi SMEs are not 
receiving adequate levels of external non-financial support. 
When asked whether they are informed about the range of non-financial support 
provided by Chambers of Commerce, 62.7% of SMEs said they were informed. However, it 
is not clear why this figure is higher than that for the (physical and virtual) attendance of the 
Chambers of Commerce (table 5.75). 
Table 5.75: SMEs' Awareness about Chambers of Commerce support programmes currently available 
for SMEs 
Frequency Percent C"mulative Percent 
Informed 163 62.7 62.7 
Uninformed 97 37.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
The low rate of attendance at Chambers of Commerce represents a negative condition 
for business incubation. Chambers of Commerce are one of the most likely delivery routes for 
business incubators, in terms of housing, funding and operating them. Even if the Chambers 
of Commerce were not directly involved in the incubator they would be the obvious point of 
contact and information for any incubator. 
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J) Collaborations and partnerships 
One of the key assets of an incubator is its ability to "fill in" for an entrepreneur"s 
"impoverished network" (Smilors, 1987). As Carayannis states, networking may go as far as 
joint research and development but certainly most small high technology companies benefit 
from information sharing (Carayannis et aI., 2000). Therefore it is important to see whether 
Saudi SMEs are currently engaged in joint ventures with other companies and whether they 
would be willing to engage with other companies. For instance Hoeser (2003: 18) regards the 
difference between the willingness to network in Argentina and Brazil as a critical factor in 
determining the relative success of the two incubator programmes. Thus, an SME's 
willingness to collaborate with other businesses has an effect upon its success within an 
incubation programme. This collaboration, according to the government's policy ought to 
facilitate the Saudisation as SMEs are believed to be excellent vehicles for replacing foreign 
nationals with native workers and reducing the reliance upon foreign-based enterprises for the 
provision of materials and technologies for the giant utilities industries (Otsuki, 2002) 
No SMEs had undertaken research and development in collaboration with a University 
or Research Institute. However, 27 SMEs (10.4%) had collaborateded with another business 
(table 5.76). 
Table 5.76: SME's undertaking Research and Development in collaboration with another business 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 233 89.6 89.6 
Yes 27 10.4 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
In order to test their attitudes towards collaboration, SME's were given a series of 
hypothetical statements about working with universities and other businesses and were asked 
to rate their agreement or disagreement with these statements(table 5.76) . 
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Responses to the statement that R&D collaboration with a university would "bring in a 
fresh point of view' demonstrated a high level of uncertainty. Some III respondents (42.6%) 
claimed to 'neither agree nor disagree' and 44 (17%) 'didn't know'(table 5.77). 
Table 5.77: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with Universities: "would bring in a fresh point of 
view" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percellt 
Strongly agree 13 5.0 5.0 
Agree 84 32.3 37.3 
Neither agree nor disagree III 42.7 80.0 
Disagree 5 1.9 81.9 
Strongly disagree 3 I.l 83.0 
Don't know 44 17.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Responses to the statement that R&D collaboration with a university would 'bring in 
expertise' were more affirmative. Cumulatively, 182 (70.0%) of respondents either "agreed' 
or 'strongly agreed' with this statement (table 5.78). 
Table 5.78: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with Universities: "would bring in expertise" 
Frequenq Percent I Cumulative Perce", I 
Strongly agree 70 26.9 26.9 
Agree 112 43.1 70.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 40 15.3 85.3 
Dis!8..ree 12 4.6 89.9 
Stron..&ly disagree 4 1.5 91.5 
Don't know 22 8.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Respondents were also uncertain about the statement that R&D collaboration with a 
university 'would reduce development time.'(table 5.79) 
Table 5.79: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: "would reduce 
d If" eve o'pment Ime 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Stro~y agree 28 9.6 9.6 
~e 81 33.5 43.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 70 28.5 71.6 
Di~ 24 9.2 80.8 
Strongly disagree 5 1.9 82.7 
Don', know 52 20 100.0 
.TotaI 260 100.0 
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A greater degree of uncertainty was produced by the statement collaboration with a 
university "would reduce costs". Cumulatively, only 79 SMEs (30.3%) agreed, or strongly 
agreed, with this statement (table 5.80). 
Table 5.80: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with Universities: would reduce costs 
Frequency Percent Ollnllialive Percent 
Strongly agree 23 8.8 8.8 
Agree 56 21.5 30.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 110 42.3 72.6 
Disagree 20 7.7 80.3 
Strongly disagree 5 1.9 82.3 
Don't know 46 17.7 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
When the statement was presented in the negative - collaboration with a university 
"would create more cost" - results were broadly consistent with the prevIous statement. 
Cumulatively, 93 respondents (35.8%) 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with the statement 
(table 5.81). 
Table 5.81: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with a university: ··would create more cost" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 15 5.8 5.8 
Agree 29 11.2 17.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 93 35.8 52.8 
Disagree 47 18.1 70.9 
Strongly disagree 46 17.7 88.6 
Don't know 30 11.4 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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There was a high degree of uncertainty over the statement "concern over loss of 
secrets". Again, 110 respondents (42.3%) claimed to 'neither agree nor disagree: (table 
5.82) 
Table 5.82: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: "concern over loss of secrets" 
Frequency Percent Cumlilative Percent 
Strongly agree 15 5.8 5.8 
Agree 45 17.3 23.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 110 42.3 65.4 
Disagree 29 11.2 76.6 
Strongly disagree 20 7.7 84.2 
Don't know 41 15.8 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Similarly, "problems with determining intellectual property" yielded 115 respondents 
(44.2%) who would 'neither agree nor disagree' with the statement (table S.83).on the other 
hand table 5.84 showed that (39.2%) of SMEs neither agree nor disagree with the statement 
that "other universities are not receptive. 
Table 5.83: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: "problems with determining 
intellectual property" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 12 4.6 4.6 
Agree 37 14.2 18.8 
Neither agree nor disagree 115 44.2 63.0 
Disagree 25 9.6 72.6 
Strongly disagree 11 4.2 76.9 
Don't know 60 23.1 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
243 
Table 5.84: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: other universities are not receptive 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 22 8.5 8.5 
Agree 26 10.0 18.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 102 39.2 57.7 
Disagree 12 4.6 62.3 
Strongly disagree 8 3.1 65.4 
Don't know 90 34.6 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
In table 5.85, only five SMEs thought that collaboration with universities was 
"made difficult because of previous bad experiences of collaboration." These results were 
to be expected given that no SMEs had collaborated with a university previously, yet 
previous experiences of collaboration with another business or organisation could be 
considered. 
Table 5.85: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: "made difficult because of 
previous bad experiences of collaboration" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 2 0.8 0.8 
Agree 3 1.2 2.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 84 32.3 34.3 
Disagree 32 12.3 46.6 
Strongly disagree 40 15.4 62.0 
Don't know 99 38.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Cumulatively, 114 respondents (43.9%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the 
statement that Research and Development with a university was 'made difficult because there 
is no advice on how to do it'(table 5.86). The provision of such advice is clearly a service 
ordinarily facilitated by incubators. 
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Table 5.86: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with universities: "made difficult because no advice 
on how to do it" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 53 20.4 20.4 
Agree 61 23.5 43.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 80 30.8 74.7 
Disagree 11 4.2 78.9 
Very unproblematic 9 3.5 82.3 
Don't know 46 17.7 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
SMEs were asked to rate their overall enthusiasm for future R&D collaboration with 
universities and/or research institutions (table 5.87). Cumulatively, 93 respondents (35.7%) 
were very enthusiastic or enthusiastic about collaboration. However, the highest proportion, 
101 (38.8%) were neither enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic. This relative lack of enthusiasm is 
both an obstacle and an opportunity for business incubation. It represents an obstacle because 
of the importance of strong links between university and business for incubator success. It 
represents an opportunity because incubators have a viable role to play in facilitating the 
"convergence" of industry and 'applied scientific research' that is advocated so prominently 
by the government (Boubshait, 1999). 
Table 5.87: SME overall enthusiasm for future research and development collaboration with universities 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very enthusiastic 23 8.8 8.8 
Enthusiastic 70 26.9 35.7 
Neither enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic 101 38.8 74.5 
Unenthusiastic 35 13.5 88.0 
Very unenthusiastic 7 2.7 90.7 
Don't know 24 9.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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When the same set of questions were asked about collaborating with business, 43.1 % of 
SMEs cumulatively 'strongly agreed' and 'agreed' with the statement that R&D collaboration 
with another business "would bring in a fresh point of view". However, there was a 
significant in difference to this question, as 132 SMEs (50.8%) either 'neither agreed nor 
disagreed' or 'didn't know' (table 5.88). 
Table 5.88: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "would bring in a fresh point 
of view" 
Frequency Percent OtnUllative Percent 
Strongly agree 9 3.5 3.5 
Agree 103 39.6 43.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 92 35.4 78.5 
Disagree 5 1.9 80.4 
Strongly disagree 11 4.2 84.6 
Don't know 40 15.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
A very similar set of results were produced by the statement: "collaboration with 
another business would bring in expertise." (table 5.89) 
Table 5.89: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "would bring in expertise" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 29 11.2 11.2 
Agree 100 38.5 49.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 83 31.9 81.6 
Disagree 6 2.3 83.9 
Strongly disagree 3 1.2 85.1 
Don't know 39 15.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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The statement that collaboration with another business "'would reduce development 
time" produced more ambiguity. Whereas 112 SMEs (43.1 %) strongly agreed or agreed with 
the statement a total of 119 respondents (45.8%) either didn't know or 'neither agreed nor 
disagreed'. (table 5.90) 
Table 5.90: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "would reduce development 
time" 
Frequency Percelll Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 25 9.6 9.6 
Agree 87 33.5 43.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 74 28.5 71.6 
Disagree 24 9.2 80.8 
Strongly disagree 5 1.9 82.7 
Don't know 45 17.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
An even greater degree of uncertainty was produced by the statement collaboration 
with another business "would reduce costs." In total 130 SMEs - precisely half of all 
respondents - either didn't know or 'neither agreed nor disagreed' with the statement 
(table 5.91). 
Table 5.91: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: would reduce costs 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 26 10.0 10.0 
Agree 73 28.1 38.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 95 36.5 74.6 
Disagree 20 7.7 82.3 
Strongly disagree 11 4.2 86.5 
Don't know 35 13.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
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A series of negative statements about business collaboration were then presented. The 
statement "collaboration with another business would create more cost" approximately 
reverse replicated the results of the statement given above. (table 5.92) 
Table 5.92: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "would create more cost" 
Frequency Percent CunUilative Percent 
Strongly agree 45 17.3 17.3 
Agree 22 8.5 25.8 
Neither agree nor disagree 81 31.2 57 
Disagree 53 20.4 77.4 
Strongly disagree 30 11.5 88.9 
Don't know 29 11.2 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Reactions to the statement that "other businesses are not receptive" were much stronger. In 
total 48.4% of respondents 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed' with the statement (table 5.93). 
Table 5.93: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: other businesses are not 
receptive 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 18 6.9 6.9 
Agree \08 41.5 48.4 
Neither agree nor disagree 52 20.0 68.4 
Disagree 60 23.1 91.5 
Strongly disagree 12 4.6 96.1 
Don't know \0 3.8 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Responses to the statement that collaboration with another business "was made difficult 
because of bad previous experiences" (table 5.94) was less compelling. Cumulatively, only 
6.5% of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement - which is likely more a 
reflection of the low frequency of previous collaboration as much as attitudes towards it. 
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Table 5.94: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "made difficult because of 
bad previous experiences" 
Frequency Percent ClImlllatil'e Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 2.7 2.7 
Agree 10 3.8 6.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 81 31.2 37.7 
Disagree 95 36.5 74.2 
Strongly disagree 18 6.9 81.1 
Don't know 49 18.9 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Responses to the statement 'no advice on how to do it' were revealing. Cumulatively, 
55,8% of SMEs agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. This seems part of a wider 
problem of poor networking amongst Saudi SMEs and a general lack of co-ordination 111 
terms of their weak relationships with Chambers of Commerce (table 5.95). 
Table 5.95: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "no advice on how to do it" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 51 19.6 19.6 
Agree 94 36.2 55.8 
Neither agree nor disagree 52 20.0 75.8 
Disagree 33 12.7 88.5 
Very unproblematic 12 4.6 93.1 
Don't know 18 6.9 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Concern over a "loss of secrets" seems limited. Only 25% of SMEs agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement. Again, there was a great deal of uncertainty - 37.7% of 
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, and 19.3% 'didn't know.' (table 5.96) 
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Table 5.96: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "concern over loss of secrets" 
Frequency I Percelll I Cumulative Percell' I 
Strongly agree 18 6.9 6.9 
Agree 47 18.1 25.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 98 37.7 62.7 
Disagree 17 6.5 69.2 
Strongly disagree 30 11.5 80.7 
Don't know 50 19.3 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Concerns over intellectual property issues are slightly more pronounced. Cumulatively 
37.3% of SMEs agree or strongly agree with the statement. This again may be due to the lack 
of advice and support services provided for Saudis SMEs. Thus legally complicated issues 
like intellectual property provide a significant obstacle to business collaboration without help 
and advice in place to surmount the problem (table 5.97). 
Table 5.97: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another business: "determining intellectual 
property" 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 45 17.3 17.3 
Agree 52 20.0 37.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 78 30.0 67.3 
Disagree 30 11.5 78.8 
Strongly disagree 12 4.6 83.4 
Don't know 43 16.6 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
A relatively high number of respondents claimed that R&D with another business was 
'too time consuming.' Cumulatively 45.7% ofSMEs agreed with the statement (table 5.98). 
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Table 5.98: SME attitudes towards R&D collaboration with another busl'ness' too t' . 
. Ime consummg 
Frequency Perce", Cumulative Percent 
Very problematic 43 16.5 16.5 
Quite problematic 76 29.2 45.7 
Neither problematic nor unproblematic 81 31.2 76.9 
Quite unproblematic 20 7.7 84.6 
Very unproblematic 12 4.6 89.2 
Don't know 28 10.7 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Overall, approximately half (50.4%) of the SMEs surveyed claimed they would be 
enthusiastic to pursue Research and Development in collaboration with another business 
(table 5.99) 
Table 5.99: SME overall enthusiasm for research and development collaboration with another business 
Frequellcy Percellt Cumulative Perce", 
Very enthusiastic 40 15.4 15.4 
Enthusiastic 91 35.0 50.4 
Neither enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic 66 25.4 75.8 
Unenthusiastic 20 7.7 83.5 
Very unenthusiastic 17 6.5 90 
Don't know 26 10.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
SME environment: discussion 
The survey of the Saudi SME environment investigated particular SME problems or 
needs in terms of planning, financing, and networking, in order to detect areas in which an 
incubator may be able to redress structural problems within the business environment. The 
'properties' of Saudi SMEs were also measured in order to see whether a viable "market" 
existed for potential incubation. 
The pre-launch business and marketing planning activites of Saudi SMEs are, as 
predicted by the literature, particularly weak. This has both positive and negative implications 
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for business incubation. On the positive side" it demonstrates the clear need for mentoring and 
assistance in the construction of adequate business and marketing plans which could be 
provided by a business incubator. On the negative side, as discussed above in the student 
survey, entrepreneurs with no business plan whatsoever would not ordinarily meet the 
application criteria for a business incubator. Nonetheless, the large scale introduction of 
business incubators would conceivably compel entrepreneurs to construct proper business plans 
before launching their ventures, with business incubators 'filling in the gaps' in their proposals. 
In terms of business facilities, it would seem business incubation has the potential to 
provide tangible benefits for Saudi SMEs. Despite the Ubiquity of phones and fax services, 
Saudi SMEs are lacking in secretarial support and, most significantly, high-speed internet 
access. Since small size is an important constraint for process and product innovations, which 
are the core of competitiveness (European Commission, 2001), SMEs are unable to obtain 
benefits from economies of scale both from the output and input side (Akcomak and Taymaz, 
2004) Therefore, the economies of scale (e.g. access to technical assistance on spot at nollow 
charge) could facilitate e-commerce introduction as a powerful selling and advertising 
channel and an edge in international competition. The low level of broadband correlates with 
a low level of website presence. Incubators would almost certainly provide high-speed 
internet access, significantly improving the likelihood of website creation. Moreover, firms 
would typically be linked to, and have a presence upon, the incubator's own website and the 
incubator would likely assist tenants in the construction and maintenance of their websites. 
Thus IT/internet provision marks a clear area were incubators could palpably assist Saudi 
SMEs. The high degree of uncertainty and ambivalence demonstrated in attitudes towards 
business and university collaboration implies that Saudi SMEs currently lack both the 
networks to maximize their individual potential and perhaps the level of commercial 
"sociability" with other businesses and organisations that is so important within the 
incubation environment. Mixed to negative results about collaboration are alarming and 
against the findings in literature that most small technology companies would benefit from 
information sharing (for example Carayannis et aI., 2000). This notion does not appear to 
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prevail amongst Saudi entrepreneurs. However, an incubator would address these problems 
by assisting businesses to network as well as, where possible, facilitating collaborations 
between incubated firms. Academia-business collaboration is as important as business to 
business collaboration and incubators are likely to make it more sustainable (and welcome). 
Saudi SMEs need support to test out possible markets, differentiate their product or 
service from the competition, prepare cash-flow statements and book-keeping, and present a 
case for financial support. Effective incubator programmes focus on these difficulties. In 
terms of funding, problems clearly exist in the provision of government grants and loans. 
However, this is clearly an area where an incubator could provide a useful service to 
incubated businesses. First, the poor publicity of the government funding opportunities 
would no longer present an obstacle to businesses - the incubator would provide information 
on the available funding sources. Second, the difficult application process would be made 
easier via mentorship from incubator staff. Third, incubators are sometimes willing to act as 
guarantors, making government loans, the government's preferred, and more generous, 
avenue for Saudi SME funding (vis-ii-vis business development grants), easier to acquire. 
However, a critical structural problem that emerges from the data significant is the time delay 
between application and receipt of government loans or grants. One way in which this 
problem could be addressed is through the provision of 'bridging loans' by the incubator. 
These loans/grants could expedite businesses' development. 
Although the majority of SMEs surveyed operated in the 'manufacturing' sector, a 
significant proportion (10.8%) operated in the technology sector. The assumptions of the 
Development Plans reflected in various governmental policies are not totally met in this 
respect. As chapter 2 shows, it is the technology incubators that create the most jobs, both 
directly, by absorbing the highly skilled graduate manpower from universities, as well as 
indirectly, by providing lower-end jobs and absorbing a number of the available native, 
technical workers who at the moment lack opportunities commensurate to their skill levels. 
Also, the government policy ('Saudisation ') is to create highly competitive jobs by 
eliminating foreign manpower from the workplace and this is more easily achieved in 
253 
technology-oriented firms that could possibly use bonds with research universities to create 
unique technology (as virtually all industrial technology was imported into Saudi Arabia at 
the expense of the 'homegrown' development). By pursuing these outlines the goal of 
substituting foreign businesses by native companies in providing many transformation 
services to the industry could be met. It is also important that the companies have the capacity 
to compete against technology and financial hubs of Qatar and UAE. The vast majority 
(84.2%) of businesses were less than 5 years old. Therefore, the ordinary market for 
incubation - ideally technology-focused, young firms - arguably already exists in Saudi 
Arabia, yet, at present, it is small. It is one of the main goals of an incubator to disperse and 
popularize technology. Which means there is a demand for business incubation. 
Saudi SMEs were shown to be seriously deficient in business planning aspects~ very 
few firms (17.7%) had prepared plans prior to start-up. Despite numerous efforts by the 
government, both in the form of education investment and the existence of the chambers of 
commerce, the level of business planning is low. This failure has ambivalent implications for 
the introduction of a business incubation programme. On the one hand, entrepreneurs are 
ordinarily required to submit business plans as part of the incubator application process - an 
entrepreneur unable to produce a business plan would have little hope of entering an 
incubator. On the other hand, incubators are able to provide mentoring and assistance to 
entrepreneurs in the construction of competent business plans. 
Thus, as the results from the student survey also implied - any business incubation 
programme would have to provide high levels of support in business planning to prospective 
applicants. However, mechanisms to provide business planning support would also need to be 
available before an application to an incubator - possibly through Chambers of Commerce 
small business units. A question has to be posed, however, why do not the available methods 
and tutoring already available to entrepreneurs function effectively in fostering careful 
business planning? This is partly explained by the proportion of businesses who have visited 
these support units. As the survey shows, very few businesses had visited their Chambers of 
Commerce (17.7%), let alone taken part in their (or any other organisation's) small business 
254 
support programmes. Thus, Chambers of Commerce or local/national governmental 
organisations wishing to provide business planning support would have to pUblicise their role 
and/or find a way to reach potential entrepreneurs 
One area that would need to be addressed III case of launching a large Saudi 
incubation programme would be the under-utilisation of Chambers of Commerce and , 
hence, the difficulties of 'establishing contact' with SMEs and entrepreneurs who would 
be eligible to apply. Another area would be assistance for Saudi SMEs to be considered in 
conventional finance schemes, rather than through specially designed loan schemes. Helping 
Saudi SMEs obtain such finance is usually achieved through advice and counselling in the 
preparation of business plans, introductions to banking officials and the packaging of 
continued support and mentoring services 
Saudi SMEs demonstrate a range of problems and needs in terms of their facilities, 
planning, funding and networking resources which could be addressed by business 
incubation. Thus, the survey of the Saudi SME environment demonstrates that business 
incubation would add tangible value to SME survival and growth. 
Business Incubation 
Looking at business incubation directly, it is important to appraise the knowledge, 
attitudes and expectations across potential future incubatees (students), potential future 
collaborators and staff (academics), and those who would have been the target audience of 
incubation (SMEs). 
The findings question of incubator 'knowledge' does not constitute a positive or 
negative condition for incubation. Indeed, it would be expected that knowledge of 
business incubation would, among SMEs at least, be fairly limited given only one 
incubator is currently operating in Saudi Arabia. However, in the case of widespread 
lack of knowledge about incubation, the government (or incubator provider) would, 
according to the scale of the programme, need to advertise and explain the incubation 
process to its potential clients. 
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Clearly, attitudes towards incubation represent an important condition for any future 
incubator programme. Negative attitudes towards the concept and the services it provides 
would axiomatically constitute a negative condition. 
Finally, the 'expectations' of what an incubator programme should provide are 
important in terms of making sure that any future incubator programme actually addresses the 
needs of its clients. Of particular interest are divergences across the three samples (e.g. do 
students want something different to SMEs? etc.) 
A) Knowledge and Understanding 
Students, academics and SMEs were all asked about their knowledge of incubators. 
A total of 113 students (73.9%) claimed that they knew what an incubator is, 32 students 
(20.9%) did not have any knowledge. An almost identical percentage of academics 14 
respondents (73.7%) also claimed to know what an incubator is, 3 academics (15.8%) did 
not know. SMEs had the lowest incidence of respondents claiming to know what an 
incubator is, only 154 (59.2%) claimed to have knowledge, 106 (40.8%) had no 
knowledge.(table 5.100) 
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Table 5.100: Student, Academics and SME's claimed Knowledge of incubators 62 
Frequency Percellt Cumulative Percent 
Students 
Knowledge of Incubator 113 73.9 73.9 
No Knowledge of Incubator 32 20.9 94.8 
No response 8 5.2 100.0 
Total 153 100.0 
Academics 
Knowledge of Incubator 14 73.7 73.7 
No Knowledge of Incubator 3 15.8 89.5 
No response 2 10.5 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
SMEs 
Knowledge of Incubator 154 59.2 59.2 
No Knowledge of Incubator 106 40.8 100.0 
No response 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
62 T-test shows that the average difference for responses on the student sample between two different sets of data is 
5.5%, demonstrating the accuracy of these results. The average difference for responses on the academic sample 
between two different sets of data is 7.8% demonstrating the accuracy of this result. The average difference for 
responses on the academic sample between two different sets of data is 0% demonstrating the accuracy of this 
result. 
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Table 5.101: Accuracy ofIncubator Knowledge Amongst Students and Academics and Saudi SMEs 
l 
I 
... 
~ ~ ~ :::' ~ ..I::) ~ ~ :::: 1:: § .!:: ~ =: 
·5 ~ ~ 0 ~ .§ 2: .... ~ ~ =: .s-- §- ~ ::: ::: ..I::) :::: ... .~ ~ '= '" ..!. 'tj Q:: ·5 =: 'II ....... 'II 
-
... ~ ~ i: - ::: ~ =: .~ a '= ::: ~ t.j ~ ~ ~ 'II '-' .!::f ::: .;: .~ ~ ~ 'II 'II .., 
'" ~ ~ ~ 'II ~ :::: ... ~ ::: ~ ::::: ::: ~ ~ -=: Q:: :§ ·5 ~ 'II t.j 
'" -So ~ Q:: :::: =: ~ ... ..I::) 
'" 
;;... ~ :::' 
"' 
Students 
33 32 33 122 121 33 31 32 31 
Correct 
(21.6 %) (20.9%) (21.6%) (79.7%) (79.1%) (21.6%) (20.3%) (20.9%) (20.3%) 
120 121 120 31 32 120 122 121 122 Incorrect (78.4%) (78.4%) (79.7%) (79.1%) (20.3%) (20.9%) (78.4%) (79.1%) (79.7%) 
Total 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100010) (100%) 
Academics 
6 7 16 19 19 13 16 to 9 
Correct 
(31.6%) (36.8%) (84.2%) (100%) (100%) (68.4%) (84.2%) (52.6%) (47.3%) 
13 12 3 0 0 3 3 9 to 
Incorrect 
(68.4%) (63.2%) (15.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (15.8%) (15.8%) (47.3%) (52.6%) 
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 Total (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100010) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
SMEs 
109 108 119 205 124 151 124 163 81 (31.2 Correct (41.9%) (41.5%) (78.8%) (47.7%) (58.1%) (47.7%) (62.7%) %) (45.8%) 
151 152 141 55 136 (52.3 109 136 97 179 Incorrect (58.1%) (58.5%) (21.2%) %) (41.9%) (52.3%) (37.3%) (68.8%) (54.2%) 
260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Total (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100010) (100010) (100%) (100010) (100010) 
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An identical question was used across all three surveys to test the accuracy of 
respondents' actual knowledge of business incubation. This question was asked across the 
three surveys (SMES, business academics and students).63 
Table 5.101 showed that, across all student answers the mean correct response rate was 
32%. In only two statements were the majority of answers correct. In response to the question 
about incubators reducing start-up costs, 122 respondents (80%) 'agreed' (i.e. answered 
correctly). In response to the statement that incubators involve shared facilities, 121 
respondents (79%) 'agreed' (i.e. answered correctly). These are perhaps the most "obvious", 
well-known or easily deducible features of incubators. However, in all other statements. no 
more than 22 % of students achieved a correct answer. Clearly, knowledge and understanding 
of business incubators amongst students is low. Across all academic answers, the mean 
correct response rate was 67% - the highest of the three surveys. On two statements 
'incubators reduce start-up costs' and 'incubators provide shared facilities' all academics 
answered correctly. Across all SME answers, the mean correct response rate was 50.6%. 
Statements that 'incubators help all kinds of businesses' and 'businesses are owned by the 
incubator' received less than 50% of correct answers across all three surveys. 
Academics and SMEs were asked whether they knew about the Eastern Province 
business incubator programme. Whereas 52.6% of academics were aware of the programme, 
63 A series of statements was presented to which respondents could either 'agree' or 'disagree' - the statements were ei~er true 
or false statements. Responses were coded as 'correct' or 'incorrect' according to whether res~ondents h~d agreed WIth true 
statements or disagreed with false statements (correct) or agreed with false statements or dIsagreed WIth true statements 
(incorrect). The statements were presented as follows: 
i. "[BUSiness incubators] are designed to help all sizes of businesses . .. 
(Agree = incorrect. Disagree = correct.) 
ii. "incubated businesses are always owned by the incubator . .. 
(Agree = incorrect. Disagree = correct.) 
iii. "[BUSiness incubators] typically provide secretarial support . .. 
(Agree = Correct. Disagree = incorrect.) 
iv. "[BUSiness incubators] reduce start-up costs . .. 
(Agree = Correct. Disagree = incorrect.) 
v. "Facilities (e.g. office equipment, meeting rooms) are often shared in an incubator. " 
(Agree = Correct. Disagree = incorrect.) 
vii. [Business incubatars] offer reduced, or sometimes free, rents. 
(Agree = Correct. Disagree = incorrect.) 
viii. "They usually offer training . .. 
(Agree = Correct. Disagree = incorrect.) 
ix. "incubated businesses con stay in the incubator as long as they like . .. 
(Agree = incorrect. Disagree = correct.) 
x. "Any business conjoin an incubator as long as it's willing to pay" 
(Aaree = incorrect. Disagree = correct.) 
(Students Q12, Academics Q32, SMEs Q38). 
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only 11.5% of SMEs knew about it. The superior academic familiarity can in part be 
explained given the proximity of the Eastern Province incubator to the KFUPM - and the 
relative distance of SMEs based in Riyadh from the project. (table 5.102 and 5.103) 
Table 5.102: Academics' Knowledge of Eastern Province incubator 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 10 52.6 52.6 
No 9 47.4 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Table 5.103: SMEs' Knowledge of Eastern Province incubator 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 30 11.5 11.5 
No 230 88.5 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Clearly, both generic and specific knowledge of business incubation is low. Academics 
performed markedly better than students and SMEs, however it is students and SMEs who are 
the actual candidates for incubation projects - that they have such limited knowledge of 
incubation (and its benefits) suggests that efforts would need to be directed at pUblicising 
information about any incubation programme. Chambers of commerce could play an 
important role here. 
B) Attitudes 
Once knowledge of business incubators had been tested across the three surveys, a 
correct explanation of business incubation was explained to respondents (see Appendix K for 
questionnaires), based on the explanation, the attitudes towards business incubation could be 
measured. 
The SMEs were then asked whether they would be interested in applying to join a 
business incubator if one were launched in their locality. Table 5.1 04 showed that the 
majority (44.2%) don't know while about (34.6%) ansewerd positively. 
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Table 5.104: SME interest in joining an incubator at present64 
Frequency Percent Cllmulati~'e Percent 
Yes 90 34.6 34.6 
No 55 21.2 55.8 
Don't Know 115 44.2 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
When SMEs were asked if they would be interested in joining an incubator if they were 
starting a new business, the majority, 153 (58.8%) of SMEs replied that they would be 
interested. Only 50 (19.2%) claimed that they would not be interested (table 5.105). This 
would suggest that the concept of business incubation holds significant appeal for Saudi 
businesses, - so long as it is clearly articulated what business incubation involves. 
Table 5.105: SME interest in joining an incubator if starting new business 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 153 58.8 58.8 
No 50 19.2 78.0 
Don't Know 57 21.9 100.0 
Total 260 100.0 
Attitudes towards business incubation amongst SMEs were predominantly positive. 
There was also implied recognition (between the two questions) that incubators are probably 
more useful to fledgling than established SMEs. 
C) University incubators 
University-based incubators make up a large proportion of worldwide incubators.6s 
Such incubators are predominantly technology-based and involved in the commercialisation 
64 The average difference for responses on the academic sample between two different sets of data is 0.75% demonstrating the 
accuracy of this results. 
65 In Europe. incubators that are attached to universities are the most common form of incubation project. University incubators 
provide a "nursery" for the commercialization of university research (in particular through technology incubators) (OECD 
1999: 8). For instance, after the original Batavia incubator, in the 1960s and 1970s the next "stage" in the US (and at that 
time, worldwide) incubation industry involved the roll out of first university incubators (e.g. the US University Science 
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(through licensing or patenting) of university research.66 Once presented with a full definition, 
students and academics were asked whether the introduction of a local municipal or university 
incubator would make them more or less enthusiastic towards starting a business (table 
5.106). 
Table 5.106: Student and Academic attitude towards university incubator 
Much More More Neither Less Much less Total 
Enthusiastic Enthusiasti Enthusiastic enthusiastic enthusiastic 
c nor 
Unenthusiastic 
Students 
Frequency 68 63 7 10 5 153 
Percent 44.4 41.2 4.6 6.5 3.3 100.0 
Cumulative 44.4 85.6 90.2 96.7 100.0 
Percent 
Academics 
Frequency 6 10 3 0 0 19 
Percent 31.6 52.6 15.9 0 0 100.0 
Cumulative 31.6 84.2 100 100 100.0 
Percent 
Respectively, 85.6 per cent of students, and 84.2 per cent of academics answered that 
the introduction of an incubator in their local community or university would make them 
either 'much more enthusiastic' or 'more enthusiastic' than they were now to start a business. 
However, three academics replied that they would be 'neither nor enthusiastic.' Notably, 
these were the same three academics that had developed technology through their research but 
had not undertaken commercial collaboration. 
Academics were asked if they would be interested in participating in a university-based 
incubator programme if the university were to launch an incubator. The results almost 
perfectly match their attitudes with the same 3 academics remaining 'very uninterested' 
whilst the remaining 16 academics are either interested or very interested (table 5.107). 
Centre). 
66 In the Korean national case study (see Chapter 2) 85% of incubators were attached or strongly affiliated to universities and 
specialized in hard or soft technologies. Similarly in the Chinese case studies, the "majority" (Lalkaka 2004) of incubators 
are "spin offs" from University projects or research institutes. In tenns of ownership (of patents and collection of royalties) 
this usually stays with the parent institution (e.g. University) which also provides the finance for the incubatee. 
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Table 5.107: Academics' Interest in joining in a university-based incubator programme67 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumlliatil'e Percent 
Very Interested 6 31.6 31.6 
Interested 10 52.6 84.2 
Neither interested nor uninterested 3 15.8 100.0 
Uninterested 0 0.0 100.0 
Very uninterested 3 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
In a question to students, it was sought to discover which benefits of an incubator were 
considered most important. These are the standard facets of an incubator as detennined by the 
literature review (e.g. Smilor, 1987). Table 5.108 shows that the majority of respondents 
regarded all facilities as either very important or quite important. The attributes cumulatively 
regarded as most important were those associated with cost (financing help, cost reduction) 
and training (mentoring and training). Overall, attitudes towards business incubation were 
generally positive across students and academics 
Table 5.108: Student's Perceived Benefits of Incubators 
~ ~ '" =:: :::: .~ .... I:IQ ~ .... ~ ~ ~ =:: .. ~ =:: ~ =:: 
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v~ Important 74 74 75 73 71 63 66 75 66 67 
~ite important 71 70 69 69 72 81 73 69 74 65 
Neither Important nor I 3 3 9 4 2 7 2 6 II unil1!l'Qrtant 
.Quite unimportant 4 2 2 I 4 3 4 2 5 4 
~ unimportant 3 3 4 1 2 4 3 5 2 3 
Total 153 152 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
67 T -test shows that the average difference for responses between two different sets of data is 17.8%, demonstrating the accuracy 
of this result. 
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D) Expectations 
Although the incubator currently operating in Saudi Arabia is not University-based. 
Saudi universities represent clear potential for future incubation projects. The KFUPM 
already has its own Research Centre (complete with a patents department) and, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, the commercialisation of University research is one of the most common 
reasons for launching an incubator programme (OEeD, 1999: 8). Thus, academics were asked 
a series of hypothetical questions based around their preferences and expectations if their 
university was to launch an incubator in the future. 
Academics were asked if/when they would expect their university to become involved 
in an incubator programme. Whereas only three academics (15.8 %) predicted an involvement 
within the next year, thirteen (68.4 %) believed involvement would take place within the next 
ten years and a further three (15.8 %) believed it would be in excess of ten years. No 
academics believed that the university would 'never' be involved in an incubator programme 
(table 5.109). 
Table 5.109: Academic's expectation of university involvement in an incubator programme 
Frequency Percent ClImlllative Percent 
Near Term (Next 12 Months) 3 15.8 15.8 
Medium Term (Next 10 years) 13 68.4 84.2 
Long term (More than to Years) 3 15.8 100.0 
Never 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
When academics were asked whether a university-based incubator should be 'general or 
technological', thirteen (68.4%) opted for general and six (31.6%) opted for 'technological' 
(table 5.110) - a rank to an extent reflecting the information in Chapter 2 (NBIA, 2002), 
which states that general incubators are the most popular type with technology incubators a 
close runner up. 
264 
Table 5.110: Academics' Preferrence on industry type of university-incubator 
Frequency Percent Cumulatil'e Percent 
General 13 68.4 68.4 
Technological 6 31.6 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
When academics were asked who should be permitted to join a university-based 
incubator programme opinions were fairly split between 'only current staff 'current staff and 
students' and 'anyone' (table 5.111) 
Table 5.111: Who should be allowed to join a university-based incubator? 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Only Current staff 7 36.8 36.8 
Both Current staff and Students 6 31.6 68.4 
Anyone 6 31.6 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
Ten academics (52.6%) set the mllllmum desired educational level of incubated 
business at Masters level whereas nine (47.4%) said Bachelors; no respondents set a 
'doctorate' or high school' as the minimum requirement. 
Academics were then asked to give a figure for the expected share of incubated 
businesses' profits the university should receive. As Table 5.112 shows, the highest 
proportion (36.8%) of respondents recorded answers between 41 % and 50% of profits, 
although no candidates thought the university should receive more than 60%. 
Table 5.112: Expected university share of net profits generated by incubated businesses 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Oto 10% 0 0.0 0.0 
It (020 % 2 10.5 10.5 
21 to 30% 3 15.8 26.3 
31 to 40% 3 15.8 42.1 
41 to 50% 7 36.8 78.9 
51 (060% 4 21.1 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 
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A figure between 41 and 50% seems prohibitively high, it is for instance. 
significantly higher than many venture capitalists would seek, at least in equity terms. As 
Hoeser's (2003) case study of the Argentinean incubator programme shows. one of the 
potential problems involved in the University incubation projects has been the level of 
equity split between the university and the incubated enterprise. Hoeser showed that 
demands for a high equity stake by the university has discouraged some enterprises from 
engaging in the incubator projects. On the other hand it is worth noting that the major 
difference between an incubator and some other type of business advisory facility is the 
responsibility an incubator assumes for the success of its tenants. It is unlikely that an 
unsuccessful incubator would continue to receive the funding necessary to sustain its 
functioning. Taking over part of equity is important both to make the incubator self-
sustainable and to motivate the tenants and staff. 
When asked about their preferred source of incubator funding, academics opted 
unanimously for 'both public and private' funding (vis-ii-vis purely 'private' and purely 
'public'). 
Academics were asked if there was any particular organisation or business they would 
expect to be involved in a University-based incubator. As Table 5.113 shows, the Human 
Resource Development Fund was the most popular response, named by 7 academics as a 
likely partner to university-based incubator. This would seem to fit with the Development 
Fund's role as the government's favoured vehicle for SME support. However, numerous 
studies discussed in Chapter 2, revealed that privately-funded incubators provide both higher 
quality services and generally a better success rate than government funded ones. 
Table 5.113: Academic expectations of businesses or organisations to be involved in a university-based 
incubator 
Cllmulative 
FreqllellSL Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Aramco 3 15.8 15.8 15.8 
Chambers of Commerce 4 21.1 21.1 36.8 
SAGIA 1 5.3 5.3 42.1 
Commercial Banks 1 5.3 5.3 47.4 
Human Resource Fund 7 36.8 36.8 84.2 
Non:~onse 3 15.8 15.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 100.0 
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Discussion: Knowledge and expectations of Business Incubation 
The role of SMEs in growth and development is universally recoginised, and is 
demonstrated by the volume of studies, research, and literature dedicated to the subject. One 
of the mechanisms employed to nurture small firms for more than two decades is business 
incubation. 
Prior accurate knowledge and understanding, of business incubation was low especially 
among students. However, this does not automatically represent a negative condition for 
Saudi business incubation, as universities and Chambers of Commerce could provide 
necessary marketing for and information on business incubators (especially that incubator 
awareness was substantially higher with the academics). Arguably, it is more representative 
of the fact that, to date, only one incubator is currently operating in the country. However, the 
low-levels of awareness about business incubation suggest that the introduction of a national 
incubation programme would require a well-targeted publicity campaign in order to reach all 
of its potential clients. 
Once respondents had an understanding of business incubation, attitudes were positive 
across all three surveys. Students, academics, and SMEs all identified properties relating to 
financing and cost-reduction as the most useful ways an incubator contributes. This is clearly 
a positive indicator as it creates the important demand for incubation which would contribute 
to the success of the programme. 
With the exception of projected university-incubator profit shares, academic 
expectations for any future university incubator were not prohibitively constrictive and were 
broadly in line with those set out by Shalaby (2004). Academics also demonstrated a high 
level of interest to participate in a university incubator programme ( a critical condition for 
success). Enthusiasm among academics and students for joining an incubator was high and 
broadly congruous. In sum, general attitudes about, and expectations of, incubation were 
encouraging for future incubator success. 
One important threat to the incubation programme's success in Saudi Arabia is the 
inclination both of the government and the majority of the surveyed academics for the 
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incubators to be publicly funded and managed. As some studies suggest, this is not the 
most effective in the long run as privately-funded incubators deemed more professional. 
Publicly funded incubators also risk dodging adequate benchmarking and measuring 
procedures due to political pressure. Also, as literature suggests, the importance of the 
incubator management is such, that if it is badly performed, the negative consequences 
for the incubatees - and possibly the whole programme when the number of incubators is 
extremely low, could be significant. It is much easier to attract good managers to private-
sector incubators. 
The experience of Brazil, suggests the degree of private involvement was a major 
feature of the success of the incubation programme. This might be of particular 
importance in Saudi Arabia, as the communication between different rungs of power is 
not clear and competences of different local and central agencies in charge of the SME 
sector development overlap. One possible solution would be for the government to 
promote the concept of business incubation to large business, thus, encouraging private 
money to become involved in the programme (sponsored by large businesses and 
organisations). Another solution would be to clearly define governmental/local 
responsibilities and tasks towards business incubation progremme. 
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CHAPETR 6: CASE STUDY 
(The leddah Business Incubator) 
6.1 Introduction 
The case study was conducted in June and July 2007. Findings are based on semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with the Director of the Jeddah Chambers of Commerce 
Business Incubator (JCCBI), the general manager of the incubator and the fourteen tenants at 
the incubator. Tenants also completed an updated version of the SME questionnaire survey 
analysed in the previous chapter. (see Appendix K) 
6.2 Incubator Characteristics 
There are a number of key factors that determine success in establishing and operating 
incubators. This section examines the role of those factors such as, location, management 
team, admission criteria, services, type of companies they attract as clients and other issues 
relating to the incubator goals and the services. 
A) Location and Size 
Business incubators can have different types of location and can be housed in different 
types of premises ranging from purpose -built new developments to converted buildings. 
The Jeddah Chambers of Commerce Business Incubator (JCCBI) opened its doors in 
June, 2005. The incubator is funded by the Jeddah Chambers of Commerce and located in a 
new, purpose-built building next to the Chambers of Commerce, based in the 'financial 
district' of Jeddah (off the main King Abdulaziz Street). This location is expected to have a 
positive effect on the operation and usefulness of (JCCBI) providing access to markets for 
goods and services as well as a degree of businesses expertise in the surrounding community. 
The location of business incubator largely reflects the aim it pursues. Thus a multi-
pUrpose incubator like the (JCCBI) may well be located in an inner city area which the case 
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for (JCCBI). This area in the city of Jeddah is attractive location for new-economy 
entrepreneurs and investors to live, work, network and promote themselves. However, being 
located little far from a University is expected to a have a negative effect on the interaction 
between the tenant firms and acadamics. A strong relation with the university is specifically 
needed for technology focused businesses because being connected to a university allows 
easier contact for firms to the incubators and give the tenants access to lab space they may 
otherwise not have. 
Instead of offices, tenants are allocated desk space (104m x 104m) in open-plan floors 
that are rented to tenants on a monthly basis. Each tenant receives a desk space and the full 
use of the incubator facilities. Significantly, only the manager/owner of the tenanted firm is 
physically incubated while other employees are able to use incubator facilities for meetings 
and client presentations but are not allocated space nor do they participate in incubator 
training programmes. 
Occupying two floors, the incubator houses 14 businesses but has recently expanded its 
capacity to 24 'desks.' To operate successfully, incubators need to have sufficient capacity to 
accommodate a minimum of a round 20 tenants (ECED, 2002) at any time to achieve 
economies of scale. Having up to 24 businesses within the incubator seems to be a reasonable 
number and quite suitable to the space available. 
B) Incubator Funding Sources 
Business incubators could not exist without funding. The main problem related to 
funding is the lack of or limited access to it. In the majority of cases, the process of business 
incubation is taken up by public sector. While a good idea in practice, its result is that 
business incubators become heavily reliant upon government funds. 
The (JCCBI) does not have a formal relationship with the government and is 
exclusively managed and financed by the Jeddah's Chamber of Commerce. The problem that 
may arise is that there is limited access to funding in the Kingdom; there are no established 
venture capital funds. As a result, if the Jeddah Chambers of Commerce decided to stop 
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financing this business incubator, then the incubator would have few options left and could 
end up having to close down. 
In contrast, Brazilian incubators are generally limited to universities and funded by 
plural government and non- government sources (Chandra, 2007). A major feature of 
incubation in Brazil is the degree of private involvement. The largest sponsors of incubators 
are not for-profit and for-profit organiztions, accounting for 40% of the total (Lalkaka and 
Shaffer 1999). The coalition of partners that support incubators is a notable feature of the 
Brazilian incubation experience. 
In the United States, government grants, university/corporate support along with rental 
and consulting income constituted primary sources of funds for incubators (Knopp, 2001). 
Since a majority of incubators in the USA are run as non-profit entities, they operate under a 
business model that generates additional revenue from rental income and consulting services. 
In comparisons, the Chinese government uses business incubators as policy tools of 
market creation by offering financial support for them both for construction and operations. 
On the other hand, the funding responsibilities of German business incubators have trickled 
down to being that of the host towns the particular business incubators are located within. Out 
of one hundred and thirty individual business incubators seventy-five percent of their local 
host towns hold equity in the business incubators. Forty-five percent of the cases receive 
money specifically from local town banks. Similar to the problems that arise when a national 
government is giving business incubators most of its funding, the same goes for when towns 
give a majority of the funding for business incubators (OECD, 2002). If the internal 
government changes and the towns decide to pull out support, the business incubators would 
have very few places to tum to. 
C) Incubator Goals 
The mission statement of a business incubator needs to be clear, so that everyone 
involved with each aspect of the incubator knows what the purpose of the incubator is and 
what its long-term goals are. This also aids in the development of intermediate goals, which 
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are very important for business incubators. They are important because they define \\hat the 
overall goal is intended to be. In addition, once the mission is clear, it will be easier to admit 
tenant companies that fit into the overall purpose of the business incubator. 
Once a clear mission is set, there is a need to develop it into logic, so that others can 
relate to it. This is especially important when it comes to raising funds. It also aids in having 
the business incubator becoming more accepted in the community it is placed in. An example 
of this is the Helsinki, Finland Business Incubators. At the time that business incubators in the 
region were first starting up those in charge proclaimed the Finland Business Incubators as 
vehicles for employment, technology transfer, and exports. They were so successful in selling 
their points, that fifty percent of their budget was from the government, with forty percent of 
that coming directly from the European Union (Abetti, 2004). The Helsinki business 
incubators were so successful in using their mission statement that they were able to receive 
funding from inception until 2006 (Abetti, 2004). 
The stated goals of the leddah business incubator are, according to the manager (i) to 
provide a suitable business environment to nurture new businesses in their early years; (ii) to 
minimise the costs of new business establishment for the entrepreneur; (iii) to support the 
skills and creativity of the owner of small projects; (iv) to give the opportunity for the small 
projects to succeed and to protect it in their early years; (v) converting the research and 
studies into real projects that are suitable to be marketed; (vi) provide strong projects to the 
society in the future that are able to be sustained and be developed; (vii) practice the concept 
of society development through developing the economy to the society's individuals.' 
According to the Director, 'the main goal of JCCBI, from [my] point of view, is to 
create a business environment for the entrepreneurs to start their work, to be successful in 
their work, to cut the unemployment rate and diversify the economy.' He went on to describe 
how he defined the properties of a business incubator: 'The incubator is an organisation that 
works to support bright and enthusiastic entrepreneurs with strong business models, who have 
the right feasibility study and some of the required resources to achieve their goals. This [the 
Jeddah Chambers of Commerce] incubator provides them with the right working environment 
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in the early critical years of the project's life. We are looking to enhance their chances of 
success by resolving their technical, logistical management issues with very reasonable 
monthly payment, allowing the project owner to concentrate on the core of his business at the 
critical start-up period.' It could be concluded that the goals set by (JCCBI) were general in 
nature and more or less similar to the goals of different incubators in various parts of the 
world (OECD 1999: 8, NBIA 2002, UKBI 2005). Putting a specific mission statement may 
serve better in the devolpment of intermediate goals. This is especially crucial for a pioneer 
incubator such as JCCBI. 
Whatever other goals may be served by an incubator, its principal function is still to 
help entrepreneurs launch new businesses. The incubator's services eliminate the need for the 
entrepreneur to attend to matters not directly concerned with the business and reduce the cost 
of operation. The below-market rentals offered by most incubators also reduce the operating 
costs for the new business during its critical early stages. The benefits of the incubator 
relative to a more traditional start-up are therefore both technical and financial. 
In general, the goals of business incubators are fundamentally economic, as noted. 
However, there are other purposes served by incubators, and most of these goals derive from 
the interests of the sponsors as well as the tenants. 
D) Management and staff 
The JCCBI has a staff of five. The Managing Director is who has been in post since 
May 2007, previously he was the Director of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce SME 
Support Unit, and has been closely involved with the incubator since its launch. It is 
recommended that the incubator manager should possess a high level of educational 
qualification and considered the most important intervention tool for incubator success (Ric 
and Abetti, 1992). The quality of the management team is considered as a critical factor in 
successfully establishing and operating incubators (ECED, 2002). Greene and Butler (1996) 
note that "this role, like every other aspect of incubators, varies widely between incubators, 
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but includes a selection of responsibilities such as networking, counseling, providing 
emotional support, and providing expertise in diverse areas as marketing, business operations. 
finance, and accounting" (Rice and Abetti, 1992; Smilor and Gill, 1986). 
The General Manager is based full-time at the incubator and oversees its day-to-day 
operations. Three additional support staff makes up the rest of the team. These support staff 
are also based full-time at the incubator to give business and management advice, help with 
facilities (where necessary) and assist with 'business, marketing and operational planning.' 
Furthermore, as discussed below, a great deal of time is expended helping tenants to apply for 
funding. The General Manager and the support staff are also involved in promoting the 
incubator to, and networking with, other businesses and banks. Finally, support staff make 
quarterly reports on the progress and performance of each tenanted business to the Director. 
There are no recognized professional qualifications or standard in this field, although specific 
incubator management functions (e.g. personnel management, financial advisor) are areas 
where such standard exist. In the future need may arise to for setting professional standards. 
The ratio of incubator staff to client companies is also a key performance indicator. 
Generally, the staffing of a business incubator can vary enormously depending on its size and 
resource. Research conducted by the Centre of Strategy and Evaluation Services for 
European commission (ECED, 2002), showed that the ratio of management to tenant firms is 
about 1 :9. It should be noted here that the ratio of incubator staff to client companies in 
JCCBI is much narrower (1:4). 
E) Incubator Type 
The incubator is 'general' and accepts almost all type of business; therefore it does not 
have the specialist laboratories or technical expertise found in many technology-based 
incubators. As discussed in the literature, (NBlA, 2002) mixed-use (or 'general') incubator 
places no restriction on the commercial type of firm tenanted and is suitable for all 
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businesses. Their objectives are also likely to be 'general' and focused around employment 
generation and local economic growth. 
All tenants in JCCBI are 'owner-managed'; no third-parties owned stakes in the 
businesses. Table 6.1 provides an analysis of the activities of tenant businesses. As can be 
seen, eight of the companies are marketing-based, four described themselves as . education 
consultancies' and two are 'professional training providers.' 
The presence of three company types within the fourteen tenants, suggests that JCCBI 
tend to be general and mixed in terms of business models.68 It is generally accepted that 
incubator models are driven, in large measure, by the type of tenant business and the agenda 
of the primary sponsors (Chandra, 2007). JCCBI is supported by the local chamber of 
commerce in Jeddah with the view of giving support to all type of new business. Therefore it 
is expected that they take in a variety of business incubatees in unrelated industries. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that for countries where incubation programmes are at 
the beginning much attention should be paid to the selection of the type of incubator that best 
suits the prevailing local conditions. The Saudi economic environment could offer a plurality 
of approaches to incubation ranging from the classical general to high technology types. 
However, close examination of the needs of the SMEs in the Saudi Arabia should dictate the 
optimum type. 
Table 6.1: Company type in JCCB) 
Colfl/NUly type Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Marketing 8 57.1 57.1 
Education consultancy 4 28.6 85.7 
Professional Training providers 2 14.3 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
61 By contrast, the Chinese incubators tend to generally more monolithic in terms of business models, this may be due to their 
hiah level ofdepcndence on the government for direction and support.{Chandra, and Fcaly, 2007). 
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F) Current tenants 
A key factor influencing the successful performance of incubators is the number and 
quality of tenants. As of July 2007, the JCCBI had fourteen businesses as tenants. It is clearly 
important to achieve a critical mass in order to maximize the economies of scale with regard 
to service provision and costs. The successful performance of a business incubator depends 
ultimately on the number of clients they attract and the performance of these firms 
New-economy incubators tend to have considerably fewer tenants because of the 
significant investment they make in each incubatee. Smaller incubators may focus their effort 
on only 2 or 3 companies. Business incubators typically focus on attracting a combination of 
pure start-up companies and firms at an early stage of development. 
Table 6. I shows the various companey types in JCCBI and these were three types 
(Marketing, Professional training providers and education consultancies). The education 
consultancies provided services for potential university students who want to study overseas. The 
consultancies marketed packages to students in terms of fees, flights, accommodation etc. as well 
as assistance with application processes. These packages are then marketed at potential students. 
According to the four tenants involved in the business, it is a service for which there is a growing 
demand in Saudi Arabia as increasing numbers of Saudi students look to study overseas. Asked to 
explain why so many tenants were in the same, relatively niche, business sector the general 
manager explained, 'well, it is a new business area and it is a new, booming market which 
intelligent entrepreneurs are trying to break into.' 
The 'professional training providers' are engaged in the design and sale of professional 
training programmes for (typically large) commercial organisations and government departments. 
One company is specifically focused upon IT-training for the employees of large organisations, 
the other provides a wider-range of management and leadership-based training for mid-level 
managers in commercial enterprises and government depamnents. Again specialist, professional 
training is said to be a rapidly growing sector in the Saudi economy, particularly in the 
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government sector. The current tenants in JCCBI more or less work in similar sectors (marketing, 
education and training), this may be explained by the popularity and attractiveness of these 
businesses for Saudi SMEs when the incubator was opened. 
However, it was put to both the incubator management and the tenants that having so many 
businesses working in similar sectors may lead to the tenants being in direct competition with one 
another. Mr Sultan, the director, rejected this claim and explained, 'first, we would not admit a 
direct competitor into the incubator if we already had a tenant specialising in a very particular 
business area. Second, many of the businesses we have here are in the same or similar sectors, but 
they are not chasing the same clients, or at least the same business, because they are providing 
different, very specialised, services.' Moreover, it was suggested by the two training providers that 
working alongside each other was of tangible commercial benefit, according to Respondent 13 
(R13): 'We provide a similar service to similar clients but in totally different areas of expertise. 
This means we can learn from each other in terms of marketing without worrying about 
competition. In fact, we have in the past exchanged contacts in major institutions because it tends 
to be the same person who buys the training packages. Overall I think it has been of great benefit 
working alongside (R 14). ' 
As new businesses, all tenants were creating a product or service new to their firm. As 
Table 6.2 shows, four firms (28.6%) claimed to be introducing entirely new services to the 
market. In addition, nine tenants claimed to be introducing services that 'significantly 
improved' their market (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.2: Created service new to the market 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 4 28.6 28.6 
No 10 71.4 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Table 6.3: Introducing services that significantly improved their market 
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Frequency Percellt Cumulative Percent 
Yes 9 64.3 64.3 
No 5 35.7 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
As discussed earlier, only the managers of incubated companies are 'hosted" full-time 
in the incubator, however as Table 6.4 shows, the majority of the incubated companies have 
more than one employee. As stipulated by the incubator, all employees must be Saudi 
nationals (this is in contrast to the 26% of mean total employees who are non-Saudi amongst 
the Riyadh-based SMEs.) 
Table 6.4: Employee numbers for JCBI tenants 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percellt 
I employee (includes manager) 6 42.9 42.9 
2 employees 4 28.5 71.4 
3 employees 3 21.5 92.9 
4 employees I 7.1 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
G) Incubator Application and Admission 
Most Business incubators adopt specific criteria to screen individual applicants. The 
quality of the entrepreneurs selected for admission, their commitment to success, their 
experience and skills, the nature of their products, etc- will of course have a very important 
bearing on how successful the incubator itself is in achieving its mission. 
A study of Kakati (2003) reveals that entrepreneur quality, resource-based 
capability and competitive strategy are the critical determinants of a start-up's viability 
and achievement. The screening practice of the first cluster (on market and personal 
factors) seems best to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful starting 
enterprises. Steffensen et a1. (2000) do not directly focus on screening practices, but 
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observe a difference between two types of spin-offs from the University of New Mexico's 
(UNM) research centeres: planned versus spontaneously occurring spin-offs. Planned 
spin-offs are initiated by the Research Centre and are offered incubation facilities by the 
university. Spontaneous spin-offs are established with little encouragement from the 
research centre by an entrepreneur who identifies a market opportunity. The fact that only 
the planned spin-offs are incubated in the university indicates the presence of implicit 
screening practices. 
There are four mandatory qualification criteria for incubatee admission to lCCBI. 
Entrants must be: 
• Saudi nationals 
• Resident in the city of leddah 
• Graduates, from a Saudi university 
• In possession of a license to engage in private enterprise, (this is to prevent 
government employees, or former government employees, from 
commercializing government technology without permission). 
Assuming entrepreneurs meet these criteria, the first stage of application IS the 
submission of an outline business plan. The second stage involves a presentation to and 
interview with, the admissions committee. Entrants must also take a test to demonstrate 
computer literacy. At this point a decision is made upon admission. 
If the application is approved at this point, the entrant signs a contract committing him 
or herself to the regulations of the business incubator. A further condition (discussed further, 
below) of incubation is that the tenanted business is staffed entirely by Saudi nationals and 
must remain so for the duration of its tenancy. 
Speaking to tenants about the application procedure revealed that the process was quite 
stringent. As (R 7) put it, 'it took me about two months from the beginning of my application 
to being accepted by the incubator. The interview was tough; they asked me many difficult 
questions about my business. I am just thankful that I would have done my research and was 
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prepared.' Respondent five said: 'I applied with a friend of mine from university. but he 
didn't spend long enough in the application process and they rejected him.' As the director. 
explained, many applications have been rejected 'due to the weakness of the feasibility 
studies submitted.' He approximated the acceptance to rejection ratio at approximately 1:4 
and claimed that demand was 'extremely high'. 
If identifying weak but promising start-ups and helping them is one of the most critical 
functions of an incubator, then the screening criteria become very important to ensure that any 
ineligible applicants have not been selected in a place of a promising and needy applicant. For 
this reason, screening criteria have received considerable attention in the literature. 
Procedures of admission to the Jeddah incubator was generally very close to the procedures 
adopted in many other incubators and following the methods which were developed by 
Lumpkin and Ireland 1988 and methods advocated by the US Department of Commerce. 
(Merrifield, 1987) gave description of the two methodologies. However, some differences and 
similarities were observed between these methods and the methods used in (JCCBI). The 
main difference between the American and (lCCBI) Incubator policy seems to be the focus 
on financial criteria in the US versus the more 'soft' criteria as the management team and 
market fit in Jeddah. 
There are no universal selection criteria for tenants, and one study (Lumpkin and 
Ireland, 1988) found that the goals of the sponsor were the predominant factor in selecting 
candidates firms. The Allen and McClusky (1990) findings were similar. For example, 
corporate "seed capital" incubators admitted new ventures with high growth potential and 
high cash harvest potential; property development incubators admitted tenants mostly for their 
ability to pay rent. 
While an important aspect of tenant entry is admission criteria, it is not the only aspect. 
One must first have entrepreneurs and thus potential tenant companies willing to enter a 
business incubator before admission criteria can be applied. It should be noted the lengthy 
procedure (as described by some of the tenants) followed in (JCCBI) may result in low numbers 
of potential tenants. One such example of this is in Argentina where they have a low number of 
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potential tenant companies available for entrance into a business incubator. The result of this 
problem is that the mission statement and admission criteria of the Argentinean business 
incubators are kept vague. This is done so that possible tenant companies are not excluded from 
entrance into the business incubator (Hoeser, 2002). Admission objectivity could also be a 
problem. In Nigeria and the Philippines, those who have political connections have a much 
better chance of getting into a business incubator. "In some instances genuine entrepreneurs are 
denied admission in favor of political appointees and top government functionaries" (Adegbite, 
2001). This means that regardless of how big an impact your product could have, you need the 
right connections to be admitted into a business incubator. This can ultimately lead to 
discouraging others to attempt entrance into business incubator and no tenant companies 
wanting to enter the business incubator. Both of these can lead to the ultimate failure of a 
business incubator. In general a balance must be observed in evaluating the candidates and 
selections must be restricted to those who have a high probability of achieving commercial 
success, making sure not to screen out any promising applicants. The criteria in use in JCCB) 
needs further revisions to lift some of the restricting criteria that may risk the rejection of 
potentially successful candidates. 
H) Tenancy and Graduation Criteria 
The process by which tenants exit an incubator can also bring forth problems. Like the 
previously mentioned issue of tenant entry, this is also a problem for Nigeria where tenant 
companies have been known to stay up to twenty years within a business incubator. One 
reason for this appears to be the reduced rent rates. Another reason brought forth by the tenant 
companies is because, they say, the government has yet to provide a suitable alternative 
location (Adegbite, 2001). When tenant companies do not exit business incubators in a timely 
fashion, usually set forth by the individual business incubator, it has a profound effect on the 
business incubator. The biggest consequence is that it stops the flow of new tenant companies 
coming into the business incubator. If there is no room within, new tenant companies can not 
enter, because the business incubator can not support them. 
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There are also important sectoral factors that influence exit rules. In the case of 
biotechnology incubators, for example, tenants will require lengthier incubator stays than 3-5 
years. Pharmaceutical companies in incubation may require 10-12 years incubation. 
A further factor is the extent to which rental charges are adjusted to become more 
expensive the longer a company remains in an incubator. The practice of increasing rental 
charges to above market rates is quite frequently used as an altemative to fixed - term 
tenancies to encourage firms to graduate. In this regard, rents, which are subsidised by the 
Chambers of Commerce, are staggered according to the duration of tenancy (as shown in 
Table 6.5 below). Thus, in the first six months, monthly rent is set at 600 Saudi Riyals (SR), 
approximately £85 GBP. In the next six months, it rises to 700 SR (approximately £99 GBP) 
per month and after one year of incubation it is set at 1000 SR (approximately £ 141 GBP). 
Table 6.5: JCCBI rent structure 
Length of tenancy Monthly rent cosf9 
0-6 months 600 SR (approx. £85) 
6-12 months 700 SR (approx. £99) 
12 - 24 months 1000 SR (approx £ 141) 
The residency period in new economy incubators is considerably shorter. In the early 
days, some of them stated that they could tum an idea into a fully operational business in 6 
months or less. Of course, in the case of a dot.com the actual business was usually nothing 
more than a website, 
The maximum tenancy in JCCBI is 2 years and the average length of tenancies is only 
one year. There is no 'minimum' graduation criterion - although as part of quarterly reporting 
and appraisal sessions with incubator staff, tenants are given a timetable of objectives which 
includes prospective graduation dates. It is also a priority of the incubator to make sure that 
firms are 'properly prepared' for graduation, particularly in terms of their revenue streams 
and, of course, their move to new accommodation. As Dr Sultan explained, many firms have 
69 Rents are calculated in GSP according to June 2007 exchange rate of 1 GSP = 6 SR. 
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'stayed for just 6 months and left because they have succeeded; the incubator became too 
small for them.' Since its opening in June 2005, all companies that have left the incubator are 
still in business. The longer tenancy period may partly be a reflection of differences in 
business cycle times. It may equally reflect a more protective stance by incubator 
management vis-a.-vis their incubator offspring, preferring to nurture firms until they have 
reached a later stage of maturity . 
The JCCBI did not state clear criteria for graduation; however, it specified the 
maximum tenancy to be two years. Usually businesses remain in the incubator until they 
achieve a certain size (Garrity, 2002) In this case study the results demonstrated that most of 
the firms (12) were graduated within the first year. This is similar to the graduation time in 
private incubators where start up usually graduates in one year (Rosenwein, 2002: Rothaermel 
and Thursby, 2005). 
As of July 2007 (two years, one month after the opening of the incubator), the 
majority of businesses (58.3%) have been in the incubator for less than six months. 
Moreover, only two businesses have stayed for more than one year. That seven of the 12 
firms graduated in only six months, may indicate a good performance and higher 
effectiveness of this incubator (table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Length of tenancy in JCCBI 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0·6 months 7 58.3 85.7 
6·12 months 5 35.7 85.7 
12·18 months I 7.1 92.8 
18-24 months I 7.1 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
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J) Facilities 
Start-up firms have a need for certain services but are often too small to justify the cost 
of providing these services in-house. Access to those services through the incubator means 
that entrepreneurs can focus their attention and capital on the critical task of getting their 
product or service to the market, while still presenting a professional image to their business 
contacts and customers. 
It is important to note that the first two dimensions of a business incubator, shared 
services and small spaces, have been available in the marketplace for many years via serviced 
offices and so called nursery factories, to name two of the more common options. A business 
incubator must include a number of additional dimensions to distinguish itself from such real 
estate ventures. These additional dimensions relate to how incubators facilitate management 
development and growth in their clients (Allen and Weinberg, 1988). 
In Jeddah incubator, each tenant is provided with a phone and high-speed internet 
connection. Printing and fax facilities are available and shared by all tenants. All tenants have 
access to conference and meeting rooms. A front desk is manned by a secretary, who also 
answers incoming phone calls on behalf of the tenants. This range of facilities and assistance 
is expected to cut their overhead costs at this critical stage (Garrity, 2002). This contrasts 
favourably to the Riyadh-based SMEs, 11.2% of whom had high-speed internet access and 
only 26.9% had secretarial support. 
However, only ten (71.4%) of tenanted businesses (table 6.7) had created company 
websites. Although this is a significant improvement on the Riyadh-based SMEs, (of whom, 
only 18.5% had websites), it was hypothesised in this chapter that almost all incubated 
businesses would have their own website. However, it was revealed that all four tenants 
without websites were also the newest members of the incubator and none had spent more 
than 3 months in the institution. 
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Table 6.7: Tenants with websites in JCCBI 
Frequency Valid Percelll i I Cumulatil'e Percent 
i 
Valid Yes 10 71.4 71.4 
No 4 28.6 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
As R3, manager of a marketing company put it, 'there's no point having the website yet 
because we're not really open for business, we will build the website when we have the 
products.' The Director of (JCCBI) revealed that 'obviously we strongly advise entrepreneurs 
to create an internet presence and of course we are able to help them create this, if they should 
need our help. But in truth, it is not an immediate priority for businesses - they need to get 
their finances and business planning in order before they start thinking about websites.' 
J) Funding 
Availability of capital, as well as the structure of financial markets is a key determinant 
of growth of fledgling ventures (Bhide, 2000). Lack of financing for new ventures will thwart 
the creation of dynamic local economies built around a robust SME sector. Access to 
financing is a crucial factor for innovation (Mytelka and Farinelli, 2003). Gaps in financing, 
particularly for early stage ventures, can be a major deterrent to new business creation, often 
leading to a fledgling venture's early demise. 
The JCCBI does not provide funding directly to the tenants. Instead, once an entrepreneur 
has been approved for incubation, incubator staff assist the prospective tenants apply to the 
funding sources. There are three main sources of funding. First, the incubator 'has a strong 
relationship' with private banks and if necessary, the SME Support Unit is able to act as guarantor. 
According to Mr Sultan, it is 'a given' that if entrepreneurs meet the incubator entrance criteria 
they will be eligible for bank loans. The second source of funding is provided by the govemment-
Sponsored Saudi Arabian Centenary Fund which provides very-low interest business loans. 
Entrepreneurs are eligible for the Centenary Fund loan if they are (a) Saudi, (b) 18-35 years old, 
(c) working for their business full-time and (d) the business and the entrepreneur are based in the 
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same city (the loans are administrated regionally). Finally, the Abdulatif Jamee\ Fund provides 
similar very-low interest loans to Saudi businesses. Eligibility is based upon: (a) Saudi 
nationality (b) the exclusive employment of Saudi nationals (c) entrepreneur's age between 
20-40 years (d) full-time commitment to the business (e) business is based in same city as 
entrepreneur (t) submission of a feasibility study and (g) application is backed by a guarantor. 
The business incubator is able to be especially useful in the provision of the last two criteria. 
No tenants had obtained funding from their family, the Saudi credit bank. venture 
capitalists/private investors or parent companies. The only four sources of funding said to 
have had any impact on start-up funding were: the manger's own funds, private bank 
loans, the Saudi centenary fund and the Abdulatif Jameel fund. Of these four sources, the 
Centenary Fund was the most cited source of start-up funding and rated as having the 
highest impact (tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.10). 
As Table 6.8 shows, the manager's own funds had, relatively, the lowest impact on 
start-up funding. However, only two businesses entered the incubator with no funds at all (i.e. 
they relied entirely upon loans). 
Table 6.8: Impact of manager's own funds on start-up funding 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
High Impact 6 42.9 42.9 
Medium impact 3 21.4 64.3 
Low impact 3 21.4 85.8 
No impact 2 14.2 ]00.0 
Total 12 100.0 
Table 6.9 showed that the impact of private bank loans was rated highly by 50 % of 
the respondents. The bank loans are, ordinarily, set at special new business rates but were 
less preferred than the Centenary Fund and the Abdulatif Jameel Fund. (As R2) 
explained: 'bank loans have a higher rate of interest than the government funds, but the 
good thing is that they take much less time to approve. You can walk into a bank and in 
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the next day they have approved your loan. I think you need a bank loan first before you 
move to the government.' 
Table 6.9: Impact of Private Bank Loan on start-up funding 
Frequency Valid Percent 
I 
Cumulative Percent 
High Impact 7 50.0 50.0 
Medium impact 4 28.6 78.6 
Low impact 0 0.0 78.6 
No impact 3 21.4 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Every tenant who had applied to the Centenary Fund for a low-interest start-up 
loan had received the loan (tabel 6.10). As stated above incubator staff spend a 
significant amount of time ensuring that applications are properly prepared. Moreover, 
as the director explained: 'being inside the incubator is very helpful for loan approvals, 
we are able to act as guarantors and referees and of course, the people who approve the 
loans see that the businesses are in the incubator and have been through our vetting 
procedures. I would be very surprised if we ever had a tenant who was not approved for 
this loan.' 
Table 6.10: Impact of Centenary Fund Loan on start-up financing 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
High Impact 11 78.6 78.6 
Medium impact 3 21.4 100.0 
Low impact 0 0.0 100.0 
No impact 0 0.0 
Total 14 100.0 
To evaluate the ease of access to financial support several indices related to the speed, 
and simplicity of the procedures were tested. 
The speed of the Centenary Loan was rated highly by tenants, the majority (78.5%) 
cumulatively rated it as 'fast' or 'very fast' (table 6.11). The director stated that 'I don't think 
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that being in the incubator speeds up the application process, but it does mean that our tenants 
fill out the application forms correctly so there are no delays having to re-send parts of the 
application etc.' 
Table 6.11: Speed of Centenary Fund Loan Receipt (from time of application) 
Frequency Percent Cumlliative Percent 
Very fast 5 35.7 35.7 
Fast 6 42.8 78.5 
Neither fast nor slow 3 21.4 100.0 
slow 0 0.0 100.0 
Very Slow 0 0.0 100.0 
Don't know 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
As Table 6.12 shows, the OpInIOnS on the 'simplicity' of the Centenary Loan 
application process were more mixed. Although the majority of tenants (57.1 %) cumulatively 
regarded it as very simple or simple, three tenants (21.4%) regarded it as 'difficult.' 
Respondent 7, who described it as difficult said that 'the application form is about twenty 
pages long, you need references, certificates, CV s, you also have to present yourself for 
interview where you give a presentation, it took me a long time to put it together.' The 
director agreed that 'the Centenary Fund is not an easy application process, they get a lot of 
applicants and they need lots of documentation to make sure there are not any fraudulent 
claims. But the important thing is that here at the incubator we help the tenants put together 
their application to make sure there's no discrepancies. Also, the paperwork is made easier 
because we ask for almost exactly the same things when they join us here, so they're 
repeating the same process for much of it.' 
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Table 6.12: Simplicity of Centenary Fund Loan application process 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very simple 3 21.4 21.4 
Simple 5 35.7 57.1 
Neither simple nor difficult 3 21.4 78.4 
Difficult 3 21.4 100.0 
Very difficult 0 0.0 100.0 
Don't know 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Of the current tenants, only two had not received a loan from the Abdulatif Jameel 
Fund Development loan (table 6.13). However, these two tenants claimed that they had 
not yet submitted an application, but fully intended doing so or were in the process of 
doing so. The Abdulatif Fund is for business 'development' and therefore plays a 
different role to the Centenary Fund, it is designed for new businesses looking to expand. 
In other words, the business has to be in operation, and demonstrate proof of being so, 
before it is eligible for the loan. 
Table 6.13: Impact of Abdulatif Jameel Fund Development Loan on start-up financing 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
High Impact 7 50.0 50.0 
Medium impact 5 35.7 85.7 
Low impact 0 0.0 85.7 
No impact 2 14.3 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
The speed of the Abdulatif Jameel Loan (after submission of application) was rated as 
higher than that of the Centenary Loan. Of the twelve tenants who had applied, all rated it as 
either 'very fast' or 'fast (table 6.14). 
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Table 6.14: Speed of Abdulatif Jameel Fund Development Loan Receip 
Frequency Percent Cumlliatil'e Percent 
Very fast 4 28.5 
I 
28.6 
, 
I 
Fast 8 57.1 ! 85.7 
Neither fast nor slow 0 0.0 : 85.7 
Quite slow 0 0.0 i i 85.7 
i 
Slow 0 0.0 85.7 
Don't know 2 14.3 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
However, the Abdulatif Jameel Loan was rated as a more difficult application process 
than the Centenary Loan (table 6.15). Six tenants (42.8%). The one tenant who rated it as 
'very difficult' was the tenant currently in the process of putting together his application (R3). 
The application process involves two interviews and the submission of company accounts. 
The director explained that: 'it's is a very stringent application process and to be honest, I 
think businesses would really struggle without outside help, especially as they're new 
businesses. ' 
Table 6.15: Simplicity of Abdulatif Jameel Fund Development Loan application process 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very simple I 7.1 7.1 
Quite simple 3 21.4 28.5 
Neither simple nor difficult 2 14.3 42.8 
Quite difficult 6 42.8 85.6 
Very difficult I 7.1 92.8 
Don't know 1 7.1 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
As Table 6.16 shows, tenants ubiquitously regarded the incubator's role in helping to 
secure funding as 'very important'. Probed further on this topic, R9 revealed: 'the excellent 
thing about the incubator is that it guarantees funding. Banks know that if we are working 
here, it is safe to lend us money, especially as the incubator guarantees it.' Respondent 10 said 
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that 'I think I would have struggled with the application forms for the Jameel Fund without 
their help, they show you how to answer the questions in the way that will get an approval.' 
Table 6.16: Opinion of Incubator role in helping firms to secure funding 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Important 14 100.0 100.0 
Important 0 0.0 100.0 
Neither Important nor 0 0.0 100.0 
unimportant 
Unimportant 0 0.0 100.0 
Very unimportant 0 0.0 100.0 
I 
Total 14 100.0 I I 
K) Training and technical assistance 
Each new tenant undertakes a compulsory one-week course entitled 'How to start your 
small business'. The course is taught inside the SME support centre, Jeddah Chambers of 
Commerce. The course contains the following modules: 
• Investment opportunities (evaluating and selecting them) 
• An introduction to business management 
• Marketing and marketing research 
• Technical study of the project 
• An introduction to financial management 
• A financial study of the project 
• How to produce a feasibility study 
• An introduction to accounting 
• An introduction to sales 
• Brief of the government's regulations, business incubators franchising 
No further 'fonnal' training is provided, however tailored advice is constantly available 
from support staff and the general manager. Tenants rated the training they had received in 
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the incubator highly. Ten tenants (71.4%) rated the training role of the incubator as 'very 
irnportant.'(table 6.17) 
Table 6.17: Opinion ofincubator training role 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percell1 
Very Important 10 71.4 71.4 
Important 4 28.6 
1
100
.
0 
Neither important nor unimportant 0 00.0 100.0 
Unimportant 0 00.0 100.0 
Very unimportant 0 00.0 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
According to the General Manager (JCCS]), 'much more important than formal 
training is the mentoring we give to businesses.' When probed on what 'mentoring' involved 
in the Jeddah Incubator, he described it as 'mainly encouragement, when it is needed, advice, 
obviously when [the tenants] are in need of it, helping [tenants] with anything they need. I 
think we're a bit of safety net, it's the small things as much as the big things, we can reassure 
them they are not making a mistake, and if they are making a mistake we can correct them 
and help them to do things properly.' The views of the manager were reflected in the survey 
of tenants. All tenants rated the incubator's 'mentoring role' as 'very important.' 
As requirements of the application procedure, and the follow-up assistance provided 
upon admission to the incubator, every tenant had compiled a comprehensive feasibility study 
and business plan (in comparison to the 17.7% of Riyadh-based SMEs who had written a full 
business-plan). Ten tenants (71.4%) had written marketing plans (again, in marked contrast to 
the 1.5% of Riyadh-based SMEs.) Again, of the four tenants who had not written marketing 
plans, each had spent less than six months in the incubator. Tenants unanimously regarded 
the incubators' role in assisting with business planning as 'very important. ' 
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I) Networking and Business Links 
Networking is a key to success that a business incubator needs as early as possible. 
There are multiple areas where networking is important. One such area is funding. Funding is 
especially important because if one does not know the right people, the chance of finding 
investors is decreased. 
A database should also be kept of potential donors. This not only helps the business 
incubator for funding during start-up phases, but also can help match up tenant companies 
with potential donors. One group of business incubators that has done this type of networking 
well is the Helsinki, Finland business incubators. The Helsinki business incubators keep a 
database that makes experts and donors easily identified and able to be contacted (Abetti, 
2004). 
Networking, in the form of seminars and workshops for the incubators community, is 
another important activity that should be done by business incubators. These seminars and 
workshops allow for new ideas to be discussed in a "safe" setting. As a result, it can 
potentially bring in new entrepreneurs, and thus possibly new tenant companies. The reason a 
"safe" setting is important is because especially in communities where taking risks is seen in a 
negative light, personal interaction with those involved in the business incubator community 
can change people's minds. Going along with this idea, public workshops and seminars also 
play a role in garnering more acceptance of a business incubator within its respective 
community. 
According to Mr. Sultan, the incubator has developed 'good connections' with large 
companies based in Jeddah. The Chambers of Commerce has been active in promoting the 
incubator to local businesses. One of the key tasks performed by incubator staff is to 
introduce incubator tenants to other businesses. These businesses may be able to offer advice 
to tenants, they may also constitute potential suppliers, buyers or collaborators. Several 
tenants had secured sales through the networking efforts of incubator staff who had 
recommended them, and made introductions to, potential clients. As the manager put i~ 
'sometimes the staff become like marketing and salespeople for the tenants, of course we 
293 
expect the tenants to do things for themselves, but we can help them by making introductions. 
It gives them credibility which they might not have if they had approached firms on their own 
in this stage of their development. So far, we have been very successful in finding potential 
clients for our tenants.' 
The incubator has also held two 'networking events' where receptions have been held 
for local businesses to meet the tenants. Asked about their relationship with local businesses 
tenants were broadly enthusiastic, R13 (IT training company) said that 'I made some really 
good contacts, potentially clients, at the last event, I think the businesses here want us to 
succeed, so they are trying to help and want to give us business.' However, to date, no sales 
have come directly as a result of the receptions. 
According to table 6.18, the majority (78.6%) regarded the incubator's role in creating 
business contacts as 'very important.' As shown in the literature, apart from providing basic 
services and resources to the start-up venture, the incubator plays a critical networking role 
(Smilor and Gil, 1986). 
Organized networking was identified as a significant differentiating factor that 
distinguished incubators from other structures that merely provided office space and basic 
services (Hansen, et aI., 2000a). The government and local Universities involvement with the 
incubator is limited, however there is increasing recognition to expand this involvement. 
Table 6.18: Role of incubator in creating business contacts 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Important 11 78.6 78.6 
Quite Important 3 21.4 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
As stated above, there are no 'direct links' to the Saudi government, the incubator is an 
autonomous project managed entirely by the Chambers of Commerce. Instead, the incubator 
director and manager are regularly consulted by government policy-makers who have, 
understandably, shown a keen interest in the project. The manager explained, various 
294 
Ministry of Trade representatives have visited the incubator on "fact finding' missions on 
several occasions in the past two years. 
At present there is no link with any of the Saudi universities. However, the director 
claims that discussions are underway to build such links with the potential of opening a 
second incubator at King Abdulaziz University (Jeddah) which would be a joint project 
between the university and Jeddah Chambers of Commerce. 
M) Business Collaboration 
Two of the incubator's tenants had collaborated with other businesses, based outside of 
the incubator. None of the incubator tenants had collaborated with other tenants, in any 
formal capacity. (R 13), the IT training company, had worked with a software firm to develop 
a 'tailor-made' online training programme for a government department. The intellectual 
property of the programme was purchased by the government and the firms were paid 
separately. (R 9), an education consultancy, had worked alongside a travel bureau to create a 
travel-study package for Saudi students studying abroad. 
These results indicate a low level of collaboration and reflect the inability of the 
incubator in resolving this difficulty. The results showed that Saudi SMEs are not enthusiastic 
about joint ventures with other companies. As mentioned earlier, one of the key assets of an 
incubator is its ability to "fill in" for an entrepreneur's "impoverished network" (this is 
Smilors, 1987 "fourth criteria" for incubation). As Carayannis et al (200) states, networking 
may go as far as joint research and development but certainly most small high-technology 
companies benefit from information sharing. Hoeser (2003) regards the difference between 
the willingness to network in Argentina and Brazil as a critical factor in determining the 
relative success of the two incubator programmes. Thus, an SME's willingness to collaborate 
with other businesses has an effect upon its success within an incubation programme. This 
collaboration, according to the government's policy ought to facilitate the Saudisation as 
SMEs are believed to be excellent vehicles for replacing foreign nationals with native workers 
295 
and reducing the reliance upon foreign-based enterprises for the provision of materials and 
technologies for the giant utilities industries (Otsuki, 2002) 
N) Future Developments 
Asked what the future holds for the Jeddah incubator, the manager stated that 'we 
would like to make a formal link with King Abdulaziz University [Jeddah], I think this 
would be most useful and beneficial for the tenants.' The proposed link would 'allow 
tenants to use some of the university facilities, we would also look to recruit from the 
university.' He also thought that such an agreement could be made 'within 12-18 
months.' He predicted continuing success for the current incubator 'we will soon have 24 
desks available, although we don't necessarily want full capacity, we prefer good 
entrepreneurs to full capacity. In terms of the incubator's weaknesses he replied that: 'I 
wouldn't say we have any major weaknesses but we can improve in the links we have 
with large businesses, 1 think we could look into some form of collaboration or 
sponsorship with one of the larger national or international businesses.' Asked to give his 
overall assessment of the Jeddah incubator the manager stated that 'Overall, we are doing 
well. This is the first incubator in Saudi Arabia and so far, it is successful. We can show 
that it helps SMEs and entrepreneurs to succeed and cuts unemployment. I am sure 
Jeddah will be full of incubators in the future.' To date, the incubator had not had any 
failed businesses, either amongst tenants or amongst graduated businesses. The director 
put it 'We've had no failures until now. Demand is very high. From the Director's point 
of view, it has has been a very successful project.' 
The director was asked how he saw the prospects of business incubation in Saudi 
Arabia. He replied that he anticipated a rapid expansion in Riyadh, Jeddah and the 
Eastern Province. 'I think what we have shown here is that incubation can really help 
Saudi SMEs, we can address a lot of the problems that are holding them back.' However, 
he was skeptical about a government-run incubation programme: 'If incubators are to 
expand they are going to need to move away from the Chambers of Commerce and will 
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require funding from the government or other sources. Nevertheless, the problem will be 
in the management. Mixed management (governmental and private) would not do the job. 
If incubators are to be funded directly by the government there needs to be a special 
department set up for them, one that understands how they work and does not try to use 
them for different purposes. But the most important thing is that the director is 
independent so that there is some continuity, without the government making changes or 
setting different priorities.' 
Recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has adopted a long term economic strategy 
to develop a knowledge-based economy. Currently the Kingdom is in the process of 
launching a giant incubation programme covering all regions of the Kingdom. The 
major universities with collaboration with King Abdullaziz city for science and technology 
(KACST) are seeking to playa full part in this strategy through the development of a 
substantial science parks. Through this project, the major universities aim to satisfy the 
demands of the knowledge-based industries, and to commercialize its research 
outcomes, in addition to enhancing the research environment and encouragmg 
researchers and graduates to participate in the incubation programme and to establish 
spin-off knowledge-based companies. 
The first outcome of this ambitious programme was already materialized in King 
Abdulaziz University. There, already Knowledge and Business Alliance Business Incubator, 
has emerged at King Abdulaziz University, to reflect the pioneer role of the university, in 
creating a new entrepreneur generation, and effectively participating in serving the society 
and national economy. The Jeddah incubator was moved to this incubator and will start to 
operate in the second half of 2009. 
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1- Introduction 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarise and discuss the main findings 
of the thesis in relation to the research questions that guided the study. The chapter also 
includes recommendations, theoretical and practical implications of the research findings, 
research limitations, and suggestion to future research. 
This research aimed first, to seek, through inductive enquiry based on available 
secondary data and the literature, to establish a set of politico-economic conditions under 
which business incubators are likely to be successful. These conditions included, the 
macro economic conditions, micro economic conditions, the political environment, the 
levels of government and non-governmental support, the levels of co-ordination between 
interested agencies, the relationship between business, science and academia and the 
salient cultural context. 
Second, these general properties were deductively applied in a specific environment: 
Saudi Arabia, to explore the SMEs environment in Saudi Arabia, and to find out whether 
business incubation might help meet the needs of the emerging market economy in the Kingdom. 
In addition, the basic characteristic of the early phase of Saudi experience in business 
incubation was investigated. To achieve this task, information on leddah business incubator 
was collected through face to face interviews and questioners. 
The researcher collected (primary) data in order to address these questions - and has 
outlined the likely course and level of success of incubation development in Saudi Arabia. In 
order to address this issue, five main objectives were used to guide the research. The study 
aimed to examine: 
1- The potential of success of incubation in the Kingdom 
2- Education and Business 
3- The SMEs Environment 
4- Knowledge and Expectations for Business Incubation 
5- The Jeddah Incubator 
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To summarise the main findings of the thesis, the results will be presented one after the 
other in relation to each of the objectives. Also, because the study employed a three-staged 
stepwise methodological approach to obtain a fuller and richer understanding of the research 
issues, the findings will be discussed according to the three stage process, (starting with the 
results from the focus group, then those from the follow-up surveys, and finally, those from 
the case study. 
7.2- Potential for Success of Incubation in the Kingdom (Focus Group) 
7.2.1 Summary of main findings: 
The major outcome from discussion with the focus group turned the attention to the 
major challenges facing the SMEs in the Kingdom and the opportunities for future progress. It 
can be concluded from this discussion that despite their strategic and economic importance, 
the state of SME's in Saudi Arabia leaves much to be done. Radwan and AI-Kibbi (2002) also 
note that the SME sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains underdeveloped. SMEs 
lack the primary tools that enable them to grow and develop. They lack funds and credit 
options, they operate in an unfriendly business environment, they are handicapped by extreme 
regulation, and they function without the availability of basic statistics and data needed to 
ensure sound business decisions. Indeed, Otsuki (2002) identified seven reasons as to why 
SMEs in Saudi Arabia are underperforming, namely: lack of funds, lack of skilled human 
resource, lack of management skills, lack of marketing penetration, lack of modern 
technology, lack of information and cost problems. 
The discussion has shown that a joint, national effort towards a new SME support 
strategy is possible and that it can lay a concrete ground for a giant jump in the role and 
potential of the SME sector. As argued by Boubshait (1999), there is wide support amongst 
Participants that the process of business incubation and the development of facility-based 
business incubators can serve as a vehicle which can bring all these functions together. 
In Saudi Arabia, at the macro-level, new business creation is facilitated by a stable 
macro environment, and low rates of inflation and interest. With vigorous privatisation 
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process and economlC stability, it is expected that all the needed conditions, such as 
technology development and economic diversification (Saudi Ministry of Finance, 2002), for 
establishing business incubation and hence SME development are currently present. The 
consensus, reached by participants is that, the introduction of business incubators programmes 
could serve as a viable tool for providing support for SMEs. Prior studies (e.g. Boubeshait, 
1999; Radwan and AI-Kibbi, 2002; Radwan, 2005) also note that incubator programmes are 
influential to the development of SMEs. 
7.2.2 Conclusion: 
The successful development and operation of Saudi Arabia national business incubator 
programme requires an intensification of the policy reforms already underway. The main 
problems that could face business incubators as cited by participants are: 
• Lack of clearly defined funding policies and modalities. 
• Absence of coordination and cooperation between public and private sector for 
putting a long term planning to launch a viable incubation processes 
• Legislation and regulation 
• The absence of a proper legal framework to promote not-for-profit business 
incubators. 
• Lack of a well established government and Universities R&D centres 
7.3-Education and Business 
7.3.1 Summary of main findings: 
Concerning graduate skills and training, the main findings of the research indicated 
that, very few students (9.2%) had undertaken paid work experience. However, one need to 
be cautious as this may be a reflection of current economic conditions rather than student 
attitudes toward work (Oxford Business Group, 2007). The results also, revealed that 
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student's business planning skills were poor, with just over half (52.6%) had any experience 
of writing a business plan as part of their studies. Such findings reveal that universities need 
to revise their curriculum in order to develop students' management skills and encourage 
creativity as put forward by Bailey (1995). However, most academics (78.9%) believed that 
students possess the adequate skills and knowledge necessary to start a successful business. 
The positive belief expressed by most of the academics about the skills of students should be 
taken with cautious because it does not reflect a measured criterion and it is more subjective, 
especially the more objective question about the number of students who actually wrote a 
business plan showed deficiency in this skill. 
A second key condition for a successful business incubator is related to vocational 
training, an activity that this research demonstrated to be low amongst business students in 
Saudi Arabia. In general, the results indicated that students share many of the problems the 
general population experience in small business development, such as the lack of business 
and management skills, abilities and inadequate vocational training. In fact, Cordesman 
(2003) and Looney (2004b) argue that in order to compete, the technical knowledge and skills 
of Saudi students must be raised to international standards. 
When testing the entrepreneurial attitudes, the data demonstrated low numbers of 
students (4.6%) expected to work in the public sector. Students' expectations are in line with 
Saudi seventh and eighth development plans. In addition, findings showed that the 
overwhelming majority of students (79.7%) demonstrated a high level of enthusiasm to start 
their own businesses in the next five years. Such results confirm the entrepeneural nature of 
young graduates (McLarty, 2005). 
When testing the graduates employment prospects, the finding demonstrated that, a 
potential surplus of unemployed graduates exists where less than half of final year students 
(49.7%) had received job offers at the time of enquiry. Looking at this finding in light of the 
previous result regarding the high level of enthusiasm of students to start their own businesses 
in the next five years, one can conclude that there is a positive environment for incubation. 
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However, it should be noted that universities produce a number of graduates whose chances 
of contribution to business development are limited (e.g. Islamic studies, etc.). 
The findings related to university and business links revealed that the majority of 
students (53.6%) had undertaken commercial internships as part of their degree programme. 
Indeed, internships act as useful linkage between businesses and universities (Bates, 1996). 
Regarding commercialisation of university research the results demonstrated that a high 
proportion of academics (84.2%) had undertaken commercial research. The 
commercialization of university research is seen as a key driver of national competitiveness 
(Henderson et aI., 1998; Mowery et aI., 2002). Not surpring, the most popular area of research 
was Information Technology (47.4%). A significant proportion of academics (31.6%) have 
conducted research on SME development. Furthermore, a significant proportion of academics 
(36.8%) regarded the relationship between local business and their university as 'quite poor'. 
This represents a major impediment to the success of incubator (Boubshait, 1999). The 
relationship between the university and business was deemed unsatisfactory by the majority 
(68.4%) of academics. In general, the surveys showed mixed results in terms of suitability of 
business-academia relationships for business incubation. 
7.3.2 Conclusion and recommendations: 
Based on the results of this research, it can be concluded with some confidence that the 
educational quality of students needs further strengthening. Business and technology students, 
described within this work as the most suitable for business incubation, lack needed skills. 
While students' vocational skills are of particular importance, yet in Saudi Arabia this is one 
of the weakest I inks of business-education cooperation; with less than 10% students taking up 
paid jobs and just over 500/0 taking part in commercial internships. 
By assuming that there is a positive correlation between the entrepreneurial attitudes 
and the desire of students to start their own business, it can also be concluded that young 
Saudis are potentially prepared to start their own enterprise. This could reflect a positive 
environment for entrepreneurship in the kingdom. Good and well-developed infrastructure in 
302 
addition to higher income amongst Saudis could explain this tendency of students for self 
employment. 
It is recommended that establishing a national Graduate Enterprise Programme 
sponsored by the government and targeting final-year undergraduate students of any 
discipline for a range of training workshops and placement opportunities within local 
businesses could work as an effective tool to achieve this linkage. A programme like this 
could allow students to learn more about the realities of small business and to explore their 
own potential for self-employment. 
Furthermore, Introduction of programmes for training graduates in entrepreneurship is 
expected to widen their ability to initiate their own business. The best practice in training 
young graduates in entrepreneurship and business management means training should be 
designed around researched and known needs. They should also be interactive - allowing 
students to question, discuss and work with the information provided. 
Effective training programmes promote practical learning by allowing students to learn 
by doing, building their knowledge through experience, and building upon participants' 
knowledge base - moving from the known to the unknown. Programmes should be flexible in 
structure, timing and materials used so that they respond to the needs and capabilities of the 
trainees. Training should be linked to the broader community - its resources, networks, 
markets and social structure. An integrated approach will make each component relevant to 
the complete process of managing a business. For example, training should be relevant to the 
needs and interests of trainees and focused on improving skills and competencies rather than 
providing certificates. Finally, good training should be arranged in sections or small "bites" 
and should encourage ownership of learning by ensuring participants remain active in the 
programme. It should be practical, providing know-how rather than theoretical content. 
Training institutions should be encouraged to help young graduates to learn about 
business in a safe and practical way. They should provide an environment for the young to 
plan, develop and operate their own companies under the supervision and management of a 
support agency. This role could be shouldered by incubators effectively; therefore it should be 
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emphasised that introduction of incubation programme in Saudi Arabia would bring tangible 
benefit in this area. 
Regarding the links between universities and industry it can be concluded that those 
links are unsatisfactory and measures should be adapted to encourage stronger links. The 
quality of basic research and its links to industry is a cornerstone for innovation and depends 
on knowledge flows which could be boosted by mechanisms such as joint industry research, 
public/private sector partnerships, technology diffusion, shared infrastructure and movement 
of personnel. There is a need to develop an integrated set of actions for industry, government, 
universities and other research organisations, venture capitalists and the researchers 
themselves. The process of commercial ising research and the culture change, which 
accompanies that, needs to be significantly strengthened. 
Formal and informal links between universities and the business environment were 
shown to be limited. Indeed, the linkages between business (local and national) and 
universities were regarded by the majority of academics as underdeveloped. As discussed in 
the literature, links between universities and incubators are regarded as an important condition 
for incubator success, whether the incubator is based inside or outside of the university. If the 
relationship is poor, two major problems are likely to ensue: (i) incubator clients will be 
disadvantaged in building commercial relationships with the private sector and marketing 
their products/services to private sector clients; and (ii) the products/services produced by 
incubator clients may not be responsive to the needs of commercial sector - driven instead by 
the ''rationale'' of the academic environment. 
Thus, it is recommended that any university-based incubator programme would need to 
build strong links to the business community as a priority. As the way in which knowledge is 
produced undergoes fundamental change, the exploitation of research will need to become an 
integral part of the research process. Participation is unlikely by simply demanding that 
financiers take more risks or academics get involved for the good of society. It is important 
that action is taken to ensure that participation is based on mutual self-interest. 
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Finally, the major conditions required for a successful business incubation discussed 
are: (1) a surplus of qualified work force, (2) initiative and enthusiasm to take up business 
challenges. The latter condition appears to be met in Saudi Arabia; the former, however, 
exists only partially, as the skills of fresh university graduates indicate critical deficiencies as 
discusses above. If the general goal of tackling unemployment (which is sizable among 
university graduates - over 30%) is to be achieved, decisive and rapid steps must be taken. 
This presents a potential for successful business incubation in Saudi Arabia. 
7.4 The SMEs Environment 
7.4.1 Summary of main findings: 
With regard to the Saudi SMEs properties, the mam findings of the research 
demonstrated that the majority (84.2%) of SMEs were less than 5 years old, reflecting 
Otsaki's (2002) assertions that there is a high rate of failures amog SMEs in Saudia Araba. 
Also, the majority of SMEs (89.2%) were involved in manufacturing, vis-a-vis technology 
(10.8%). In line with Boubshait (1999), the two most common types of SMEs ownership 
structure were owner-managed (56.5%) and family-owned (31.9%). The mean total number 
of employees was 9.66; the mean number of Saudi employees was 7.1 and the mean number 
of non-Saudis was 2.53. The research also showed that, sales were mostly distributed locally 
(50.89%) with 25.86% at the regional levi, 8.08% nationally, and only 4.89% internationally. 
Such results echoed Otsuki (2002) concerns in terms of the lack of market penetration that 
negatively affect SMEs performance. 
As for SMEs facilities, business planning and funding, the main findings of the research 
demonstrated that all SMEs had access to telephone and fax and some had secretarial support 
(26.9%). However, ADSL internet provision was extremely limited (11.2%) and only few 
SMEs (18.5%) had their own websites. A plausible explanation would be the lack of attention 
to technology as noted by Al-Kurdi (2002). On the other hand the research demonstrated that 
few SMEs had prepared business plans (17.7%) or marketing plans (1.5%) before starting 
their businesses. Regarding the funding of SMEs, the findings revealed that Private bank 
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loans made the highest impact (68.5%) upon SME start-up funding, followed by government 
grants (49.2%), family funds (37.7%), owner's own funds (37.5%) and government loans 
(35%). Within the last two years, the majority of SMEs have applied for a government grant 
(56.2%); approximately half of all such applicants had received a government grant. Fewer 
SMEs applied for a government loan in the same time period (30.8%), however the loan 
approval rate was much higher. When testing the support to SMEs, the results revealed that 
the majority of SMEs (67.8%) rated highly the government's overall responsiveness to their 
needs. The majority of SMEs (62.7%) also claimed to have enough information about SME 
support programmes. However, only a minority of SMEs (17.7%) had visited their local 
Chambers of Commerce. The results also showed that SME attitudes towards collaborating 
with other businesses and organisations were mixed. Attitudes towards R&D collaboration 
with other businesses were more enthusiastic (50.4%) than attitudes towards R&D 
collaboration with universities (35.7%). Such mixed results about collaboration are against 
findings in the literature (for example, Carayannis et aI., 2000). 
7.4.1 Conclusion and recommendations: 
In general this research confirmed that business facilities of Saudi SMEs were generally 
lacking in secretarial support, high-speed internet usage, and website construction - all 
regarded as critical business facilities which would ordinarily be provided by an incubator. It 
is especially relevant that in light of fierce international competition the businesses in Saudi 
Arabia must seek modern e-commerce channels on the Internet. The study of the Jeddah 
incubator showed that all participants have or will have in the near future set up web pages. 
Thus, incubation could clearly add tangible value in terms of 'hard' provisions to Saudi 
SMEs. 
Saudi SMEs were found to be deficient in business networking and had minimal 
experience in collaborating with other businesses and no experience in collaborations with 
universities or other outside institutions. A key function of business incubation is to "fill in" 
the "impoverished networks" of entrepreneurs - thus incubators would also have the potential 
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to provide qualitative improvements to Saudi SMEs. It cannot be omitted that in order to 
meet the goal of increased competitiveness and modernisation of business in Saudi Arabia. 
international contacts must also be established and maintained. This is partly being introduced 
by the Saudi Ministry of Planning in the form of cooperation with countries successful in their 
business incubation programmes such as Italy or South Korea, to adapt their methods. 
Business incubation could certainly use this opportunity to help the businesses grow 
internationally, in addition to the national expansion. 
In terms of funding, several problems were highlighted. Both government grants and 
loans were rated as poor in terms of the length of time they took to apply for and in the length 
of time it took the government to process and award them. The complexity of the application 
process was also criticised by past-applicants. The findings from the Jeddah incubator show 
that at least the application process should be made significantly easier within an incubator. 
Moreover, the incubator achieved an approval rate of 100% in securing government grants, 
government loans and bank loans. This finding reflects on the importance of meticulous 
application process that selects the best projects, with high potential of success. A properly 
constructed application process should take account of the criteria employed by the financial 
institution available to SMEs which further increases the chances oftheir survival. 
To conclude, the SME survey has shown that market exists for incubators in Saudi Arabia, 
and that incubators could provide tangible benefits to entrepreneurs in terms of (1) business 
planning, (2) basic 'hard' facilities, (3) improved networking and (4) funding assistance. 
7.5- Knowledge and Expectations for Business Incubation 
7.5.1 Summary of main findings: 
The main findings of the research about knowledge and expectations of business 
incubation in Saudi Arabia showed that the majority of students (73.9%), academics (73.70/0) 
and SMEs (59.2%) claimed to know what a business incubator is. However, because business 
incubation remains a young industry (OEeD, 1999), when this knowledge was tested, the 
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mean correct response rate was much lower - the lowest percentage of correct answers 
coming from students (32%), followed by SMEs (50.6%) followed by academics (67%). 
With regard to the attitudes towards incubators it was found that if they were to start a 
new business, a majority of SMEs (58.8%) would apply to an incubator if the option \\as 
available to them. In addition, student's enthusiasm in business activity would be enhanced in 
the event of the availability of an incubator. Also, in line Shalaby (2004), findings suggest 
that academics interest to participate in a university-based incubator was high (84.3%). 
Students and SMEs identified cost-savings and the provision of start-up finance as the main 
benefits provided by business incubators. 
Regarding expectations for business incubation, the findings revealed that all academics 
surveyed expected to be involved in business incubation within the next 10 years. Moreover, 
all academics believed that a university-based incubator should be both publicly and privately 
funded. In addition, the majority of academics (68.4%) believed that a university-based 
incubator should be exclusively focused upon technology and also believed that the university 
should hold 50% of equity in incubated businesses. 
Attitudes towards business incubation are predictably positive. Over half of surveyed 
SMEs claimed they would apply to a business incubator if they were to start another business. 
Students overwhelmingly believe that the availability of business incubation would encourage 
their involvement in private enterprise. The greatest appeal of incubators - as identified by 
students and SMEs alike - was deemed their potential to reduce cost and assist in start-up 
finance. Access to finance and the ability to reduce cost are the two most sought offered 
services among incubatees (Albert, 1986; AI-Kurdi, 2002). Fund shortages are one of the 
reasons much Saudi business faces the problem of limited availability of information and data 
on the production technology and know how - one of the major shortfalls of Saudi businesses 
according to Otsuki (2002). The example of the Jeddah incubator shows that these problems are 
effectively tackled once the business is in the incubator. 
Expectations for a university-based incubator, as set out by business academics, were 
broadly in line with those proposed for the prospective KFPUM-linked Eastern Province 
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incubator. More significantly, academics demonstrated a willingness to participate In 
university-based incubator programme. There were also expectations amongst all academics 
that they would, at some point, become involved in an incubation programme. 
7.5.2 Conclusion and recommendations: 
Even amongst potential 'interested parties' (i.e. business students, academics and SMEs) 
current knowledge and understanding of business incubation was found to be low. This is not, 
however, surprising given that only one business incubator currently operates in the Kingdom. 
What seems evident, once again, is that in the event of a national programme of business 
incubation being introduced, its sponsors would need to take steps to pUblicise its benefits and 
existence. As the findings from the SME survey demonstrate, few Saudi SMEs have visited 
their Chambers of Commerce or participated in any form of local or national governmental 
programmes. Either a way must be found to encourage entrepreneurs to visit Chambers of 
Commerce, or else an alternative means must be provided to reach (and potentially co-ordinate) 
Saudi entrepreneurs. 
7. 6-The Jeddah Incubator (Case Study) 
7.6.1 Summary of main findings: 
Unlike in other countries such as the US where 24% of incubators are government 
sponsored and 8% venture capital (NBIA, 2000), findings of the case study showed that the 
Jeddah incubator is in independent of the government and sponsored by the Jeddah Chamber 
of Commerce. Currently, the ratio of full-time staff to firms is 1:3 (5 staff and 14 firms) which 
of a much better ratio than OECD 2002 recommendations of 1 :20. In addition, only the 
business owner is physically incubated, whilst employees are allowed to use meeting 
facilities. 
The services offered were consistent with Hackett and Dilts (2004) propositions and 
include: high speed internet, secretarial services, desk space, conference facilities, formal 
training, on demand coaching and assistance from staff 'with everything they [incubatees] 
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need', networking events, financial application assistance and low rent is charged for services 
(subsidised by the chambers of commerce). 
The tenants were eight marketing firms, four education consuItancies, and two 
professional training companies. Twenty-nine percent of the tenants claim to introduce an 
entirely new service to the market, 64.3% tenants claim to significantly improve their market 
with their products and most firms (42.9%) had one employee (including manager), only one 
(7.1%) had more than three. The maximum tenancy is two years. There are no 'minimum' 
graduation criteria. However, 58.3% of companies stay in the incubator for less than 6 months 
with the majority (85.7%) no longer than 12 months. Such results support the hypothesis that 
tenancy of incubated firms should be limited (Garrity, 2002) and firms graduate within two 
years in public incubators and within one year from private incubators (Rosenwein, 2002 in 
Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005). 
The Jeddah Incubator does not offer direct funding, but can act as guarantor and 
networking with banks. In fact Smilor (1987) note that credibility (in the form of a 
gurantor) is the main sought offer benefited by incubatees. Staffs help incubatees with the 
financial application process. Incubated businesses are funded by: their manager's own 
funds, private bank loans, Saudi Centenary Fund, and Abdulatif Jameel Fund. Saudi 
Centenary Fund has the most impact on start-up financing (every tenant received a loan, 
majority of tenants (78.5%) considered the process fast and only 21.4% difficult). 85.7% 
tenants rated the impact of Abdulatif Jamee1 Fund as high to medium (85.7% considered 
the process fast and as much as 42.8% as difficult). 
The benefits to incubatees is reflected in that 71.4% companies have set up web 
sites with the rest planning to do so when they have developed their products, two tenants 
have secured sales through the networking efforts of incubator staff. Indeed, Rice (1992) 
notes the importance of networking opportunities as a non-real estate parameters in 
incubator management. Furthermore, all incubated firms claimed the incubator role in 
helping secure financing was very important. (71.4%) of incubated firms claimed the 
incubator training role was very important and 28.6% claimed it was important. All 
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incubated firms claimed the incubator role of mentoring was very important. All 
incubated firms claimed the incubator help in business planning was very important. 
The case study revealed that the leddah incubator was providing a wide range of soft 
inputs to clients, however harder measures were more difficult to establish. It was shown that 
client business skills (IT, ICT, business presentational skills) have improved, as well as 
confidence and business professionalism as a consequence of incubation. Such findings 
reflect the shift in focus from "hard facilities" to "human provisions" in modem incubators 
(Adkins, 2001; Kirby, 2004; Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Clients also demonstrated high levels 
of networking both inside and outside the incubator (the role of 'business networking' was 
rated by 78.9% of clients as 'very important'). Indeed, as highligjhted in previous studies 
(Hanson et aI., 2000), networking remains an important feature of incubator facilities. Since 
2005 the incubator itself has grown in terms of staff numbers (5 full time staff were available 
to 14 businesses), and gained recognition by the enterprise support community (most notably 
private banks' small business units, and the SME support unit at the Chambers of 
Commerce). However ties to universities were only just beginning. Government interest in 
the project was high. Yet, the incubator management was keen to maintain 'independence' 
from local and central government. This keenness on independence is recommended by 
previous research (Shalaby, 2001). An internal evaluation was conducted quarterly by 
incubator staff providing objectives for incubatees. However, unlike Barrow (2001), who 
highlighted the need for adequate incubator management, a formal evaluation mechanism for 
the incubator itself was not yet in place. Nonetheless the incubator enjoyed continued support 
from the Chambers of Commerce, with proposals for expansion to other branches. 
In terms of hard outputs, in line with Allen and Weinberg (1988), clients reported 
much-improved funding assistance and availability, significant cost-reductions, and 
high enterprise growth. Tenants reported extensive usage of incubator facilities, taking 
advantage of secretarial and conferencing facilities, as well as improved communication 
resources. Ten of the fourteen tenants had established websites with the help of 
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incubator staff.70 The incubator itself was meeting internal targets, was over-subscribed 
4: I in terms of applications, and was looking to expand. The incubator staff conducted 
both periodic as well as on demand mentoring sessions helping the incubatees succeeds. 
Moreover, the synergies reSUlting from close cooperation of similar companies-who do 
not directly compete with one another - have been noted. 
The services provided by the incubator appear to be responsive to the major structural 
and institutional flaws of Saudi SMEs. Similar concerns were noted by AI-Kurdi (2002), 
Otsuki (2001) and Shablaq (2003). These are summarized below: 
1. Lack of finance - by providing links with financial institutions and assistance 
with grant/loan application processes (e.g. the Abdulatif Jameel Fund 
application process is perceived as difficult and if it were not for the incubator 
assistance, this source of funding would not be so widely available to the start-
up businesses), 
2. Poor management-by active mentoring and business advice from the incubator 
staff, 
3. Poor business planning- by basing the application process upon outlined business 
plans and feasibility studies and, if required, helping the incubatees develop proper 
business plans, 
4. Poor market intelligence - by organizing promotional events in the incubator 
where the entrepreneurs can get acquainted with prospective collaborators and 
learn about their needs and, requests. 
5. Under-utilisation of technology - businesses are encouraged to use the internet 
and establish web-pages, as well as cooperate amongst themselves to create 
effective processes, 
6. A difficult business and legislative environment - again the mentoring and 
helping as well as the advice with application and paperwork. 
1\1 Unfonunately the young age of the incubator prevented an adequate measurement of the amount of graduates, sales turnover 
and profitability. 
312 
Typical, beneficial services not provided to the incubatees were: technology assistance 
(as the incubator had no connection to labs or research units), although the incubator commits 
to resolve incubatees' technical issues, lack of direct funding to the incubatees in the fonn of 
bridging loans/grants -but the proficiency in other financial assistance diminished the demand 
for this service. 
Thus, the case study broadly confirms the view of Mian (1996) - 'the vast majority of 
the respondents [incubator tenants] believed that the services they were receiving were adding 
value to their fledgling finns' (Mian 1996: 203 in Barrow, 2001). It must be noted that the 
Jeddah incubator fulfils the seven critical success factors pointed out by Shalaby (2003): 
1. Choosing the right Manager: the Jeddah incubator manager is independent from 
government, 
2. Gaining Local Support: the incubator is sponsored by a local chamber of 
commerce, there are plans to start cooperation with the local universities, the 
incubator staff also claim it has "good connections' with large companies 
based in Jeddah' 
3. Choosing the right projects for the incubator: the application process is 
considered stringent, with the feasibility studies playing an important role 
which assures an increased success rate, 
4. Securing finance: the incubator is subsidised by the local chamber of 
commerce, and participants pay a monthly fee for the incubator services, 
5. Marketing: the demand for the incubator's services is already high with 4: 1 
application/admission ratio; promotional events are organized, recruitment at 
universities is planned, 
6. Ongoing evaluation: the incubated businesses are required to report quarterly to 
the Director, 
7. Centralised administration: the Jeddah incubator has a full time general-
manager who reports to the Director of the incubator. 
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It must also be noted, that the leddah incubator is responsive to the major goals set by 
the government in modernizing the economy (see Chapter 4 for details): 
1. Creating jobs - although the majority of the companies have only I employee. 
the firms graduate and expand, thus creating employment, 
2. Saudisation - the nurtured businesses are required to be staffed entirely by 
Saudi nationals, 
3. Modernizing economy towards a knowledge-based society - four education 
consultancies hosted in the incubator help students secure study abroad - this 
foreign knowledge can be repatriated later and many Saudi problems e.g. poor 
business university curriculum can thus be tackled. 
4. Boosting local economies - all incubatees are required to be leddah locals. 
7.6.2 Conclusion and recommendations: 
Being the first incubator in Saudi Arabia, leddah incubator is expected to playa pivotal 
role in the incubation movement in Saudi Arabia. Even though creating and establishing a 
business incubator takes time, leddah incubator, in only one year or so, performed 
successfully as a business creation tool. However, some of it is main features need further 
strengthening. First, the emphasis in leddah incubator appears to be more on tangible services 
such as office space/equipment as well as some consulting advice. With relatively smaller 
client base ranging from 14-24 incubatees, more effort should be exerted on softer services 
such as networking relative to the provision of physical space and hard infrastructure. This 
could facilitate transitioning to the newer approaches to incubation that relies less on the 
hardware of incubation and more on the software of value adding services. Furthermore, the 
business incubator has to market itself, participating in seminars, making speeches, publishing 
special information material, and using the media and the Internet in order to create an 
attractive image. 
Based on the aforementioned results and the experience of the first incubator in the 
Kingdom, it may be concluded that business incubators are feasible for business development 
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in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, they could turn to be better than other fonn of new-business 
development assistance. The steps that could enhance successful creation of incubators. 
includes: 
• Precise definition of incubator goals 
• Finding sources of funding for both the incubator and its tenants 
• Assessment of tenants needs, in terms of training, and technical expertise 
• Analysis of domestic economic activity 
• Creation of start-up plan and market potential 
• Marketing and promotion of the incubator. 
With regard to the goal of the incubator, there should be a strong focus on economic 
and business-development goals. Also, it is recommended that the incubator itself be 
established with the objective of becoming a profitable and self-sustaining organisation. This 
will help sustainability of the incubator and prevents collapse of the incubator in case of 
withdrawal of support provided to them. Goal should also focus on the training in capacity 
building and development in the areas of financial management and accounting control. It is 
also recommended that the incubator should establish continuing relationships with external 
funding agencies. Unlike many U.S. incubators, Saudi incubators will need to be sources of 
direct funding and investment capital for tenant firms. Organisations such as Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) and The Saudi Credit Bank (SCB), and others specializing in 
providing start-up capital and seed money may serve as sources of funding for new 
companies. 
With regard to entrance and exit policies, it is recommended that incubator need to be 
highly selective in choosing incubator participants. It is advised to clearly define the target 
market and adopt admission criteria that focus on projects where an incubator can genuinely 
add value. Regarding the tenancy period, it seems that limits on tenancy period, is not needed 
under Saudi condition. The result of this research showed that most of the tenant firms would 
like to graduate as quickly as possible. However it is recommended that a multiple limit 
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structure for different types of firms for example, a simple business might be restricted to one 
year to get started, where a high-technology, high-value-added company might be allowed as 
long as it takes. 
Furthermore, the networking under the Saudi context is underdeveloped and mostly 
relations with other business are very restricted. People generally prefer to network with other 
family members or relatives. Therefore, it is expected that incubator would serve as a local 
nucleus for networking and development of support relationships for sharing of knowledge 
and information of value to entrepreneurs in wider circles. Services offered must include 
basic internal business functions, such as planning, and consulting on organisation, financing 
and financial planning, accounting services, tax assistance, and the like. 
Finally, given the above recommendations, incubator managers in Saudi Arabia will need to 
meet the requirements for effective management. This will require the ability to evaluate business 
plans according to the best standards, to be able to recommend projects and new entrepreneurial 
undertakings as worthy of funding. Therefore, selection of managers must be done very carefully. 
Those selected should be trained properly before they start their work. The training should be held 
in countries with deep and extensive experience in business incubation. 
7.7 Overall Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.7.1 Conclusion: Are incubators the right approach for Saudi Arabia? 
The fundamental question this thesis addresses is whether conditions exist for the 
successful introduction of business incubation in Saudi Arabia? However, in order to 
address this question properly, a further dimension (as laid out in Chapter 2 and 4) needs to be 
recalled: what would "success" look like in the Saudi context? In Saudi, as in many places 
elsewhere (especially developing nations), incubators are looked at as a means to promote the 
survival of new enterprises - which in tum, are intended to promote the (mutually 
reinforcing) objectives of (i) generating employment opportunities(reducing unemployment) 
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and (ii) diversifying of the economic base (in the Saudi case, away from oil dependence).1J 
Thus, the promotion of private enterprise (which directly addresses the aims of reducing 
unemployment and diversifying the economic base in an oil-based economy) remains the firm 
priority of the Saudi national development strategies. Thus, "success" is seen as the 
promotion! survival of more small enterprises in the country. 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, incubation is to be investigated within 
the context of the Saudi national development strategies and incubation is to be considered as 
a large-scale national or at the very least, regional, programme co-ordinated and/or sponsored 
by Saudi central government. The central issue to be addressed is, whether business 
incubation introduced on a wide, co-ordinated scale will provide an effective means of 
encouraging and sustaining private enterprise growth in Saudi Arabia? 
First, the thesis has shown that incubation has a positive influence on enterprise survival and 
growth. Quantitatively, incubated businesses have a much higher survival rate than non-incubated 
businesses. Business incubators have also been shown to provide highly valuable qualitative 
services to the entrepreneur. But could there be, considering the large-scale ambitions of the 
Saudi government, a more effective means of promoting enterprise growth and survival? As 
Barrow puts it 'there seems little doubt that some incubators give entrepreneurs a terrific 
deal.. . but neither is it clear that incubators offer wonderful value to their sponsoring bodies' 
(Barrow, 2001: 24). Indeed, when Storey (1994) conducted an exhaustive study into small 
business research and examined every initiative designed to help small firms in the UK, he came 
to the conclusion that 'no government or local government initiative had ever represented any real 
value to the tax-payers concerned' (Barrow, 2001: 24).72 However, as Barrow warns, Storey's 
findings must be looked at in the context of the difficulties which affect any comparative research 
in SME support and business incubation (discussed in Chapter 2): 'with innumerable variables to 
71 There are, of course, many other approaches to generate employment within a national economy however th~ Saudi.public 
sector is at full capacity in terms of its abilities to absorb further labour and, moreover, the country (em~led by Its WTO 
accession in 2005) is committed to a brand of free-market capitalism which inhibits the government's abilIty to grant 
subsidies and apply protective tariffs. . . . 
n It is worth pointing out that in Saudi Arabia, income tax is not applied and government revenues ongmate from 011 sales, and 
the government has been running at a significant budget surplus in recent years. 
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control for and the difficulty of finding a control group [such research is] daunting~ (Barrow, 
2001: 24). Thus, attempting to establish a direct comparison between incubated business and 
either (i) non-incubated businesses or; (ii) different types of incubator or; (iii) alternative SME 
support schemes are extremely difficult. Moreover, at a qualitative level, there is no doubt that: 
'many firms and geographic areas have benefited greatly from attracting, stimulating and fostering 
an entrepreneurial community. It just might be that some aspects of the payback are too vague to 
assign a monetary value to. That however does not mean there is no value.' (Barrow, 2001: 25). 
This view is supported by new growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1990, 1994 in Hollingsworth 
and Boyer 1997: 14) which has shown that the "spillover effects" of state-sponsored 
innovations, educations and some supply-side orientated interventions effectively promote 
efficiency and growth; however, such benefits often only materialise in the long-term. 
Accepting that incubation offers real value to clients, what are their chances given the 
conditions prevailing in Saudi Arabia? The literature has shown that incubators work best 
when they respond to certain structural conditions, these conditions include: 
• A free market economy 
• The availability of private credit 
• A legal environment that facilitates easy business creation and protects 
investors 
• A surplus/availability of (skilled) graduates 
• A labor force orientated towards private sector employment 
• Specific areas of structural weakness in the SMElbusiness environment (so that 
the incubator can provide tangible 'hard' benefits to clients), e.g. 
communication provision, start-up financing, access to facilities, access to 
management training) 
• Stable government (consistent government SME policy) 
• Strong links between the 'triumvirate' of government, business and education. 
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These structural conditions are broadly in place in Saudi Arabia. The country operates a 
free-market economic model, private credit is readily available (however, as in most countries, 
banks remain cautious about high-risk business start-ups). The Saudi commercial legal regime 
has been reformed according to the terms of its WTO accession in 2005, and is in the process of 
further reformation. A surplus of graduates exists. However, the skill-base of these graduates has 
been revealed as deficient in several areas. New entrants to the labor market are increasingly 
seeking private sector employment. However, 'employment culture' remains routed in the public 
sector. Weaknesses in the business environment exist that can be readily addressed by incubation, 
e.g.: lack of facilities, lack of start-up financing, lack of managerial experience and knowledge. 
The Saudi government is extremely stable and governmental objectives and policy towards 
private enterprise development (as evidenced in development plans) has remained stable over the 
last decade. However, the links between government, education and business - and specifically 
between education and business- have been shown to be lacking. As discussed extensively above, 
poor links between academia and business either deprives business of the expertise and research 
knowledge and deprives educational institutions of the vital access to business required to 
properly direct the commercialisation of research. 
Although this final condition is not currently in place in Saudi Arabia, it has become evident 
in the course of this research that a large number of conditions are in place, which suggests that 
incubators can add tangible value to the Saudi business environment. Business incubation represents 
the most comprehensive, and direct, form of assistance available to small businesses, it is the only 
process that can develop entrepreneurs ideas into compelling business plans, provide them with 
professional management teams, source fmancing, build working organisations, create products and 
services, acquire strategic partners and customers (through networking) and prepare their fledgling 
companies for further funding, acquisition, or public equity markets (Barrow, 2001). Moreover, 
they attempt to do all of this in around six months of starting-up (Ibid). Thus, incubators are 
unrivalled in the benefits they offer entrepreneurs. For a government that has identified the 
promotion of new enterprise creation as its top economic priority, has an enormous budget surplus, 
but is against supply-side inteIVention in the economy, incubation clearly has much to offer. 
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7.7.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, it can be concluded that, the business-education component of 
the incubation programme in Saudi Arabia reveals salient problems with creating the 
cornerstone for a successful programme. It is therefore recommended that: 
• 
• 
The collaboration between universities and business should be increased 
(students should be encouraged to take up jobs during course of study), 
The academic curriculum should be improved in regard to business planning, 
management and 'vocational' training for the students, to reflect the 
requirements of the successful business marketplace (e.g. mandatory 
internships should be introduced as a graduation criterion), 
• The collaboration between academics and businesses should be encouraged, 
especially in regard to commercializing research in various fields. 
The survey of the business students and academics reveals that any prospective Saudi 
incubator programme would need to take into account (i) the relatively low level of practical 
business skills and experience exhibited by Saudi graduates, and (ii) the weak relationship 
between academia and the private sector. The former could be addressed by an incubator 
programme that incorporates soft provisions such as mentoring, management-training and 
business-planning services. The latter would require the improved co-ordination of the 
academic and private sectors. This could be facilitated at a local level through the Chambers 
of Commerce or through national government policy. Alternatively, the individual incubator 
could endeavour to make the links itself; arguably, incorporating business incubators into 
universities would - if done properly - be constitute of the process of reconciling the business 
and academic worlds. Finally, the survey reveals that a "market" for incubation exists in 
terms of a surplus of (potentially) unemployed business graduates with ambitions to start 
private enterprises. 
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It is concluded that the business incubator may be a very appropriate and useful tool for 
development of private companies in the changing Saudi economy. It is highly recommended that 
incubators should be created in major cities, in municipalities where a specific knowledge base 
has been created through industrial or educational development, and which holds promise as a 
resource for entrepreneurial initiatives. Selection of sites for incubators will require evaluation and 
outside expertise as time goes by and opportunities increase. These considerations are offered as a 
first step toward creating a viable and helpful incubator in Saudi Arabia, and not as a definitive 
blueprint for such an incubator. 
But how should incubators be introduced in Saudi Arabia? The research has also 
revealed that for an incubator to be successful, several critical incubator-specific conditions 
have to be established: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Strong links with universities 
Strong links with business community 
Strong links with local community 
Clear, consistent and unified policy from sponsoring organisation(s) 
Publicity programme put in place 
Clear and rigorous application procedure 
Provision of both hard and soft resources for clients (with strong provision of training 
and mentoring services) 
• Facilitate internal and external network opportunities for clients 
• Regular evaluation processes for (i) clients and (ii) the incubator/incubator staff. 
The government policies in Saudi Arabia should address all these factors by creating an 
official body that co-ordinates governmental and private initiative for establishing a viable 
incubation programme and take the responsibilities of issuing the necessary legislations that 
could make the application of the above mentioned conditions possible. 
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7.8-Implications of Findings 
7.8.1 Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study lay some preliminary steps that could contribute in 
developing a theory of successful incubation. Critical success factors identified in this 
research are consistent with prior literature and are broadly similar to business incubators in 
other countries. However, some factors, such as networking and academic-business links, are 
more critical under the Saudi socio-political environment. Accordingly, such results advance 
our knowledge that certain critical success factors are very specific to the underlying 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions that prevail in the Kingdom and possibly in other Gulf 
countries. 
Findings of this study show that networking (both internal and external) is an important 
factor for successful incubation. Previous research also recognises the key role that networks 
play in incubatee success (e.g. Hansen et aI., 2000; Novak and Grantham, 2000; Peters et aI., 
2004; Totterman and Sten, 2005). In essence, apart from shared-office facility and other 
infrastructures, the incubator is also a network of individuals and organisations and typically 
includes the incubator manager and staff, incubator advisory board, incubatee companies and 
employees, local universities and university community members, industry contacts and 
professional service providers (such as lawyers, accountants, consultants and marketing 
specialists among others) (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Indeed, over the years, incubator's role in 
the entrepreneurial process has changed from just being a business centre with office facilities 
to one that offers training, networking and consulting in various areas of expertise. Hansel et 
ai., (2000) identify network design, together with entrepreneurial intensity and economies of 
scale and scope, as important factors for incubation success. Network relationship-building is 
a key value-added component of the incubation process (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Moreover, 
Shennan and Chappell (1998) stress that internally tenants have a tendency to use incubators 
to facilitate relationships with other incubator residents. However, contrary to Bollingtoft and 
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Ulhoi (2005) assertions that collaborative relationships are more likely to develop when 
tenants are under one roof, findings reveal that no collaborative arrangements exist at JCCBI. 
This is surprising as one would expect that the physical and mental proximity would increase 
the level of credibility among tenants, leading to collaborations (Totterman and Sten, 2005). 
Furthermore, consistent with previous studies (e.g. Totterman and Sten, 2005) findings 
also confirm the need for incubators to develop external networks that would benefit its 
tenants. Duff (1994) describes an incubator's external networks as consisting of professional 
service providers, experienced business people and educators located outside the incubator. 
External networks can also contain governmental organizations (i.e. expert organizations and 
universities) and private organizations (e.g. mentors, financiers, accountants, customers and 
suppliers). However, out of the 14 tenants, to date, only two have collaborated with other 
outside businesses. Such a low willingness to network externally might be culture specific to 
Saudi SMEs reluctance to engage in joint ventures and can be related to trust. Totterman and 
Sten (2004) in their study note that trust among tenants within an incubator is relatively 
higher as compared to the outside incubator community. The authors' findings revealed that 
tenants and members of the network were more likely to engage in social exchange with each 
other, rather than with external actors. 
In addition, findings further confirm the importance of developing formal and informal 
relationships between universities, industry and incubators. While the majority of academics 
surveyed in this research highlight that linkages between universities and businesses are 
underdeveloped in the Saudi context, previous studies (e.g. Etzkowitz, 2002; Phan e aI., 2005) 
have theoretically established that strong university-incubator linkages lies at the heart of 
incubator performance. For example, in their comprehensive review of business incubators 
studies, Hackett and Dilts (2004) list university ties as a key characteristic for the success of 
business incubators. Similar findings were obtained by Ratinho and Henrique's (2009) in their 
study of business incubators in the context of converging economies (such as Portugal). 
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However, confirming Vedovello (1997) findings, the authors note that formal linkages and 
geographical proximity are not driving forces behind university-industry cooperation. Rather. 
it is the effectiveness, scope and intensity of university links that are more important in 
determining success. 
7.8.2- Practical Implications 
The establishment and development of business incubators is a key requirement for the 
high technology industry. As a huge developing country, Saudi Arabia has made efforts to 
accelerate the birth and growth of incubators, with the aim of catching up with 
technologically more advanced countries. As one of the major studies (first PhD thesis), this 
research provides a better understanding of business incubation in Saudia Arabia. Results of 
this research offer some practical implications for the successful development of business 
incubators in Saudi Arabia. Findings of this study are important to both business incubation 
providers and entrepreneurial researchers in recognizing valid and possible success measures. 
Incubator providers could utilize the results of the study to identify factors that would 
increase the chances for the success of incubators. Case study findings presented in Chapter 6 
revealed some of these factors and include: 
• Clear, consistent and unified policy from sponsoring organisation(s). To improve 
business incubator performance the development of more effective support programs 
is required. This will boost chances of success of entrepreneurs. It is also necessary to 
clarify a business incubator's key goals and develop appropriate support programs to 
help tenants. One approach is to recruit highly talented people to manage the 
incubators and develop effective programms. This calls for other skills than 
traditional administrative and managerial skills, i.e., collaborative and networking 
skills, which in turn has implications for educators of future entrepreneurial actors 
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• Strong links with business community and facilitating internal and external network 
opportunities for clients. Another important mechanism for fostering entrepreneurship 
is through enhancing links and network with business community. Networks are 
crucial to entrepreneurial actors. Thus, the ability to connect up to strategically 
important clusters of networks is a critical managerial skill. Such networks can give 
entrepreneurial actors the necessary legitimacy, skills, and resources needed when 
launching a new venture. Under the Saudi context networking with business 
community is underdeveloped and relations with other business are very restricted. 
People generally prefer to network with other family members or relatives. Such a 
situation might hinder the relative success of such relationships. 
• Strong links with local community 
• Publicity programme put in place 
• Clear and rigorous application procedure in order to attract a good mix of tenants in 
terms of the industry they represent. 
• Provision of both hard and soft resources for clients (with strong provision of training 
and mentoring services) 
• Regular evaluation processes for clients; and the incubator/incubator staff. 
7.9 Contribution 
Findings of this research provide a number of key theoretical contributions, as 
summarised below: 
This study provides a comprehensive review of the literature on business incubation 
in the context of Saudia Arabia; 
Using JeeBl as a case study approach, this research identifies the underlying 
functions, operational issues, challenges and problems related to business incubation 
in Saudi Arabia. The JeeBl, although still at early development level, broadly 
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demonstrate similar characteristics of successful business incubators In other 
countries such as Brazil and Argentina. 
Unlike the common wisdom in the Arab world (a preference for public sector 
employment; AI-Lamki, 1998), findings reveal a shift in attititudes among young 
graduates towards private sector employment. 
In line with previous research (e.g. Totterman and Sten, 2005) results indicate that 
incubators should provide both "hard" and "soft" resources to its teanants. For 
instance, while space and office facilities are important elements, they are not key 
focus aspects in supporting tenants. Rather, as findings of this study indicate, for 
long-term success of its tenants, the focus should be more on the nurturing of 
business networks. 
Similar to other studies (e.g. Totterman and Sten, 2005), findings indicate that the 
incubator manager plays a central role in building trust that facilitates networking and 
social interaction among tenants. 
Case study analysis indicates that, at present, unlike technology incubators (Jaffe et 
aI., 1993), the JCCBI is not affiliated to any university but have future plans to 
develop a formal relationship with King Abdulaziz University. Such an initiative 
further reinforces the theoretical and empirical arguments in favour of university 
linkages (e.g. Jaffer et aI., 1993; Rothaemel and Thursby, 2005). 
Consistent with the rich literature on business incubation, this research indicates that, 
at the national level, incubators are important links in the entrepreneurial value chain. 
7.l0-Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations and summarised below 
• First, the case study included only one business incubator (Jeddah Business 
Incubator). When this study commenced it was the first and the only Saudi 
incubator. This constitutes some limitation in this study. Most of the incubatees 
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have not yet graduated. Working with a number of firms of relatively inexperience 
firms makes it difficult to draw conclusive findings. 
• 
• 
Another limitation is that this study discussed the relationship at a general 
level; no specific type of incubators was explored. 
The findings relating to the academics were based on a comparatively small 
number of only business academics respondents. This may not reflect a clear 
picture and hence it would not be wise to generalize the respective findings. 
• In this research, it is assumed that a positive relationship could exist between 
business education and business start up. Due to limitation of the research data, 
it was found difficult to assert any significant links between these variable 
empirically. To invistigate this causal relationship future research is needed to 
assess the overwhelming desire of students to start their own business while 
on the other hand their education skills is limited as shown in this research. 
Other factors such as the financial capabilities SMEs support should also be 
introduced. 
• Finally, the scarcity of studies of business incubation as a possible tool that can 
deal with obstacles facing SMEs in Saudi Arabia plus the absence of studies on 
any kind of supportive bodies that could lend a hand to SMES 
. . 
IS a major 
limitation in this study. Without such studies, literature that could be used to 
support the arguments or to compare the findings with was a great lack in 
conducting this study. 
7.tO-Future Research 
There are many possible avenues of future research in this area in addition to the ones 
already mentioned. First is to replicate this study on a wider sample representing various 
classes of the youth sector and students in different colleges. Future research should focus on 
327 
other variables that could be related to the creation of business incubation programme: small 
businesses, in rural areas and may be women-owned businesses. What more is needed b\ 
SMEs and students in the areas they identified as important? Is there a noticeable impact to 
the success of their businesses? 
In this research, it is assumed that a positive relationship could exist between business 
education and business start up. Due to limitation of the research data, it was found difficult to 
assert any significant links between these variables empirically. To investigate this causal 
relationship future research is needed to assess the overwhelming desire of students to start their 
own business while on the other hand their education skills is limited as shown in this research. 
Other factors such as the financial capabilities SMEs support should also be introduced. Future 
research should also extend the current study to other group of individuals in other colleges and 
even to those who does not have university degrees. This would allow new comparative insights, 
which are not available in a single group such as the one in this study. 
Much of the literature on business incubators is of the 'critical success factors' (CSF) 
variety, answering the question, 'What determines the success or failure of incubators and the 
entrepreneurial projects within them?' But as Hackett and Dilts (2004) note, the research is 
mainly a-theoretical, while "theory is the lifeblood of any research area." They add: " ... we 
must turn our attention from 'what' are the most important factors to 'how' and 'why' and 'in 
what context' ... these factors are interrelated." It is believed that this is exactly the area where 
future research needs to devote more efforts. 
Given the limitations above, however, the results of this study shed light and provide 
important clues to the question of business incubation under the Saudi conditions. Further 
research is needed to find out other obstacles that might face the proposed Saudi incubation 
programme. Survival rates of the graduated firms (in comparison to non incubated finns) is 
important to get to the conclusion that 'incubators add value' to the business creation process. 
It should be recognized, however, that assessment methodologies tend to differ considerably; 
a comprehensive methodology effort for evaluating incubator perfonnance would represent 
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an important step to increase the overall knowledge in this sector, which is still limited. 
fragmented and anecdotal in nature, especially in developing countries. 
In developing countries, this should preferably be conducted in broad terms, in order to 
consider incubators as part of an often 'challenging' private sector environment. In this way, 
it could be analyzed and discussed whether incubators could be a cost-effective mechanism 
for development purposes, compared to alternative choices, and eventually be incorporated 
into broader national strategies. 
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APPENDIX (A) 
Historical Development 
The 1970s (second stage in incubators industry growth) saw the first University Incubators 
(most notably, the US University City Science Centre). However, their numbers, especially in 
the United States and Europe, only began growing rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s and they 
became increasingly recognised within academic literature, specifically after the formation of 
the NBIA in 1985. 
University incubators could be traced back to the early twentieth century, in the Silicon 
Valley of California, with a firm formed by a Stanford university graduate (Castells and Hall, 
1994). One of the employees invented the vacuum tube. This became the beginning of a 
research tradition in electronics in Silicon Valley. Stanford Industrial Park, established in 
1951, aimed to further support such a high-technology industrial base. 
During the 1960s, there was a growth of innovative microelectronics firms in the 
region. The Department of Defence's electronic-based programmes for the United State's 
aerospace programme supported the first spin-offs. The next wave came in the 1970s with the 
consolidation of semiconductor merchant producers and the launching of the personal 
computer. The computer industry continued to dominate Silicon Valley through the 1980s and 
at the same time the industrial structure became internationalised and a second round of spin-
offs evolved. 
One important factor behind the innovative environment of Silicon Valley is the 
aerospace programme mentioned above, which meant high prices paid for the most innovative 
technologies (Castells and Hall, 1994). In addition, there is a culture of circulation of the most 
talented people between different firms, making it impossible to define the owner of every 
specific innovation. As a result of this circulation, the firms could accelerate their own path of 
innovation, thereby giving way to new spin-offs. 
Beginning in 1973, the National Science Foundation supported a senes of 
experiments with innovation centres through its Experimental Research and Development 
Programme. By 1981 the Programme had expanded to include a total of eleven centres. 
These served as the basis for future university efforts in launching innovation/incubator 
centres. (Allen and Weinberg 1988, p200) Through these formative efforts it was 
recognised that fledgling firms could benefit from a supportive environment which could be 
structured to achieve a balance between entrepreneurial independence and linkages to an 
incubator organisation. (Cooper, 1985) A frequently cited example of the involvement of an 
incubator organisation in enterprise development is the Fairchild Corporation, which 
between 1957 and 1970 was directly or indirectly responsible for the start-up of 3S 
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compames including Intel and National Semiconductor (National Council for Urban 
Economic Development. 1985, page 1). 
Outside of universities, the second major surge in incubator development came in the 
United States in the early-mid 1980s - a period of recession in the US economy. The closure 
of many large businesses, (in particular in industrial manufacturing plants) left behind 
numerous empty premises and thousands of unemployed former workers (Clark and Minor. 
2000). From this vacuum emerged numerous small business incubators which aimed at 
alleviating the distresses caused by regional economic decline by harnessing surplus business 
spaces and manpower, facilitating investment in new ventures and generating job 
opportunities (Ibid). 
By 1984 there were still only 26 incubators in the US (Meyer, 1987, p53), but then 
came an explosion in numbers. The business incubator concept was adapted to "incubate" a 
much wider range of enterprise types, with a concomitantly broader set of objectives and 
desired outcomes. The type of organisation interested in incubators was also broadened by the 
entry of policy-oriented public sector institutions driving for job creation, or welfare-oriented 
bodies seeking to provide enhanced job opportunities for the unemployed and minorities. By 
January, 1990, 385 Business Incubators were operating in the United States (NBIA 1990). 
Naturally, this exploding activity brought with it an expanding analysis and literature as more 
researchers began to explore this phenomenon. 
The "incubator industry" also became more formalised with new institutions, such as 
The Pennsylvania Business Incubator Association which commenced operations in 1984 
(Hogan, 1991, p. 54), followed shortly afterwards by the National Business Incubation 
Association (NBIA) and other regionally-based incubator associations. 
The third key period of growth in the incubator industry occurred during the ~~dot-com 
boom" of the late 1990s. This boom also encouraged additional research in the field as the 
media became fixated on "infinitely scaleable, dot-com e-business start ups" that had been 
"hatched" in incubators (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Unfortunately, many of the incubatees and 
incubator projects launched in this time shared the fate of the many thousands of dot-com 
start-ups that went bust after the ~crash' of2000. 
The incubator concept spread internationally. In Europe, a uniformly accepted 
definition of business incubators does not exist (Monck et aI., 1988). A variety of names are 
applied to these centres including, among others, Science Parks, Business Innovation Centres, 
Technology Centres, and Research Centres (Storey and Tether, 1998; Monck et aI., 1988; 
Lindelof and Lofsten 2002). One of the first incubators in Europe was established at 
Cambridge Science Park, United Kingdom, and Sophia Antipolis in France in the late 1960s 
(Storey and Tether, 1998). 
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The dispersion of incubators to the rest of Europe was relatively slow. The concept 
spread in the United Kingdom (UK) more quickly with Business Innovation Centres (BIC) 
being developed more than 20 years ago (OECD, 1999). BICs and Science Parks are part of a 
continuum of such services offered in the UK. The only distinction between them is that 
Science Parks usually have formal and operational links to academic institutions while BICs. 
being property based initiatives do not have these links (Storey and Tether, 1998). 
In Germany, the first incubator was built in Berlin (Berliner Innovation-und 
Grundersentrum-BIG) in 1983. It was set up jointly by the government and the Technical 
University to commercialise technology projects (OECD, 1999: 49). The incubator concept 
was spread nation-wide, driven by city councils. German incubators are monitored by a 
special Government programme (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Technologiezentren), which 
was established as part of the unification between East and West Germany and the economic 
restructuring of East Germany (OECD, 1999). As at 1999, there were 103 incubators in the 
east and 27 incubators in west of Germany. 
Finland was ranked first in the UNDP Technology Development Index for its strength 
in innovation and in the networking skills that take place between companies and research 
institutions (National Technology Agency of Finland, 2002). This has been due in large part 
to the successful application of the science park and business incubator concept (Tarkianen, 
2002) and demonstrates why the idea has spread so broadly. Incubators were tarnished by the 
excesses of the internet boom in the late nineteen-nineties. Some 400 incubators worldwide 
developed companies that rapidly listed on stock exchanges to take advantage of this boom 
(Lalkaka, 2001). Then, as technology shares started loosing their value, many of the 
incubators that had supported these companies collapsed along with their graduates. Despite 
this, incubators are still a growth industry. 
In Australia, the development of incubators was supported by both the federal and the 
state governments for the same reason as they were supported in Europe and USA. Incubators 
were evident in almost all Australian states by 1989, with 17 incubators in operation (Small 
Business Council, 1989). Of the 17, only 2 were privately funded. Most had direct or indirect 
connections with academic institutions (University of Wollongong (UOW) and Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) being the first to have incubators located on 
campus (Small Business Council, 1989). Seventy-eight million Australian dollars were set 
aside by the Commonwealth Government in June 1999 for the development of incubators that 
focused on the commercialisation of ideas, research and technology in the information 
technology and communications area. This was done under the Building on Information 
Technology Strengths (BITS) Programme, intended to increase the long-term success rate of 
new ICT -related business formations. The outlay of this funding continued till 30 June 2004 
(Directory of Community, Industry and Tourism Australia DCIT A, 1999). There are 10 ICT 
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focused BITS incubators around Australia, eight are for-profitand two are non-profit centres 
(DelTA, 2003: 29). According to Australian and New Zealand Association of Business 
Incubators in total, Australia has more than 60 incubators in operation (ANZABL 2003). The 
majority of these are a part of state or local government economic development initiatives. 
At present the incubator industry could be said to be in a fourth stage of development 
marked by a period of "consolidated growth" within Western economies and rapid expansion 
in the developing world. As a device that has long been associated with the fostering of new 
technology (particularly in its University-based and Science Park incarnations) and 
entrepreneurship, business incubation has increasingly found favour in the ·'globalised" 
economy. Within developing economies the threats and opportunities associated with 
competing in a globally competitive marketplace have created a pressing need to 
commerciaIise new technologies (both as a means of technological transfer and economic 
development/diversification) thus the introduction of incubator projects has become a popular 
development programme amongst regional and central governments Amongst Western 
nations, already-existing incubator projects are typically being expanded to f1ll1her harness 
the entrepreneurial forces that have traditionally fuelled technological innovation. Thus as of 
2002, a new incubator was opening in the United States every week and 8,000 US SMEs were 
residing in incubators at this time (NBIA, 2002). 
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APPENDIX ( B ) 
Definitions of Incubators 
Over the past five decades and across several continents, many different models of incubators 
have emerged. There is no formal, or legally recognizable definition available, therefore criteria 
amongst the relevant literature fluctuates between the generic and highly specific. 
Given this high degree of ambiguity and the consequent tendency to confuse 
incubators with other business development tools, before considering precisely what a 
business incubator is, it seems worth considering first what it is not. Firstly an incubator 
is not a "small business development centre" (sometimes also called "advice centres") _ 
whereas such development centres typically dispense advice, training, occasionally 
funding and can perform various "networking" roles, they do not house, adopt or 
generally "nurture" young businesses, - nor do they ordinarily focus exclusively on 
'young' businesses (as do incubators). 
Similarly, certain investors/investment groups purport to call themselves "incubators" 
however while they may (occasionally) offer business guidance and funding (as do 
incubators) they do not provide training, services or housing. 
Moreover, there are many businesses and organisations that provide 'accommodation' 
and shared office services for businesses. However these are effectively providing 'serviced 
office spaces'. In other words, they derive their purpose and/or revenue streams from real 
estate development/servicing and not from any stake in new business development. No 
responsibility is taken for, or stake invested in, the development and success of the housed 
businesses. Neither is training or guidance provided. An "entry policy" is unlikely, therefore 
any type or age of firm is liable to share the space and tenancy is more likely to be linked to 
the ability to pay and not limited to the age of the firm as in an incubator. 
Thus, it is important to distinguish the incubator from the advisor, the investor, the 
landlord or even the professor. In doing so it already becomes apparent that business 
incubation is concerned with housing new (or very young) small businesses, providing them 
with business services, including advice, training and sometimes funding. The incubator will 
have a responsibility for the businesses' success. The incubator is likely to specialise in 
certain types of businesses and tenancy is always limited. 
Researchers have felt the need to define incubation and illustrate the features, which 
distinguish an incubator from other support programmes. As a result, research in the early 1980s 
focused on the basic task of identifying the common features of incubators. Smilor and Gill (1986) 
identified these features as the collective activities that assist entrepreneurs in the development of 
new technology-based fmns, both start-ups and fledglings. It further seeks to effectively link talent, 
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technology, capital and know-how to leverage entrepreneurial talent in order to accelerate the 
development of new companies, and thus speed the commercialisation of technology: 
In similar manner Albert and And Gaynor (200 I) defined the incubator as 'collective 
and temporary place for accommodating companies which offers space, assistance and 
services suited to the needs of companies being launched or recently founded. He identified 
four principle characteristics which are: The availability of modular and expandable space to 
rent for a limited period, access to shared cost services relating principally to administrative 
functions, access to management or technological support as well as privileged access to 
business and scientific communities and a place for interaction between companies and for 
moral support co-ordinated by the management team. 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
which has the current responsibility for incubator funding, defines them as: 
A facility designed to assist new and growing businesses to become established and 
profitable by providing premises, advice, services and support. The incubation period is 
normally from one to three years, during which time fledgling businesses can become 
established before graduating into the wider business community (DEWRSB 73, 200 I: 128). 
Although, in general, there is a common understanding of incubation as a concept, 
many slight differences exist in the application of the concept For example, do incubators 
help create and grow new businesses in a community? (Campbell, 1989). or accelerate the 
successful development of entreprenual companies or both? (Sherman and Chappell, 1998) . 
As a result, varying definitions have evolved to differentiate incubation from other forms of 
support; example of these definitions is the following: 
"A business incubator may be defined as an organisation which offers a range of 
business development services and access to small space on flexible terms, to meet the needs 
of new firms. The package of services offered by a business incubator is designed to enhance 
the success and growth rates of new enterprises thus maximising their impact on economic 
development... A business incubator consists of five dimensions namely enterprise 
development, a consultancy network, entrepreneurial synergy , flexible space and shared 
services". Duff (1994, P 11). On the other hand Tomatzky et al. (1996) defined it as a 
technology business incubator give the investor/entrepreneur the place and time to develop 
the product, as well as access to skills and tools needed to create a successful business. 
Finally, Allen and Bazan (1990) defined incubator as network or organisation providing 
skills, knowledge and motivation, real estate experience, provision of business and shared 
services. Allen and McCluskey (1990) defined incubator as a facility that provides affordable 
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space, shared office services and business development assistance In an environment 
conducive to new venture creation survival and early stage growth. 
But what, precisely, is the purpose of a business incubator? At the most generic level it 
is safe to define a business incubator as 'a dynamic business development process"- (both the 
NBJA (2002) and the UKBI (2004) use identical wording.) 
In addition to promoting survival rates, a focus is often placed upon the "development''. 
"growth" and "nurturing" roles of the business incubator for SMEs in the early stages of 
formation. For instance, Greene and Butler (1996:51) assert that "the purpose of a business 
incubator is to provide some combination of necessary resources in order to nurture a new 
and/or growing business to some level of maturity." 
Looking at the broader socio-economic roles of incubators, the NBIA makes the bold claim 
that 'Incubation programmes diversifY economies, commercialize technologies, create jobs and 
build wealth" (NBIA 2000). Campell (1989) describes business incubators as change agents of an 
economy that has been based on large manufacturing but is transforming to one with many new, 
small information or service-type firms. He addresses many of the failures that new businesses face: 
restricted capital, lack of technology transfer, information costs, and unequal opportunity. 
Incubators are crucial in providing a smooth starting conditions and support needed by 
growth-oriented compan ies. (Cooper, 1985; Achtleitner and Engel, 2001). 'Incubators have a 
positive impact on start-ups either directly by providing intangible services or indirectly by 
providing access to professional specialist services and lending reputation (Cooper, 1985; 
MacMullan et al. 1986; Mian, 1996). They provide entrepreneurs with means of financing, 
consultation services, networking opportunities as well as necessary infrastructure (Cooper, 
1985; Achtleitner and Engel, 2001). 
As Seidel (2001) put it, the main intangible resources incubators provide are a network 
of contacts (i.e. contacts with prospective suppliers or customers), feedback on performance, 
benchmarking, incubator staffs expertise and acumen as well as the signalling effects an 
incubated firm receives through incubator affiliation (Seidel, 2001). Since start-ups lack 
resources and insight due to their short existence, a central purpose of the incubator is to fill 
physical as well as intangible resources and knowledge gaps. Business incubators bridge the 
gap the small entrepreneurs face as they are "starved of equity capital and experienced 
management" (Barrow, 2001: 9). Also, 'some incubators give entrepreneurs a terrific deal of 
subsidised rent, shared office equipment and access to tax breaks and grants" (Ibid: 24). 
Barrow proposes a differentiation of the incubation spectrum according to their capacity to 
add value by placing for-profit property development incubators on one end (little or no value-
added) and for profit investment incubators (seed capital) on the other (considerable value-added), 
with non-profit and academic incubators in between. The major goal of for-profit property 
development incubators is property appreciation and maximised occupancy as well as selling 
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services to the tenants in order to create investment opportunities for more property. Non-profit 
incubators are usual1y sponsored by governments and non-profit groups and focus on creatingjobs 
by creating employers. (Barrow, 2001 :31). University-related incubators sponsored by colleges 
and partnerships of companies and faculties focus on commercialisation of technology, 
intellectual property and science. (Smilor, 1987). 
A further difficulty in agreeing on a viable definition is that the literature on business 
incubators often interchanges the terms "business incubator" with "research park"' 
"technology innovation centre", "science park" etc. Nomenclature differs across OEeD 
countries, the term "science park" often refers to a high-technology-orientated variant of the 
incubator-model, and is sometimes used synonymously with "technology incubator". In the 
UK a "science park" generally has fewer of the typical attributes of an incubator and basically 
provides workspace near to a university. Many UK science parks also incorporate incubator 
units. (OEeD, 1999: 11). In terms of a general approach, it seems sensible to follow the 
advice of Thirstein and Wilhelm (2001: 329) who concluded that within the incubator 
literature there is 'no clear cut distinction', unless explicitly specified between incubators, 
technology parks and innovation centres. 
A more detailed definition that can be extracted from all the aforementioned definitions 
sees incubators as an organisation, which offers a range of business development services and 
access to small space on flexible terms, to meet the needs of new firms. The package of 
services offered by a business incubator is designed to enhance the success and growth rates 
of new enterprises thus maximising their impact on economic development. They embody a 
systematic approach to new enterprise development that can be described as consisting of five 
dimensions namely: enterprise development, a consultancy network, entrepreneurial synergy, 
flexible space and Shared services. 
These five dimensions describe the purpose, benefit, design and management of incubators. 
These elements will be explored in a little more depth to clarify the concept of incubators and to 
distinguish between unmanaged workspace or serviced offices and business incubators. 
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APPENDIX (C) 
Incubator Funding 
VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE 
Incubator managers can provide assistance to clients in accessing to appropriate sources of 
finance. These include government finance programmes, banks, angels, seed and venture 
capital, the second board stock market, and so on. Incubators can provide a vital role in 
helping clients be "investment ready" by assisting them to develop documentation, and 
present their case in the best possible light to finance providers. Incubators can playa key role 
in building relationships with financial providers, and conveying their need sand 
requirements to clients. 
Most incubators target high growth firms with significant market potential, and 
although not all of these are always suited to VC, many will need VC at some stage. 
There is no one way that venture capitalists select investment targets, but some 
fundamentals are almost always considered. Market potential, management quality, and 
cash flow are keys in almost everyone's investment decision. How a VC selects 
investments is a function of: (1) whose money they are investing, (2) what other rates of 
returns are available to those who invest in the fund (LPs) from other investment vehicles, 
and (3) the stage of company they invest in. 
Choosing the right VC firm as "partner" IS important for incubator clients. The 
consideration when clients look for VC partners should extend beyond capital to industry 
expertise, good track record, and reputation for working well with entrepreneurs. Incubatees 
should also make sure the VC's expectations on growth strategy, future fundraising, and 
investment time horizon are the same as their own. 
incubator funding 
Incubators are adept at funding for small businesses, but who is actually funding the 
incubator? According to the European Commission Report (2002), three-quarters (77%) of 
incubators within the EU operate on a not-for-profit basis. In the United States, state 
governments or nonprofit organisations fund approximately half of all business incubators. 
According to NBIA academic institutions sponsored 20% of the incubators in the USA 
in 2005 while government-organisations sponsored incubators constituted 21 %. For profit 
sponsors were only 4% and 8% were funded both by public and private funds. 54% of all 
incubatees were IT and technology firms. (NBIA, 2007) 
The fact that such a large proportion of incubators are publicly funded 'is not trivial' 
(Hacket and Dilts, 2004), despite a recent increase in private sector and corporate for-profit 
incubators, the public sector remains the most active sponsor of incubators. This support has, 
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historically, been motivated by the belief that incubators make significant economic 
contributions and are an efficient way of stimulating local economic (re)development. 
As the OECD report explains, the economic rationale underlying incubation 
programmes 'often remains unarticulated' (OECD 1999: 12). 
Vesper (1983) cites the common reasons for small business failure as poor marketing. 
poor management, and lack of capital. It is believed that incubators can help eliminate these 
"extraneous factors" that lead to the early stage failure of small businesses (according to 
Brooks: poor management, inability to find early stage financing, high overheads, etc.) 
(Brooks ,1986). The "Theory of Economic Development Through Entrepreneurship" believes 
that the entrepreneurial process of conceiving new business ideas and then initiating these 
ideas is the main basis of economic growth (Brooks, 1986). Economists who follow this 
model are therefore highly concerned with the 'gap' that exists between conceiving an idea 
and realising/'instantiating' the firm - Brooks believes that incubators are highly useful to 
narrow this gap: Once extraneous factors that lead to early stage failure of small businesses 
(poor management, no early stage financing, high overheads etc.) are controlled or 
eliminated, the projected increased survival rate of new ventures should lead to increased 
employment and an expanded tax base (Brooks, 1986: 26) 
Indeed, it is argued (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002: 1104) that there are severe 
market failures that prevent new firms (especially New Technology Based Firms, NTBFs) 
gaining access to key inputs; in particular, finance. For instance, in the high technology 
sector, banks lack the technical expertise required to judge the quality of a new business, 
and the firms often have no record or history on which most institutions base their lending 
decisions. Moreover, banks are generally prone to regard high-tech projects as being too 
risky (Storey, 1994). 
Another 'extraneous' factor, not so far considered, is that small businesses have a 
high failure rate because, in part, they are more dependent on narrow and often local 
consumers and producers than are larger firms. In 'State Investment in Business 
Incubator' Allen and Weinberg (1988: 196) argue that incubators can create a 'positive 
entrepreneurial environment' which will also avoid this dependence with the provision of 
pooled services and an enhanced ability to attract national and international custom 
through increased prestige. 
According to the European Commission Report (2002), three-quarters (77%) of 
incubators operate on a not-for-profit basis. Despite the wide variety of means in which 
incubators cover their operating costs, the majority still rely upon public subsidies, - there 
is a growing 'argument in favour of dependence on this source of revenue funding to be 
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minimised' (Ibid). Incubator operating costs are estimated at an average of 500,000 Euros 
74 per annum . 
PUBLIC FUNDING 
In their most basic and generic form, business incubators reduce the rate of small 
business failure. According to the NBIA (2000) between 87% and 90% of incubated 
businesses that graduated from an incubator are still in business. This is in comparison to 20% 
to 30% of non-incubated businesses (Ibid). "The effects of taking up residence in a business 
incubator also reach into the revenue stream of businesses, as the average firm's sales 
increase by more than 400% from the time it enters until the time it leaves the incubator and 
as startup firms in incubators annually increased sales by $240,000 each and added an average 
of3.7 full- and part-time jobs per firm (NBIA, 2000). 
Second to this incubators could play a positive role in technological Innovation. As 
Oakey (1995) points out, high technology, or new firms that innovate and invent (either 
products or services) promote dynamism in advanced economies. The 'diffusion' of new 
technologies is seen as a key economic role of small businesses (Thierstein and Wilhelm, 
2001: 315). These firms have the potential to revolutionise current practice and open up new 
markets, therefore it is in the public and government interest to support their development. 
For instance, in Taiwan, the government recognised a need to formulate an export-
orientated strategy, along with high-tech industrial development, in order to maintain 
economic growth (Hsu and Chiang, 2000: 123). Therefore, publicly funded Taiwanese 
incubator centres aim to provide favorable Research and Development environments - and 
reduce financial risks generally - for technical personnel or organisations entering into a new 
business (Ibid: 129). 
As for employmentit is stated in the introduction, locality and prevailing circumstance 
massively affect incubator objectives. For many incubators, generating new jobs is the main 
objective, although none of the recognised aims of incubators are mutually exclusive, it is 
most likely that in areas of high unemployment, job creation will be the main focus, whereas 
where unemployment is low, technology transfer and wealth creation may be the top priority. 
For instance, as Thirstein and Wilhelm explain in their survey of Swiss incubators, it was 
only since the early 1990s, when Swiss unemployment levels soared to 'unprecedented levels' 
that federal technology and innovation policy began to design their activities with regard to 
employment and the establishment of new firms and the subsequent creation of incubators 
(Thirstein and Wilhelm, 2001: 315). 
74 The highest proportion of cost relates to staff (41%) followed by client services (24%), maintenance of buildings and 
equipment (22%), and other costs such as utilities (13%) (EC Report, 2002) 
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According to the European Commission (Enterprise Directorate-General) Report (2002) 
on 'Benchmarking Business Incubators,' of the 900 reported incubators in Europe at the time 
of study, it was calculated that some 40,000 new (net) jobs were generated each year by 
incubators. 
A national Business Incubation Association (NBIA) survey showed that 87% of 
incubator 'graduates' are still in business. Importantly, the NBIA calculates the 'cost' of 
creating jobs through publicly funded incubators at around $1,100 each, whereas other 
public mechanisms 'often cost more' (1998, cited in Lalkaka, 2002) They go on to 
calculate that for every 50 jobs created by an incubator client, a further 25 jobs are 
generated in the local community. In total it is estimated by the NBIA that incubator 
clients and graduates have generated approximately 500,000 US jobs between 1980 and 
2002 (around 23,000 a year, on average). The Impact of Business Incubators study 
(NBIA, 1996) found that between 1990 and 1996 the average number of employees in the 
firms considered rose from 4.5 to 13 . 
As an instrument of employment creation incubators may favour those in the workforce 
possessing higher levels of skill (depending on each case, of course, on the characteristics of 
the population tenant firms). However, once established, new businesses can raise demand 
for services which are often provided by less skilled workers (such as copying, packaging, 
freight services, printing etc.) It should also be borne in mind that incubation is a medium - to 
long-term undertaking, unsuitable for responding to short-term employment crises. (OEeD, 
1999: 10-11). 
A final positive role could be the regional Development. Given the "local setting" of 
incubators, where jobs are created is an important consideration. The EC survey (2002) found 
that over three-quarters of the personnel recruited by companies came from the same areas 
where the incubators are located, which 'points to a favorable impact on local labor markets.' 
In the US, the high proportion of incubator 'graduates' are "mainly" said to be still located in 
their local communities (NBIA, 1998 survey, cited in Lalkaka, 2002). 
Furthermore, business incubators have often emerged as a response to 'industrial 
restructuring' (OECD, 1999: 8). In seeking to minimise social and economic damage caused 
to local communities by plant closures or technological, large companies have in some cases 
played a key role in the evolution of business incubation (Ibid). Business incubators 
sometimes introduce infrastructure previously lacking in a given community, and can 
improve operating revenues by extending services to nearby firms. (OECD, 1999: 9) 
In Australia, for instance, larger incubators frequently offer telephone answerphone 
services to local "home businesses". Incubators can also serve as a point of referral for 
local firms, signposting the range of business, training and financial support services 
often on offer for small firms and start-ups. Marketing and matchmaking services have 
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likewise been offered by some incubators, as well as by tenant firms within incubators. so 
as to facilitate outsourcing and supplier linkages between tenant and non-tenant local 
enterprises. (OECD, 1999: 9) 
The economic characteristics of the location in which an incubator is established 
will greatly affect its operation and usefulness. The areas chosen as incubator sites should 
ideally provide access to markets for goods and services (as small firms within an 
incubator stand to benefit from trade and networking with larger companies outside) as 
well as a degree of business expertise in the surrounding community, diverse financial 
resources (such as venture capital funds, business angels, banks etc.), and local 
commitment to the incubator programme. However, such ideal conditions will often be 
lacking, especially as incubators are often established in response to local economic 
distress. Consequently, prior to setting up a business incubator it may be necessary to 
improve the local climate for entrepreneurship so as to encourage demand for the services 
an incubator would provide. (OECD, 1999: 9) 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST PUBLIC FUNDING 
However, despite the significant justifications for public funding and wide variety of 
means in which incubators cover their operating costs, - there is a growing 'argument in 
favour of dependence on this source of revenue funding to be minimised' (EC Report 2002). 
Profit-orientated incubators have not been translated into profitability for the majority of 
public funded incubators (Bearse, 1998). Dependency on public finance inevitably leads to 
incubators operating in a "politically charged" environment, which can pressure 
"stakeholders" into constant demonstrations and advertisements of "success", under-report 
failures and over-report success, in order to justify continued public funding (Ibid.). 
This also makes research difficult as the political, and funding, implications of 
incubator failure make data on the success and failure of 'comparable non-incubated 
companies' extremely difficult to come by (Ibid). Despite reporting that incubated businesses 
do 'much better' than non-incubated firms, the NBIA does not track the number of companies 
that fail while in incubators, which would be a better comparison of success rates between 
incubated and non incubated start-ups (Brissett, 2001) 
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APPENDIX ( D ) 
National case studies 
National case study: republic of south korea 
Background, support structure and government involvement 
The rapid expansion of business incubators in Korea is one of the most important phenomena 
affecting the high-tech industries in Korea. Y ong Suk, (2008) presented the current conditions 
of Korean incubators and proposes what factors are important for their continual 
development. He showed how rapidly this new organisational model, business incubation, 
expanded in Korea after the IMF bailout crisis. Second, he explored what factors led these 
incubators to perform better and emphasise that better qualified technical, managerial, and 
administrative support of incubators are important success factors. 
After rapid growth throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early I 990s, Korea - which 
became an OECD member in 1996 - suffered a profound economic set back in 1997 when 
(alongside the south east Asian "tiger economies") it was 'bailed ouf by the international 
monetary fund (IMF). The economic crisis had a profound effect upon business practice and 
the pace and style of new venture creation. 
The decline of large conglomerates and heavy industry has seen a shift towards 
entrepreneurial start-up ventures, thereafter called 'certified venture firms'. These firms are 
defined for administrative purposes as businesses with significant R&D activity (over 5% of 
sales) and some venture capital (more than 10%) with products and services based on 
commercialising their own or publicly-funded research results (Ibid). These firms have grown 
four-fold in the last two years(1998-1999), to some 10,000 (as of Devember , 2000). A global 
entrepreneurship monitor (GEM )study found that in 2000, around 9% of Korean workers 
were employed in firms that were less than three and a half years old, compared with a half-
percent in Singapore and Japan. 
Although the first Korean incubator was started in 1993, the major expansion has taken 
place since the start of the century. As of 2004, there were 200, with plans for rapid expansion 
of numbers in place. The majority are sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy, Ministry of Business and Communication and the Small and Medium Business 
Association. The vast majority ( 85 per cent) are attached or affiliated to universities. The 
majority of incubators specialise in specific technological fields; for example half of all 
Korean incubatees are involved in internet and software-related work, around 14 per cent in 
equipment and instruments, 11 per cent in biotechnology. As of 2004, there were 
approximately 3,000 incubated companies and 1,200 graduates , with a total of 21,000 
employees in the incubators (ibid). The average area per incubator is 1,700 square meters, 
each with 15 tenants. 
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PROBLEMS 
Despite the large-scale expansion of the both the SME sector and the incubation process 
within Korea in less than a decade, there has been a relative failure in the area of for-
profit/private incubation. This is predominantly associated with the dotcom boom (and bust) 
which has seen the number of for-profit incubators reduced from 100 in 1998 to 10 in 2001 
(Hong, 2001). However, more recently (Kak-Bum,Bum: 2002 in Lalkaka, 2003) large scale 
national technology operators like Samsung, LG and Korea Telecom have started to enter the 
arena and develop their own incubator projects, although these projects remain closely tied to 
the parent company. Venture capital is also becoming more involved in financing incubator 
projects. 
NATIONAL CASE STUDIES: BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA 
In 'Business Incubation in Argentina' (2005) Hoeser assesses the relative failure of the 
Argentine incubator against the strong success experienced in the Brazilian economy. He 
identified several key factors that delineate the Argentinian and Brazilian experience and 
which may provide grounds for ascribing suitable economic and political conditions for 
incubator programmes. 
A. ARGENTINA 
BACKGROUND, SUPPORT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 
The stated aim of all Argentine incubators is to produce "technology based" 
"innovative" or "knowledged based" enterprises. This reflects the widespread belief that 
incubators are to provide a "link" between science and technology (ST) institutions (including 
universities) and the private/productive sector. 
Like 'many Latin American countries' the ST sector operates with a good deal of 
autonomy from the sector, state funding energized the ST sector through academic science in 
public universities and state sponsored institutes of technology. Significant public funding of 
these initiatives (which began in the 1950s) was intended as a (state directed) attempt to 
"boost" the economy in the medium and long term. The assumption was that: 'investing 
heavily in basic research in any country would generate a sufficient stock of scientific 
knowledge which applied research would eventually transform into new products and services 
to the productive sector' (Hoeser, 2003: 3). 
This is commonly referred to as a "linear" model of innovation in that it supposes a 
'linear' sequence of events from inventions to end-products. As such, the relationship 
between Argentine ST and the productive sector has been "supply side" orientated, the ST 
sector 'generates knowledge based on internally defined priorities of the ST organisations, 
without taking into account the needs of the productive sector (Ibid). 
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A further problem specific to Argentina was a growing "political" antipathy between 
the universities and the private sector that led to a decline in co-operation. 
At the national level, an incubation support network was created in 1997 and in 200 I 
the Science and Technology Secretariat of the Science Ministry, through the Argentine 
national technology fund subsidised 7 incubators for a total of $1,000,000 US. As of 2003, 
twelve incubators were operational in Argentina, with several others in the "launch phase", 
these incubators fall into the categories: run by universities, run by technology institutions, 
run by municipalities or run by 'an association of private actors.' There are no private sector 
for-profit incubators. All the incubators offer the standard facilities of accommodation 
, 
administrative services, lab equipment, business plan development and legal and financing 
advice. 
Problems 
According to Cardozo (2001 in Hoeser, 2003: 11) the 'general perception' of incubation 
m Argentina is one of 'failure', especially in comparison to its neighbour Brazil. This 
perception is based on the small number of incubators and incubatees, the extremely low 
number of successful enterprises leaving incubators, and the shut down of many new-
technology/internet incubators. 
There has also been a problem of low quality incubatees and 'lax quality standards.' 
However, there have been multiple obstacles to success in the Argentine case. One of 
the most salient problems has been a lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the 
different incubators and different sponsors. For instance, the City of Buenos Aires and the 
University of Buenos Aires are sites of political "conflict" between different "factions", 
however the city's four incubators are funded by one, or both, of the institutions. 
Another political problem has been the lack of continuity over time that comes with 
government changes and with it attitudes and funding resources for the incubation 
programme, This leads to instability and inconsistency in centralised administration and 
support of incubators. 
There are also various other problems that incubators have run into that do not fit into 
any broad categories. For example, in Argentina, scientific research is not produced for 
industry (Hoeser, 2003). This results in a lack of strong links with the market. Another 
problem that has arisen, that could be seen as both positive and negative, is that of business 
incubators being based on foreign models. This is positive not just when the country is basing 
itself on a model that has been successful, but more so if and when a country is able to 
translate the business model used, to their own specific country and its capabilities. Examples 
of this can be seen in Argentina, who based themselves on Italian business incubators 
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(Hoeser, 2003), and China who based themselves on North American business incubators 
(Harwit, 2001). 
B. The brazilian model 
Background, Support Structure And Government Involvement 
In Brazil, according to SEBRAE ,(2004), the movement of business incubation started 
in 1984 with the creation of five technological institutions located at Campina Grande (PB), 
Manaus (AM), Sao Carlos (SP), Florianopolis (SC) and Porto Alegre (RS). They had been 
created to transfer the knowledge from universities to companies. Up to 1987, Brazilian 
business incubators had not had importance, but in this year the National Association of 
Promotional Entities and Advanced Technologies (ANPROTEC, in portuguese), was created 
emphasising the concept of business incubators and entrepreneurship in Brazil. 
Currently, with over 400 incubators, the Brazilian incubation market is counted as the 
fourth largest in the world after the United States, Germany and China .. They are divided 
according their type as "55% with technological characteristics~ "19% with traditional 
characteristics;" 18% with mixed characteristics; and" 8% with others characteristics. In the 
last two decades the number of business incubator in Brazil increased in a fast pace ( 
Chandra, 2007 ) 
Brazilian incubators are generally linked to universities and funded by plural 
government and non-government sources. Financial support for incubators comes from 
federal government programmes such as the PNI (National Incubation Support Programme) 
Brazil was also early to form a comprehensive national science and technology (ST) park and 
incubation association (ANPROTEC) in 1987 which has shaped the evolution of the sector.' 
The Brazilian incubation experience first "took off in 1993 and in the year 2002 Brazil had 
over 200 operating incubators. Hoeser summarizes the key factors in Brazil's success as 'well 
defined' public policy, ideal conditions for entrepreneurs and a genuine demand for 
incubation services, which is designed to support new incubator creation and the expansion of 
existing ones. The PNI programme is supported by a coalition of government, industry and 
incubator associations, such as the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology, the CNPq 
(National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FINEP (Financing 
Agency for Projects and Studies), SEBRAE (Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support 
Service) and ANPROTEC (National Association of Incubators and Science Parks) 
(Scaramuzzi, 2002). A major feature of incubation in Brazil is the degree of private 
involvement - for instance, the Federation of Industries for the state of Sao Paulo (FIESP) 
operates a dozen incubators. The largest sponsors of incubators are not-for-profit and for-
profit organisations, accounting for 400/0 of the total (Lalkaka and ShatTer, 1999). The 
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coalition of partners that support incubators is a notable feature of the Brazilian incubation 
scene. 
Universities played a pivotal role in the creation of incubators in Brazil. Government 
agencies at the federal level play an important role in supporting incubators but seem to work 
synergistically with universities, industry and incubator associations. Incubators emerged in 
Brazil with the end of the military regime in the mid 1980s in a grass roots movement that 
included individuals from several sectors of society, particularly from the university. During 
the military era, innovation happened by central government mandate, which directed 
resources to selected industries related to national security. At this time, the private sector 
primarily sought technologies from foreign sources in lieu of home-grown R&D (Coutinho 
and Ferraz, 1995). Import substitution and technological self-sufficiency were the norm in the 
military government's Science and Technology policy in the context of a hierarchical, 
centrally planned system. By 1986, the National Research Council (CNPq) had created five 
technology parks and two incubators, one in Sao Paulo with the state government and one 
with the Federal University of Santa Catarina (Hoeser, 2003). After the fall of the military 
regime in the mid 1980s, the nexus of innovation shifted from a top-down approach to a 
bottom-up grass roots approach, with the incubator playing a key role in facilitating new 
venture creation at a local or regional level (Etzkowitz et aI., 2005). 
The most important difference between Brazil and Argentina seems to be the level of 
'co-ordination' and 'harmonisation' between the ST system/incubator programmes and 
government and the private sector. ANPROTEC is well funded and does not compete with 
rival organisations for dominance in the incubator sector, whereas Argentina's equivalent, the 
National Innovation System ('NS!') remains a "discourse" rather than a co-ordinated 
administrative body. 
Importantly, at a government level, the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MST) has been consistent in its co-ordination of ST policy since 1985. This means that 
funding mechanisms have been co-ordinated and productive interaction is welcomed with 
non-governmental bodies like SEBRAE, a Chambers of Commerce style organisation that 
provides not-for-profit support (including risk finance) for small businesses. 
In Argentina, changing governments meant changing policies and lots of "stopped 
programmes." An institutional support network did not exist before 1999. 
Conditions For Entrepreneurs 
One of the key mistakes of the Argentine model was to create incubators in areas which 
did not "need" incubation - either through identified SME failings or because of local 
regeneration initiatives. Instead, incubators were established on an arbitrary basis depending 
on where a province-finance awarded grants that did not seem to bear much relation to 
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"need". 'In such a context it is difficult for any new organisation to "find its niche" in a 
network of existing institutions' (Hoeser, 2003: 18) 
There is also a fundamental "opposition" between public and private sectors that 
incubators have failed to surmount. At a "cultural level" researchers in Argentina "tend to 
believe that their research is not produced for industry ... and do not want another measure of 
success apart from their publications' (Ibid). 
This cultural "mis-match" is also manifest m a general lack of integration and 
"networking-forming" in the areas and institutions around incubators. 
Demand 
At a practical level, the regulatory process of starting a company is unnecessarily strict 
and limits the amount of new SMEs available for incubation. 
Similarly, the ST system itself is relatively weak and Argentina's (1999) R&D spending 
(as a proportion of GDP) is less than half that of Brazil (Ibid: 19). This is also borne out in the 
Science Citation Index which show a significant lag behind the Brazilians (Ibid). 
Taken together these factors make for a relatively smaller number of ST based SMEs 
entering the marketplace which, inevitabl, undermines the physical need for incubators in the 
first instance. 
Hoeser (2003: 20) also lists 'without gomg into detail' other constraints upon the 
Argentine business environment as identified by the World Bank (2002): 
A lack of venture capital, the absence of a legal framework for risk capital 
A lack of credit I ines for SMEs 
A lack of social capital 
Difficulties with red tape in starting companies 
Uncoordinated SME policies 
Cultural aversion to entrepreneurs, individualism and the absence of an association 
culture. 
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Appendix (E) 
Research Methods 
Qualitative Research Methods 
The major qualitative research methods include the following: 
• Ethnographic research 
• Participant observations 
• Focus Groups 
• In-depth interviews 
These methods are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Ethnographic Research Method 
Ethnography is a qualitative research method and has roots in anthropology (Sarantakos, 
1998; Brewer, 2000; Seale, 2004). Ethnography is defined as 'collection of data that describe a 
culture' (Bernard, 1994). According to Toren (1996), 'ethnography is the analysis of the way in 
which collective relations between people at large inform what particular persons ... do and say'. 
According to Neuman (2000), ethnography is description of 'a culture and understanding another 
way of life from the native point of view'. Human activity is therefore the focus of ethnographic 
research (Richardson, 2000). In ethnography, data collection involves ethnographic fieldwork and 
ethno-historic research (Sarantakos, 1998). The primary method of data collection is 'participant 
observation' (Toren, 1996). Nonetheless, participant interviewing is also important in ethnography 
(Becker and Geer, 2004), which can be unstructured or semi-structured (Bernard, 1994). In 
addition, note taking by the researcher is also important in ethnographic research (Morse, 2003). 
Therefore, participants' observation, interviewing and field-note taking are essential in 
ethnographic research. 
The main strength of ethnographic research is that it helps in studying participants in their 
"natural" environment. It has, however, been criticised for its unwieldiness, highly subjective 
nature (Toren, 1996) and high cost in terms of both time and money (Neuman, 2000). 
Participant Observation 
Participant observation can be a part of an ethnographic research or an independent 
method of inquiry. Participant observations can be participatory or non-participatory, 
structured or non-structured, active or passive (Sarantakos, 1998); controlled or non-
controlled (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996) as well as reactive (obtrusive) or non 
reactive (non-obtrusive) (Bernard, 1994). 
The advantages of participatory observation research is that it can be applied to any 
subjects in any environment (Bernard, 1994; Toren, 1996) and, like ethnography, study 
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participants in their natural setting (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). It facilitates collection of 
first hand data (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996) and the study of the research 
problems that can not ordinarily be studied by other means (Bernard, 1994). This approach is 
more useful for micro level study (Neuman, 2000) and studying the participants that have. in 
some way, a "communication problem" (Johnson and Turner, 2003). 
The major disadvantages of participant observation include high costs and time 
consumption (Mahoney, 1997; Johnson and Turner, 2003), training and experience 
requirement for the observer (Bernard, 1994; Sarantakos, 1998), interruption of the privacy of 
participants and lack of control of the situation (Mahoney, 1997) and reactivity of the 
participants (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Johnson and Turner, 2003). In addition. 
participant observation is regarded as a tedious and unsuitable method for macro level study 
(Neuman, 2000) and can be associated with observer bias (Johnson and Turner. 2003). 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups are a useful way of examining ways in which people, in conjunction 
with one another, construe the general topics in which the researcher is interested 
(Bryman 2001: 337). According to Carey (1994), a focus group is 'a semi structured 
group session, moderated by a group leader, held in an informal setting, with the purpose 
of collecting information on a designated topic'; it is 'quite simply' a group interview or a 
group discussion. 
The focus group method allows the exploration of participants' views and 
experiences on a specific subject in some depth and as with the individual interview, the 
focus group discussion involves the exploration of ideas and interpretation of 'what 
people say' (Cronin 2001: 165). Unlike the individual interview, the focus group is 
dependent upon interaction between participants. For this reason the type of data 
produced is unique and is not merely a group-based facsimilie of the individual interview. 
According to Massey and Wallace (1991), the technique is intended to elicit knowledge in 
a group situation, allowing the researcher to see how participants "collectively make 
sense" of the issues and as participants bring to the fore the issues in relation to the topic 
that they deem to be important and significant. 
The duration and number of participants in a focus group varies. However, a smaller focus 
is methodologically superior than a larger group given problems of cohesion and logistics 
associated with larger group (Scheuren, 2004). A typical focus group, according to Johnson and 
Turner (2003), is composed of a homogeneous group of about 6 to 12 persons that discuss in 
depth on a given topic from 1 to 3 hOUTS. A facilitator or moderator leads the group and guides the 
discussion between the participants. In addition, a 'focus group interview protocol' is required that 
usually contains 5 to 10 open-ended items (Johnson and Turner, 2003). The purpose of organising 
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focus groups includes generation of ideas and elicitation of participants' opinions, attitudes and 
perspectives (Clapper and Massey, 1996). Focus groups are frequently applied for exploratory 
purposes and may be used for informed development of questionnaires and interviews in 
quantitative research as well as for enhancing understanding and interpretation of results and 
findings of previous research (Johnson and Turner, 2003). 
Merton et al (1956, cited in Cronin, 2001) cite four criteria necessary for a successful 
focus group discussion: (1) Range (2) Specificity (3) Depth (4) Personal context. Range refers 
to ensuring that the focus group schedule enables the maximum number of relevant topics to 
be covered. Questions should be presented so as not to inhibit participants from raising the 
topics of interest to them. Specificity involves ensuring that the facilitator 'encourages 
participants to move beyond the abstract and situate their talk in actual lived experience' 
(Cronin, 2001: 173). By adding clarity and revealing the 'lived' sources of attitudes and 
beliefs, respondents add Depth to their responses. The researcher may also pay careful 
attention to the Personal Context of participants' lives, that is, their social position or role and 
the social 'category' to which they belong which must be taken into account alongside the 
personal context of the other participants in any analysis. 
The level of facilitator "involvement" in the focus group should be extremely 
limited and relative 'free reign' should be given to participants. The advantage to 
allowing a fairly free reign to the discussion is that the researcher stands a better chance 
of getting access to what individuals see as important or interesting (Bryman, 2001: 342). 
However, the facilitator may need to be involved to respond to specific points that are of 
potential interest to the research questions but that are not picked up by the other 
participants. Clearly, the moderator has to straddle two positions: allowing the discussion 
to flow freely and intervening to bring out especially salient issues, particularly when 
group participants do not do so (Ibid) 
Focus groups, like any other research method, have advantages and disadvantages 
(Nielsen, 1997). The advantages of focus groups include: the absence of complex sampling 
techniques as required in surveys (Scheuren, 2004); usefulness for exploring participants ideas, 
decision and consensus making in a group setting (Johnson and Turner, 2003); generation of 
micro understanding of issues under discussion and production of empirical data for policy and 
planning of the issues(Gaber and Gaber, 2002). In addition, focus groups can be applied as a 
stand-alone method and/or in combination with other methods of inquiry (Johnson and Turner, 
2003). The disadvantages of focus groups, according to Gibbs (1997), include need for a lot of 
planning, training and experience to facilitate, organise and conduct focus group sessions; tape 
and lor video recording and note taking to facilitate transcribing of the data; problems 
surrounding the anonymity/confidentiality of participants; lack of representativeness of general 
population and limitations of (extemally) generalising the results. 
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An obvious alternative approach to the focus group would be to interview the individuals 
separately. In an interview setting individuals may be more forthcoming, or rather, less inhibited 
to speak out as they may in the highly 'socialised' focus group. It is also difficult to analyse the 
sheer volume of data produced by a 1-3 hour discussion. Moreover, the 'depth' of material yielded 
in a focus group is likely to be less than that provided by several individual interviews. Moreover, 
individual interviews have the advantage of eliciting a larger amount of aggregate data. However, 
this is also a disadvantage: whereas the 'issues that matter' tend to predominate in a focus group 
discussion and can be approximately ranked in terms of duration of discussion, level of 
agreement/disagreement etc. Given their unstructured nature, it is difficult to make any 
comparisons between individual 'open ended' interviews especially as standardisation of questions 
(e.g. a topic list) means that the agenda has already been 'set' by the interviewer. 
Importantly, this initial, qualitative approach allows for the "human" element of 
decision-making to emerge: 'causality is intrinsic to the internal world of meanings, motives 
and logics of the human actors and can only be established by research approaches which 
focus directly on these' (Curran and Blackburn, 2001: 121) Its use at a preliminary stage of a 
research project can provide insight on a topic and inform the development of an interview 
schedule or questionnaire (Cronin, 2001: 168). 
In-Depth Interviews 
The long interview technique is useful and effective in small business research (Wright and 
Geroy, 1990 in Siu and Kirby, 1999: 141). According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002), interviews 
require actual interaction between the researcher (interviewer) and the respondent (interviewee). 
Interviews can be of different types such as qualitative interview, quantitative interview and mixed 
interview (Johnson and Turner, 2003) Pure-qualitative interviews are unstructured and pure 
quantitative interviews are structured in nature where as semi-structured interviews are mixed i.e. 
both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews require 
greater skills from the interviewer compared to structured interviews. The interviews can be 
structured, unstructured and semi-structured. (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002)The pure qualitative 
interview, according to Johnson and Turner (2003), is unstructured, exploratory, open-ended and in-
depth, probing about and around the topic of interest. Whereas in the quantitative interview, all 
respondents are asked questions from a carefully written interview protocol and the questions are 
mostly closed ended and the exploring mechanism is pre-planned (Johnson and Turner, 2003). 
Interviews can be applied as a single method of inquiry as well as in combination with 
other methods. However, interviews are usually used in conjunction with other methods such 
as questionnaire surveys, observations (Johnson and Turner, 2003). The interview can be 
conducted either on telephone or in person. Personal interviews are conducted at the 
respondent's home or work place and are more expensive than telephone interview as well as 
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mail questionnaire survey. They provide rich and descriptive data and are important for 
complex information elicitation (Scheuren, 2004). On the other hand, telephone interviews 
are efficient in terms of time availability however they are associated with higher non-
response rates and are not free from bias (Freeman et aI., 1982). 
In an unstructured, in-depth interview, the interviewers 'simply have a list of topics 
which they want the respondent to talk about, but are free to phrase the questions as they 
wish, ask them in any order that seems sensible at the time, and even join the conversation by 
discussing what they think of the topic themselves' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 124). In this 
sense unstructured interviews can be regarded as a "guided conversation". 
It is 'particularly appropriate' (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 203) to use these open-
ended topic prompts when the object is to know the respondent's 'frame of reference' or the 
'level of information possessed.' A greater depth of response is allowable in the open-ended 
question; and since no clues are given for the answer, it would seem to invite a respondent to 
give authentic information to a question (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 202). 
The table (3.1) below shows the comparison between closed 'survey' interviews 
(discussed below) and in-depth interviews. 
Like other qualitative methods, non-standardised interviews are valuable as 'strategies 
for discovery' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 124). In-depth interviews are very appropriate for 
exploratory and inductive type of studies (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). Moreover, the 
interviewer can probe the interviewee for clarifications and further explanations (Johnson and 
Turner, 2003). The objective is 'to elicit rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative 
analysis ... its object is to find out what kinds of things are happening rather than to determine 
the frequency of predetermined kinds of things that the researcher already believes can 
happen'(Loftland, 1971 in Ibid: 125). 
However, 'since the response is open, it does take effort and high motivation for a respondent 
to react to the items and complete the instructions provided by the questionnaire maker' (Adams and 
Schvaneveldt, 1985: 202) hence low levels of response can be anticipated if either a) it is sent by 
mail or b) respondents are not properly targeted. (Therefore, in-depth interviews are optimally held 
'face to face' with participants who have made a prior agreement to participate.) Another drawback to 
these kinds of interviews is the risk of 'interviewer effects', traditionally this concern has centreed 
around matching the demographic characteristics of the interviewer and respondent. However, at a 
more general level, there is always the risk that the 'personal context' (as discussed above, in Focus 
Groups) of the interviewer may affect the respondents answers. Moreover, these types of interviews 
are relatively more expensive and time consuming compared to questionnaire surveys (Johnson and 
Turner, 2003) and require a skilled interviewer (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002) and the respondent's 
anonymity is low (Johnson and Turner, 2003). Sometimes, it becomes hard to interpret and analyse 
data collected by interviews (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002) 
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Table 3.1: comparison between Standard 'Survey Interviews and In-Depth Interviews' 
TYPICAL SURVEY INTERVIEW TYPICAL IN DEPTH INTERVIEW 
I. It has a clear beginning and end. I. The beginning and end are not clear. The interview can be 
picked up later. 
2. The same standard questions are asked of all respondents 2. The questions and the order in which they are asked are 
in the same sequence. tailored to specific people and situations 
3. The interviewer appears neutral at all times 3. The interviewer shows interest in responses, encourages 
elaboration. 
4. The interviewer asks questions, and the respondent 4. It is like a friendly conversational exchange, but with 
answers. more interviewer questions. 
5. It is almost always with one respondent alone. 5. It can occur in group setting or with others in area, but 
varies. 
6. It has a professional tone and businesslike focus; 6. It is interspersed with jokes, asides, stories, diversions. 
diversions are ignored and anecdotes, which are recorded. 
7. Closed-ended questions are common, with rare probes. 7. Open-ended questions are common, and probes are 
frequent. 
8. The interviewer alone controls the pace and direction of 8. The interviewer and member jointly control the pace and 
the interview. direction of the interview 
9. the social context in which the interview occurs is ignored 9. the social context of the interview is noted and seen as 
and assumed to make little difference important for interpreting the meaning of responses. 
10. The interviewer attempts to mold the communication 10. The interviewer adjusts to the member's norms and 
pattern into a standard framework. language usage. 
Source: adapted/rom BTlggs (1986), Dellzm (/989), Douglas (/985), MIShler (/986), Spradley (/979) ill Neumall (2003) 
Quantitative Research Methods 
The main quantitative research methods are as follows: 
Surveys (Questionnaire surveys and closed interviews - mail, email, telephone, face-to-
face), 
Causal modelling. 
Survey Method 
The aim of the method is to collect as much, comparable, information as possible -
particularly in the area of attitude measurement. Surveys are 'a method of gathering 
information from a sample of individuals' (Scheuren, 2004: 9). They are extensively used 
method for data collection (Neuman, 2000), and specifically for measuring opinions, 
attitudes, descriptions and causal relationships (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). Used for 
data collection in several fields (Neuman, 2000) surveys remain most popular in business 
studies (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). The researcher follows a deductive approach by 
beginning with a theoretical or applied research problem and ending with empirical 
measurement and data analysis (Neuman, 2000). The basis steps in conducting a survey 
research are depicted in figure 3.1. 
354 
The questionnaire could be descriptive and/or analytical (Ghauri and Gronhaug. 200:2). The 
development of the questionnaire requires considerable planning and consideration 
(Scheuren, 2004): it can be structured, semi structured or unstructured (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 
2002). Review of the relevant literature is vital in de\eloping the questionnair~ (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2002). The questionnaire may comprise closed-ended and open-ended questions, 
which can be operationalised as independent, dependent and extraneous variables ("\feuman, 
2000; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). The questions should be clear. concise. specific. 
straightforward, logically ordered and constructed in accessible language (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2002). 
Figure 3.1. Steps in the process of suney research. 
Step I 
Develop h) pothesis 
Decide on type of sun e) 
(m ail / telephone / intenic\\ ) 
Write suncy questionnaire 
D ccide on rcsponse categories 
Design 1<1) out 
1 
Step 2 
Plan ho \\ to reco rd data 
Pilot test survc) instrument i . e, que s t i () n n a i re 
I 
Step 3 
D ccide on target population 
Get sam p lin g !I'am e 
D ccide on sam pie size 
Select sam pie 
I 
Step 4 
Locate res po n d en ts 
Conduct sunc) 
Carefully record data 
I 
Step 5 
Enter data into computers 
Recheck all data 
Pertolm statistical anal) sis of data 
I 
Step 6 
Describe methods and findings in n:search repllrt 
Present findings to others 
Source :tltillptetl !rom( \CIIII/IIII. _'(I{)(): _'.'i I) 
. t tl rc~carcher should make ~ure tt) In de~igning the questionnaire ~lInc~ IIlstrumen lC 
/ . I abbreviations. emotional language. "prestige bia~", t\\(.) or more i\\oid Jargon. ~ (lng. 
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questions joint together, asking questions that are beyond respondents' understanding and 
asking future intentions under hypothetical circumstances (Neuman, 2000). The layout and 
length of questionnaire is important because it affects the response rate and responses (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2002; Scheuren, 2004). However, there is no standard length of the survey 
questionnaire (Neuman, 2000; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002); but it should not be too long and 
laborious from the respondent's perspective (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). The respondents 
should be selected via a form of probability sampling (e.g. simple random sampling), thus 
ensuring statistical significance. Maximising the response rate is essential in survey research. 
clearly if the nonresponse rate is higher then there will be greater biasing effect (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). There are no fixed response rate levels however. a response 
rate of 50% , 60% and 70% is regarded more like as more than adequate, good and very good 
respectively (Babbie, 1973: 165). The response proportion can be calculated by the following 
formula (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 200): 
R = 1- (n-r)/n 
Where R = response rate 
n = sample size 
r = responses returned 
Like all research methods the survey has specific advantages and disadvantages. According to 
Scheuren (2004), survey advantages include speedy and economical collection of a variety of 
generalisable data. Moreover, data generated by survey method is inherently statistical (and 
significant) in nature (Neuman, 2000). Data can be easily coded and quantified, and ranked75 • 
Moreover, the fixed-alternative question can be much more directly applied to a hypothesis because 
the data are quantifiable (and reduced to a 'common dimension') with much less effort (Adams and 
Schvaneveldt, 2005: 203).In addition, survey makes it possible to ask about several things at one 
time, measure several variables, test several hypothesis and survey many people, respondents, about 
their beliefs, opinions, characteristics and behaviours (Neuman, 2000). Another clear advantage to 
this approach is that it is much easier for participants to complete the questionnaire as they are less 
time consuming than open-ended surveys. Therefore, response rates are much higher. Moreover, 
there is increased speed at which responses can be gathered and processed and an absence of the 
interviewer effects that may undermine face-to-face interviews. 
Disadvantages of the survey comprise respondents' apathy and fatigue, low response 
rate, bias in results and sampling problems (Scheuren, 2004). Surveys are associated with 
errors, which occur due to badly designed sampling frames, non-response, question wording 
or order and researcher bias (Neuman, 2000).The "inflexible" nature of quantitative surveys 
75 Statistical analysis can easily take place using SPSS software. It is likely that a Likert scale will be used to rank the questions 
and measure response sets, this "vertical" format allows the questionnaire to be pre-codcd. 
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may miss crucial variables not considered by the researcher. Hopefully the secondary data 
sources, and prior primary research combined with significant piloting and careful targeting 
will avoid this problem and help to deliver accurate and relevant measures. 
Nonetheless, surveys suffered from further problems such as: 
1. Set questions with set answers (meaning the person taking the survey actually has to 
pick a certain answer even if it does not fit with how they feel on the subject. 
2. No way to expand on your answers. When I am asked a question I do not like to give just a 
yes or no answer I like to state my reasoning behind my decisions or my though process. 
3. Giving surveys you have to make sure that it is being answered by a variety of people. 
I find most surveys are limited to a certain group, ie houswives, working mothers, 
students, middle class, etc,. To get the most out of the survey it has to be offered to 
everyone from every background, race, nationality, religious and political background 
this is a daunting task 
4. Incentive to take the survey. If the survey takes more than a few mins then people will 
not complete it or even start it. Time is valuable and we all have so little of it. 
S. I know personally from taking a few surveys that it is aggravating not to know what 
has been deemed from the survey, I feel I have taken time out of my day to answer the 
survey at least I could be informed of the results 
6. With surveys or really any other test you can never be sure if you are be given the 
truthful answer or the answer that the survey taker thinks you want to hear, So 
scientifically they provide no real data 
Therefore, it is imperative, that surveys are conducted in conjunction with measures 
from other research instruments. 
There are several types of survey research. The most commonly applied survey types 
include postal surveys and (closed') interviews which could be on telephone or in-
person/face-to-face (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002; Scheuren, 2004). These are discussed in the 
following sections. 
Online Surveys 
Although there is still a great deal to learn about online surveys, the research to date is 
valuable to the developers and researchers using typs of data collection tool. Online surveys 
are an effective way to gather information quickly and relatively inexpensively from a large 
geographic region. E-mail and Web-based surveys are useful I many situation; however, it is 
important to emphasize that they are not appropriate for all types of survey research. 
Researchers should carefully assess the target audience, research objectives, and data 
reporting when selecting a survey format. (Sue and Ritter, 2007) 
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Postal Surveys 
The postal survey is also known as mail surveyor self-administered questionnaire survey. 
In the postal survey, a self-administered questionnaire accompanied with an introductory letter 
and a return envelop is mailed to the selected respondents (Babbie, 1973). This type of survey has 
several advantages (Babbie, 1973), which include minimising time, money and manpower 
compared to other types of surveys (Scheuren, 2004). This type of survey can be conducted by a 
single researcher, cover geographically scattered popUlation, respondents complete the 
questionnaire at their convenience, provide anonymity and avoid interviewer bias (Neuman, 
2000). The data collected can be easily analysed, particularly information from closed-ended 
questions (Johnson and Turner, 2003). However, this type of survey requires careful planning and 
pre-testing (Babbie, 1973). There are several disadvantages of this type of survey. Respondents' 
lists may be biased, incomplete and outdated (Scheuren, 2004). Questionnaire survey is not 
returned which results in low response rate (Neuman, 2000). Some time partially completed 
questionnaires are returned (Johnson and Turner, 2003).There is need for monitoring the returns 
and sending follow up mailings to non-responders (Babbie, 1973). The non response, according to 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) depends on the nature of the population and the kinds 
of questions asked. Researchers do not have control on conditions under which a survey 
questionnaire is completed (Neuman, 2000). A problem with all 'self-completed' items is that of 
"missing data" - certain questionnaires may be incomplete, illegible, or incomprehensible 
(Simmons, 2001: 87) Moreover, data analysis for open-ended questions demands significantly 
more time (Johnson and Turner, 2003) and the format of survey questionnaire provides limited 
choice to the researcher to ask questions (Neuman, 2000). 
Face-To-Face And Telephone Surveys 
The chief advantage to administering a survey interview - typically over the phone, or 
face-to-face - response rates are likely to be higher than those with a mailed out questionnaire 
whilst costs (especially over the phone) remain low. 
The three most common methods of data collection are mail surveys, face to face interviews 
and telephone surveys (Dillman , 1978). Each has inherent advantage. However when comparing 
the three, properly structured telephone surveys provide more control over data quality, collection 
speed and cost efficiencies. In addition, telephone surveys offer a researcher a means to combat on 
their greatest threats to data integrity, non response bias. Telephone response rate average 10-15% 
higher than the best conducted mail surveys (Frey, 1989). 
Face- to- face surveys have the biggest response rate among all methods. By using this 
method, the rate of missing or incomplete answers and the possibility for misunderstanding 
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questions or answers is the lowest, but it is relatively expensive and slow in comparison with 
telephone or web surveys. 
Mixed Methods Of Research 
CASE STUDIES 
The case study method is one of the research methods that use both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Bowling, 2000) it is also defined by Yin (2003: 13) as 'an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident'. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), the 'case study as a research approach focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings'. Case studies can be explanatory, exploratory and 
descriptive (Yin, 2003). The approach can be used for conducting applied, problem solving 
research, developing new theory and testing existing theory (Sterns et aI., 1998). Several and 
often complementary sources of data are used in case studies such as documentation, archival 
records, interviews, observations (direct and participant) and questionnaires (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003). The case study approach is suitable for business studies such as conducting 
intensive study of one or a small number of business networks engaged in doing business with 
each other (Halinen and Tornroos, 2005). In addition it is used in several other disciplines 
such as sociology, political sciences and social work (Yin, 2003) as well as economics (Sterns 
et aI., 1998; Roy et aI., 2005) and sustainable development (Bond et aI., 200 I). Case studies 
can be used to build theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) and provide knowledge about 
delicate processes of interaction (Romm and Hsu, 2002). Case study research is pluralistic in 
that epistemology-positivistic, normative, and prescriptive types of knowledge all contribute 
to the overall approach (Sterns et aI., 1998). 
However, the use of case study approach has been challenged (Yin, 2003) and criticised 
for not being a scientific research method particularly from generalisation perspective and 
being situation specific (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Romm and Hsu, 2002) thus undermining 
its external validity. 
Sampling 
Sampling a research population is essential, when a survey conducted, due to cost and 
time factors (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002: 112).A sample frame is defined as a 'listing of 
units from which the actual sample will be drawn' (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002: 112). 
However, finding or creation of sampling frame, (Sampling frams is the actuall set of units 
frome which a sample has been drown: in the case of a simple randome sample, all units 
from the sampling fram have an equal chance to be drown and to occur in the sample which 
rightly matches to the target population of interest, is not easy. 
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Types Of Sampling 
According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002: 113-114), sampling can be of following types: 
1. Probability sampling 
This type of sampling allows for statistical inferences, assessment of the amount of 
sampling error and there is known chances for each unit to be included. Examples of this type 
of sampling are: 
• Convenience or accidental sample 
• Judgement sample and 
• Quota sample (for example small, intermediate and large firms) 
According to Tashakori and Teddlie (1998, p7S), most common types of probability 
sampling include simple random sampling, systematic random sampling, stratified random 
sampling, proportional sampling, non-proportional sampling, cluster random sampling and 
multistage cluster sampling. 
Table 3.2: Types of Probability Sampling 
Type 0/ sample Description and sampling procedure 
Simple random sampling Every individual in a population has equal and independent chance of being 
selected for the study. The sample is obtained through selection by chance. a table 
of random numbers or computer generated random numbers. 
Systematic random sampling Based on the number needed in the sample. every nth person in the target 
popUlation is selected for the sample. 
Stratified random sampling This is used when the proportion of subgroups (strata) are known in the 
population; selection is random but from each of these strata 
Proportional sampling The proportion of each subgroup within the sample is the same as the proportion 
of each subgroup within the population 
Nonproportional sampling Regardless of the proportions in the population, the sample includes an equal 
number of individuals from each of the subgroups. The results are generalisable 
to the subpopulations rather than to population as a whole. This sampling 
strategy is useful for populations in which some minority groups do not have a 
large enough proportion that can be represented if simple random sampling is 
used 
Cluster random sampling Already formed groups of individuals within the population are selected as 
sampling units. Because the group is the unit of selection, a relatively large 
number of groups must be selected. A sample of five randomly selected schools is 
not a true cluster random sample 
Multistage cluster sampling This combines cluster sampling technique with others. For example, first select 
clusters such as school districts, then within each cluster select individuals I 
schools randomly or with certain attributes similar or stratified samples 
Source: adopted/rom Tashakkon and TeddJie (1998: 75)/ 
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2. Non-probability sampling 
This type of sampling does not allow for valid inferences about population, 
evaluating extent of the sampling variation, error of estimation and are unrepresentative 
and easy to draw. 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998: 75), most common types of nonprobability 
sampling include purposive sampling, sampling for homogeneity, sampling for heterogeneity. 
stratified nonrandom sampling, snowball or chain sampling, sequential sampling and 
convenience sampling. Description and sampling procedure about these is given in the 
following table. 
Table 3.3: Types or Non-probability Sampling 
Type of sample Description and sampling procedure 
Purposive sampling Selection of individuals/ groups based on specific questions/purposes of the 
research in lieu of random sampling and on the basis of information available 
about these individuals 
Sampling for homogeneity Cases are selected such that they have the same equality and / or magnitude of the 
attribute. Regardless of the size of the sample and depending on the objectives of 
the study, cases might be selected that are extreme or deviant/outliers, have a high 
intensity of an attribute, or are average/typical on an attribute. 
Sampling for heterogeneity Cases are selected such that their combination provide the maximum heterogeneity 
on certain attributes (e.g. ethnicity, education) that are important to the research 
objective of the study. Usually at least one case is selected from each level of the 
attribute. 
Stratified nonrandom This is similar to stratified sampling but in a non-random purposive, convenient 
sampling manner. Case or cases are selected nonrandomly (volunteer, available, and so on) 
from each subgroup of the popUlation under study. In sociological research, this is 
also known as 'quota sampling'. 
Snowball or chain sampling Select individuals on the basis of information obtained from others selected 
sample members or from other individuals. Because each new person has the 
potential to provide information regarding more than one other suitable case, the 
sample mushrooms as the study continues. 
Sequential sampling Start with a small sample and continue sampling until a desired level of certainty 
is achieved. In focus groups, for example, sampling stops when the new groups 
add little or no new ideas/themes to the ones already obtained in previous groups 
(saturation). 
Convenience Sampling is done on the basis of availability ~nd .ease of da.ta collection rather 
than in terms of suitability based on research obJectlvesl questIOns. These samples 
Sampling also include what is known as ' captive samples' (groups of individuals who are 
accessible to the investigator such as students in a class), 'volunteer samples'. 
accidental samples and so on. 
Source: adapted/rom Tashakkori and Teddl,e (1998: 76) 
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APPENDIX (G) 
Entrance And Exit Policies 
Based on a survey of US incubator managers, Lumpkin and Ireland (1988) identified three groups 
of screening criteria. A first group is labeled "experience of the management team" and contains 
management, marketing, technical and financial skills, experience and growth rate projection of 
the management team. The second group, "financial strength", includes profitability. liquidity, 
price earnings, debt and asset utilisation, personal investment of the management team and current 
size of firm. The written business plan, references from others, persistence, marketability of 
product/service, creativity, uniqueness of product/service and age of the management team are 
grouped under the denominator of' 'market and personal factors". They also observed that, in the 
late 1980s, a vast majority of the American incubators submitted their potential tenants to severe 
screening practices. Cluster analysis identified four types of incubators, each with a specific 
screening pattern. About 45.5% of the American incubators screened thoroughly on market and 
personal factors. This group obviously wants to create synergy between the internal capacities of 
the tenant (personal characteristics of the management team) and external opportunities in the 
market (market factors). A second cluster (15.2%) consists of no screening incubators. The third 
cluster (24.2%) had a strong financial emphasis. The last cluster (15.2%) screened mainly on 
personal factors. 
A study of Kakati (2003) reveals that entrepreneur quality, resource-based 
capability and competitive strategy are the critical determinants of a start-up's viability 
and achievement. The screening practice of the first cluster (thorough on market and 
personal factors) seems best to be able to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful 
starting enterprises. 
Steffensen et al. (2000) do not directly focus on screening practices, but observe a 
difference between two types of spin-offs from the University of New Mexico's (UNM) 
research centres: planned versus spontaneously occurring spin-offs. Planned spin-offs are 
initiated by the Research Centre and they are offered incubation facilities by the university. 
Spontaneous spin-offs are established with little encouragement from the research centre by 
an entrepreneur who identifies a market opportunity. The fact that only the planned spin-offs 
are incubated in the university indicates the presence of implicit screening practices. 
Efficient screening procedures are vital for an incubator and Lumpkin and Ireland 
(1988) identified dimensions that play a role. The next question then becomes: who is in 
charge of the screening process? Hackett and Dilts (2004) state some incubator policy 
prescriptions, based on their literature review. They conclude that the complexity of the tenant 
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selection process impels an advisory board, both for economic (understanding of the market 
and new venture formation) and political (e.g. secure subsidies) reasons. 
Although screening criteria have received more attention in the literature than most of 
the other individual components of the incubation process, these questions continue to be 
debated. Two methodologies have been developed. Lumpkin and Ireland (1988) employ 
cluster analysis to identify critical factors, while the U.S. Department of Commerce has 
developed constraint analysis for this purpose. The U.S. Department of Commerce has 
developed screening tools and computer simulation models that aid in the identification of 
new ventures with a high probability of achieving commercial success. These tools go 
through a three-stage process which seeks to determine first the attractiveness of the business 
a venture intends to enter, then the fit between the applicant and the business, and finally 
whether incubation is the best way to proceed. 
Merrifield (1987) developed a series of "entrance criteria" for incubation candidates. 
First he asks about the attractiveness and "fit" of the business (i) "Is this a good business in 
which anyone should be involved?" and then (ii) "Is this a business in which [the applicant] 
organisation has the competence to compete?" If these questions are answered in the 
affirmative, then he asks the final question (iii) "what is the best method for entry and/or 
growth?" If market entry and growth can be advanced by incubator tenancy then the firm 
should join. Similarly, the (UK) Enterprise Panel (1996, cited in Kirby, 2003) concluded from 
an investigation of British Incubators that they are most effective in helping start-up 
businesses 'with high growth potential to succeed.' Given as most young businesses would 
(hopefully) claim to have 'high growth potential', how does an incubator manager discern 
which businesses have the highest potential? Or, more specifically, which businesses will best 
realise their high growth potential within an incubator?76 
Applications to most established incubators may exceed available places (NBIA, 2002). 
Thus many incubators have in place an extended application and interview procedure wherein the 
entrepreneur's business idea and business plan are evaluated (Ibid). Typical considerations are (i) 
the businesses' suitability to the aptitudes and capabilities of the incubator type to which it is 
applying (ii) the profitability and growth potential of the business and (iii) the contribution to the 
local community. Clearly the specifics and relative weight of these considerations vary according 
to the particular incubator's sponsor, objectives and sector. 
First, a business must "fit" with an incubator's particular sector niche (e.g. technology, 
manufacturing, targeted). In all cases (including mixed use) it is likely that the manager will 
seek to host a 'complementary' range of businesses which may be able to provide goods and 
76 The current research (see Chapter 6) showed that Jeddah Business Incubator adopted four qualification criteria for admission 
and these were: Saudi national. resident in Jeddah. graduate from Saudi University and possession of license 
363 
services to one another or potentially collaborate on R&D. This also has the benefit of 
enhancing "camaraderie" between businesses within the institution. Similarly, an incubator 
manager may seek out "anchor tenants" who are able to provide specialist services to other 
tenants. Occasionally (for-profit) incubators will take a reduced equity in anchor firms in 
exchange for services provided to other tenants (Barrow, 2001). 
The application process itself typically begins with a written tenancy application. If the 
applicant meets with a broad set of pre-determined criteria, an interview with the incubator 
manager is scheduled. A further interview may be required with an Admissions or Review 
Board who would typically be made up of representatives from the sponsor organisation. As 
Garrity (2002) explains, the applicant's business plan will be discussed at these meetings and 
the decision to accept or decline tenancy will be predominantly based upon this document77 • 
The plan must also demonstrate how the business will be financed, - specifically 
whether it can be "self-financed" (e.g. from the entrepreneurs own funds, family or friends, or 
low-level unsecured borrowing) or whether it requires more significant start-up capital 
through bank loans or private investment (Garrity, 2002). Moreover, its eligibility to qualify 
for government and other public-body grants / loans will be assessed in this context of 
whether the start-up is financially viable. 
Finally, the incubator will 'want to see a full-time commitment from the entrepreneur' 
(Garrity, 2002). The entrepreneur's educational and professional qualifications and past 
experience (i.e. his or her CV) will also be a likely factor here. 
Some incubators expect prospective clients to have fully developed business plans, 
whereas others require a less developed idea and offer business plan development assistance. 
(NBIA,2006) 
In the event that the business plan is deemed "incomplete" but demonstrates high 
potential, the business may be invited to join the incubator wherein the plan will be further 
refined with the help of incubator staff (NBIA, 2002). 
Many incubators wish to encourage firms that playa role in, or "add value" to, the local 
community. This can take a number of forms. Clearly empowerment incubators specifically 
target local community projects, but any incubator can potential play an important role in 
regeneration, job creation, technology transfer etc. 
We can therefore loosely summarize entry criteria as involving some or all of table 2.3 
77 The business plan should show a clear demonstration of a market. meaning there are people who are ready. willing and able to 
buy the product or service. (Garrity. 2002) 
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Table 2.3: Incubator entry criteria 
Type of business Business Plan Communit), Role 
Does it fit with incubator type? What are the prospects for growth? Does it "add value" to the local 
community? 
Does it complement the "mix" of Is there a market for the 
businesses within the incubator? product/service? 
Can it offer specialist services to other Is finance available? 
tenants? 
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APPENDIX (I) 
Development Plans 
Table 8: Expenditures During the Saudi Development Plans. 
Economic Human Social and 
Resource Resources Health Infrastructure Total 
Expenditures Development Development Development 
Development 
SR (%) SR SR SR SR Billion Billion (%) Billion (%) (%) (%) Billion Billion 
First Plan 9.5 27.7 (1970-74) 7.0 20.6 3.5 10.3 14.1 41.4 34.1 100 
Second Plan 
97.3 28.0 51.0 14.7 27.6 (1975 - 79) 8.0 171.3 49.3 347.2 100 
Third Plan 192.2 30.7 115.0 (1980-84) 18.4 61.2 9.8 256.8 41.1 635.2 100 
Fourth Plan 71.2 20.4 115.1 (/985 -89) 33.0 61.9 17.7 100.7 28.9 348.9 100 
Fifth (1990- 34.1 10.0 164.6 48.0 68.0 20.0 74.2 22.0 94) 340.9 100 
Sixth Plan 48.2 11.5 216.6 51.5 87.5 (/995 - 99) 20.8 68.1 16.2 420.4 100 
Seventh Plan 41.7 8.5 276.9 56.7 95.8 (2000-04) 19.6 73.8 15.2 488.2 100 
Source: SAMA 2002. 
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE EIGHT DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The First Development Plan (1970-1974) 
Emphasized the Kingdom's rapid transformation into a more 'advanced nation by 
focusing on providing a modem infrastructure and basic government services such as water 
supply and electricity generation as well as expanding social services and developing human 
resources' (Cordesman 2003: 344). 
The Second Development Plan (1975 -1979) 
Involved over a ten-fold increase in expenditures over the first development plan, after 
the rise in oil prices following the 1973 embargo. As in the first plan, the emphasis was on 
infrastructure to enable the acceleration of socio-economic development. The major areas of 
infrastructure development were: 
1. Transport, electricity, water and housing 
2. conservation and development of hydrocarbon resources 
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3. the modernization of the Kingdom's 'administrative structure: 
4. the support of the private sector, establishing credit funds and policies aimed to 
support private sector activity 
The Third Development Plan (1980 - 1984) 
The third plan almost doubled the expenditure of the second. With much 
'infrastructure' in place, the Kingdom now needed to make 'more efficient use of foreign 
labour' (Cordesman 2003: 346). It focused on making structural changes in the economy by 
defining oil and gas production levels in ways that would maintain national resources, 
continuing to build hydrocarbon industries and completing infrastructure projects (Ibid). 
The Fourth Development Plan (1985 -1989) 
The fourth plan saw a major shift in focus. A priority was to re-structure the economy 
to allow the private sector to playa role in the development process, and a major emphasis 
was placed upon industrial diversification. Population growth was increasingly recognised as 
a problem, hence the 33% allocation to human resource development. 
The Fifth Development Plan (1990 -1994) 
This plan was massively influenced by the 1990 Gulf War and the realisation that oil 
prices were increasingly volatile. Again, the private sector was encouraged to 'provide 
services in areas where the government had previously provided services' (Ibid: 347). 
Increasing the 'technology base' was also a priority. Overall, the plan saw a downward shift 
in government spending and a further decline in infrastructure development. 
The Sixth Development Plan (1995 - 2000) 
By the sixth plan, Human resources development rose to 51.5% of the total budget. 
Focusing on private enterprise and the non-oil sector the plan included the following 
macroeconomic strategies: 
a shift from government expenditures from consumption and current operating 
expenditures to investment 
a steady increase in opportunities for the private sector through the gradual and 
selective use of alternative financing and privatisation initiatives. 
Mobilization of the private sectors financial assets by broadening the domestic capital 
market 
Reductions in the number of low-skilled foreign workers and increased capability of 
the Saudi workforce in order to improve productivity. 
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The Seventh Development Plan (2000 - 2004) 
As discussed above, the plan continues to emphasise the need to address the Kinodom's 
eo 
increasingly urgent human resources problems. Macroeconomic objectives include: 
Diversify the economy by generating a non-oil sector growth of 4.0 1 % per year, 
expanding the role of the nonoil sector from 68.4% to 71.6% by 2004. 'Much of this 
growth should be targeted at the manufacturing sector, rather than the service sector' 
(Cordesman 2003: 351). 
Enhance the private sectors involvement in the petroleum industries. 
Increase the role the Saudi Credit Bank plays in investing in small businesses 
Increase the share of national manpower in total employment from 44.2% to 53.2% 
and replace 488,600 workers with Saudi nationals. 
Develop human resources and the value of Saudi nationals through programmes that 
expand higher education, with an increased emphasis on on-the-job training, by 
increasing technical school enrolment from 33,000 to 55,000. 
Develop a national manpower database to match individuals with appropriate jobs for 
their level of qualification 
Like other plans, the Seventh stresses the importance of a continued drive toward 
privatisation. There is an urgently growing need for the level of foreign investment and private 
sector growth that can alleviate the government's capital budget deficit (Cordesman 2003: 354). 
The Eighth Development Plan (2005 - 2010) 
The Eighth Development plan saw a continuation, and relative acceleration, of the SME 
policies introduced by the Seventh plan. Notably, the role of the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) was expanded to finance more loans to the SME sector. The Fund 
now operates a special loans programme which works alongside private Saudi banks to 
provide an equal distribution of SRIOO million each(£16 million), which will be disbursed by 
the SIDF (Radwan, 2005: 199). At the same time, the Saudi Credit Bank is to expand the 
scope of its SME lending, raising the current lending ceiling to SR 200,000(£32 million) per 
firm (Radwan, 2005: 199). 
The objectives and strategic principles of the Eighth Development Plan comprise the 
creation of an adequate "enabling environment", which enhances the activities of the private 
sector and encourages it to implement more investments and to playa leading role in the 
economic development process. Given the constraints, which impede the development of the 
private sector, it deems imperative to (1) support private sector development through the 
creation of an appropriate investment climate, (2) enhance the role of the commercial banks in 
supporting the development activities of the private sector, (3) develop the capital market, (4) 
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re-activate the privatization program, and give more opportunities to SMEs to contribute to 
the development of the economy (Phillai ,2006) 
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APPENDIX ( K) 
Questionnaires: 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in the Industry and Technology Sectors 
This questionnaire is part of my Doctoral research at the University of Surrey in England. My 
thesis looks into the prospects for, and suitability of, the introduction of business incubators in 
developing economies. Its particular focus is on the potential introduction of business 
incubators in Saudi Arabia. This questionnaire is trying to find out about the current situation 
of Saudi technology and industrial SMEs, the business climate in Saudi Arabia, the support 
facilities that are available and the attitudes towards and knowledge of business incubation 
processes 
The results will be treated in strictest confidence and analysed on a non-personal 
aggregate basis. They will be used solely for academic purposes, though clearly the findings 
could have practical significance for the introduction of incubators in developing economies 
in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. Should you wish to know more, please do not 
hesitate to contact me (amasa} 01@hotmail.com) or my supervisor, Professor David A. Kirby 
(D.Kirby@surrey.ac.uk). Thank you for your support. 
ABDULATIF M. ALSHEIKH 
COMPANYNAME ________ __ 
ADDRESS ________________________ __ 
I YOUR DETAILS 
YOUR NAME: ______ _ 
YOUR AGE: _____ _ 
JOB TITLE: ____ _ 
HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION ACHIEVED: 
D DOCTORATE 
D MASTERS 
D BACHELORS 
D TERTIARY 
D HIGH SCHOOL 
D OTHER 
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YOUR POSITION: 
DOWNER 
o PARTNER 
o DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER 
o DIRECTOR, BUT NON SHAREHOLDER 
o OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
I YOliR C()\II'.\'\' 
IMPORTANT NOTE: IF YOU DO NOT KNOTt· THE PRECISE FIGURES PLE~SE ,\ 1.·1 KE .~.\' ESn\l.~ TE 
TYPE 
1. Please Describe the Business' Main Area of Acti\ity ____ _ 
2. HOW LONG AGO WAS YOUR BUSINESS FOUNDED? 
o LESS THAN ONE YEAR 
o LESS THAN TWO YEARS 
o LESS THAN FIVE YEARS 
o LESS THAN TEN YEARS 
o MORE THAN TEN YEARS 
OWNERSHIP 
3. How Would You Describe the Ownership Structure of Your Business? 
DOWNER-MANAGED 
D FAMILY-OWNED 
o INDEPENDENT LTD 
o GROUP SUBSIDIARY 
o PLC 
EMPLOYEES 
.t. In Total, How Many People Work in the Business? (Full Time Equivalents) ---
5. How Many Nathe Saudis Work in the Business? (Full Time Equhalent) ---
6. How Many Foreign Nationals Work in the Business? (Full Time Equivalent) ---
7. Please List the Educational Qualifications of the Five Most Senior ;\lembers of the Business. 
then, Please Describe the Subject Area of their Final Qualification. 
.JOB II II.I-
111(;11 S(\I00L 
DlPIO\1 \ 
o 
o 
o 
B.\OIELORS 
DEGREE 
o 
o 
o 
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CR\Dl \ II 
DEGRII 
o 
o 
o 
DOCTOR \ II 
n 
o 
o 
MARKET 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
8. How are Your Sales Geographically Distributed by Percentage 
Local (within 80 km of enterprise) 
Regional (within 300 km, exclude local) 
National (within Saudi Arabia, exclude local and 
regional) 
International 
FACILITIES 
Total: 100% 
9. Does Your Business Currently Have Access to the Following: 
o TELEPHONE 
o FAX 
o DIAL-UP INTERNET 
o ADSL OR HIGH-SPEED INTERNET 
10. Do You Currently Have a Website? 
DYes 0 No 
11. Do You Have Secretarial Support? 
DYes 0 No 
FINANCE 
o 
o 
12. When the company was formed, which of the following sources of finance were used? Please 
rate the impact of each of the sources used by ticking the boxes below. 
Overall impact 
Source High Medium Low 
o Directors' own funds o o o 
o Parent Company o o o 
o Private investors (including "business angels") o o o 
o Family and/or friends o o o 
o Saudi Credit bank loan o o o 
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o Venture capitalist fund o o o 
o Chamber of Commerce grant 
0 0 0 
o Private bank loan 0 0 0 
o Government grant 0 0 0 
o Other public grant 0 0 0 
o Other, please specify: 0 0 0 
13. Please describe any problems encountered in raising capital for the business 
PLANNING 
14. Before establishing your business, did you do any of the following: 
o Attend workshops or seminars related to the business 
o Produce a feasibility Study 
o Produce a Business Plan 
o Have a marketing plan 
I TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
15. During the last five years, did your business introduce any products and/or processes that 
were: 
Product(s) Process( es) 
Entirely new to your firm? DYes DNo DYes DNo 
Significantly improved to DYes DNo DYes DNo 
your firm? 
Entirely new to your market? DYes DNo DYes DNo 
Significantly improved to DYes DNo DYes DNo 
your market? 
16. Approximately, how was your turnover last year distributed between products that were: 
New to your firm 
Significantly improved 
Unchanged or only marginally modified 
Total turnover in last year: 100% 
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17. If you didn't improve or develop any new products or processes, please give a reason you: 
18. Please indicate your sources of R&D and rate their overall impact by ticking the appropriate 
boxes: 
Overall impact 
Source High Medium Low 
._-_............ . .... _ .._ ..... -.-... __ ..... _-_ .. _ ... -
_ .... _ .......... _-_ ... 
o Your own company 0 0 0 
o Your suppliers 0 0 0 
o Other companies 0 0 0 
o Parent company 0 0 0 
o Consultancies 0 0 0 
o Universities/research institutes 0 0 0 
o Other, please specify: 0 0 0 
I PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SUPPORT 
19. Do you feel that you are well informed about the range of government finance support 
available to SMEs? 
D YesD No 
20. Can you name any of the financial support programmes that you have heard about? 
DYes D No 
If Yes, please describe. ____ _ 
21. Have you applied for a government grant in the last three years? 
DYes, one 
DYes, more than one 
D No 
23. Have you received one or more government grants in the last three years? 
24. How did you hear about these grant(s)? 
25. Please rate the following features of the government grant schemes that you have applied for? 
Excellent Good Average Poor Very poor 
-----~~----------.. -.. ----<' .. -.. -.. 
. -... .. _ ........... - ................. _ ........... _ .. _ ................. - .... __ ........ , .. -........ _ .............. _. __ .... -..... -..... -....... -, ..... -.. --.. ,------.. ~ .. -... -.-.... _ .... _.-.. -...•. _--_. __ .•.. _-_ .. _--
Publicity about these schemes 0 0 0 0 0 
Simplicity of application system 0 0 0 0 0 
Speed of application process 0 0 0 0 0 
Understanding of SME needs 0 0 0 0 0 
---_ .. _-_ .. _ .. -----------_ ....... __ ....•.. - _. __ ._------_ .... __ .. _----
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26. If you rated any ofthe features above as "Poor" or "Very Poor", please explain why: 
22. Have you applied for a government loan in the last three years? 
DYes 
DYes, more than one 
o No - If No, go to question 
26. Have you received one or more government loans in the last three years? 
DYes 0 No - If No, go to question 
24. How did you hear about these grant(s)? 
25. Please rate the following features of the government grant/loan schemes that you have applied 
for? 
Publicity about these schemes 
Simplicity of application system 
Speed of app\ ication process 
Understanding of SME needs 
Excellent 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Good 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Average Poor 
.-.......................... _ ... _.- .. _-_. __ .... _ .. __ ... _---._--
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
Very poor 
D 
D 
D 
D 
26. If you rated any of the features above as "Poor" or "Very Poor", please explain why: 
27. Are you a member of a Chambers of Commerce? 
DYes 
DNo 
Irrespective of membership, have you ever visited the chamber of commerce small business 
support unit? 
DYes - physically 
DYes - on the internet 
DNo 
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28. Have you ever attended workshops, seminars or training programmes held b the Chambers 
of Commerce? Y 
DYes ONo 
Improving support 
29. What, in your opinion, could the Government do to better support SMEs? 
I NETWORKS AND EXTERNAL PARTNERS 
30. Have you ever undertaken R&D in partnership with a University or DYes D No 
research institute? 
If Yes, please name which one(s) below. 
31. To what extent do you agree with the following statements describing your overall experience 
with joint R&D projects with University/research institute(s)? 
Brought in fresh point of view 
Brought in expertise 
Reduced development time 
Cost-effective 
Strongly Somewhat Neither agree Somewhat Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree 
D 
o 
o 
o 
o 
D 
D 
o 
D 
D 
o 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
D 
D 
............. n ............... , ••••••••••••• , ...................................................................................... , ••••••••••••••• - •••••••••• ~~ •••• M ...... • .... ·n .................................. . 
. .......... __ ................ . ................ _--_ .. __ ........... . ....... .- .... _ ... _._...... . .- ......... -......... - .... . 
Other comments: 
32. How did you get in contact with the University/research 
institute(s)? 
33. Irrespective of whether you have conducted R&D projects with Universities/research 
institutes, please indicate to what extent you agree that the following are legitimate barriers to 
these kinds of partnerships: 
Strongly Somewhat Neither agree Somewhat Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree 
Don't need outside help 0 0 0 0 0 
No time to investigate 0 0 0 0 0 
Too expensive 0 0 0 0 0 
They were not receptive 0 0 0 0 0 
Bad experience in the past 0 0 0 0 0 
Couldn't find suitable advice 0 0 0 0 0 
Didn't know any advice was available 0 0 0 0 0 
Loss of commercial secrets 0 0 0 0 0 
Issues of ownership and intellectual property 0 0 0 0 0 
Other, please specify below: 0 0 0 0 0 
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34. Have you ever undertaken R&D jointly with other 0 Yes 
business(es)? 
o No - I f No. please jump to 
question 34 
3~. T? ~hat extent do yo~ agree.with the following statements describing your overall experience 
with Jomt (e.g. R&D) projects with other business(es)? 
Strongly Somewhat 
agree agree 
-'''-'''~''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''...... ...................... . .................................................................................. - ................ _ ... __ ..... . .............................. --.... . 
Brought in fresh point of view 
Brought in expertise 
Reduced development time 
Cost-effective 
Other 
comments: 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Neither agree Somewhat Strongl~' 
nor disagree disagree disagree 
. ........... ---.-.. 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
......... - .. -.-.--_ .. _.-
36. Irrespective of whether you have conducted joint (e.g. R&D) projects with other business(es), 
please indicate to what extent do you agree the following are legitimate barriers to this kind of 
partnerships: 
Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly 
agree agree agree nor disagree disagree .......~i.~_'.lg~~_~ 
......... " ........................................................ ...... , ................................... 
. ............................ _ .......... . ............ -.. __ .......... 
Don't need outside help 0 0 0 0 0 
No time to investigate 0 0 0 0 0 
Too expensive 0 0 0 0 0 
They were not receptive 0 0 0 0 0 
Bad experience in the past 0 0 0 0 0 
Couldn't find suitable advice 0 0 0 0 0 
Didn't know any advice was available 0 0 0 0 0 
Loss of commercial secrets 0 0 0 0 0 
Issues of ownership and intellectual 0 0 0 0 0 property 
Other, please specify below: 0 0 0 0 0 
INCUBATORS 
37. Do you know what a business incubator is? 
DYes D No 
38. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about business incubators: 
They are designed to help all sizes of businesses Agree 
The incubated businesses are always owned by the incubator 
They typically provide secretarial support 
They reduce start-up costs 
Facilities (e.g. office equipment, meeting rooms) are often shared in an incubator 
Going into an incubator is a more expensive way of starting a business 
They offer reduced, or sometimes free rents 
They usually offer training 
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D Disagree 
D 
o 
D 
o 
D 
o 
o 
D 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Incubated businesses can stay in the incubator as long as they like 
Any business can join an incubator as long as it's willing to pay 
Read the following definition: 
D 
D 
D 
D 
"Here is a brief definition of a business incubator. Business incubators are designed to help small 
businesses in the start-up phase, they are usually a property with small work units which provides an 
instructive and supportive environment to entrepreneurs at start-up during the early stages of business. 
Typically a number of new and growing businesses operate under one roof with affordable rents, 
shared support services, business development services and office equipment, with each business 
having equal access to a wide range of professional, technical and financial programmes." 
39. If the university or local municipality launched an incubator now, would you be interested in 
applying? 
DYes 
DNo 
D Don't know 
40. What do you think the main benefits to your current business of joining an incubator would 
be? 
Very Quite Neither Quite Very important nor important unimportant unimportant unimportant unimportant 
.......•. _ ........... __ .. _ .......... _ .......... 
.. M ................. "·.·· .. ••••••••••• .. •••••••• .. ,·,,,,,········· ..... ,. 
Help with financing 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with training 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with marketing 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with business planning 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with management skills 0 0 0 0 0 
Contacts with other businesses 0 0 0 0 0 
Help from mentors 0 0 0 0 0 
Access to business premises 0 0 0 0 0 
Shared facilities (e.g. secretarial, phone internet, 0 0 0 0 0 
meeting rooms) 
41. Are you aware that a business incubator is currently under construction in the Eastern 
Province? 
DYes 
DNo 
If yes, please describe what you have heard ______ _ 
42. Do you have any other comments or suggestions to make about support for industry a~d 
technology-based SMEs and/or the concept of business incubation that we have not covered In 
this questionnaire? 
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43. Do you have any comments that you would like to make about this questionnaire? 
Thank you for taking part in the survey. 
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QUESTIONNAIRES: 
Final Semester Business And Science Students 
This questionnaire is part of my Doctoral research at the University of Surrey in England. My 
thesis looks into the prospects for, and suitability of, the introduction of business incubators in 
developing economies. Its particular focus is on the potential introduction of business 
incubators in Saudi Arabia. This questionnaire is attempting to find out about the current 
nature of the relationship between universities and business, the experiences of students and 
staff in terms of their involvement with business and the attitudes of academics towards, and 
knowledge of, business incubation. 
The results will be treated in strictest confidence and analysed on a non-personal 
aggregate basis. They will be used solely for academic purposes, though clearly the findings 
could have practical significance for the introduction of incubators in developing economies 
in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. Should you wish to know more, please do not 
hesitate to contact me (amasa 10 I @hotmai1.com)or my supervisor, Professor David A . Kirby 
(D.Kirby@surrey.ac.uk). Thank you for your support. 
Abdulatif M. Alsheikh 
University ___ _ 
I YOUR DETAILS 
Your name 
----
Date of graduation _____ _ 
Your degree ______ _ 
DepartmentIFaculty _____ _ 
I FUTURE PLANS 
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1. What do you expect to be doing in 12 months time? 
o Employed in the public sector 
o Employed in a large (national or international) private sector company 
o Employed in a small, local firm in the private sector 
o Self employed, running my own business 
o Don't know 
2. If you were given a choice of a career in either the public or private sectors. which 
would you prefer? 
o Public(government) D Private 
Please give any reasons for your choice 
3. Do you currently have any offers of employment for when you graduate? 
DYes D No If yes, please give details ______ _ 
..t. Are YOll currently engaged in any paid employment? 
DYes D No If yes, please give details of the position ___ _ 
5.How likely is it that you will start your own business in the next five years? 
o Very likely 
o Likely 
D Neither likely nor unlikely 
DUnlikely 
D Vcry unlikely 
6. If you were going to set up a business in Saudi Arabia, how would you rate the 
following problems in terms of importance? 
Yer~ 
importnnt 
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Quite '\eithn Quite Yen 
importnnt important nor unimportant unimportant 
7. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about starting up a 
business? 
Strongly Neither 
Agree agree nor Disagree 
agree 
disagree 
It is important that people involved in the business 0 0 0 0 receive proper training 
New businesses need mentoring 0 0 0 0 
It is important to have a marketing plan before 0 0 0 0 starting the business 
It is important to have a business plan before starting 0 0 0 0 the business 
It is important for a new business to make contacts 0 0 0 0 with other businesses 
LEARNING EXPERIENCES 
8. During your university studies have you ever: 
Learned about writing a Business plan 
YEsDNOD 
Written a Business plan 
YEsDNOD 
Learned about writing a Marketing plan 
YEsDNOD 
Written a Marketing plan 
YESDNoD 
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Strongly 
disagree 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9. Have you ever spent time with a commercial organization (e.g. an internship) as part 
of your University course? 
DYesD No 
If no, go to question 12 
10. In terms of your future intentions, did you find your most recent commercial 
experience: 
D Very helpful 
D Quite helpful 
D Neither helpful nor unhelpful 
D Quite unhelpful 
D Very unhelpful 
Please give details of the business 
--------
Please give details of your position within the business 
How long was your placement with the business? 
-------
-------
I INCUBATORS 
11. Do you know what a business incubator is? 
DYes D No 
12. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about business incubators: 
They are designed to help all sizes of businesses Agree 
The incubated businesses are always owned by the incubator 
They typically provide secretarial support 
They reduce start-up costs 
Facilities (e.g. office equipment, meeting rooms) are often shared in an incubator 
Going into an incubator is a more expensive way of starting a business 
They offer reduced, or sometimes free rents 
They usually offer training 
Incubated businesses can stay in the incubator as long as they like 
Any business can join an incubator as long as it's willing to pay 
I READ THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION: 
D Disagree 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
o 
o 
o 
o 
"Here is a brief definition of a business incubator. Business incubators are designed to help small 
businesses in the start-up phase, they are usually a property with small work units which provides an 
instructive and supportive environment to entrepreneurs at start-up during the early stages of business. 
Typically a number of new and growing businesses operate under one roof with affordable rents, 
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sha~ed support services, business development services and office equipment, with each business 
havmg equal access to a wide range of professional, technical and financial programmes." 
13. If the University or local municipality launched an incubator before you graduated, 
how would it affect your attitudes towards starting a business? 
o Much more Enthusiastic 
o More Enthusiastic 
o Neither more enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic 
o Less enthusiastic 
o Much Less enthusiastic 
14. What do you think the main benefits to you of joining an incubator would be? 
Very Quite Neither Quite Very 
important unimportalll important nor unimportant unimportant 
"nimportant 
........ " ............................. ", ... ,., .................................... " . 
........................ -..... 
................•.... ............ -. 
. .... --.... -... ~-... - .. --... 
Help with financing 0 0 0 0 0 
Reduction of start-up costs 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with training 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with marketing 0 0 0 D 0 
Help with business planning 0 0 0 0 0 
Help with management skills 0 0 0 0 0 
Contacts with other businesses 0 0 0 0 0 
Help from mentors 0 0 D D 0 
Access to business premises 0 0 0 0 0 
Shared facilities (e.g. secretarial, 0 0 0 0 0 phone internet, meeting rooms) 
15. Do you have any other comments or suggestions to make about your future plans, 
experiences and knowledge of business and the concept of business incubation that we 
have not covered in this questionnaire? 
16. Do you have any comments that you would like to make about this questionnaire? 
Thank you for taking part in the survey. 
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QUESTIONNAIRES: 
Business Academics 
This questionnaire is part of my Doctoral research at the University of Surrey in England. My 
thesis looks into the prospects for, and suitability of, the introduction of business incubators in 
developing economies. Its particular focus is on the potential introduction of business 
incubators in Saudi Arabia. This questionnaire is attempting to find out about the current 
nature of the relationship between universities and business, the experiences of students and 
staff in terms of their involvement with business and the attitudes of academics towards. and 
knowledge of, business incubation. 
The results will be treated in strictest confidence and analysed on a non-personal 
aggregate basis. They will be used solely for academic purposes, though clearly the findings 
could have practical significance for the introduction of incubators in developing economies 
in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. Should you wish to know more, please do not 
hesitate to contact me (amasaIOl@hotmail.com) or my supervisor, Professor David A. Kirby 
(D.Kirby@surrey.ac.uk). Thank you for your support. 
Abdulatif M. Alsheikh 
University ___ _ 
I YOUR DETAILS 
Your name 
----
Job Title _____ _ 
DepartmentlFaculty ______ _ 
Qualifications (please tick all achieved) 
o Doctorate 
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o Masters of Business Administration 
o Masters of Science 
o Masters of Art 
o Bachelor's degree 
Professional qualifications (please list) 
-----------------
RESEARCH 
1. Have you undertaken research in the last five years? DYes D No I fi\o. please go to the 
next section. 
2. Please describe the main area of your research 
----------------------
3. What was the source of your research funding? (please tick any that appl~) 
o By the University 
o By a government organization 
o By Private Business 
D By a national company 
D Other public grant 
D Other _____ __ 
·t Has any of your research been conducted in association with a commercial 
organization? 0 Yes 0 No 
If yes, please describe the nature of your association _______________ _ 
5. In the COUl"se of your research, have you developed any new technologies 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details _____ .~ _____ ._ 
6. I n the COUl"Se of )'our research, have you patented any technologies 
D YL'S 0 No. IfYcs. please gi\c details _. ____ .. _ 
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7. Have you ever licensed any of these technologies 0 Yes 0 '\0. If Yes. please gi\e details 
8. In the course of your research, have you developed any new businesses processes 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details 
------~ 
9. In the course of your research, have you patented any businesses processes 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details 
-------
10. Have you ever licensed any of these businesses pl"ocesses 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details _~~ _~ ____ . 
11. Have you ever created a new venture to commel"cialise yOlll" research? 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details _~_ 
12. Have you ever been involved in any I"eseal"ch involving the support of Small or 
Medium Sized Enterpl"ises 0 Yes 0 No. 
If yes, please describe yOlll" research 
Research collaborations and funding sources give some indication of the 
interaction between business, government and academia. As discussed at length 
by Hoesler (2003) this relationship is critical in creating successful (or 
unsuccessful) environments for incu bators. 
I TilE U:\I\·ERSITY\:\D BlSI:\ESS 
13. In the past 12 months, has the university held an~· events themed around Si\IEs? 
o Meetings 
D Seminars 
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o Conferences 
o Other, please describe 
------
o No Events 
14. How do you rate the University's relationships with local businesses: 
o Extremely Good Relationship 
o Quite Good relationship 
o Neither Good nor Poor 
o Quite Poor relationship 
o Extremely Poor Relationship 
o Oon't know 
IS.How do you rate the University's relationships with national businesses: 
o Extremely Good Relationship 
o Quite Good relationship 
D Neither Good nor Poor 
o Quite Poor relationship 
o Extremely Poor Relationship 
DOon'tknow 
16. How do you rate the University's relationships with international businesses: 
D Extremely Good Relationship 
o Quite Good relationship 
o Neither Good nor Poor 
o Quite Poor relationship 
o Extremely Poor Relationship 
DOon'tknow 
17. Do you think that the current relationship between your University and business is 
satisfactory? 
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o Yes 0 1\0 
If No, can you suggest any ways in which the relationships between your l ni\ lTsity and 
business could be improved? 
These are more direct questions concerning the relationship between academia 
and business (as above). 
18. Do you agree that the University should help and encourage its staff to launch 
commercial ventures. 
o Strongly Agree 
o Agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Don't know 
19. Do you agree that the Univel'sity should help and encourage its students to launch 
commercial ventures, 
o Strongly Agree 
o Agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Don't know 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
20. During )'OUI' teaching in the past year, have you ever asked ~'our students to create: 
Business plans: 0 Yes 0 No 
1\ L1rkcling plans 0 Yes 0 No 
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21. During the research for their dissertations, are final semester students cncouraoed to 
,... 
undertake scientific research? 
o Encouraged 
o Neither encouraged nor discouraged 
o Not encouraged 
o Don't know 
22. During the research for their dissertations, are final semester students encOllI'aued to 
~ 
undertake commercial research? 
o Encouraged 
o Neither encouraged nor discouraged 
D Not encouraged 
D Don't know 
23. What would you say was the approximate percentage of students who undertook 
commercial research 
scientific reseal'ch 
._--
other research 
---
no research 
24. Do you agree that business students in their final semester have enough knowledge 
about business to launch their own businesses immediately upon graduation? 
D Strongly Agree 
D Agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
D Strongly Disagree 
o Don't kllo\\ 
25. Do YOU agl'ee that science students in their final semester have enough knowledge 
about business to launch their own businesses immediatel~ upon graduation'! 
D Strongly Agn:L' 
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o Agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Don't know 
As discussed in the focus groups, there is a danger in Saudi Arabia that 
graduates are not exposed to sufficient practical and commercial knowledge and 
experience before leaving University. The tendency to focus upon theoretical 
instead of practical/commercial dissertations is seen as a particular problem. 
POLICY ~L\KING 
26. Have you participated In any government-sponsored discllssions towards S'I F 
policy. 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details _________ _ 
27. Have you ever participated In government discussions involving economic 
development? 
DYes 0 No. If Yes, please give details (including year)_ 
28. In the past year, have you participated in any government eH'nts'! 
Forums: 
D Yes, as a speaker 0 Yes, as a guest D No. 
Workshops: 
o Yes, as a speaker 0 Yes, as a guest 0 No. 
Please (Jive details of anv events attended _______ _ e . 
Do you know who funded the event(s)'? _____ _ 
[ SMEs 
29. How do ~·ou rate the impo."tance of the following roles performed h~' S" Fs 
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Overall importance 
Role High Medium Lo\\ 
Diversifying the economy 0 0 0 
Helping reduce unemployment 0 0 0 
Developing new technologies 0 0 0 
Helping regional development 0 0 0 
30. What, in your opinion is the single most important of the above roles? 
---
These questions are designed to see whether academics share the same concerns 
as the government development plans. 
I INCUBATORS 
31. Do you know what a business incubator is? 
DYes 0 No 0 Not sure 
32. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about business incubators: 
Agree Disagree Don't Know 
They are designed to help all sizes of businesses 0 0 0 
The incubated businesses are always owned by the 0 0 0 incubator 
They typically provide secretarial support 0 0 D 
They reduce start-up costs 0 D D 
Facilities (e.g. office equipment, secretarial support) D D D are often shared in an incubator 
Going into an incubator is a more expensive way of D 0 0 starting a business 
They offer reduced, or sometimes free rents 0 D D 
They usually offer training 0 D 0 
Incubated businesses can stay in the incubator as 0 0 0 long as they like 
Any business can join an incubator as long as it's 0 0 0 willing to pay 
0 0 0 
BUSINESS INCUBATOR DEFINITION: 
"Business incubators are designed to help small businesses in the start-up phase, they 
are usually a property with small work units which provides an instructive and supportive 
392 
environment to entrepreneurs at start-up during the early stages of business. Typicall~ a 
number of new and growing businesses operate under one roof with affordable rents, shared 
support services, business development services and office equipment, with each business 
having equal access to a wide range of professional, technical and financial programmes." 
33. If the University or local municipality launched an incubator, how would it affect 
your attitudes towards becoming involved in business activities? 
o Much more Enthusiastic 
o More Enthusiastic 
o Neither more enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic 
o Less enthusiastic 
o Much Less enthusiastic 
34. Would you be interested to participate in an incubator programme if the university 
launched one now? 
o Very Interested 
o Interested 
o Neither interested nor uninterested 
o Uninterested 
o Very uninterested 
35. Do you expect to be involved in an incubator programme at some point 
o in the near term (the next 12 months) 
o in the medium term (next 10 years) 
o in the long term (10 years+) 
o never 
o don't know 
36. If an incubator was based at your University do you think it should be open to: 
o Only current staff and students 
o Both current and former staff and students 
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D Anyone 
37. If an incubator was based at your university do you think it should incubate general 
(for any type small business) or technological (only for technology based businesses)? 
D General 
D Technological 
D Don't Know 
38. In order for the incubator to be a success, what do you think should be the minimum 
educational level of incubatees? 
D Doctorate 
D Masters 
o Bachelors 
o High School 
39. How would you expect any profits from an incubator to be divided between the 
university and the incubated businesses? 
Percentage to university ___ _ 
Percentage to incubatees __ _ 
40. Do you think the incubator should be publicly or privately funded'! 
D Public 
D Private 
D Both 
.. 1. An~ there an~' particular organizations or businesses you would expect to be invohed 
in an incubator based at your University? Please name them 
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"'2. Are you aware that a business incubator IS currently under" construction In the 
Eastern Province? 
DYes 
DNo 
If yes, please describe what you have heard? 
---------------
And, what is your reaction to this information? 
---------------------
43. Do you have any other comments or suggestions to make about the relationship 
between business and academia and the concept of business incubation that we have not 
covered in this questionnaire? 
L..-.-_______________________________________ -----
4 .... Do you have any comments that you would like to make about this questionnaire? 
Thank you for taking part in the sllnr~. 
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